Why not default? : the structural power of finance in sovereign debt crises by ROOS, Jérôme E.
 
 
Why Not Default? 




Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences 
of the European University Institute 




European University Institute 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
Why Not Default? 








Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences 
of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Prof. Pepper D. Culpepper, European University Institute (supervisor) 
Prof. László Bruszt, European University Institute 
Prof. Robert H. Wade, London School of Economics 
Prof. Daniel Mügge, University of Amsterdam 
  
© Jerome Roos, 2016 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 




Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work  
Department of Political and Social Sciences - Doctoral Programme 
I , Jerome Roos, certify that I am the author of the work Why Not Default? The 
Structural Power of Finance in Sovereign Debt Crises, which I have presented for 
examination for the Ph.D.  at the European University Institute.  I also certify that 
this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly indicated, in 
this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others. 
I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material 
from other copyrighted publications. 
I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research 
issued by the European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297). 
The copyright of this work rests with its author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This work may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent. This authorisation does not, to the best of my 
knowledge, infringe the rights of any third party. 
I declare that this work consists of 98,087 (109,119 incl. bibliography) words. 
 
 











Some debts can neither be repaid nor repudiated – only acknowledged. Unlike the liabilities
piling up in the fnancial system, what makes these obligations so special is that, instead of
leaving us individually poorer, they tend make us collectively stronger. Notwithstanding
the neoliberalization of our societies and universities, personal and scholarly debts often re-
main of this “virtuous” kind. I know because I have incurred many in writing this thesis.
Academically, I am above all indebted to my supervisor, Pepper D. Culpepper, whose sharp
eye, straight-shooting style and balanced approach to supervising – always there to help yet
allowing the necessary space for independent research – is the best thing a graduate student
could wish for. I am also profoundly obliged to the members of the jury, and not just for
their close reading of and helpful feedback on the thesis. To Robert Wade I actually owe the
original inspiration for this research, which properly began with his thrilling IPE course at
the London School of Economics in late 2008, as fnancial panic raged through the City.
Daniel Mügge's excellent comments, both on the thesis and on an earlier paper presented
in Berlin in 2013, have been of great help in making sense of some of my own remaining
questions and concerns. Lászlo Brúszt's course on capitalism and crisis during my frst year
at EUI helped provide some of the early theoretical foundations.
Intellectually, I have been very lucky to have benefted from conversations with and com-
ments by some of the greatest living theorists of capitalism and the state: David Harvey,
John Holloway (who kindly hosted us at the Institute in Puebla), Wolfgang Streeck, Leo
Panitch, Bob Jessop, Toni Negri, Michael Hardt and the unforgettable Manolis Glezos.
On a personal level, I will never be able to repay my dear parents, Ronny and Peter, for
their unconditional support throughout all my travels and travails; my beloved sisters,
Louise, Milou and Mimi, for tolerating my long absences and always giving me such joy in
coming home; my parents-in-law, Jan and Dominique, for showing so much interest and
excitement throughout; and of course to all the compas, especially in Greece: Leonidas
iii
Oikonomakis, Markos Vogiatzoglou and Myrsini Antoniou, Maria Kanellopoulou, Manolis
Michelakakis, Antonis Vradis, Dimitris Dalakoglou, Katerina Tsapopoulou, Manos Cizek,
Theodoros Karyotis, Antonis Broumas, Christos Staikos, and so many more.
I owe the compagne e compagni in Collettivo Prezzemolo for the fun and action in Florence,
and the ROAR Collective for their help with the new print journal: Leonidas Oikonomakis
(again!), Carlos Delclós, Jelle Bruinsma and above all my good friend Joris Leverink. Special
thanks to Ingeborg Beugel for sharing her knowledge of Greece during the many late-night
political discussions on Hydra, to Michael Albert for landing me a columnist gig while wri-
ting up the thesis, and to Marianne Maeckelberg and Brandon Jourdan for their help with
our research foundation. A special shout-out to Dr. 7 and I.G. Karfeld.
This thesis is dedicated to the people of Greece who are now opening their arms and doors
to those feeing war, poverty and persecution even as they face the most severe economic
calamity in living memory. Over all these years, the Greeks have taught me more than any
social science degree ever could about the true meaning of solidarity. As the wayward son
of a stingy creditor nation, I know we owe them more than we will ever know we owe.
But personally, above all, I owe Tamara, mi querida compañera de vida. She was there at the
beginning and at the end of it all. Only she knows what went into this thesis – so much of
it hers. Its cover may bear my name, but her boundless love, brilliance and support refects
back on every single line of the 320 pages that follow.
iv
Abstract:
This thesis aims to answer a simple question with far-reaching implications: why
do heavily indebted peripheral states not default on their external debts more
often? Building on case studies of substantively important sovereign debt crises
in Mexico (1982-'89), Argentina (1999-'05) and Greece (2010-'15), the fndings of
this research demonstrate that the traditional explanations of debtor compliance
proposed in the economics literature – centering on reputation, sanctions and
democratic institutions – hold limited explanatory power.
Instead, the thesis spells out a political economy approach to sovereign debt that
recognizes the importance of social conficts and power struggles over the distri-
bution of adjustment costs. In these conficts, it is argued that fnance possesses a
unique advantage over indebted states: through its capacity to withhold the
short-term credit lines on which the latter depend for their reproduction, len-
ders can infict debilitating spillover costs that greatly limit the debtor's room
for maneuver. This structural power of fnance has increased markedly as a result
of globalization and fnancialization, and the main objective of this project is to
identify the exact mechanisms through which it operates and the conditions
under which it is efective and under which it breaks down.
The fndings highlight the importance of debt concentration in the lending
structure (which eases the formation of creditors' cartels, strengthening market
discipline); the exposure of big banks and institutional lenders in core countries
(which compels creditor states and international fnancial institutions to inter-
vene as lenders of last resort and provide emergency loans under strict policy
conditionality); and the bridging role fulflled by bankers and elites inside the
borrowing country (which endows them with a privileged position in fnancial
policymaking and internalizes fscal discipline into the debtors' state apparatus).
The thesis concludes by spelling out the implications of these fndings for the
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And many a man whom law or fraud had sold 
Far from his god-built land, an outcast slave, 
I brought again to Athens; yea, and some, 
Exiles from home through debt's oppressive load, 
Speaking no more the dear Athenian tongue, 
But wandering far and wide, I brought again; 
And those that here in vilest slavery 
Crouched 'neath a despot's frown, I set them free.






Why Do Countries Repay their Debts?
Why do heavily indebted countries not default on their external debts more often?
This question, which lies at the heart of a long-standing debate in the economics literature
and touches upon some of the most important controversies in political science, has gained
renewed relevance in light of the ongoing European debt crisis. Recent events have revealed
how international lending is governed by a fundamental paradox: in the absence of a world
government capable of enforcing debt contracts between sovereign borrowers and private
foreign lenders, we would expect default to be a widespread phenomenon. Since repayment
efectively constitutes a wealth transfer from the borrower to its lenders, a distressed debtor
that spends more of its tax revenues on foreign debt servicing than it attracts in new loans
has an inherent incentive to suspend payments. In fact, this is precisely how international
debt crises were generally resolved in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries: through
the imposition of unilateral moratoriums by the debtors. And yet such payment standstills
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are exceedingly rare today: recent decades have witnessed a generalized trend away from uni-
lateral default as a prevalent and permissible policy response; a trend that holds important
lessons about the asymmetric balance of power between debtors and creditors in the global
political economy and the evolution of state-fnance relations more generally.
This PhD thesis aims to contribute towards the development of a political economy
approach to sovereign debt that can account for this generalized trend away from unilateral
default. The main argument developed in these pages is relatively straightforward: over the
past decades, the dual processes of globalization and fnancialization have greatly enhanced
the disciplinary force of fnance, providing international lenders with a form of structural
power over heavily indebted peripheral states, revolving around their capacity to withhold
the short-term credit lines on which these states depend for their own reproduction. While
this “structural power hypothesis” is by no means original – as we will see, its roots go back
to the political economy debates on the capitalist state of the 1970s – this project hopes to
contribute to the recent revival of scholarly interest in the structural power of fnance by
identifying the exact enforcement mechanisms through which this power operates and the
precise conditions under which it is efective and under which it breaks down. Building on
in-depth case studies of three of the most important sovereign debt crises of the past decades
– Mexico (1982-'89), Argentina (1999-'05) and Greece (2010-'15) – the thesis aims to shed a
new light on the enforcement of debtor compliance and the ways in which contemporary
crisis management systematically favors the interests and ideas of private lenders over those
of working people inside the debtor countries and taxpayers in the creditor countries, with
far-reaching consequences for the distribution of the costs of adjustment and the quality of
democracy. This introduction presents the puzzle at the heart of the research project before
outlining the main argument and providing a chapter overview of the rest of the thesis.
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A Very Brief History of Sovereign Default
The starting point of this research project is the simple observation that things were
not always the way they are today. In the early days of international lending, between 1820
and the 1930s, sovereign default was widespread and often unavoidable. While there were
always exceptions, the declaration of unilateral moratoriums by heavily indebted peripheral
states was so common that it was considered to be “part of the rules of the game” (Ocampo
2013).1 Indeed, all the four major lending cycles prior to World War II ended in a wave of
defaults. Take the frst cycle of the 1820s, in which the independence struggles of a number
of Mediterranean and Latin American countries coincided with a speculative boom in the
London Stock Exchange. In the space of just three years, between 1822-'25, dozens of newly
emerging countries contracted multi-year loans in international money markets to fnance
their costly independence wars. The experience ended in tears as virtually all the new states
unilaterally suspended payments in the bust that followed. Peru was frst to default, in April
1826, followed by Colombia. By 1829 all Latin American and Southern European countries
except Brazil and Naples were in arrears, and there was remarkably little bondholders could
do to recoup their investments (Flandreau and Flores 2009:659). As a leading historian of
the episode wrote, “during a quarter of a century most of [the new borrowers] maintained
an efective moratorium on their external debts, which indicated an appreciable degree of
economic autonomy from the great powers of the day” (Marichal 1989:66).
In the late 1860s and early 1870s, European capital began to fow back towards Latin
America and the Mediterranean, but the expansion of international lending again turned
1 One observer lamented early on that “the fscal history of Latin America is replete with instances of
governmental defaults. Borrowing and default follow each other with almost perfect regularity. When
payment is resumed, the past is easily forgotten and a new borrowing orgy ensues” (Winkler 1933:1).
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out to be short-lived, with most borrowers suspending payments in the depression of 1873.
As in the previous wave, the defaults of the 1870s were unilateral and outright; govern-
ments generally did not resume payments until after the economy had recovered, foreign
exchange reserves had been replenished and the defaulted debt had been restructured on
terms favorable to the borrowers. By the 1880s, a third international lending frenzy nearly
led to the collapse of the Barings Bank when a fnancial panic surrounding bad investments
along the River Plate ended in the Argentine default of 1890. It was in this period, the
classical gold standard era of 1870-1913, that the creditor states began to assert themselves
more aggressively to defend bondholder interests and enforce debt repayment. With inter-
capitalist rivalries feeding the imperialist ambitions of the European powers and to a lesser
extent the United States, the use of force became increasingly frequent in the settlement of
international debt disputes. While there is still scholarly disagreement over how widespread
military action really was in this period, Mitchener and Weidenmier (2011:156) fnd that
non-compliant debtor countries risked a 30 percent chance of being subjected to military
invasion, gunboat diplomacy or the establishment of international fnancial control. Often-
cited examples include the imposition of foreign control over public fnances in Egypt, the
Ottoman Empire and Greece, the naval blockade of Venezuela, and the occupation of the
customs houses of numerous Caribbean and Central American states by US Marines.
While the First World War brought the age of high imperialism to a violent end, the
roaring 1920s that followed gave rise to yet another major bout of speculative investment.
Like the previous ones, this fourth lending cycle quickly turned to widespread default in
the Great Depression of the 1930s – with the major diference that this time around the use
of military might to enforce debt contracts had been ruled out, leaving bondholders once
again powerless in the face of a wave of defaults. With the exception of Argentina and some
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of the smaller debtors, all Latin American countries suspended payments, as did the vast
majority of European states. Jorgensen and Sachs (1989:78) stress that “the defaults of the
1930s present lessons for contemporary experience because these countries actually ceased
payment on their foreign debts and these defaults were acknowledged, accepted, and even-
tually negotiated on terms favorable to the debtors.” The leading sovereign debt scholar of
the time even concluded that “defaults are inevitable when attempts are made by lenders to
take advantage of temporarily embarrassed borrowers by exacting all sorts of concessions
and imposing all sorts of impossibly harsh terms” (Winkler 1933:xvi). The lessons from
history are therefore unambiguous: in suspending payments, the heavily indebted states of
the periphery displayed a remarkable degree of autonomy, as a result of which the burden
of adjustment tended to be shared relatively equitably with foreign bondholders; countries
that defaulted experienced faster recoveries than those that repaid in full; and most debts
were eventually restructured on terms favorable to the debtors. 
The Puzzling Absence of Default Today
This experience contrasts sharply to the management of sovereign debt crises in
recent decades. Even in the absence of a military enforcement regime, the repayment record
of distressed borrowers appears to be better today than it has been at any other point in his-
tory. Unilateral defaults are anathema and increasingly rare. By the early 1980s, a new rule
seemed to have emerged: governments should repay their debts and avoid a unilateral sus-
pension of payments at all costs. In his review of fve centuries of sovereign lending, Dyson
(2014:323) confrms that “the absence of sovereign default became the new norm.” Insofar
as sovereign defaults still occur today, they tend to take the form of voluntary reschedulings
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or negotiated settlements rather than the unilateral moratoriums that characterized the frst
four waves of sovereign default. This is a puzzling observation, as the four decades since the
collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in the 1970s have been by far the most tumultuous in
economic history, with fnancial crises twice as frequent between 1971-'97 as they were
during the frst era of globalization before 1914 (Eichengreen and Bordo 2003). Still, the
incidence of default today is remarkably low compared to previous periods. A new database
compiled by the Bank of Canada (2014) shows that between 2009-'11, including the worst
of the European debt crisis, only 0.1 percent of world public debt was in a formal state of
default. The fact that international capital markets are thriving in spite of the frequency and
intensity of sovereign debt crises is a clear indication that international investors generally
expect governments to honor their external debts – even if they can not.2 But how can these
investors be so sure? That is the central question this thesis seeks to address.
The question itself is by no means original. In fact, there is a venerable and rapidly
expanding academic literature dealing precisely with this so-called “sovereign debt puzzle”:
why do sovereign borrowers honor their external obligations in the absence of gunboats or
some form of world government capable of enforcing international debt contracts? Why do
heavily indebted countries not default more often? The question has eluded – and divided –
professional economists ever since it was frst posed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) at the
start of a new era in fnancial history and at the peak of a large international lending boom.
2 Of course none of this is to say that the specter of default has been banished altogether. According to data
compiled by Reinhart and Rogof (2009), default continues to be a pervasive feature of fnancial markets.
In fact, by the latter's metrics, the 1980s and 1990s were the decades with the highest rate of sovereign
borrowers in a state of default ever. But as we will see in greater detail in the following chapters, this
statistic tells us little about the type of default and the willingness of the borrowers to repay. If we leave
voluntary reschedulings and negotiated restructurings out and look purely at unilateral moratoriums and
outright repudiations, default is an exceedingly rare phenomenon today.
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Eaton and Gersovitz proposed reputational concerns and long-term exclusion from inter-
national capital markets as a credible reason for governments to repay in the absence of an
international enforcement regime. Another group of scholars, following Bulow and Rogof
(1989), has proposed sanctions like lawsuits and trade embargoes. Others still have argued
that the institutions of liberal democracy compel the executive to credibly commit to its
fnancial obligations. Yet while a large number of books and articles has been published
purporting to deal with the intractable “enforcement problem” at the heart of the sovereign
debt puzzle, scholars have so far failed to reach a conclusive answer on the matter. As three
prominent experts in the feld noted on the eve of the European sovereign debt crisis:
Almost three decades after Eaton and Gersovitz's path-breaking contribution, there is
still no fully satisfactory answer to how sovereign debt can exist in the frst place. None of
the default punishments that the classic theory of sovereign debt has focused on appears to
enjoy much empirical backing … In sum, thirty years of literature on sovereign debt do
not seem to have resolved some of the fundamental questions that motivated the feld.
(Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2009:693)
The research project presented in this PhD thesis intends to make a contribution to
the scholarly debate by situating the intractable question of sovereign debt and default in its
appropriate theoretical context as a political question rather than a purely economic one.
And as a matter of politics, it is argued, scholars of sovereign debt and default would be well
advised to pay more attention to the fundamental importance of asymmetric power relations
and distributional confict in processes of economic policymaking. In a word, the decision to
repay a foreign debt cannot be isolated from questions about who gets to call the shots and
who gets to bear the burden of adjustment in the management of international debt crises.
Every time a government chooses to repay rather than suspend or repudiate its outstanding
obligations, it fnds itself making a political as much as an economic calculation, and it does
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so within a context that may structurally constrain a government's room for maneuver and
systematically incentivize one set of policy choices over another. Understanding the role of
such external constraints and internal motivations in enforcing debt repayment is therefore
fundamental to the efort of developing an adequate theory of sovereign debt and default.
A Comparative Study of Mexico, Argentina and Greece
In an efort to shine a fresh light on the sovereign debt puzzle, this study takes an in-
depth look at three of the most severe and substantively important sovereign debt crises of
the past decades. The focus on the “hard times” of fnancial crisis is deliberate. From Marx
to Gourevitch, political economists of various stripes have long known that moments of
crisis tend to lay bare – and shape – underlying interests, allegiances and power relations. As
political fash points, these brief episodes often tell us more about the deep structures and
dynamics of social reality than the decades of tranquility that preceded them.
Departing from a critical political economy perspective and proceeding on the basis
of a qualitative comparative case study approach that contrasts crises in Mexico (1982-'90),
Argentina (1999-'05) and Greece (2010-'15), this thesis hopes to make several contributions
to the literature. First, it aims to problematize the existing economic theory on sovereign
debt and default by revealing how the literature tends to depoliticize the subject matter. In
its place, a number of orientating principles are defned that could inspire the development
of a political economy of sovereign debt. Such an approach would recognize and emphasize
the redistributive consequences of default/repayment; the centrality of conficts of interest
and protracted power struggles over the burden of adjustment; the asymmetric balance of
forces and structural constraints on national autonomy that lie at the heart of the global
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political economy; and the diferent forms that default can take in practice. In relation to
the last point, the theory chapter proposes a new and explicitly political typology of default
that in many important respects moves beyond the widely used technical defnition of the
term, distinguishing instead between unilateral action by debtors and negotiated settlements
with creditors. Without recognizing the decline in the incidence of unilateral action, it is
argued, scholars will be unable to recognize the disciplining efects of “crisis management”
and the dramatic shift in power relations at the heart of contemporary capitalism.
A second contribution this thesis seeks to make is to the political economy debate
on the power of fnance and the nature of the capitalist state. Here, the emphasis is on the
concept of the structural power of capital, which has recently been staging a comeback in
the literature after decades of scholarly neglect. One of the reasons original formulations of
structural power went out of vogue after the 1980s and '90s was that they proved incapable
of accounting for variation in outcomes (Culpepper 2015). If the power of capital is structu-
ral in nature, how do we explain those situations in which corporate interests actually lose
out over other social concerns? Until recent years, scholars working on business power have
struggled to specify the exact conditions under which structural power is operative and the
conditions under which it breaks down. This thesis proposes a two-pronged way out of the
theoretical mire: frst, by focusing on the enforcement mechanisms through which the struc-
tural power of fnance is brought to bear on heavily indebted states and identifying the con-
ditions under which these mechanisms are efective and the conditions under which they
are not; and second, by taking social struggles and political conficts seriously and allowing
for the structural power of capital to be contested from below. In the process, it is hoped
that the thesis will not only provide an answer to the question why governments by and
large repay their external debts, but also why they sometimes choose to defy their foreign
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creditors and default on their obligations. The disciplinary framework of the project thus
aims to combine the strengths of the International Political Economy literature, with its
focus on the global fnancial structure and its interest in explaining world-historical change
at the systemic level, and the Comparative Political Economy literature, with its keen eye
for detail and its emphasis on explaining variations in outcomes across specifc national con-
texts. The selected case studies – contrasting Mexico's compliance to Argentina's defance
and applying the lessons of this comparison to Greece – are especially useful for parsing out
the precise ways in which the hypothesized enforcement mechanisms of debtor compliance
function (or fail to function) under specifc national and international conditions.
Summary of the Argument: The Structural Power of Finance
The frst premise of the thesis is that recent decades have witnessed dramatic changes
in the material and normative structure of the global political economy and the nature of
the capitalist state that have in turn caused the international balance of power to shift deci-
sively in favor of fnance and the main creditor states, and the domestic balance of power
decisively in favor of local elites whose interests and ideas are broadly aligned with those of
foreign creditors. Three structural changes are identifed in particular. First, the processes of
globalization and fnancialization have massively increased the mobility and concentration
of capital among a decreasing number of systemically important (“too big to fail”) fnancial
institutions in the core countries. In terms of international lending, this has meant that the
liabilities of peripheral borrowers like Mexico, Argentina and Greece have increasingly
been held by an ever-smaller group of big banks and institutional investors in the US and
Northern Europe. This highly concentrated lending structure contrasts sharply to the
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dispersed bondholdings of the aforementioned pre-war lending cycles, in which small and
atomized retail investors found it exceedingly difcult to coordinate collective action and
exert the requisite leverage over defaulting governments. In comparison, the concentrated
lending of the post-1970s period has made it much easier for investors to coordinate collec-
tive action and maintain a relatively unifed creditor cartel capable of credibly threatening a
withdrawal of further credit in the event of non-compliance. It is argued that this frst
development has strengthened the primary enforcement mechanism of market discipline.
The second structural change is related to the frst and concerns the active “fnancial
interventionism” of the dominant creditor states and ofcial multilateral lenders from the
1980s onwards. The growing concentration of international debt among a small group of
systemically important fnancial institutions in the advanced countries has meant that a dis-
orderly sovereign default in the periphery now risks triggering a deep fnancial crisis in the
core countries. As a result, a systemic need arises for state intervention and an international
lender of last resort capable of “bailing out” distressed borrowers in order to prevent conta-
gion towards over-exposed fnancial institutions in the core. The US Federal Reserve and
US Treasury Department actively intervened in the international debt crises of the 1980s
and 1990s, while Eurozone creditor states – led by Germany – and the European Central
Bank played a key role in the management of the Eurozone debt crisis of the 2010s. In all
cases, bailout loans provided by ofcial lenders were disbursed in tranches and conditional
on far-reaching budget cuts, tax hikes, privatizations and market reforms aimed at freeing
up public revenue for full debt servicing. From the early 1980s onwards, creditor states have
increasingly relied on the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (and to a lesser
extent the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements), which has efectively
assumed the function of an international lender of last resort, enforcing fscal discipline and
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structural reform through its loan conditionality. Beside its own emergency lending, the
IMF's most important contribution has been to monitor the performance and compliance
of debtor states, providing the Fund with a gatekeeping function over market access. This
transformation of the IMF has ended up institutionalizing a set of surveillance and control
functions that had hitherto been only partially, irregularly and improvisationally fulflled
by private international banks and creditor states. In the process, it has served to entrench
the second enforcement mechanism of policy conditionality.
The third change involves the thorough restructuring, over the same period, of the
state apparatus itself. This transformation is probably best captured in Streeck's (2014:72)
conceptualization of the debt state as “a state which covers a large, possibly rising part of its
expenditure through borrowing rather than taxation, thereby accumulating a debt moun-
tain that it has to fnance with an ever greater share of its revenue.” The debt state's struc-
tural dependence on private credit conspired with the international mobility of capital and
the deregulation of the fnancial sector to greatly increase competitive pressures on national
governments, which consequently found themselves compelled to continuously reproduce
the ideal conditions for foreign lending and private investment. This development ended up
greatly strengthening the privileged position of those social groups whose material interests
and ideological convictions were closely aligned with those of international investors, at the
expense of those political actors whose loyalties continued to lie with working people back
home. The result was a dramatic reconfguration of domestic power relations in favor of
fnancial and political elites who were perceived to be capable of fulflling a “bridging role”
towards global fnance, thereby entrenching the third enforcement mechanism of debtor
compliance: the privileged position of wealthy local elites with shared views and close ties to
foreign creditors and the international fnancial establishment.
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These structural changes have gone hand-in-hand with a set of normative and ideolo-
gical changes that led to the frm entrenchment of neoliberal ideas about crisis management
and the reafrmation of a culturally-embedded creditor morality that places the responsibi-
lity for adjustment squarely on the shoulders of the debtor.3 This ideological realignment
has in turn had far-reaching implications for prevalent norms about debt repayment, clearly
expressed in the stark contrast between the pre-war concern with preventing moral hazard
and the current concern with defending “creditor rights.” While the Palmerston doctrine of
1848, one of the keystones of the regime of laissez-faire liberalism, still held that the British
government reserved the right not to intervene on bondholders' behalf in international debt
disputes, so as to discourage “hazardous loans to foreign governments who may either be
unable or unwilling to pay the stipulated interest thereupon,” and while during the 1930s
President Franklin D. Roosevelt personally apologized to his Bolivian counterpart for Wall
Street's “supersalesmanship” in the lead-up to the crisis, acknowledging that “of course” the
Latin American countries were “unable to pay either the interest or the principal” on their
debts (both citations from Winker 1933), the idea that non-payment could be considered a
permissible policy response or that unsustainable debts could actually be forgiven is clearly
anathema today. Ever since the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, the widely shared expectation is
that borrowers will bear the full burden of adjustment even as the lenders are made whole.
Never before in modern economic history, it seems, have prevalent norms of sovereign debt
repayment and dominant ideas about crisis management been so kind to bondholders. This
thesis aims to investigate how these norms and ideas are enforced in practice.
3 This creditor morality is powerfully expressed in the German and Dutch word Schuld,  which means both
debt and fault or guilt, so that a distressed debtor is always-already considered to be guilty or at fault for
their own predicament. For a discussion of the morality of debt, see Graeber (2011) and Lazzarato (2012).
Dyson (2014) applies some of these cultural and ideational themes to sovereign debt and the crisis of the
Eurozone. For a related history and critique of the “dangerous idea” of austerity, see Blyth (2013).
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The main argument is that, by greatly raising the costs of default and increasing un-
certainty about the consequences of more confrontational courses of action, the structural
and normative transformations of recent decades have signifcantly reduced the room for
maneuver available to the governments of heavily indebted states, undermining both the
actual and the perceived viability of more debtor-friendly alternatives to full repayment. If a
heavily indebted state were to default tomorrow, it would not only be forced to move into
primary balance right away, as lenders would cut of short-term credit lines; it would also
have to contend with devastating and unpredictable spillover costs into the wider economy.
These spillover efects would initially operate through the transmission belt of the domestic
fnancial sector, with a default on foreign creditors likely to provoke capital fight, a stock
market crash and a collapse of domestic banking and pension systems. But given the centra-
lity of fnance to contemporary capitalism, the consequences would quickly ripple through
the national economy, risking massive social dislocation. Firms would no longer be able to
obtain trade credit and would start laying of workers; depositors would no longer be able
to access their savings and would likely instigate a bank run requiring far-reaching capital
controls; households would no longer be able to obtain credit for consumption, as a result
of which industrial and agricultural producers would see demand and private investment
dry up, bringing production to a halt – in sum, the bankruptcy of the state risks provoking
the bankruptcy of large parts of the domestic economy, with high social costs in the short-
term and grave consequences for the state's capacity to legitimize itself in the eyes of its citi-
zens. Given the ability of lenders to infict such devastating but largely unpredictable short-
term spillover costs simply by withholding credit and withdrawing capital, it is perhaps no
surprise that many governments – including those of a leftist or even of an anti-capitalist
persuasion – are hesitant to defy their foreign creditors. Compliance becomes the rule.
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Still, since these spillover costs tend to be short-lived, a government that fnds itself
under immense popular pressure from below may yet decide to pursue a rupture with inter-
national creditors if it considers the alternative – continued repayment – to be even more
costly politically. It should be stressed, in this respect, that a debtor country is not simply a
unifed actor always responding in coherent fashion to economic shocks. Diferent groups
inside the country are afected diferently by diferent policies, and some will stand to gain
more from repayment than others. One common aspect of sovereign debt crises is therefore
the proliferation of distributional conficts between diferent social groups over who gets to
call the shots and who gets to bear the burden of adjustment. If those opposed to austerity
and repayment manage to gain the upper hand in such struggles, the government may end
up switching its policy preference from compliance to default. Given the crippling short-
term consequences of a default, however, there is unlikely to be any real confrontation with
foreign lenders without a deep legitimation crisis and intense social mobilization leading to
the rise of a pro-default coalition, or at least forcing the political and fnancial establishment
to make far-reaching concessions to the domestic population in an attempt to restore social
peace and preserve the political status quo. In this sense, the push for a unilateral suspen-
sion of payments is unlikely to emanate from within the state apparatus itself; it will only
emerge from the broader feld of social antagonism and political contestation – unless, that
is, the debtor is forcefully pushed over the edge by the creditors themselves.
Structure of the Thesis: Chapter Outline
This thesis is divided into six chapters – the frst two theoretical, the third methodo-
logical and the last three empirical. Chapter I looks at the economics literature on sovereign
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debt and summarizes the main theoretical contributions in the feld. After presenting the
four main hypotheses in the existing literature – the reputation hypothesis, the sanctions
hypothesis, the democratic advantage hypothesis and the spillover costs hypothesis – and
weighing the relative merits and shortcomings of each, the second part of the chapter takes
the existing literature to task for its depoliticization of the subject matter and outlines the
basic contours of a political economy approach revolving around the analysis of structural
constraints, the redistributive consequences of compliance and default, conficts of interest
over the burden of adjustment, disagreements and uncertainty over the perceived costs of
alternative courses of action, and protracted power struggles over who gets to decide on
matters of fnancial policy. It concludes by proposing an alternative political typology of
default that distinguishes crucially between unilateral action and negotiated settlements.
Chapter II is a review of the political economy literature on business power and the
nature of the capitalist state. It starts with an outline of the main political science debates
on the issue – between pluralists and elite theorists, and between instrumental Marxists and
structural Marxists – and presents a number of key analytical concepts, most importantly
the structural dependence of the state on capital and business' privileged position in capitalist
democracy. The second section takes the analysis to the global level and briefy discusses the
globalization and fnancialization debates as well as Wolfgang Streeck's concept on the evo-
lution of the “debt state” as a state that increasingly depends on private credit. Finally, the
third section starts by highlighting the main shortcomings of the original formulation of
structural power – the fact that it cannot always account for variations in outcomes across
cases – and proposes to focus explicitly on the enforcement mechanisms that connect the
structural power of fnance to the outcome of debtor compliance, and the conditions under
which these mechanisms are efective and the conditions under which they are not. This
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part presents the three enforcement mechanisms and the hypothesized conditions under
which they break down and default becomes possible.
Chapter III on methodology and research design is signifcantly shorter. It starts by
presenting the project's three-pronged methodological approach, drawing on a comparative
case study method combined with process tracing and structural power analysis, and then
outlines the research design, main questions, variables, hypotheses and case study selection.
The exact conditions shaping the enforcement mechanisms are also further spelled out here.
Chapters IV, V and VI present the case studies of the Mexican debt crisis (1982-'90),
the Argentine default (1999-'05) and the ongoing Greek debt crisis (2010-'15), respectively.
These longer chapters are each structured in the same way. The frst section weighs the evi-
dence in favor of the conventional hypotheses discussed in Chapter I. After deriving a set of
predictions from each of these explanations, this frst part aims to assess whether the obser-
ved processes and outcomes of the respective crises are in accordance with what the theories
would lead us to expect. The second part then weighs the evidence for the hypothesized
enforcement mechanisms outlined in Chapter II – market discipline, policy conditionality
and the privileged position – tracing the processes through which the observed conditions
impacted the operativeness and efectiveness of each of them. The third part looks at the
outcomes of the crises and compares these observations to what we should expect if the
structural power hypothesis were correct. The fnal part of each chapter briefy considers
other possible explanations for the fndings.
Finally, the conclusion sums up the main fndings of this project and outlines their
implications for future research on sovereign debt, structural power and political economy
more generally – especially in relation to the concentration of wealth and power, the trans-
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formation of the state-fnance relation and the deepening tensions between capitalism and
democracy. The study concludes by proposing the entrenchment of a distinct “democratic
disadvantage” at the heart of fnancial capitalism, systematically disincentivizing democratic





The “Enforcement Problem” of International Lending
As the introduction has shown, the study of sovereign debt has long been plagued
by a seemingly irreconcilable paradox. More than three decades after the seminal theoretical
contribution by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), economists still do not fully understand how
sovereign debt can exist in the frst place. Since there is no world government to enforce
international debt contracts, a country that is unwilling or unable to repay its debts should
in theory be able to default without repercussions. Why transfer scarce public funds abroad
if there is no greater power to enforce compliance? Assuming rational representatives and
national autonomy, distressed sovereigns would simply refuse to repay. At the extreme, this
logic would cause international capital markets to collapse altogether, as rational creditors
would in turn refuse to extend further credit to unreliable sovereigns.4 Yet this is far from
what happens: international capital markets have been thriving ever since the 1970s, and
4 “The most radical way of posing the question is to ask whether there would be a sovereign debt market if
creditors had no direct power to enforce repayment whatsoever” (Panizza et al 2009:9).
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borrowers generally do repay their debts. As renowned sovereign debt lawyer Lee Buchheit
puts it, “conventional wisdom is that sovereigns will rarely, if ever, default on their external
debts in circumstances where it is clear that they have the capacity to pay” (Buchheit and
Gulati 2009:1). Similarly, Lienau (2014:1) observes that international lending is governed by
a simple rule: “sovereign debtors must repay, regardless of the circumstances of the initial
debt contract, the actual use of loan proceeds, or the exigencies of any potential default.”
As a result, many governments choose to go through great pains to avoid default
even when the costs of debt servicing have become politically, socially and economically
highly disruptive – during a major debt crisis, for instance, when investors take fright and
the cost of public borrowing shoots up. IMF economists have recognized that policymakers
appear to prefer avoiding default “even if that implies running down reserves, shortening
the maturity of the debt, and ceding part of their economic policy sovereignty to multi-
lateral institutions” (Kruger and Messmacher 2004:3). If, for whatever reason, a government
is unable to repay its debts in full or on time, it will generally try to negotiate an orderly
settlement with its creditors over a unilateral suspension of payments. In practice, it there-
fore remains extremely rare for governments to simply stop paying, let alone to repudiate
their obligations outright (Rose 2005:191; Eaton and Fernandez 1995:1). So why are govern-
ments willing to incur such high economic, social and political costs to avoid default?
This puzzle of sovereign debt has long been known as the “enforcement problem” of
international lending: clearly there is some kind of enforcement at work, but the precise
mechanism is invisible and scholars still do not understand how, exactly, it operates. “The
central issue,” Martínez and Sandleris (2011:909) write, “is not why governments default,
but quite the opposite: why they usually choose not to do it.” Or, as Reinhart and Rogof
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(2009:52) put it slightly more dramatically: “why on earth do foreign creditors ever trust
countries to repay their debt anyway...?” Apparently governments do consider default to be
costly, even more so than the painful experience of fscal adjustment. But why is this so? In
the past three decades, this question has inspired a set of hypotheses about the precise costs
of default and the invisible mechanisms through which debtor compliance is enforced.
This chapter begins by outlining the four main hypotheses that have been developed
by economists over the years. The frst stresses the reputational costs of default, which are
theorized to lead to long-term capital market exclusion; the second emphasizes the directly
imposed costs resulting from legal, trade or military sanctions; the third argues that liberal-
democratic institutions tie the hands of the executive power and increase the credibility of its
commitment to repay; and the fourth focuses on the spillover costs of default into the wider
economy – specifcally through the channel of the domestic fnancial sector – and the efects
on indicators like growth, employment and overall economic performance. After briefy
discussing the merits and shortcomings of each, the second part of the chapter outlines the
overarching defect of the economics literature on sovereign debt (the depoliticization of a
highly political subject matter) and stresses the need for a political economy approach that
can account for conficts of interest and conficting ideas and interpretations on appropriate
policy responses within the debtor country; the asymmetric distribution of power in the
global fnancial architecture; the diferences between economic and political determinants of
default; and the diferent forms that default can take in practice. It concludes by proposing a
new typology of default that seeks to re-politicize the concept and thereby to do justice to
the qualitative diferences between, on the one hand, unilateral moratoriums and
repudiations, and on the other, negotiated reschedulings and restructurings.
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Reputation: Capital Market Exclusion and the Reluctance to Repudiate
The puzzle of sovereign debt only really became an issue of interest for economists
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The wave of defaults that rocked the world during the
Great Depression had efectively caused international capital markets to freeze up for the
next forty years, and it was not until the emergence of the Eurodollar markets in the 1960s
and the eventual collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in 1973 that capital began to fow
across borders again. This led to renewed interest in the question of sovereign debt and how
it can exist to begin with. The frst paper to systematically identify this puzzle was the early
theoretical contribution by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), which argued that countries repay
their external debts because they are concerned about their reputation. In this reputational
model, countries borrow in order to be able to smoothen out consumption in the event of
unforeseen adverse shocks on the economy. Governments therefore have an inherent incen-
tive to repay in order to retain access to international capital markets. “Should the country
refuse to repay,” Eaton and Gersovitz wrote, “we assume that it faces an embargo on future
loans by private lenders and that this embargo is permanent.” In short, countries repay
because repudiating their obligations would leave them “forever unable to use international
borrowing to smooth absorption across periods of varying income” (1981:290).
It is immediately apparent that the original reputation hypothesis hinges on two
questionable assumptions: frst that lenders can and do act monolithically in their refusal to
extend further credit after default, and second that default means permanent exclusion from
international capital markets. In reality, countries often succeed in securing credit not only
from the same lenders on whose loans they previously defaulted but from new lenders as
well (Kolb 2011:6). Not surprisingly, therefore, subsequent empirical evidence has largely
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disproved Eaton and Gersovitz' reputation hypothesis – at least in its rigid original form.
Eichengreen and Portes (1988a; 1988b) and Lindert and Morton (1989) importantly found
that countries that defaulted in the 1930s did not borrow systematically less in the 1970s,
nor did they borrow on terms diferent from non-defaulters. Jorgensen and Sachs (1989)
found that in the decades following the defaults of the 1930s, Latin American countries
faced severely restricted access to foreign credit, but the efect was just as strong for a non-
defaulter like Argentina as it was for the other Latin American countries that did default.
When international lending was resumed in the 1970s, there was no diference in terms of
market access between past defaulters and non-defaulters. Lindert and Morton (1989:40)
concluded that “investors seem to pay little attention to the past repayment record of the
borrowing governments,” while Eichengreen and Portes (1989:3) pointed out that “there is
little evidence that countries which defaulted in the 1930s sufered inferior capital market
access subsequently.” Indeed, “they were ofered virtually identical access to the capital
market as were countries which had maintained debt service without interruption” (ibid).
The evidence for the post-1982 period, including a wave of defaults in the 1980s and 1990s,
appears to further challenge the original reputation hypothesis. Citing a rare large-N study
by Gelos et al (2004), one recent contribution concludes that, “contrary to predictions from
reputational theories, the probability of market access is not strongly infuenced by a
default in the previous year” (Datz 2013:9).
In a subsequent paper, Eaton and Fernandez (1995:31) acknowledged that the evi-
dence to support Eaton's thesis was “ambiguous” at best. For instance, while Ozler (1992)
found that defaults after the 1930s did afect the interest rates for these countries, the efect
does not appear to be strong enough to deter default. When Eichengreen and Portes (2000)
studied the crises of the 1990s, they again found no evidence that defaulting countries
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sufered reduced capital market access in the form of higher risk spreads. This fnding was
echoed by a study using a more extensive historical database, which found a “surprisingly
small” default penalty (Obstfeld and Taylor 2003). A number of scholars have nonetheless
sought to resuscitate the original framework proposed by Eaton and Gersovitz. Building on
evidence from three centuries of sovereign lending, a major study by Tomz (2007) currently
stands as the most important contribution in defense of the reputation hypothesis.
Still, even proponents of the reputation hypothesis now admit that “the empirical
support for this proposition is mixed” and that most of the empirical research of the past
three decades fnds the default premiums in sovereign credit markets to be negligible (Das,
Papaioannou and Trebesch 2012:60). To the extent that countries do pay higher interest
rates after default, most scholars would agree that these costs tend to be short-lived. Gelos,
Sahay and Sandleris (2004:1), for instance, fnd that it only took past defaulters an average
of 4.5 years to regain full capital market access in the 1980s. By the 1990s, this duration had
been reduced to 0 to 2 years, with an average of 3.5 months, leading the authors to conclude
that “we are unable to detect strong punishment of defaulting countries by credit markets”
(ibid). Similarly, Borensztein and Panizza (2008) fnd that yield spreads tend to stabilize one
or two years after default. The consensus view is therefore that the original reputation
hypothesis is not clearly backed by the available evidence and is, if anything, disproved by it
(Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2009:27; Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch 2012:61).
Aside from the lack of empirical evidence on long-term capital market exclusion or
higher borrowing costs, the reputational explanation has also been criticized on theoretical
grounds. In the second most important contribution to the early sovereign debt literature,
Bulow and Rogof (1989) famously pointed out that countries have other ways of insuring
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themselves against adverse shocks on the economy. Instead of repaying, for instance, a
government could simply repudiate its debts outright and invest the savings thus obtained
in foreign capital markets, which would provide a more proftable cushion for bad times. If
true, the reputational mechanism, hinging entirely on the debtors' concern about retaining
long-term access to foreign credit, would simply collapse. In order to have any efect at all,
“the reputation approach therefore requires some discipline” (Reinhart and Rogof 2009:54).
Sanctions: Asset Seizures, Trade Embargoes, and Gunboat Diplomacy
In contrast to Eaton and Gersovitz, Bulow and Rogof proposed direct punishment
as the main enforcement mechanism of debtor compliance. By imposing sanctions – or by
threatening to impose them – private creditors and their governments could directly coerce
debtors to repay (Eichengreen and Portes 1988a). For these authors, such sanctions could
take either of two forms: the seizure of a debtor's assets abroad and the imposition of trade
embargoes. Subsequent work has highlighted the historical importance of so-called “super-
sanctions,” where direct state coercion and the threat of outright military action served as
the principal enforcement mechanism. What these diferent types of sanctions have in
common is that they all seek, through some form of direct intervention, to “raise the cost
of default sufciently high to make repaying the foreign obligations in the self-interest of
the sovereign debtor” (Kolb 2011:9). Like the reputation hypothesis, the sanctions approach
– particularly in its legal and trade forms – therefore remains frmly within the boundaries
of neoclassical cost-beneft analysis and rational choice theory. “In this sense,” Reinhart and
Rogof (2009:57) acknowledge, “the reputation and legal approaches are not so diferent.”
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Legal Sanctions:
In the legal approach, sovereign borrowers will do almost anything to avoid default
because of the danger of lawsuits inficting further damage on an already strained economy
(Eichengreen 2002). Since most emerging market debt is denominated in foreign currencies
and under foreign legal jurisdictions, the debtor is liable to the laws of the country where
its debt was issued. Scholars in this tradition argue that there is therefore no way for the
borrower to protect itself from aggressive litigation strategies pursued by foreign creditors
inside the issuing country. Selective default, discriminating between domestic and foreign
creditors, is often not an option either, especially in the case of securitized bond fnance,
where secondary markets add a veil of anonymity to bondholdings and where a suspension
of payments might trigger so-called cross-default clauses. The notorious example of the US-
based vulture fund Elliot Associates buying up Peru's greatly depreciated post-default bonds
at far below par, and then suing the government for its refusal to repay the full face value, is
often cited as an exemplary case of aggressive legal sanctions bearing fruit for the persistent
creditor (Moody's 2000). After Elliot succeeded in attaching some of Peru's foreign assets –
including a payment on its Brady Bonds that was to be channeled through a Brussels-based
clearing house – Peru found itself forced to settle and repay part of its defaulted debt.
However, aside from anecdotal evidence, even legal scholars recognize that lawsuits
alone could never constitute an efective enforcement mechanism at the global level. “As an
initial matter,” Choi, Gulati and Posner (2012:133) point out, “one can wonder why anyone
pays attention to sovereign contracts at all, [since] it will almost always be impossible for
creditors to march into a country and simply repossess the assets of the sovereign even if a
contract so allows.” In an extensive historical survey, Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2006:133)
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found that, in the period prior to World War I, the legal doctrine of sovereign immunity –
religiously adhered to by the courts of the main issuing countries, the UK and later the US
– made it literally impossible for private creditors to sue defaulting foreign governments.
While the doctrine of sovereign immunity has since been greatly diminished in commercial
dealings, the empirical evidence still contradicts the idea that legal sanctions are really taken
seriously by debtor countries (cf. Buchheit and Gulati 2002). An early scholar of sovereign
debt wrote that “judicial remedies of foreign bondholders are hardly efective” (Borchard
1951:172). During the crisis of the 1980s, a Financial Times reporter noted that “bankers'
hopes – and borrowers' fears – that crippling costs could be imposed on recalcitrant debtor
countries through court action appear to be greatly exaggerated” (Kaletsky 1985:21). Three
years after Argentina's 2001 default, some 140 lawsuits had been fled against the country in
several jurisdictions, but even though the creditors won most of them, “attempts to actually
attach assets turned out to be fruitless” (Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2009:9).
Similarly, legal considerations clearly did not withhold Ecuador from defaulting on
part of its external debts in late 2008. In the wake of Ecuador's default, Lee Buchheit, who
served as the country's contract lawyer in negotiations with foreign creditors, observed that
“the breakdown of the [legal] line of defense is signifcant because this was the frst time that
the modern theory of supermajority creditor control of sovereign debt problems was tested
in practice” (Buchheit and Gulati 2009:1). At the other end of the extreme, Greece refused
to unilaterally default even though, prior to the private sector debt restructuring of 2012,
the majority of its bonds were issued under Greek law, meaning the government always had
the option of changing these laws to forestall legal reprisals by bondholders (Choi, Gulati
and Posner 2011). So while legal considerations may play a limited role in deterring default,
mostly in terms of preventing the hassle of having to deal with bothersome lawsuits by
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speculative vulture funds, such lawsuits do not appear to make for a credible enforcement
regime by themselves. Indeed, it has been pointed out that the majority of lawsuits from
1994 through 2007 “had no efect on bond yields” (Ahmed, Alfaro and Maurer 2010:45).5
Trade Sanctions:
The second form of direct punishment proposed by Bulow and Rogof consists of
trade sanctions. Unlike legal sanctions, trade sanctions would be pursued not by the private
creditors themselves but by their host government. It has been claimed, for instance, that
Argentina's decision to maintain payments in the 1930s – while the rest of Latin America
fell into arrears all around it – was due to fears that the British would impose a particularly
harmful embargo on Argentine beef imports (Eichengreen 1992:260; Jorgensen and Sachs
1989:66; Skiles 1988:24). Economic historian Carlos Díaz Alejandro (1983:29) argued that
this would have had far-reaching repercussions domestically, as “tampering with the normal
servicing of the Argentine debt would have involved not only a bruising commercial clash
with the UK, but also probably a major restructuring of the Argentine political scene, at
the expense of groups linked with Anglo-Argentine trade.” Tomz (2007), however, shows
that this long-standing argument does not hold up to scrutiny, not least because Argentina
honored its obligations to US banks as well, even if the US was in no position to impose
similarly harmful trade sanctions on Argentina. Overall, while Rose (2005:205) fnds that
default is associated with a signifcant decline in bilateral trade between a debtor and the
host country of its creditors, amounting to roughly eight percent per year and lasting for
ffteen years, he also notes that he is unable to identify whether the negative efect is due to
5 A more recent paper by Schumacher, Trebesch and Enderlein (2014) challenges this perspective, fnding a
“drastic rise of sovereign debt litigation” and “signifcant externalities” outside of the courtroom.
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a “natural shrinkage” in trade credit or due to a deliberate attempt by the government of
the creditors' host country to deter default.
In a subsequent study, Martínez and Sandleris (2011) point out that for commercial
punishments to be an efective enforcement mechanism, the fall in bilateral trade between
the defaulter and its creditor countries should be signifcantly larger than the fall in trade
with non-creditor countries. The authors do not fnd any evidence for this proposition (see
also Das, Papaiouannou and Trebesch 2012:61-2). “Contrary to the prediction of the trade
sanction argument,” the authors summarized their fndings later, “there seems to be no
signifcant decline on bilateral trade between the defaulting country and defaulted creditor
countries in the aftermath of defaults.” Given these unambiguous fndings, Martínez and
Sandleris (2011:911) conclude that “trade sanctions can be ruled out as the enforcement
mechanism for sovereign debt repayment.” Absent direct sanctions, “the channel linking
default to trade remains a mystery” (Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2009:29).
Super-Sanctions:
Finally, another debate has taken place in recent years about a third possible type of
sanctions: so-called “super-sanctions.” Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), joined by Ahmed,
Alfaro and Maurer (2010), have argued that the abolition of fscal sovereignty and the threat
of outright military intervention served as the most important deterrents for sovereign debt
repudiation in the classical gold standard era (1870-1913), also known as the age of high
imperialism or the frst wave of globalization. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005:26) write
that “contrary to recent studies examining modern defaults, we do not fnd that, in general,
trade fell in response to default, nor do we fnd that sanctions applied by private creditors
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were an efective mechanism for preventing future defaults or cleansing the reputation of
defaulters.” The most important enforcement mechanism, they argue, “was the imposition
of foreign fnancial control or gunboat diplomacy.” From European powers taking over tax
collection in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Greece and sending gunboats to Venezuela,
to the US invasions of the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua, there are plenty of
examples of military or fnancial coercion by creditor states to restore repayment to private
bondholders. Indeed, Mitchener and Weidenmier (2011:156) fnd that “the probability that
a country would be supersanctioned was almost 30 percent during the period from 1870 to
1913,” and “extreme debt sanctions were applied to more than 40 percent of defaulted debt
during the frst era of globalization.” Most importantly, after the defaulters were subjected
to “fscal house arrest” or “gunboat diplomacy,” their spreads fell by some 1,200 basis points
– almost 90 percent. Prior to these interventions, the countries in the sample spent nearly
half of the gold standard era in a state of default, while the same countries spent practically
no time in default after sufering the indignity of being “super-sanctioned” (ibid 2011:163).
Historical case studies by Borchard (1951) and Wynne (1951) also appear to confrm the
efectiveness of foreign fnancial control and military sanctions in enforcing repayment.
Tomz and Wright (2008:6-7), however, have contested these fndings. In his extensive
study of three decades of sovereign default, Tomz (2007) fnds little proof that creditors used
– or threatened to use – gunboat diplomacy to coerce debtors to repay, arguing that while
sovereign default was often invoked as an excuse to invade a country, the real motivations
had to do more with underlying geo-strategic and imperial interests. Either way, while The
Hague Peace Conference of 1907 ironically still recognized “the legitimacy of the use of
force in settling debt disputes,” the debate is a purely academic one in the post-war era, now
that armed intervention has been fully ruled out as an acceptable enforcement mechanism
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(Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh 2006; Finnemore 2003). As Panizza et al (2009:28) write,
“regardless of how the debate between Tomz (2007) and Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005)
is resolved, there does not appear to be any recent evidence for supersanctions.” We are
therefore compelled to look beyond both reputational costs and the costs of sanctions to
uncover the hidden forces behind sovereign debt repayment in the post-war era.
Institutions: Private Property, Credible Commitment, and Democratic Advantage
One explanation that has not been widely picked up in the economics literature on
sovereign debt but that has nonetheless been very infuential among political scientists and
developmental economists focuses on the role of political institutions in protecting creditor
rights. Towards the end of the Cold War, at a time of great neoliberal triumphalism, North
and Weingast (1989) published an article emphasizing the connection between political and
economic rights – and, indeed, between the underpinning institutions of market capitalism
and liberal democracy: private property and limited government. Extrapolating from a case
study of England before and after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, North and Weingast
based their argument on the idea that liberal institutions limiting the power of the executive
greatly enhance the government's ability to credibly commit to upholding property rights
and hence honoring its debt contracts. In North and Weingast's (1989:808) formulation,
liberal-democratic institutions “do not substitute for reputation-building and associated
punishment strategies,” but “appropriately chosen institutions can improve the efcacy of
the reputation mechanism by acting as a constraint in precisely those circumstances where
reputation alone is insufcient to prevent reneging.” In sum, the institutional innovations
of an empowered parliament, an independent judiciary and strong rule of law, and a central
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bank to safeguard “sound money” collectively served to “dramatically increase the control
of wealth holders over the government,” thereby constraining the sovereign and reducing
the likelihood of default (North and Weingast 1989:829).
Expanding on these ideas, subsequent work by Schultz and Weingast (2003) posited
the existence of a distinct “democratic advantage” allowing liberal regimes to borrow larger
sums at lower interest rates than their less democratic or authoritarian counterparts. “The
institutions of limited government,” Schultz and Weingast (2003:11) wrote, “can modify the
incentives of the sovereign by increasing the ability of those with a stake in the repayment
of debt to impose penalties on him.” The problem with this argument is that its logic only
holds when the private creditors are domestic constituents. While this might make sense for
advanced capitalist economies, which largely raise credit domestically and in their own own
currencies, it does not apply to developing or peripheral economies, which still depend on
credit denominated in currencies and legal systems other than their own – a weakness that
Eichengreen, Haussman and Panizza (2005) have referred to as “original sin,” which is often
considered an important determinant of default.6 Since foreign creditors are not represented
by the democratic institutions of these peripheral countries (or at least are not supposed to
be), the institutional explanation has still not solved the enigma of international lending.
An important caveat here is that the democratic advantage could be hypothesized to
operate via the enforcement mechanism of “domestic audience costs” developed by Fearon
(1994), which hypothesizes that “leaders that break international commitments will lose the
support of constituents at home and damage their chances for reelection” (Tomz 2002:2;
6 Buckley (2009:2) puts this in simple terms: “As a nation can only print its own currency, and as poor
countries invariably can only borrow abroad in other nation's currencies, sovereign debtors can be unable
to service their foreign-currency denominated debts as they fall due.”
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Jensen 2002). This domestic audience constraint is claimed to be much weaker for autocrats,
“who do not jeopardize their domestic political future when they abrogate international
agreements or violate international norms” (McGillivray and Smith 2000). In this particular
interpretation, the government's creditors need not necessarily be domestic. The problem,
however, as Tomz has extensively documented, is that this line of argument in turn hinges
on a number of further assumptions that are not very likely to hold across a great variety of
cases. Most importantly, it assumes that the interests of the median voter are aligned with
those of foreign creditors, while Tomz (2002:1) has convincingly demonstrated that “even
knowledgeable and motivated voters may favor noncompliance as the best way to promote
the national interest or their personal welfare.” Tomz (2002:2) thus concludes that, “to the
extent that democracy empowers those champions of noncompliance, it could make default
more rather than less likely.” Saiegh (2005a:99-100) argues that “democracy alone does not
create credibility. What matters is representation of debt-holder interests, which democracy
provides only when those with a stake in the repayment of debt are electorally pivotal.”
Aside from these theoretical questions, there appears to be a further problem with
the democratic advantage hypothesis: the empirical evidence simply does not stack up in its
favor. First of all, pertaining to North and Weingast's English case study, Robinson (1998)
has highlighted that the fall in interest rates following the Glorious Revolution was actually
part of a much more long-term downward trend that went back to at least the late sixteenth
century. Furthermore, as Stasavage (2002) shows, interest rates remained volatile even after
the Glorious Revolution, and the establishment of democratic institutions ensuring credible
commitment far from abrogated opportunistic behavior by the executive. And while these
two contributions call into question the internal validity of the democratic advantage thesis,
a number of other studies have challenged its external validity (e.g., Brewer and Rivoli 1990;
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Sussman and Yafeh 2000; Stasavage 2002; Tomz 2002; Saiegh 2005b). One study by Mauro,
Sussman and Yafeh (2006b:1) fnds that “news about institutional reforms seldom [has] a
rapid and signifcant impact” on bond yields, indicating that investors were often either
unaware of (or unmoved by) institutional factors. Another study by Enderlein, Trebesch
and Von Daniels (2011:24) fnds that “democratically-elected politicians respond with more
aggressive policies towards foreign fnancial markets” than their autocratic counterparts.
Historical evidence casts further doubt on the democratic advantage hypothesis. In
his case studies on the emergence of public debt in early-modern Europe, Stasavage (2007a;
2007b; 2011) fnds that representative institutions only enforced compliance when merchant
interests were represented; insofar as they were, the nature of the political regime tended to
be oligarchic rather than democratic. Pezzolo (2007:15-16) also writes that “the key feature
that underpinned the [debt in the Italian city states] and supported a vivid and large market
– which in turn called for a certain degree of credibility – lay in the close permeation
between major bondholders and a power elite. As long as this identity persisted it would
have been unlikely the government defaulted.” Also, while a body of work fnds support
for the commonplace view that “institutions matter,” those studies based on extensive data-
sets fnd little evidence for a real democratic advantage. Most notably, a study by Archer,
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) of 50 developing countries between 1987 and 2003 fnds that
the three big credit rating agencies – Standard & Poor's, Moody and Fitch – did not favor
democracies over comparable autocracies. Another study by Saiegh (2005b), building on a
dataset of 80 developing countries between 1971 and 1997, fnds that while democracies and
non-democracies paid similar interest rates, the democracies were actually more likely to
reschedule their debts. According to Flandreau and Flores (2009), who study the develop-
ment of global capital markets in the 1820s, the key role of fnancial intermediaries like the
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House of Rothschild virtually dissolved the democratic advantage. Indeed, the authors note
that the intermediaries displayed a distinct “bias in favor of arch-conservatives who had no
remorse about implementing unpopular policies or even ruthless repression” to extract
wealth and revenues from their respective populations for the servicing of their debts. “This
somewhat frightening conclusion,” Flandreau and Flores (2009:679) conclude, “is antithetic
to the 'democratic advantage' view, which neo-institutionalists have recently emphasized.”
In a word, while a ruthless dictator may be willing and able to face down popular resistance
to austerity measures and structural reform, a democratic leader may in fact “prefer protests
from the fnancial markets to the protests from their own people” (Balcerowicz 2010:4-5).
These fndings have prompted scholars to ask a simple question: “where is the
democratic advantage?” (Beaulieu, Cox and Saiegh 2011:1). Not only does the evidence seem
to indicate that “regime type and most other political factors have little efect on bond
rates” (Archer, Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007:341), but it actually points in a politically dis-
turbing direction: when it comes to debt repayment, coldblooded dictators may be more
reliable partners for creditors than democratically accountable leaders. Extending the argu-
ment, Saiegh (2005b) contends that, insofar as democracies obtain better terms than non-
democracies, this is only due to the intervention of multilateral lenders. Once the role of
IMF policy conditionality is taken into account, “dictatorships are more likely to honor
their debts than democracies” (2005b:20). This leads Saiegh to a provocative but not altoge-
ther far-fetched conclusion: “if multilateral agencies can condition democracies to behave as
non-democracies on debt matters, then the problem dissolves. Namely, if the decision-
maker is no longer the median voter but the political leadership … repayment is assured.”
In other words: “we will bail you out but you promise to conduct yourself as if you were a
dictatorship when it comes to repaying the debt” (ibid:20). Paradoxically, in other words,
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the democratic advantage may consist of a mechanism whereby democratic countries are
systematically conditioned by the IMF to behave more like non-democracies.
Spillover Costs: Bank Runs, Output Losses, and Private Borrowing
The puzzle at the heart of this chapter – and of the academic literature on sovereign
debt more generally – has still not been resolved. “At some level,” the IMF's former chief
and deputy-chief economists Kenneth Rogof and Carmen Reinhart (2011:57) were forced
to admit, “neither the reputation-based model of Eaton and Gersovitz nor the institutional
approach of Bulow and Rogof seems quite adequate to explain the scale and size of inter-
national lending or the diversity of measures creditors bring to bear in real-life default situ-
ations.” Since democratic institutions, creditor sanctions and the threat of long-term capital
market exclusion do not seem to be sufcient reasons for private creditors to keep lending
to foreign governments, a small but growing body of literature has recently focused on
another set of factors that may motivate governments to repay: the so-called spillover costs
of default. This literature suggests that the main costs of default may be borne not so much
by the government as by the private sector.7 Starting with theoretical contributions by Cole
and Kehoe (2000), Dooley (2000), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005), Sandleris (2008; 2010), Catão,
Fostel and Kapur (2007) and Mendoza and Yue (2011), sovereign debt scholars have become
increasingly aware of the ways in which sovereign default could either afect private actors
directly, or otherwise indirectly harm the government's trust relationships with domestic
7 Borchard (1951:178) made an early allusion to such spillover costs: “[T]he most efective sanction for the
service and payment of a foreign bond in the minds of bankers is the consequence of default on a nation's
credit and the efect on all credit-seeking subdivisions and even private business. By making new loans
unavailable, or obtainable only at a cost commensurate with the risk involved, prolonged default may
exert a depressing if not disastrous efect on the economic life of a country.”
36
businesses (Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris 2004:5). The consequences of default could spill over
into fnance, trade and production, harming not only bankers, traders and industrialists,
but also afecting overall economic performance, output and employment.
A number of recent contributions seem to indicate that these theoretical intuitions
may indeed hold true in practice. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), for instance, fnd that
sovereign credit ratings strongly impact the performance of bond and stock markets, while
Levy-Yeyati et al (2011) show that sovereign debt crises tend to lead to a loss of confdence
among depositors, thereby contributing to the risk of bank runs. Borensztein and Panizza
(2008) also fnd that sovereign distress can trigger broader banking crises, while Borensztein
et al (2007) fnd that sovereign credit ratings strongly infuence the private credit ratings of
emerging market frms, implying strong negative consequences on the ability of frms to
borrow in the event of a sovereign default. Another study has shown that, “contrary to
conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance
sheets of domestic banks,” especially in countries with more more developed fnancial
institutions, in which banks tend to hold more government bonds (Gennaioli, Martin and
Rossi 2013:1; see also Angeloni and Wolf 2012). Brutti (2010:16) also fnds that “default
episodes appear to lead to banking crises,” which in turn disrupt private investment and
reduce domestic production. A recent paper by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS
2011:1-2) identifes four principal channels through which the loss of a sovereign's credit-
worthiness afects the domestic banking sector:
First, losses on holdings of government debt weaken banks' balance sheets, increasing
their riskiness and making funding more costly and difcult to obtain ... Second, higher
sovereign risk reduces the value of the collateral banks can use to raise wholesale funding
and central bank liquidity … Third, sovereign downgrades generally fow through to
lower ratings for domestic banks, increasing their wholesale funding costs, and poten-
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tially impairing their market access. Fourth, a weakening of the sovereign reduces the
funding benefts that banks derive from implicit and explicit government guarantees.
It is not just the banks that are afected by a sovereign's loss of creditworthiness: the
spillover costs of default ripple through the entire economy. Cruces (2007), for instance, has
shown that sovereign default risk leads to signifcantly higher equity risk premiums in the
stock market, while Arteta and Hale (2005) observe that sovereign debt restructurings have
an adverse efects on private sector access to credit. Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (2009;
2011) fnd a 40 percent drop in foreign borrowing by the private sector following restructu-
ring, while Fuentes and Saravia (2010) observe a reduction in FDI infows of 2 percent of
GDP per year. Trade may also be afected. Because international commerce depends on a
complex network of short-term credit arrangements, it has long been argued that “the inter-
ruption of trade fnance might turn out to be the heaviest penalty for a defaulter,” and that
“trade fnance could be the Achilles' heel of a default strategy” (Kaletsky 1985:36-38).8 It has
been said that “a defaulting country frst loses access to its trade credit” (Cohen 1991:1),
while Rogof (1999:31) has suggested that “the strongest weapon of disgruntled creditors,
perhaps, is the ability to interfere with short-term credits that are the lifeblood of interna-
tional trade.” Building IMF (2002) research, Panizza et al (2009:29) conclude that “defaults
could cause output drops, or make already bad output states worse, at least in the short
run.” Mengus (2014:3) notes that the inherent opacity of securitized bond markets leaves
governments unable to “precisely observe individual domestic exposures to domestic debt,”
and argues that “repayment derives from the fear of the messy consequences of a default
and from the government's inability to compensate for those consequences. Financial opa-
8  “Trade fnance is a critical issue because most trade is conducted on a credit basis of one kind of another.
A common rule of thumb is that a country’s lines of trade credit may cover as much as six months’
merchandise imports and should at a minimum cover about three months. A debtor country which lost
the whole of this trade fnance would fnd it a daunting sum to recoup” (Kaletsky 1985:36-37).
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city, by making domestic portfolios more difcult to assess, prevents government to cost-
lessly default by perfectly reallocating resources.”
As with the evidence on capital market exclusion, the spillover costs of sovereign
default do appear to be short-lived. According to Fuentes and Saravia (2010:337), “if there
are any costs derived from default, it is likely that they last only for a limited number of
periods [sic].” Borensztein and Panizza (2010) show that the impact of default on exports
tends to last only one to two years. Moreover, these costs afect diferent economic groups
diferently, with default particularly costly for exporting companies and the fnancial sector.
Import-competing industries, by contrast, may actually end up beneftting from a default,
especially if it is accompanied by currency devaluation (Lanau 2008). A Rabobank study
(2011:1) concludes from these fndings that “the economic costs of sovereign default, as
estimated by scholars, are found to be less drastic than most believe.” Yet these costs also
appear to be unpredictable, messy and disproportionately costly to banks and businesses. If
it is true that these banks and businesses wield disproportionate infuence over economic
policymaking in the debtor countries (see Chapter II), that may help explain why unilateral
default remains such a relatively rare phenomenon today.
Repoliticizing the Theory of Sovereign Debt
The spillover costs literature therefore points in an interesting direction. If default
has strong negative efects on the fnancial sector, on trade and on the capacity of domestic
frms to borrow, then one would expect banks and other businesses to be strongly opposed
to it. As Tomz (2002) has shown, such opposition does not necessarily hold for all social
groups. In times of crisis, in particular, the alternative to default – full repayment – tends to
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require major sacrifces from the working population, often involving protracted austerity,
deep wage, pension and welfare cuts, steep tax hikes, and large-scale privatization of state
assets. Most economists working on the spillover costs of default do not yet appear to fully
grasp the theoretical implications of these observations: their fndings risk undermining one
of the unspoken assumptions within the economics literature, namely the conceptualization
of sovereign debtors as “unitary agents” responding in neutral fashion to straightforward
market signals. Dimsky (2011:119) summarizes the assumption as follows: “the borrower
country, conceptualized as a unitary agent, compares the relative utility of repaying its debt
and of defaulting on its debt; as a rational agent, it defaults when the utility from default is
larger.” Once we accept that some domestic groups derive greater utility from repayment
than others, the unitary agent assumption begins to crumble, and the decision whether to
default or to repay can no longer be reduced to straightforward utility maximization. With
the redistributive consequences of default and payment now exposed, the fundamentally
political nature of debt management fnally comes to the fore.
The economics literature has so far largely ignored such overtly political questions.
Who benefts from default? Who benefts from repayment? Who decides upon the course of
action to be taken? The answers to these questions cannot be taken for granted; they must
be subjected to critical theoretical analysis and thorough empirical research. The remainder
of this chapter will try to outline a basic critique of the depoliticization of sovereign debt in
the literature and proposes a number of alternative theoretical insights derived from critical
political economy. First, the unitary agent assumption that underpins the existing literature
should be replaced with a recognition of the inevitable confict of interests in and confic-
ting ideas and interpretations about crisis management and debt repayment. Second, social
structure and the distribution of interests and power should be made visible and endoge-
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nous to our modes of analysis. Third, scholars should clearly distinguish between willing-
ness and ability to pay, and especially the role of foreign exchange depletion in circumscri-
bing the latter. Finally, the conceptually stretched technical defnition of default should be
replaced with a political typology that recognizes the crucial qualitative diferences between
various forms of default. These points will then be taken up in greater detail in Chapter II.
Problematizing the Unitary Agent Assumption
Most economists working on sovereign debt still treat debtor countries as singular
entities whose diferent social groups are aggregated into an overarching national interest.
Governments, then, are merely “representative agents” that negotiate with foreign creditors
on behalf of the country as a whole. In the process of this aggregation, however, all possible
conficts within the debtor country are quietly assumed away: all social groups are assumed
to share the same interest in compliance or non-compliance, repayment or default, and the
country's government is presumed to apolitically represent this singular national interest.9
Yet, Guembel and Sussman (2008:3) have rightly noted, “this aggregation ignores important
conficts of interests within the debtor country, [arising] because some agents, presumably
those who are better of, are invested in their own country's sovereign bonds, while poor
agents have no such positions.” In fact, wealthy elites may derive much greater utility from
repayment than others, giving them a vested interest in compliance even if this inficts harm
on the wider economy and on the population at large (Tomz 2002:2; Drazen 1998; Beetsma
1994; Calvo 1988). Insofar as borrowing governments can be said to represent the “national
9 Lienau (2014:37) has also criticized this conception: “[I]n the preferred metaphor of international relations
theory, this account of sovereignty conceives of the state as a 'unitary black box' whose internal
machinations are irrelevant to its foreign interactions.”
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interest,” scholars of sovereign debt should frst try to explain how this national interest is
determined and whose interests it truly refects. As Streeck (2013:14) has put it, “the poli-
tics of public debt may be conceived in terms of a distributional confict between creditors
and citizens,” with both constituencies laying a claim on scarce public funds “in the form of
contractual-commercial and political-social rights, respectively.”
The redistributive implications of repayment suggest that a government's decision
to honor a debt contract is not just the outcome of some disinterested rational calculation
taking place inside the fnance ministry, but is rather a product of protracted social and
political struggles within the debtor country itself – and between the debtor country and its
international creditors – over who is to bear the burden of adjustment. In these social and
political struggles, domestic elites “can be expected to exert all their infuence to prevent the
government from repudiating” (Waldenström 2011:287-288). As we saw before, this may be
true even if these elites do not hold government bonds themselves, since the spillover costs
of default tend to disproportionately afect the private sector and wealthy elites regardless of
whether they hold government debt. As stock markets collapse, inter-bank lending freezes
up, and frms can no longer obtain access to trade fnance and foreign investment, bankers
and businessmen will fnd themselves facing serious losses. By contrast, other social groups,
including workers, civil servants, students, pensioners, the poor and unemployed – basically
those who rely on wage labor and/or state expenditure for their livelihoods – are likely, in
relative terms, to be more negatively afected by the austerity measures required in order to
keep servicing the debt, possibly leading these groups to favor a moratorium or repudiation
over continued repayment, thus pitching them against both foreign creditors and domestic
elites (Tomz 2002; Saiegh 2005b; Lapavitsas et al 2012). How such conficting interests are
represented politically and eventually transformed into policy (or not) is a matter of ferce
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power struggles between these diferent groups at both the domestic and international level.
In discussing the determinants of default, the politics of sovereign debt cannot be ignored.
These politics of sovereign debt are not just characterized by distributional conficts
over the burden of adjustment, but also by grave uncertainty over the exact consequences of
default. While the aforementioned economics research on spillover costs has clearly shown
how the consequences of default can ripple through the wider economy, the unpredictable
nature of such spillover efects will in practice regularly lead actors to misjudge the actual
costs of default and perceive the consequences to be either more or less dramatic than they
really are. Any theory of sovereign debt therefore needs to reckon with possible divergences
between the perceived and the actual costs of default for individual actors, social groups and
society at large, creating space for the role of ideas, beliefs, interpretations and afects about
the consequences of non-compliance, which can in turn become political battlegrounds in
their own right. One group, for instance, may be more inclined to downplay the costs of
default for itself, while another – presumably those with a vested interest in repayment or
those fearful of future losses – may end up wittingly or unwittingly overestimating the costs
for other groups and society as a whole. As a result, while the actual costs of default will by
defnition only manifest themselves in the lead-up to and the aftermath of the event itself,
the perceived consequences can become an important site of political contestation and thus
a key determinant of policy outcomes. In such conficts over the “correct” interpretation of
the likely consequences of default, those with access to the mass media, those in positions of
fnancial power and those with expert knowledge on the economy are likely to gain in poli-
tical infuence over those who do not enjoy such privileges, as the former can deliberately
or passively mobilize popular and political fears over the consequences of non-payment as a
compelling motivator of fscal discipline and debt compliance.
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By contrast, at the other extreme, popular indignation about the social costs of fscal
consolidation and the lack of political representation aforded to working people and the
general citizenry may motivate disafected social groups to underestimate or even ignore the
actual costs of default and push for non-compliance as a means of punishing foreign lenders
and unresponsive domestic elites or restoring national sovereignty in the face of powerful
external constraints. The importance of ideas, beliefs, interpretations and afects thus goes
to show just how fundamentally political the question of debt repayment really is, and how
little neoclassical rational choice theory – with its problematic unitary agent assumption –
can tell us about the underlying uncertainties, conficts and power dynamics.
Making the Structure of Sovereign Lending Visible
Yet the politics of sovereign debt are not only domestic. Wherever foreign investors
hold a signifcant amount of bonds, the issue automatically becomes an international one.
Here, too, the economics literature has largely tended to bypass questions of politics and
power. Streeck (2011:9) again rightly remarks that “standard economic theory treats social
structure and the distribution of interests and power vested in it as exogenous, holding
them constant and thereby making them both invisible and, for the purposes of economic
'science', naturally given.” One of the most important contributions of a political economy
approach to sovereign debt would be to render visible the structure of sovereign lending and
the continuously evolving distribution of interests and power within that structure, treating
the resulting social struggles and political conficts as endogenous to the decision whether
or not to repay. As Dyson (2014:36) puts it, “sovereign debt rests on an inbuilt asymmetry
of power that is readily disguised by abstract economic models and legal principles.”
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This brings us right back to the question of international enforcement mechanisms.
Crucially, the fact that there is no formal enforcement mechanism for debtor discipline does
not preclude the fact that there may in fact be a set of informal mechanisms that ensure the
same outcome (or alternatively a set of formal mechanisms, like the IMF's stringent policy
conditionality, that unofcially serve the same purpose). As Lipson (1981:606) pointed out
years ago in a seminal article in International Organization, “the metaphor of anarchy, so
often used to describe the underlying conditions of international relations, should not be
interpreted as an absence of structures that constrain state behavior and give rise to stable
expectations. What must be explored … is the character of the international political struc-
tures that have thus far prompted debt service by sovereigns, even when they have found it
onerous to continue payments.” These structures can be said to include both global capital
markets and international fnancial institutions. As Lipson (1981:606) notes, “what is most
compelling about these structures is that sovereigns are constrained less by other sovereigns
than by sanctions and incentives organized primarily by multinational banks and ofcial
multilateral lenders.” In the next chapter we will see how these global power structures can
become intermeshed with domestic power structures as foreign creditors, international
fnancial institutions and domestic elites are corralled into an international coalition in their
concerted eforts to enforce compliance both from the outside and from within.
Distinguishing Between Willingness and Ability to Pay
Of course the assumptions of mainstream economic theory also have implications
for our understanding of the determinants of default. To cite Streeck (2011:9-10) again, “the
only politics [that standard economic] theory can envisage involves opportunistic or, at
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best, incompetent attempts to bend economic laws. Good economic policy is non-political
by defnition.” In other words, the only politics that mainstream scholarship on sovereign
debt can envisage is the “opportunistic” decision to default. Repayment is considered non-
political by defnition. Unsurprisingly, this neoclassical smokescreen leads many economists
to a warped understanding of policy choices. On the one hand, most economists end up
depoliticizing repayment, simply considering it “good economic policy” and therefore not
really a choice in the political sense of the word, while on the other they lump together all
forms of default and brand them – often without qualifcation – as universally political.
Kolb (2011:7) perfectly illustrates this tendency when he writes that “default by a sovereign
borrower is almost always a choice, and because the default is by a government, such a
choice necessarily has a political component.” The observation is somewhat paradoxical:
while repayment is seen as “apolitical” compliance with the expectation that governments
will always repay their debts, non-payment is stigmatized as an irrational and explicitly
political choice, precisely because it goes against this norm. For many economists, politics
therefore comes in through the back door – only in the event of non-compliance – as some-
thing to be avoided. The fact that the norm of repayment is itself a pre-established political
fact is simply ignored. As Lienau (2014:5) writes, “one of the most puzzling elements of the
conventional narrative is the notion that the sovereign debt regime's repayment rule could
be apolitical.” As we have established by now, it clearly is not.
Moreover, while the choice to repay is always by its very defnition a political act
with important redistributive consequences, not all defaults are necessarily the result of the
same political calculations. Often a government may simply be unable to service a debt in
time or in full, even if it is politically committed to doing so. By depoliticizing repayment
and universally politicizing all forms of default, the literature ends up collapsing the crucial
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distinction between ability to pay and willingness to pay. Insofar as the distinction is still
recognized, the former is often brushed away as irrelevant – all defaults are presumed to be
a result of the latter (for an example of this, see Reinhart and Rogof 2009:54). Years ago,
Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986:31) declared that, since national wealth is always greater
than the total outstanding debt, “it seems implausible that lending to developing countries
is constrained by their ability to pay. Long before a country's ability to pay would become
relevant, its willingness to pay constrains its access to credit.” More recently, Mauro,
Sussman and Yafeh (2006:140) echoed a similar conclusion, arguing that “willingness to pay
seems to have been more important than ability to pay,” while Panizza, Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2009:668) claim that ability to pay is of limited import “since even crises that
are triggered by a bad shock could be viewed as 'willingness to pay' crises in the sense that,
with sufcient adjustment (e.g., a large decline in consumption), repayment would be
feasible.” In this line of reasoning, whether or not the debt is repaid is really just a question
of how far the government is willing to go: “Greece, for instance, could theoretically sell
the Parthenon or some of its sovereign territory” (Choi, Gulati and Posner 2012:132-3).
The distinction between a country's ability and its willingness to pay is, of course, a
unique and crucial aspect of sovereign debt. While a country's ability to pay can largely be
defned in economic terms of illiquidity and insolvency, its willingness to pay is indeed an
inherently political question (Cooper and Sachs 1985). A government may, for instance, “be
unwilling to pursue large fscal adjustments or enact reforms to achieve debt sustainability,”
preferring instead to renege on its external obligations (Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch
2012:67). Still, despite the repeated insistence that default is always the result of an explicitly
political unwillingness to pay, there is overwhelming empirical evidence for the stylized fact
that external economic conditions play a crucial role in default sequences. Indeed, it is now
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well-known that defaults tend to occur in clusters during “hard times,” often involving a
strong external shock to the economy and a marked deterioration in the terms-of-trade and
debt burden.10 These fndings strongly suggest that ability to pay – constrained not so much
by national wealth but rather by an acute shortage of foreign exchange with which the debt
is to be serviced – may be an important determinant of default after all. The vast majority
of developing country debt contracts (between 93 and 100 percent, depending on the
measures) is denominated in foreign currencies (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza 2005).
With the exception of the major fnancial centers and Europe, developed countries also have
between 70 and 90 percent of their debt issued in foreign currencies (Gennaioli, Martin and
Rossi 2013:12). A shock in the exchange rate, a decline in the terms of trade, a serious bout
of capital fight, or a sustained run on a borrower's currency could easily lead to the failure
of an otherwise compliant sovereign borrower to meet its contractual obligations in full
and on time. This is precisely what happened in previous default waves like the 1930s.11
The recognition of the size of foreign exchange reserves as a measure of liquidity,
and of foreign exchange depletion as an immediate limitation on the ability to pay, remains
remarkably absent from the economics literature, which, insofar as it discusses ability to
pay at all, focuses almost entirely on national wealth as a measure of solvency. While it may
be true that national wealth will on paper almost always tend to be greater than a country's
total outstanding debt, making it difcult to objectively determine the long-term solvency
of a sovereign borrower, such observations are ultimately beside the point. What matters in
an acute debt crisis is a government's ability to redeem the bonds falling due tomorrow; not
10 For recent evidence, see Reinhart, Reinhart and Trebesch (2016).
11  “Many … sovereign crises are of a systemic nature, clustered around panics in the fnancial centers ... We
fnd that systemic crises are diferent. The international collapse of liquidity is at their core. Default spells
and recovery rates are also afected by liquidity crashes” (Kaminsky and Vega-Garcia 2014:1).
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its ability to service a long-term debt fve or ten years from now, after the meager proceeds
from the privatization of the Parthenon have fnally been checked in. In many cases, the
immediate factor inhibiting repayment is not unwillingness to pay, nor the insufciency of
national wealth, but simply the lack of available foreign exchange.
Towards a Political Typology of Default
This brings us to the fnal point, which is that a default arising from the inability to
pay in the short term is something qualitatively diferent from an outright denial of liability
over a long-term government debt. Moreover, this qualitative diference has crucial political
implications. As it turns out, the mainstream economics literature has not just depoliticized
the borrowing country, the structure of sovereign lending, the decision to repay, and the
determinants of default; by defning default in purely technical terms it has also ended up
depoliticizing the concept of default itself.12 This fnal section of the chapter therefore aims
to outline an alternative typology of default that recognizes the diferent forms that default
can take, and that is capable of accounting for the political implications of each.
We have so far followed the literature in using default as a homogeneous catch-all
term referring to the failure or refusal of a sovereign borrower to live up to its contractual
obligations to repay a debt in full and on time. This standard defnition, widely used in the
literature, is due to Standard & Poor's, which considers a country to be in default whenever
it fails to make an interest or principal payment by the contractually-specifed due date (or
within the stipulated grace period), or if its debts are restructured on terms “less favorable”
than those specifed in the original debt contract (Reinhart and Rogof 2009:11; Wright
12 Grossman and Van Huyck's (1985) recognition of “excusable defaults” is a notable exception.
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2010:3; Tomz and Wright 2007:353; Beers and Chambers 2006:22). While it may be easy to
operationalize and quantify, the trouble with this technical defnition is that it is far too
broad. By lumping all defaults together into a single overarching category, the literature
ends up stretching the concept beyond its proper meaning, representing what Sartori (1970)
might have referred to as “a deliberate attempt to make our conceptualizations value free.” 
In the real world, defaults occur in many forms and guises. While few scholars make
an explicit distinction between the diferent types of default, a small but growing body of
literature has begun to recognize that “there is some controversy over how one should
defne a default in practice” (Miller, Tomz and Wright 2006:2-3). What especially concerns
us here is the relative absence of unilateral default in the post-war era. Unilateral default can
in turn be divided into two sub-types: it can take the form of a moratorium (a temporary
suspension of payments) or of an outright repudiation, which can be defned as “a legisla-
tive or executive act of government denying liability” over its obligations (Pescatori and Sy
2007:309). Borchard (1951:129) made a similar distinction between outright repudiation (“a
refusal to admit the binding character of an obligation”) and simple default (“which admits
the binding character of the debt but pleads inability to meet its terms”). The International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) defnes repudiation as “a situation in which an
authorized ofcer rejects or challenges the validity of one or more obligations” (Das, Papa-
ioannou and Trebesch 2012:9). Historically, repudiations have been extremely rare, and
countries have tended to reject their obligations only in the wake of wars, like Turkey after
WWI; or revolutions, like Mexico in 1914, Russia in 1917, China in 1949, Czechoslovakia
in 1952 or Cuba in 1960 (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006; Bordo and Oosterlinck 2005).
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In an attempt to contribute to the formulation of a political economy of sovereign
debt and an appropriate conceptualization of sovereign default, tables 1 and 2 outline an
alternative typology of default that breaks down and re-politicizes the concept by identifying
four specifc sub-types.13 Unsurprisingly, a political typology of default that recognizes the
diferences between unilateral and negotiated default, and between rescheduling with a view
to later repayment and restructuring with a view to cancelling at least part of the debt, has
major political implications. Most importantly, it reminds us that sovereign default is rarely
an aggressive act imposed by an all-powerful sovereign on its poor and hapless lenders; very
often, a voluntary debt rescheduling or restructuring may in fact be in the enlightened self-
interest of the collective of creditors. This leaves moratoriums and repudiations as the only
types of default that seek to unambiguously prioritize the debtor's interests over those of its
creditors, with the former deliberately shifting the costs of adjustment onto the latter. This
diferentiation matters because only a government that refuses to honor its debts even if it is
fnancially capable of doing so can be said to be “sufciently powerful to translate resentment
into efective resistance” (Marks 1978:231).
Table 1.1 – typology of default:
TYPES OF DEFAULT Delay of payments Debt cancellation
Negotiated Rescheduling Restructuring
Unilateral Moratorium Repudiation
13 A further distinction that is not recognized in the tables needs to be made between domestic and external
default (Reinhart and Rogof 2008), whereby our interest – as we already established in the introduction
to this thesis – is frmly on the latter, involving international lending by foreign creditors.
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Table 1.2 – defnitions of default:
TYPES Description
Rescheduling
A rescheduling is a negotiated agreement with creditors to delay
payments on (part of) the outstanding debt by extending maturities
and/or amortization schedules on existing contracts with a view to
repaying the debt in full at a later date. Reschedulings are agreed to by
creditors primarily to bridge periods of illiquidity and do not involve
any reduction in the face value of the debt (although the extension of
maturities may still involve creditor losses on interest).
Restructuring
A debt restructuring is a negotiated agreement with creditors to cancel
(part of) the outstanding debt by writing down or “forgiving”
obligations with a view to securing full repayment on the remaining
debt at a later date. Restructurings are pursued primarily to deal in
orderly fashion with insolvency and can take place either through a
reduction in face value or a lowering of interest rates. They are also
referred to as “haircuts”, “orderly defaults”, or “debt reduction”.
Moratorium
A debt moratorium is a unilateral suspension of payments by the
debtor of (part of) the contractually specifed interest and/or principal
payments with a view to resuming debt servicing at a later date. As
such, moratoriums involve the debtor's attempt (either explicitly
declared or implicitly enacted) to bridge a period of illiquidity or fscal
stress. Moratoriums do not involve any reduction in the face value of
the debt (although the confrontational delay of payments may still
involve creditor losses on interest).
Repudiation
A debt repudiation is a unilateral cancellation by the debtor of (part
of) its outstanding debts with a view to never repaying them. As such,
repudiations involve a formal statement, publicly declared by an
authorized ofcial, in which the government explicitly denies liability
over (part of) the state's obligations, regardless of its capacity to honor
these obligations or the creditors' willingness to accept the





Business Power and the Capitalist State
As we established in the previous chapter and in the introduction, the management
of sovereign debt crises is by its defnition always a highly political afair involving social
conficts and ferce power struggles over who is to bear the costs of adjustment. It is there-
fore clear that the study of sovereign debt, and of political economy more generally, cannot
proceed without a proper appreciation of the centrality of business power to redistributive
conficts, and of the particular ways in which the policy responses to international debt
crises are conditioned by the distribution of power and interests in the structure of the
global political economy. Yet the literature on sovereign debt has largely ignored questions
of structure and power, just as the political science literature has increasingly abandoned the
study of corporate infuence on policymaking. As Culpepper (2011:185) writes, “the study
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of business power is currently more neglected than it has been for the last half century.”
This study aims to contribute to the recent revival of scholarly interest in business power
by situating the study of sovereign debt frmly within a number of long-standing debates on
the nature of the capitalist state, the privileged position of business in capitalist democracy,
and the ways in which the two have been impacted by globalization and fnancialization.
The frst part of this chapter will present an overview of the main political science
debates on business power and the capitalist state. The second section shifts the analysis
towards the international level and considers how globalization and fnancialization have
impacted the autonomy of the state and the power of fnance. This section also introduces
Streeck's concept of the debt state. Finally, after outlining the shortcomings of original for-
mulations of the structural power hypothesis, the fnal section outlines the main theoretical
contribution of this thesis: its emphasis on the mechanisms through which the structural
power of fnance operates and the conditions under which these mechanisms are efective
and under which they are not. This section introduces the three hypothesized enforcement
mechanisms of debtor compliance mentioned in the introduction: (1) the market discipline
enforced by an international creditors' cartel; (2) the policy conditionality imposed by the
international lender of last resort; and (3) the privileged position of wealthy domestic elites
capable of fulflling a bridging role towards foreign lenders.
Polyarchy: Robert Dahl and the Pluralist Approach
The origins of contemporary political science literature on business power are often
traced back to a classical debate between the pluralists and the elite theorists; a debate that
reached an early apotheosis in landmark studies by C. W. Mills (1956) and Robert A. Dahl
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(1961). Analyzing the concentration of political power in the hands of a small “inner circle”
of businessmen, bankers, military ofcials and party leaders, Mills had tried to demonstrate
how US policymaking was slanted in favor of a powerful minority, highlighting the funda-
mentally undemocratic nature of American politics. Against Mills and the Marxists, Dahl
forcefully contended that theories of elite power and class domination ignored confict
among elites, rendering the entire concept of a dominant class problematic to begin with.
Dahl and his pluralist followers stressed divisions within business itself, with diferent frms
and sectors pursuing their own particular interests, vying for political infuence not only
against other groups like trade unions or civil society organizations but also amongst them-
selves. For the pluralists, business could therefore not be seen to wield any extraordinary
power compared to other organizations; it is just an interest group like any other.
Capitalist democracy, then, is conceived of as “polyarchy,” or the rule of many. It is
portrayed as a relatively balanced multi-polar system in which contending interest groups
compete for specifc policy decisions and state power more generally, allowing no single
group to ever become fully dominant over the others. In Dahl's (1959:36) formulation, the
idea of polyarchy means “that there are a number of loci for arriving at political decisions …
businessmen, trade unions, politicians, consumers, farmers, voters and many other aggre-
gates all have an impact on policy outcomes.” Moreover, pluralism contends that “none of
these aggregates is homogeneous for all purposes; that each of them is highly infuential
over some scopes but weak over many others; and that the power to reject undesired alter-
natives is more common than the power to dominate over outcomes directly” (ibid). Dahl
and the pluralists thus sought to disarm the Marxist theory of elite domination by shifting
attention away from the relations of production and focusing narrowly on the importance
of business confict in the political sphere, which its proponents claimed to be evidence for
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the fact that capital as a conceptual category is simply too broad and too vague to allow for
careful and sophisticated empirical analysis of when business interests do and when they do
not win out (Vogel 1987). The implicit value statement behind the pluralist approach is that
while the ideal of a thoroughly democratic polity may be fundamentally unattainable, poly-
archy contains within its institutional design a sufcient set of checks and balances to gua-
rantee at least an acceptable degree of democratic accountability.
Perhaps most importantly, however, the pluralists challenged the Marxist method,
narrowing the concept of power to those forms that can be easily observed and wielding
their empiricism as a powerful weapon against the Marxists' excessively theoretical analyses
of class-based power. For the pluralists, the infuence of business on the political process is
conceived in Weberian terms as a form of relational power, wielded “instrumentally” by its
bearer, in the sense that power is conceived to be at play only when actor A mobilizes its
resources in order to intentionally force actor B to do something they would not otherwise
have done. This instrumentalist conception of power, however, had already been criticized
by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) for eliminating the possibility of analyzing less direct forms
of power. Specifcally, Bachrach and Baratz observed that power is not just about making
decisions but also about what Schattschneider (1960) called the “mobilization of bias” into
the institutional fabric of communities; not only about what is organized into the political
process but also about what is organized out – the non-decisions, in short. Power is not just
about A afecting the choices of B directly, but also about A indirectly reinforcing certain
institutional practices and social values that limit the scope of the debate to those options
that narrowly serve its own interests against those of others. In a word, power is equally
about the ability to set a political agenda to which others have to adhere. “To the extent that
A succeeds in doing this,” Bachrach and Baratz (1962:170) wrote, “B is prevented, for all
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practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be
seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences.” This form of agenda-setting power has since
become known as the second face of power. In yet another important contribution, Lukes
(1974) subsequently took Bachrach and Baratz to task for not going far enough, proposing a
third face of power that explicitly recognized the existence of latent confict and the possi-
bility that perceived (subjective) interests and real (objective) interests may diverge. Lukes'
schema therefore allowed for the exercise of power to be internalized subconsciously among
subjected actors, in much the same way as Foucault had theorized.
The State-as-Object: Miliband and Instrumental Marxism
It took nearly a decade for the Marxists to conjure up a retort to their pluralist
critics, but when they did, the response made waves in social science departments around
the English-speaking world. In 1969, Ralph Miliband published his groundbreaking study
The State in Capitalist Society, which was purposefully formulated as an argument against
the dominant pluralist paradigm of the time. Echoing the power elite theory of C. W. Mills,
Miliband set out to disprove Dahl's “plural elites” thesis by identifying, through careful
empirical investigation, the predominance of capitalist elites – united through their shared
ideological, educational and professional backgrounds – at the apex of the state apparatus.
Far from being populated by the “many,” as proponents of polyarchy had argued, Miliband
showed how state institutions were in fact dominated by a tightly-knit minority of wealthy
businessmen. Miliband (1969:23) thus identifed the existence of a capitalist class that “owns
and controls the means of production and … is able, by virtue of the economic power thus
conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society.”
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In itself, Miliband's theoretical argument was not particularly innovative. Sweezy
(1942) had summarized the instrumentalist view long before when he described the state as
“an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability
of the class structure itself” (cited in Barrow 1993:13). What made Miliband's intervention
particularly relevant, however, was his strong commitment to an empiricist methodology
and the wealth of evidence he produced in defense of this controversial ruling class hypo-
thesis. As Barrow (1993:25) points out, Miliband took as his key indicator of the power of
business “the degree to which members of the capitalist class control the state apparatus
through interlocking positions in the governmental, administrative, coercive, and ideolo-
gical apparatuses.” This led Miliband and his followers to adopt a particular interest in –
and a narrow focus on – the social composition of the state elite. Since Miliband considered
state power to be located within the state apparatus, the question who controlled its various
branches logically became the main subject of inquiry. This, in turn, justifed the empiricist
focus on the “colonization” of state institutions by members of the capitalist class.
After an extended period of relative scholarly forgetfulness, Miliband's propositions
have recently resurfaced with the emergence of new empirical evidence in their favor. In a
breakthrough statistical study, Gilens and Page (2014:1) now fnd that “economic elites and
organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on
US government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or
no independent infuence.” The authors – whose research builds on multivariate analysis of
1,779 policy issues between 1982 and 2002 – note that their fndings “provide substantial
support for theories of Economic Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism”
(ibid.). Citing Miliband and the instrumental Marxists, Gilens and Page conclude that the
US – far from being a polyarchy – in fact constitutes an oligarchy: the rule of the few.
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The State as a Social Relation: Poulantzas and Structural Marxism
But Miliband's instrumentalist approach was never without its critics. No sooner
than his book had been published, a critique appeared in the New Left Review penned by
the Greek political theorist Nicos Poulantzas (1969) – infuenced by the Althusserian school
of structural Marxism (Althusser 1965; Althusser and Balibar 1970) – who took Miliband to
task for ceding far too much methodological ground to the pluralists. For Poulantzas, the
narrow focus on elites at the expense of a more theoretical investigation of class structures
and the specifcally capitalist nature of the state apparatus, risked reproducing an unspoken
assumption in the pluralist literature, namely that “social classes or 'groups' are in some
way reducible to inter-personal relations” (Poulantzas 1969:70). Poulantzas praised Miliband
for “demystifying” the myth of polyarchy, but at the same time accused him of confusing
cause and efect: the direct participation of capitalist elites in the state apparatus, he argued,
is not the reason for its power but its logical outcome (Poulantzas 1969:73).
For Poulantzas, Miliband's narrow focus on actors and groups at the expense of class
relations and structures and his defnition of the state apparatus as a “state within capitalist
society” failed to emphasize and identify the uniquely capitalist nature of the modern state
(Jessop 1977:361; Barrow 1993:46). Instead, Poulantzas and the structural Marxists defned
the relationship between the capitalist class and the state as an objective relation that cannot
be reduced to inter-personal relations, the direct participation of capitalist elites in the state,
or “the motivations of conduct of individual actors” (Poulantzas 1969:70). Pointing to all the
Socialist and Communist parties that had conquered state power and had nevertheless failed
to fundamentally transform capitalist relations of production, Poulantzas wanted to show
that “far more must be at work in the operations of the state and social policy than mere
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occupation of the state apparatus by the personnel of a particular class” (Barrow 1993:46). A
result of this original formulation was that Poulantzas' earlier work, by appearing to deny
the role of state administrators, had fairly strong structuralist overtones (Jessop 1982:223).
Poulantzas was quick to abandon this Althusserian functionalism, however, and by
the time of his last major work he had come to think of the state as a social relation whose
“substantive unity [is] historically contingent and thus an empirical question that cannot be
assumed away” (Bratsis 1999:167). In State, Power, Socialism, Poulantzas (1978) importantly
defned the state as “a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of
such a relationship among classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the
state in a necessarily specifc form,” adding that, “by grasping the state as the condensation
of a relationship, we avoid the impasse of that eternal counterposition of the state as a
thing-instrument and the state as a subject” (Poulantzas 1978:129). In this reformulation,
the state becomes less of a functional necessity for the reproduction of capitalist relations of
production and more like a material condensation of a long history of class struggle. With
the nature of the state considered to be historically contingent on the outcome of concrete
conficts between opposing social forces, the deterministic overtones of Poulantzas' earlier
work are replaced with a dialectical understanding of class struggle and collective agency as
the motor of history. The capitalist state is no longer just “the state of the capitalists”; it is
now shot through with the inherent contradictions of the class relation (Carnoy 1984:98).
As Bratsis (1999:168) put it, “since within and between state institutions various classes are
engaged in struggle, no one class will have complete control of all the state institutions.”
Workers' militancy and social movements thus become central in Poulantzas' later work, as
the state becomes a site of struggle where power is continuously contested from below.
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Public Finance: O'Connor and the Structural Dependence of the State
The Miliband-Poulantzas debate dominated the study of the capitalist state for much
of the past half-century. Yet, for all the obvious diferences between them, there was one
remarkable similarity that somehow managed to escape many thoughtful commentators:
the insistence on the conceptual distinction between the categories of the political and the
economic; between state and capital. As Lasslett (2014:1) noted in a recent contribution,
“Marxist state theory has a tendency to treat the modern state as a distinctly political organ
disaggregated, relatively speaking, from the economic structure of society.” This tendency
probably fnds its clearest expression in Poulantzas' (1978:54) defnition of the state as “a
specialized and centralized apparatus of a peculiarly political nature, comprising an assem-
blage of impersonal, anonymous functions whose form is distinct from that of economic
power.”14 In a contemporary critique, Holloway and Picciotto (1978:3) argued that both
Poulantzas and Miliband sufered from “an inadequate theorization of the relation between
the economic and the political as discrete forms of capitalist social relations.” By failing to
clearly articulate how state and capital are actually interrelated and deeply interconnected in
practice, both sides of the debate ended up reifying a false dualism. If we are to take our
critique of political economy seriously, Holloway and Picciotto insisted, we should “break
out of this dichotomy by developing an adequate theory of this relation” (ibid.).
What is perhaps most remarkable, in this respect, is that neither Miliband nor Pou-
lantzas ever really raised the question how the state is funded. Yet is is precisely here, in the
somewhat arcane realm of public fnance, that the intricacies of the state-capital relation
14 The citation continues: “The specifcity of the modern state therefore refers precisely to the relative
separation of the political from the economic, and to the entire reorganization of the respective spaces and
felds implied by the total dispossession of the direct producer in capitalist relations of production”
(Poulantzas 1978:54, cited in Lasslett 2014:1; see also Tabak 1999:140).
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most explicitly come to the fore. As Krätke (2009:5) notes, “the modern state's power to tax
[and to borrow] provides an excellent link between economic and political theory proper.”
After early contributions by Schumpeter (1918) and Goldscheid (1919), the frst scholar to
properly probe into public fnance from a critical perspective was James O'Connor (1973).
In The Fiscal Crisis of the State, the American sociologist observed a contradiction between
the state's two main functions: legitimization, on the one hand, and accumulation, on the
other. If the state fails to establish legitimacy, he noted, it will end up undermining its basis
of popular support; if it fails to recreate the conditions for capital accumulation, it “risks
drying up the source of its own power, the economy's surplus production capacity and the
taxes from from this surplus (and other forms of capital)” (O'Connor 1973:6). The state
therefore fnds itself in a bind: on the one hand, its legitimization function compels it to
respond to ever-growing demands for new spending; on the other, its accumulation func-
tion prevents it from taxing capital sufciently to fnance this increase in public expendi-
ture. The result, for O'Connor, was the fscal crisis of the state, resulting in a stagnation of
growth on the one hand and a deepening legitimation crisis on the other.
While this fscal crisis did not (immediately) materialize in the 1970s, O'Connor did
identify a number of elements in the state-capital relation that are of great relevance to the
study of business power today. The most important relates to the sources of public revenue.
O'Connor noted that the state can fnance itself in three ways: through the operation of
state-owned enterprises, through taxation, and through public borrowing. All three directly
position the state within the process of capital accumulation. To reproduce itself – in other
words, to be able to maintain its basic administrative functions and its various budget out-
lays – the state is compelled to produce its own surpluses, claim part of the existing econo-
mic surplus in taxes, and convince capitalists to recycle their untaxed surpluses by lending
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them to the state against a pledge of future tax revenues. Since the latter, public borrowing,
did not play a big role at the time, O'Connor paid relatively little attention to it. Still, he
rightly observed the contradictory nature of public debt, which both enables and constrains
state power: “on the one hand, the growth of state debt gives the treasury more power in
monetary and fscal planning. On the other, the institution of the debt normally tightens
capital's grip on the state” (O'Connor 1973:188; see also Dyson 2014:34). The same paradox
was captured by Ernest Mandel (1971:16) in his metaphor of the public debt as “the golden
chains of capital,” tying the state to business and vice versa. As Mandel explained:
No government could last more than a month without having to knock on the door of
the banks in order to pay its current expenses. If the banks were to refuse, the government
would go bankrupt. The origins of this phenomenon are twofold. Taxes don't enter the
cofers every day; receipts are concentrated in one period of the year while expenses are
continuous. That is how the short-term public debt arises … But there is another problem
– a much more important one. All modern capitalist states spend more than they
receive. That is the long-term public debt for which banks and other fnancial estab-
lishments can most easily advance money, at heavy interest. Therein lies a direct and
immediate connection, a daily link, between the state and big business.
While other scholars did not specifcally identify the importance of public debt, this
deep connection between big business and the state came to be known in Marxist circles as
the “structural dependence of the state on capital” (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988). This
concept of structural dependence highlights the fact that capitalists must continuously be
induced to lend and to invest; in other words, the state must at all times try to produce and
reproduce the ideal conditions for the accumulation of capital. As Przeworski (1980:55) put
it, “as long as the process of accumulation is private, the entire society is dependent upon
maintaining private profts and upon the actions of capitalists allocating these profts.” It is
is this structural dependence of the state that ultimately provides business with the unique
form of power it wields under capitalism: structural power.
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The Market as Prison: Lindblom and the Privileged Position of Business
It was in this intellectual environment of burgeoning critical scholarship on business
power and the capitalist state – and in the real-world context of growing capital mobility
within states – that Charles Lindblom, one of the founding fathers of the pluralist tradition
in political science, slowly became aware of the inherent limitations of his own approach.
In his classic work, Politics and Markets (1977), Lindblom famously distanced himself from
his friend Robert Dahl by contending that business in fact occupies a “privileged position”
in capitalist democracy. Identifying a key puzzle left unresolved in the pluralist literature,
Lindblom starts out by asking why – if no social group is dominant in polyarchy – not a
single democratic polity has ever voted to abolish private property and socialize its means
of production. Noting that such a decision could potentially be favored by a majority of
voters, who are workers, but that it would at the same time spell catastrophe for private
business, Lindblom poses a simple question: could it actually be business that calls the shots
in capitalist democracy? “At this point,” Lindblom (1977:179) writes, “we must consider the
possibility that existing polyarchies are not very democratic, that political debate in them is
not very free, and that policymaking in them is actually in the hands of persons who want
to protect the privileges of business and property.”
In Lindblom's new conceptualization of polyarchy, then, the market becomes like a
prison – efectively locking in the political process by structurally enthralling policymakers
to business interests (Lindblom 1982). The most remarkable thing, Lindblom argued, is that
this disciplinary power of markets is brought to bear immediately, automatically and often
unintentionally. “Punishment is not dependent on conspiracy or intention to punish,” he
wrote. “Simply minding one's own business is the formula for an extraordinary system for
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repressing change” (ibid:237). State managers fnd themselves faced with the imperative to
maintain a healthy investment climate under all conditions, and to immediately restore
business confdence whenever key indicators start trending downwards. As Block (1987:8)
later summarized in a dual critique of Miliband and Poulantzas, “it appears that even when
the business community is not able to infuence the state in the traditional ways,” through
lobbying, stafng government positions, drawing on personal contacts and doling around
campaign contributions, “policy outcomes [still] tend to be favorable to business concerns.”
This, he observed, suggests that “there are 'structural' factors that operate at a diferent level
from the exercise of personal infuence. Even with a change in government personnel, the
power of business would continue to have a large infuence over governmental policies.”
Business, scholars like Lindblom and Block noted, is diferent from any other interest group
because – as the primary source of investment – it fulflls a key public function in the capi-
talist economy. Businessmen allocate investment and thereby determine outcomes, refected
in a number of key socio-economic indicators. Policies or regulations that counter business
interests could trigger divestment, which would negatively afect growth, employment and
approval ratings. Since elected leaders generally depend on a healthy economic environment
for their re-election, they will try everything in their power to “convince managers to keep
business fring on all cylinders” (Culpepper 2008:7). Crucially, this mechanism appears to
operate irrespective of the ideology or partisan afliations of those in power; it is the mere
possibility or treat of divestment that forces ofcials to “anticipate and defer” to business
interests. It was this insight that led Lindblom (1977:175) to argue that “businessmen cannot
be left knocking at the doors of the political systems, they must be invited in.”
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Globalization, Financialization, and the Debt State
By the 1990s, however, both the study of the capitalist state and Lindblom's thesis of
the privileged position of business had largely fallen out of fashion in political science, even
as numerous scholars began to note the increasing leverage of multinational frms over
national states (e.g. Gill 1992; Cerny 1993; Ohmae 1995; Korten 1995; Gill 1995; Strange
1996; Pauly 1997; Cohen 1998; Hardt and Negri 2000). As it turned out, the main weakness
of the structural power hypothesis – or at least the way it was interpreted in subsequent
scholarship – was that it put too much emphasis on the independent and automatic nature
of market punishment. In short, Lindblom's conceptualization of the “market as prison”
and Block's invocation of an “investment veto weapon” were seen to sufer from deter-
ministic overtones. Even though Lindblom explicitly recognized the possibility that policy-
makers sometimes act against business interests – noting that wherever there are prisons
there will also be prison breaks – he never specifed when business is likely to win out and
when it is not. Culpepper (2011:185) has noted how as a result “theories of the structural
power of business have been marginalized in the face of careful studies showing how often
business organizations fail to get what they want.” The question, then, is why the structural
power of business varies in practice.
The Impossible Trinity and the Capital Mobility Hypothesis
Over the years, the globalization literature has provided at least one possible answer
to this question. As Winters (1996:16) noted, Lindblom's thesis was ultimately plagued by a
“narrow focus on single jurisdictions.” Its closed economy model recognized the ability of
business to reduce overall investment through less vigorous economic activity, or to move
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state, but left out the possibility that mobile capital – instead of slamming on the brakes or
relocating domestically – might simply move out to another country altogether. “Especially
in light of changes occurring in the global political economy,” Winters (1996:17) wrote,
“this missing element of the model is particularly limiting.” Starting with the emergence of
the Eurodollar markets in the 1960s and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime in the
early 1970s, and culminating with the widespread abolition of capital controls and fnancial
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, capital had started increasingly to fow across borders,
always in search of the highest yields and the path of least resistance. According to Winters
(1996:21-22) and others, this international mobility greatly contributed to the structural
power of capital, as it added the option of relocation – and thus a credible exit threat – to
the traditional “veto weapon” of the investment strike. As Hirschman (1970:82) famously
argued, voice is “appreciably strengthened if [it] is backed up by the threat of exit … whether
it is made openly or whether the possibility of exit is merely well understood to be an
element in the situation by all concerned.” This body of literature therefore concludes that,
by providing business with an exit option, “fnancial globalization enhances the authority
of market agents at the expense of sovereign governments” (Cohen 2012:175).
Given the centrality of the concept of international capital mobility to its analytical
scheme, much of the globalization literature has built – either explicitly or implicitly – on
the core ideas expounded in the Mundell-Fleming model and its “impossible trinity” of
monetary policy autonomy, fxed exchange rates and free capital fows, which holds that
only two of these three policy objectives can ever be realized at any given time (Fleming
1962; Mundell 1963). In other words, a government pursuing both high capital mobility
and fxed exchange rates will have to sacrifce monetary policy autonomy. This dynamic
was famously observed in the case of Mitterand's attempted socialist reforms in France,
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when the pressure of globalizing capital markets, combined with France's participation in
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, forced ofcials to accept “that their preference for
national monetary autonomy was unrealistic” (Goodman and Pauly 1993:75). Rodrik (2011)
has more recently extended this Mundell-Fleming model into what he calls the “political
trilemma of the global economy,” identifying a similar three-way tension between national
self-determination, deep economic integration and democratic politics.
But the core argument of the globalization literature is probably best summarized in
the so-called “capital mobility hypothesis,” which holds that “the degree of international
capital mobility systematically constrains state behavior by rewarding some actions and
punishing others,” as a result of which “the nature of the choice set available to states …
becomes more constricted” (Andrews 1994:199). Hacker and Pierson (2002:282) argue that
“capital mobility is a key – and highly variable – element of business' structural position,”
and conclude that in a context of low mobility business loses its privileged position and
ends up looking more like a traditional interest group, whereas in a context of high capital
mobility it can wield its credible exit threat to enhance its structural power in regulatory
and redistributive conficts. Be that as it may, it is clear that the capacity of multinational
companies to relatively efortlessly relocate capital from one jurisdiction to another creates
additional competitive pressures on states, pushing them “to accommodate the preferences
of market actors by liberalizing (or in other words, lowering) their regulatory standards”
(Andrews 1994:199), a process that has been referred to as the “competitive re-regulation” of
domestic markets (Cerny 1993). By transforming the incentive structure and reducing the
ability of individual states to efectively regulate, control or tax mobile capital, it is claimed
that globalization systematically favors the interests of multinational corporations over
those of domestic constituents (Underhill and Zhang 2008; Rodrik and Subramanian 2009).
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Structural Power in the Global Political Economy
One scholar who took a particularly strong interest in the growing tensions between
globalized markets and national states was Susan Strange. Such was Strange's concern with
the role of multinational corporations and big banks in international afairs that she ended
up playing a leading role in the creation of a new academic discipline to study its causes and
consequences. Credited as one of the co-founders of the discipline of International Political
Economy (IPE), Strange is also remembered as the most vocal proponent of the structural
power hypothesis (Keohane 2000). Setting out her critique of IR scholarship with an attack
on the one-dimensional conceptualization of power in the dominant theoretical traditions
of realism and neoliberal institutionalism, Strange argued that there are really two forms of
power: what she called relational power, which corresponds to the frst face of instrumental
power in the political science literature, and structural power, which she described as “the
power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which
other states, their political institutions [and] their economic enterprises … have to operate.”
Structural power is “the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape
frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate
enterprises” (Strange 1998:25). Like Lindblom, Strange emphasized how this form of power
is wielded by businesses, and like Lindblom, she proclaimed that its exercise need not refect
direct, intentional action on the part of its bearer (Lawton, Rosenau and Verdun 2000:5). As
Kirshner pointed out, Strange thought of structural power much as Woody Allen conceived
of aspiring playwrights: 90 percent of the job is just showing up (Kirshner 2009:208).
Structural power, then, is very diferent from instrumental power in the sense that it
does not require any coercive action on the part of its bearer for it to be efective; it is
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operative even when A cannot be observed to exercise direct control over B (Walter 2001:7).
As a result, the conceptual emphasis shifts from the resources of actors and their behavior
vis-à-vis one another towards the systems in which they are embedded (Keohane 2000:x).
Most importantly, diferent structural positions do not endow equal privileges; rather, they
distribute asymmetric privileges, as a result of which some gain a systematic advantage over
others. The classical examples include what Barnett and Duvall (2005:53) refer to as the “co-
constitutive internal relations of structural positions” between master and slave, or between
capital and labor – the nature of both elements in the equation being generated through the
symbiotic yet confictive relationship of domination or exploitation of one by the other.
The same type of confictive co-constitutive relations can be said to sustain the structural
positions of debtors and creditors. Even if the two formally enter into the market as equals,
only the creditor has the capacity to create credit (Graeber 2011; Lazzarato 2012). Since the
borrower, by contrast, depends on this credit to be able to reproduce itself, the creditor has
a structural advantage over the debtor. Its capacity to withhold something upon which the
other depends endows it with a peculiar form of power: the power to punish by not doing;
the power to discipline through refusal; the power, in other words, to dominate simply by
“being there.” The concept of structural power serves to capture this underlying asymmetry.
The main element in Strange's conceptualization of structural power is that it allows
its bearer “to change the range of choices open to others, without apparently putting
pressure directly on them to take one decision or to make one choice rather than others”
(Strange 1988:31). The policy options of national government are structurally constrained
by globalized market forces raising the costs or risks associated with one course of action
while structurally incentivizing another (Story 2000:32). Through a mechanism of reward
and punishment not unlike the one proposed by Lindblom, structural power thus alters not
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only the capacities and options but also the interests of subjected actors (Waltzenbach 2000;
Kirshner 2005). By raising the costs of a potential course of action sufciently high, those
possessing structural power can alter the cost/beneft calculation of subjected actors to the
point where acting in one's self-interest becomes all but inconceivable. Structural power,
then, can be said to impose “a bias on the freedom of choice” (Strange 1994:31). Crucially,
Strange argued that, while international afairs used to rely on more coercive forms of state
power like gunboat diplomacy and outright imperialism, globalization has given rise to the
growing importance of less visible forms of power: “in the competitive games now being
played out in the world system between states and between economic enterprises, it is
increasingly structural power that counts far more than relational power” (Strange 1998:25).
In the epic struggle between states and markets, Strange reserved a special place for
the fnancial structure, which she considered to be “the prime issue of international politics
and economics,” for whoever controls the creation of credit controls the purchasing power
and policy options of its borrowers (Lawton 2000:32). Credit, Strange never tired of saying,
“is literally the lifeblood of a developed economy.” The imperative to keep it circulating
through the world economy leads to a situation in which the ability to deny credit becomes
a key source of structural power. And yet this form of power has been all but ignored in the
literature on sovereign debt; insofar as the question of power is touched upon at all, it tends
to be in purely relational and state-centric terms (Strange 1988:91; Helleiner 2005a). “What
has been much less obvious to IPE scholars,” Strange (1991:35) wrote after the 1980s debt
crisis, “was the structural power exercised by whoever or whatever determined the fnancial
structure, especially the relations between creditors and debtors.” In the quest for credit, all
countries will be forced to “dance to the fast or slow rhythms of fnancial markets,” and all
states ultimately “run up against the limits set by international fnance” (Strange 1998:180).
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It is probably safe to say that “the skewed impact of the international fnancial structure is
nowhere more visible than in the impact of international debt” (Leander 2000:350).
Neoliberalism, Financialization, and the State-Finance Relation
Strange's work therefore provides a useful starting point for a political economy
approach to sovereign debt and default, but it is not without problems of its own. For one,
scholars have in recent years come to recognize the limits of the concept of globalization. In
the wake of the 2008-'09 fnancial crisis it has become increasingly difcult to speak of a
“retreat of the state,” as Strange (1996) and much of the globalization literature did. In fact,
the record bailouts of private fnancial institutions after the Lehman Brothers collapse have
made it amply clear just how central the state really remains within the globalized market
economy. In fact, many now argue that, far from being on the retreat, the state apparatus –
and the US state in particular – has been foundational to the rise of neoliberalism and the
process of fnancial globalization (e.g., Krippner 2011; Duménil and Levy 2011; Panitch and
Gindin 2013). This problematization of the globalization hypothesis has in turn prompted
a growing interest in the related concept of fnancialization, which – its proponents argue –
allows for a more fne-grained understanding of the recent transformations of capitalism. As
Lapavitsas (2013:194) stresses, the period of globalization has principally been characterized
by the “ascendancy of fnance,” which is precisely what fnancialization aims to capture.
While the exact meaning of the concept continues to be debated, fnancialization has
been defned as “the increasing importance of fnancial markets, fnancial motives, fnancial
institutions, and fnancial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing insti-
tutions, both at the national and international level” (Epstein 2001:1); as “a pattern of accu-
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mulation in which profts accrue primarily through fnancial channels rather than through
trade and commodity production” (Krippner 2005:174, see also Arrighi 1994); as “a process
whereby fnancial markets, fnancial institutions, and fnancial elites gain greater infuence
over economic policy and economic outcomes” (Palley 2007:1); as “a broad-based transfor-
mation in which fnancial activities … become increasingly dominant” (Krippner 2011:2); or
even as “a systemic transformation of capitalism, as a historical period” (Lapavitsas 2014).
Despite the lack of scholarly agreement on a common defnition, one advantage of the term
is that it allows for a more nuanced and more focused understanding of the benefciaries of
recent transformations in the capitalist world economy.
In contrast to the globalization literature, which had a tendency to conceptualize the
relation between nation states and global fnancial markets in terms of a dichotomy of two
opposing and mutually exclusive forces, recent literature tends to conceive of the relation in
terms of a symbiosis or mutual dependency (Wade 2014; Mügge 2010; Harvey 2010; see also
earlier work by Wade and Veneroso 1998 on the “Wall Street-IMF-Treasury complex”). Far
from hailing the retreat of the state, then, the process of fnancialization seems to involve its
ongoing restructuring; with notable consequences for the distribution of power in the global
and national political economy. As Krippner (2005:181) observes, “one would expect that
social actors occupying strategic positions vis-à-vis privileged sites of accumulation [banks,
hedge funds, rating agencies] would accrue political and economic power.” However, since
these fnancial actors continue to depend on active state intervention and market-making,
this power does not stand in isolation. As Culpepper (2015:399) notes, “the structure of the
capitalist system is one in which each [state and fnance] depends on the other. Studying
structural power means being attentive to the political implications of both elements of this
mutual dependency.” Without the bank bailouts of 2008, for instance, many fnancial frms
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would simply have gone out of business; a form of dependence that provided the structu-
rally powerful US state with an unexpected opportunity to exact concessions from rescued
banks (Culpepper and Reinke 2014). Even before the bailouts, Foster (2007:6) observed that
“the state's role as lender of last resort, responsible for providing liquidity at short notice,
[has been] fully incorporated into the system.” And as the “guardians of fnancialization,”
central banks in particular have seen their role transformed in recent years: “Protected from
electoral scrutiny through legal and practical independence, they have focused on infation
targeting, while casting a benign eye on the speculative excesses of fnance. Once the crisis
broke, they proved instrumental to mobilising social resources in order to rescue fnanciers,
drawing on their monopoly over the issue of inconvertible legal tender” (Lapavitsas 2008:3).
The Debt State and the Rise of the Marktvolk
In recent years, this thorough restructuring of the capitalist state caught the eye of
the German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck. In a series of recent interventions, Streeck has
explored how the process of fnancialization has impacted the politics of public debt and
the deep-seated tensions between capitalism and democracy, especially in the context of the
Eurozone debt crisis. For Streeck, the present turmoil is a belated manifestation of the fscal
crisis predicted by O'Connor in the early 1970s. O'Connor's prediction was partly borne
out at the time: while budget defcits in OECD countries had not exceeded 1 percent of
GNP prior to the early 1970s, they rose to 3-4 percent by the mid-1970s and up to 4-5
percent by the 1980s (Krätke 2009:19), but O'Connor appears to have erred on two counts.
First, it was not rising demand for public spending that drove the state into fscal crisis, but
stagnating or even falling revenues as a result of business and the wealthy escaping taxation.
74
Second, O'Connor had seemingly failed to anticipate the extent to which the resultant def-
cits could be plugged through vast increases in public borrowing, “buying time” and staving
of the moment of reckoning. Streeck (2011:14) shows how expanding the “[p]ublic debt
turned out, for a while, to be a convenient functional equivalent of infation, [making] it
possible to introduce resources into the distributional conficts of the time that had not yet
in fact been produced.” The result of this state borrowing, Streeck (2014:72) argues, was a
“transformation of the tax state into a debt state – that is, a state which covers a large, possi-
bly rising, part of its expenditure through borrowing rather than taxation,” contributing to
a growing “debt mountain that it had to fnance with an ever greater share of its revenue.”
This transition towards the debt state is not just a fscal development; it should be
seen as “the rise of a new political formation with its own laws,” whose defning feature is
the emergence of the Marktvolk as a second constituency alongside the Staatsvolk. “In con-
trast to the Staatsvolk of the tax state,” Streeck (2014:73/80) writes, “the Marktvolk of the
debt state is transnationally integrated. They are bound to national states purely by contrac-
tual ties, as investors rather than citizens … As creditors, they cannot vote out a govern-
ment that is not to their liking; they can, however, sell of their existing bonds or refrain
from participating in a new auction of public debt.” It is this structural power, derived from
the ability to withhold credit, that provides the Marktvolk with a privileged position in the
governance of the debt state. This privileged position far exceeds anything investors enjoyed
in the tax state. Streeck argues that “the emergence of fnance capital as a second people …
marks a new stage in the relationship between capitalism and democracy, in which capital
exercises its political infuence not only indirectly (by investing or not investing in national
economies) but also directly (by fnancing or not fnancing the state itself).” As a result of
its dependence, the debt state “must take care to gain and preserve [investor] confdence, by
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conscientiously servicing the debt it owes them and making it appear credible that it can
and will do so in the future as well” (Streeck 2014:80-81). Indeed, “the frst priority of the
international community of debt states is that all members, including the weakest, maintain
the fullest possible servicing of their existing debt” (Streeck 2014:93).
However, qua democracy, the debt state also retains a legitimization function that it
somehow has to fulfll in a context of growing constraints on public expenditure, forcing
ofcials to perform a precarious balancing act between maintaining the loyalty of their citi-
zens while at the same time retaining the confdence of private creditors: “Which of the two
sides commands greater attention from a debt state's government will depend on their rela-
tive strength. This in turn depends on how likely a threatened withdrawal of confdence or
loyalty, respectively, appears to be, and on how much pain it would cause to the country
and its government” (Streeck 2014:83-84). The conclusion is that a distressed debt state will
only ever choose to renege on its commitments to private creditors when the social costs of
repayment have become unbearable and citizens threaten to withdraw their loyalty to the
state. Only in the context of a destabilizing legitimation crisis and a democratic “rebellion”
from below will the government of a debt state ever consider defaulting on its debts.
Enforcement Mechanisms of Debtor Compliance
As the preceding discussion has shown, recent innovations in the feld provide ample
opportunity to bring together, frst, the somewhat artifcially separated scholarship on busi-
ness power in CPE and IPE; and, second, the equally isolated literatures on sovereign debt
and the structural power of fnance. However, as this chapter has demonstrated as well, the
study of structural power still faces a number of hurdles and challenges. Most importantly,
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as a “clunky variable” rooted in the structure of the capitalist economy that is often under-
stood to operate in automatic fashion, original formulations of structural power left past
scholarship ill-equipped to account for variation in outcomes (Culpepper 2010). The litera-
ture has sufered from deterministic overtones that have resulted in a stigmatization of the
study of structural power as a whole, sapping scholarly interest in the concept and leading
political scientists to discard it altogether. To salvage the important insights of the structural
power hypothesis, what is needed today is a more dynamic theoretical conceptualization
and a more sophisticated methodological framework that can satisfactorily account for the
fact that, even if it often wins, business still ends up losing at times (Culpepper and Reinke
2014; Hindmoor 2012).
In light of this crucial theoretical question, Culpepper (2015) has recently proposed
that future scholarship on structural power focus on three points. First, since the role of
structural power will be most difcult to demonstrate in situations where the preferences of
business happen to overlap with those of government or public opinion, future scholarship
should focus its attention on those situations where business preferences actively clash with
the preferences of government or public opinion. Second, scholars should aim to identify
the sources of variation in structural power and demonstrate how this variation contributes
to diferences in outcomes between cases. Third, future work should actively distinguish
structural power from instrumental power and fnd ways to operationalize this conceptual
distinction in empirical research. This thesis takes up the challenge by deliberately focusing
on the contentious politics of sovereign debt crises, which tend to involve ferce conficts
over the distribution of adjustment costs between debtors and creditors, with the latter
preferring to secure full repayment and the former preferring to avoid the painful adjust-
ments necessary to repay; by identifying the exact enforcement mechanisms through which
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the structural power of fnance is brought to bear on heavily indebted peripheral states and
hypothesizing the precise conditions under which these enforcement mechanisms will be
efective and the conditions or countervailing mechanisms under which they will tend to
break down; and by conceptualizing the structural power of fnance in very specifc terms
as the capacity of foreign lenders and domestic elites to withhold short-term credit lines on
which a heavily indebted peripheral state depends for its own self-reproduction, thereby un-
leashing debilitating and unpredictable spillover costs that quickly ripple throughout the
domestic economy, with far-reaching consequences for the borrowing state's capacity to
legitimize itself in the eyes of its citizens. The next chapter on methodology will seek to
operationalize this defnition in the context of this research project.
But frst, the following section will introduce the three enforcement mechanisms of
debtor compliance – the market discipline imposed by an international creditors' cartel; the
policy conditionality imposed by the international lender of last resort; and the privileged
position of domestic elites capable of fulflling a bridging role to foreign creditors – as well
as the hypothesized conditions under which these mechanisms are efective and the con-
ditions and countervailing mechanisms under which they are likely to break down.
The Market Discipline of the Creditors' Cartel
The frst enforcement mechanism builds on the prior conceptualization of structural
power as the ability to withhold credit to those who depend on it. One of the main reasons
governments do not default is because they fear this would cut of access to short-term credit
– not just to the government but to the private sector as well. Even if this exclusion from
capital markets tends to be of a temporary nature and hence not a matter of long-term
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reputation as such, it can still wreak havoc on the borrowing country by forcing its govern-
ment to immediately move into fscal balance and by provoking debilitating and largely
unpredictable spillover costs that would instantly leave domestic banks, frms and house-
holds unable to obtain private fnancing, thereby drying up all available liquidity in the
economy and bringing fnance, trade, production and consumption to a grinding halt – all
with potentially catastrophic consequences for the state, the economy and society at large.15
Here we have to quickly add that this form of “market discipline” is by no means
limited to the abstract, automatic and apolitical market mechanisms that were emphasized
in the original structural power literature. In fact, private creditors are capable of delibera-
tely wielding their ability to withhold credit as a political weapon to force a non-compliant
government back into line. In this respect, Culpepper and Reinke (2014:6) have made the
useful theoretical clarifcation that structural power is not limited to those forms of power
that are exercised impersonally and automatically; it is not simply a “background condition
against which politics plays out” but “an active resource employed by business in the poli-
tical arena.” As such, the concept should not be defned exclusively as a Lindblom-style
“automatic punishing recoil” mechanism: “although structural power can certainly work
automatically, it can also be deployed deliberately, with strategic intent” (ibid). What makes
structural power structural, then, is not the way in which it is exercised – whether strate-
gically or automatically – but the source of power as such, which “fows from the economic
position of the frm in an economy.” In our case, the structural power of private creditors
fows from the position of fnancial frms as the principal creators of credit money.
15 Market discipline revolves around the notion of an immediate cut-of of credit, even if such market exclu-
sion is almost always short-lived (Borensztein and Panizza 2008). In this sense, it difers substantially from
the reputational mechanism of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), who emphasize long-term market exclusion.
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The efectiveness of market discipline is in turn conditional on two factors: frst, the
capacity of private lenders to maintain an international creditors' cartel16; and second, on
the debtor's dependence on this creditors' cartel for further fnancing. On the frst point,
the threat to punish a non-compliant borrower by withholding short-term credit can only
be credible and efective if all creditors stop lending at the same time, maintaining their
credit embargo at least until the defaulted debt is renegotiated under conditions favorable to
the creditors. If a sufciently large group of lenders break ranks and ofer a defaulting state
new loans on better terms in the hope of outcompeting their rivals, the threat of immediate
market exclusion loses its credibility and the disciplinary mechanism will break down. It is
therefore crucial that private lenders present a unifed front in the pursuit of their collective
interest as a creditors' cartel rather than in the pursuit of the self-interest of individual len-
ders competing amongst each other for market share.
This in turn raises an important question: what are the conditions under which the
creditors' cartel will manage to maintain its internal coherence and what are the conditions
under which it will break down? This thesis argues that the structure of lending and the
ownership structure of the debt are two crucial factors conditioning the internal coherence
of the creditors' cartel. To be more precise, what matters is the concentration of the debt (and
hence the number of creditors involved) and the degree to which the international lending
structure aligns creditors' interests, eases coordination and incentivizes collective action as
opposed to individual free-riding.17 When debt concentration is high and creditor interests
16 The term “creditors' cartel” originated in the literature on the 1980s debt crisis and refers to the capacity
of creditors to resist incentives for individual free-riding and to act as a unifed front (Grifth-Jones 1988).
17 Suter and Stamm (1992:648) hypothesized that “the degree of creditors' infuence [is] determined by the
actor structure or, more specifcally, by the actor structure on the creditors' side ... [T]he capability of
creditors to exert far-reaching infuence on debtor countries and to enforce hard terms of debt settlements
against the interests of debtor countries, depends upon the establishment of strong cooperative networks
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are interlocked by the nature of international lending, the coherence of the cartel will be
strong. If, by contrast, the debt concentration is low and the lending structure incentivizes
opportunistic behavior, creditor coherence will be weak. In practice, highly concentrated
syndicated lending and highly concentrated securitized bond fnance will make default less
likely while dispersed bond fnance will tend to make it more likely. Historical research on
the concentrated and syndicated lending to King Philip II of Spain by a close-knit Genoese
lenders' coalition appears to confrm this observation (Drelichman and Voth 2014).
The second factor – the debtor's dependence on the creditors' cartel – in turn rests
on two further conditions: the availability of an outside option, and the extent to which the
debtor country is self-sufcient in fnancial and commercial terms. If the debtor country has
an outside option – like a friendly foreign government willing and able to provide fnancing
– or if it has enough of a bufer to absorb the shock to its economy, the opportunity cost of
short-term market exclusion will be relatively low and the disciplinary force of a lender-
enforced credit cut-of will be diminished. The capacity of a debtor to cushion the impact of
short-term market exclusion will increase when the country is running a primary surplus
(i.e, taking in more in revenues than it spends before interest); a trade surplus (exporting
more than it imports); sizable foreign exchange reserves (to defend the value of the currency
against devaluation pressures and to pay for crucial imports); and the capacity to provide
liquidity to its own fnancial system (requiring control over the central bank, a relatively
healthy and well-capitalized banking system, and the ability to impose capital controls in
order to stem destabilizing capital fight). When these conditions all apply, the threat of a
credit cut-of will lose much of its efectiveness and unilateral default becomes more likely.
among creditors. The institutionalization of such creditor clubs on their part presupposes that a relatively
few actors dominate a dense interaction structure... Prior to World War II these conditions were not met.”
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The conclusion is therefore that the disciplinary power of fnancial markets will be
increased when the debt concentration is high, creditor interests are aligned, and the debtor
depends on the creditors' cartel for external fnancing. This argument is the exact opposite
of claims made by scholars who hold that decentralized markets are more disciplinary than
concentrated ones (e.g., Kaplan 2013). The problem with the latter view is that it rests upon
a neoclassical fallacy assuming efcient markets. In reality, fnancial markets are prone to
panics that can lead individually rational investors to collectively withhold credit when the
perceived default risk rises, thereby provoking the outcome that market discipline was
supposed to avoid. To prevent default, creditors need to be able to credibly threaten debtors
with a cut-of in credit while at the same time keeping the debtor solvent so it can continue to
service its debts. This is a subtle balancing act requiring a high degree of internal cohesion,
creditor coordination and debtor monitoring that a difuse body of small bondholders will
fnd more difcult to achieve than a handful of systemically important, politically powerful
and fnancially literate repeat players whose interests are structurally interlocked. Still, even
the latter will struggle to keep a big borrower afoat when the default risk rises to the point
of imminent bankruptcy: in those instances, the incentive to collectively withdraw credit in
order to avoid crippling losses may simply become too great for individual market actors to
counteract. This gives rise to the systemic need for an ofcial creditor capable of acting as a
lender of last resort to distressed sovereign borrowers. As Soederberg (2005:935) notes, “to
recreate the power relations within the international credit system it is necessary to ensure
that debtors are kept within the lending game.” The market mechanism is a necessary but
insufcient barrier to default – to be truly efective, it requires some counterbalance.
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The Policy Conditionality of the Lender of Last Resort
The second enforcement mechanism – the direct intervention of creditor states and
international fnancial institutions – serves to provide just that. By disbursing emergency
loans to distressed sovereign borrowers under strict policy conditionality, ofcial creditors
do not merely intervene to keep the creditor solvent but also to enforce and monitor the
type of policies and reforms that would free up the maximum amount of public revenue
and foreign exchange for continued debt servicing. The main threat in the hands of ofcial
creditors is the same as the one that underpins the structural power of private creditors: the
capacity to withhold credit in the event of non-compliance, which would leave a defaulting
country without any access to external fnancing, inficting debilitating spillover costs on its
national economy. In the hands of ofcial creditors, however, this threat is enhanced by the
fact that emergency loans are disbursed in tranches: a debtor will only receive its next loan
installment if it remains current on its obligations to private creditors and carries out the
demanded structural adjustment. At the same time – unlike the market mechanism, which
will tend to break down in a market panic – the discipline of ofcial creditors is potentially
endless as the latter can maintain fnancing even in the absence of a perspective on profts. It
is also more strategic in the sense that it does not depend on any automatic mechanisms but
rather on a deliberate choice to disburse or not to disburse the next credit tranche.
The role of ofcial creditors, then, is to act as a de facto international lender of last
resort and a fscal disciplinarian of distressed sovereign borrowers. In the pre-war period,
these key functions had been only partially, intermittently and improvisationally fulflled
by private bankers and creditor states. For much of the nineteenth century, powerful ban-
king houses like the Rothschild and the Baring had the capacity to “implement conditio-
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nality loans and monitor countries' fnancial policies,” which “also enabled them to deal
with solvency.” As a result, “international capital markets could exact 'structural adjust-
ment' from borrowing governments” (Flandreau and Flores 2011:4).18 While this proved to
be very successful for bondholders buying sovereign debt underwritten by the Rothschilds,
who never faced any defaults on their claims, it did not enforce the contracts intermediated
by less prestigious underwriters – hence the high prevalence of sovereign default.
In the contemporary fnancial structure, by contrast, all these functions – providing
conditionality loans, exacting structural adjustment, monitoring fnances and policies, and
determining future market access – now rest with the International Monetary Fund, which
has been backed in its crisis management role by the US Treasury Department and the US
Federal Reserve, and which has more recently worked together with the EU creditor states
and the European Central Bank in managing the European debt crisis. Thus the IMF and
the creditor states provide a much-needed counterbalance to the market mechanism. The
function of the lender of last resort in this respect is not limited to the money it lends to a
distressed debtor; it also provides a stamp of approval for a debtor's fnances and policies
without which a borrowing government would be unable to return to the markets.
What, then, are the conditions under which the second enforcement mechanism of
policy conditionality breaks down and a distressed debtor can defy the lender of last resort?
This thesis argues that once again the efectiveness of the disciplinary mechanism is a factor
of the debtor's dependence on foreign fnancing and of the capacity of ofcial creditors to
18 The citation continues: “This occurred because of market structure. A few prestigious intermediaries had
the ability to 'certify' a borrowing government, which enabled them to infuence the terms of market
access. The intermediaries thus had a measure of monopoly power over borrowers and used it to obtain
adjustments that increased the likelihood of repayment. Conditionality lending was an investment in the
prestigious bankers’ own brand. This explains why prestigious banks were both able and willing to
manage their clients’ liquidity crises” (Flandreau and Flores 2011:1). 
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present a unifed front vis-à-vis the debtor. The conditions for the debtor's dependence are
the same as those described in the previous section, relating to its fnancial and commercial
self-sufciency (whether it has a primary fscal surplus, a trade surplus, currency reserves
and control over domestic liquidity). When a government has sufcient domestic bufers or
alternative sources of fnancing, it will be less inclined to abide by the unpopular measures
demanded by ofcial creditors and may be more inclined to forego future loan installments
in exchange for a recovery of national sovereignty and the capacity to shift at least part of
the adjustment costs onto foreign creditors and domestic elites.
The conditions for the coherence of the ofcial creditor front, however, are a more
complicated question revolving around domestic politics in the dominant creditor countries
themselves, as well as the nature of the relationship between the creditor states and the IMF.
While the domestic politics of the creditor states lie outside of the scope of this study, the
thesis does suggest two preliminary hypotheses. First, if the debt of the country in question
is highly concentrated in a set of systemically important fnancial institutions in the core
countries, the governments of the dominant creditor countries and the IMF will share a
common interest in preventing default at all costs: the IMF because it would thereby fulfll
its mission to ensure global fnancial stability, and the creditor countries because they
would avoid fnancial contagion and the need to bail out their own over-exposed fnancial
institutions. If the major fnancial institutions of the dominant creditor countries hold very
little exposure, by contrast, the risk of systemic contagion towards the core will be lower
and ofcial creditors will be less inclined to continue providing bailout loans at all costs.
The second preliminary hypothesis holds that when the provision of further bailout
loans to foreign governments encounters insurmountable domestic opposition and becomes
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politically unpalatable inside the dominant creditor countries, a split may emerge that sees
creditor states withdrawing their consent for further bailouts altogether, leaving the IMF
isolated. If the exposure of fnancial institutions inside the creditor countries is low and
opposition to further lending inside the big creditor countries is high, creditor governments
and/or the IMF may in fact decide to cancel future credit disbursements, thereby provoking
the default that their original bailout program was supposed to prevent. The party most
likely to pull the plug on further ofcial lending will tend to be either the nationalist right
inside the dominant creditor countries (when public opinion turns against sending taxpayer
money abroad) or the IMF itself (when the borrowing government in question consistently
fails to abide by its loan conditions). It should be kept in mind, in this respect, that the IMF
has a reputation to defend: continuing to lend to an insolvent or a non-compliant govern-
ment could harm its international standing, risk opposition from its member states and
damage its ability to contain future crises. The possibility therefore exists that the IMF will
decide to pull the plug on its own program, withholding credit and thus provoking default.
The Privileged Position of Domestic Elites
These two international enforcement mechanism have in turn been complemented
by the internalization of fscal discipline within the political and fnancial apparatuses of the
debt state. As we have argued at length in this chapter, the growing dependence of the state
on private credit has realigned power relations within debtor countries, strengthening the
hand of private creditors at the expense of ordinary citizens. To this we should now add the
intermediating role played by domestic elites – regardless of whether they hold any of the
government's debt – during a crisis, when the state's dependence on foreign credit becomes
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even more acute than under normal conditions. In a context of high state dependence, those
capable of attracting credit on better terms will fnd their position strengthened relative to
those who lack the trust of foreign creditors. In practice, this means that internationally
mobile, fnancially integrated and ideologically orthodox elites inside the debtor country
will obtain a privileged position in fnancial policymaking thanks to the “bridging role”
they fulfll towards foreign creditors. As Maxfeld (1990:93) argued in relation to Mexico,
wealthy elites – bankers in particular – will grow more powerful as the state's dependence
deepens: “the greater the need for good relations with international creditors, the more
weight the creditors and those bankers with close ties to them have in the policy process.”
This enforcement mechanism is not dependent on interpersonal ties or connections;
it is not the outcome of some international bankers' conspiracy intent on taking over the
debtor's state apparatus. Rather, it depends on a structural and normative alignment of the
material interests and ideological convictions of domestic elites and foreign creditors, both
of whom stand to lose from a unilateral default and both of whom will tend to beneft from
and believe in the virtues of fscal discipline, market liberalization, sound money and debt
servicing.19 As a result of this alignment of interests and ideas, domestic elites are generally
willing to commit to an “orthodox policy current,” which creditors will then reward with
better terms on future loans (Maxfeld 1990). This in turn tends to sideline political actors
whose loyalties continue to lie with working people and who cannot credibly commit to
the orthodox policies required to unlock further credit tranches or regain market access. In
practice, this usually means that social democrats will be pulled towards the center while
19 The reason domestic elites stand to lose from default is because they tend to hold a disproportionate share
of their own government's debt (Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi 2013:34). Still, the mechanism is operative
even when elites do not have exposures – they stand to lose anyway since a default would erode the basis
of their own power (their bridging role) and would cripple the fnancial sector and domestic business.
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radicals will either be marginalized or subjected to intense pressure to fall back in line with
orthodoxy. What emerges is a powerful and relatively coherent international coalition – an
alliance of convenience and conviction, not necessarily the result of direct relations – that
systematically insulates itself from popular pressures by undermining possibilities for the
institutional expression of social opposition to fscal austerity and structural reform, for
instance through constitutional checks on government spending, legally-binding agreements
with ofcial creditors and the sidelining of the legislative at the expense of the executive.
Over time, fscal discipline is gradually internalized into the state apparatus (Streeck 2014).
This indirect form of creditor control over the debtor's political processes will often
take on a “technocratic” veneer, with unelected central bankers and fnancial administrators
taking over key government positions to ensure debt repayment and other investor-friendly
policies. While such arrangements are usually presented in terms of necessity and expertise,
they are really an attempt to depoliticize fscal policy and naturalize austerity measures by
making them appear as economic inevitabilities where in reality they constitute profoundly
political interventions aimed at shifting the burden of adjustment onto less privileged and
less powerful sectors inside the borrowing country. In keeping with the insights developed
in this chapter, however, it should be emphasized that elites are powerful not because they
control fnancial policymaking through their technocratic representatives inside the central
banks and fnance ministries, but they control policymaking because they are powerful. Even
with a change in government personnel, the privileged position of domestic elites will con-
tinue to constrain the ability of debtors to defy their creditors. In fact, recent research has
shown that, the more developed and deeply integrated a country's fnancial markets are, the
more discipline the fnancial sector will exert over its own government.20 
20 One such study fnds that “the willingness of a government to repay its debts, and thus its ability to
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What, then, are the conditions under which the third enforcement mechanism is
operative and the conditions under which it breaks down? Since domestic elites derive their
privileged position at least in part from their bridging function towards foreign creditors,
the mechanism will be conditional on three factors: frst, on the government's dependence
on foreign credit; second, on the ability of domestic elites to attract that credit; and third,
on the ability of elites to fend of popular opposition from below, to prevent a destabilizing
legitimation crisis, and to retain ministerial and bureaucratic control over the “commanding
heights” of fnancial policymaking – namely the fnance ministry and the central bank.
On the frst point, growing dependence on foreign credit will strengthen the hand of
domestic elites while lower dependence will weaken it. When the government does not
need any foreign credit at all, the bridging function becomes useless and breaks down.
On the second point, the ability of domestic elites to attract credit depends on their
capacity to convince foreign creditors of the credibility of their commitment – a factor that
is not the result of democratic institutions, as North and Weingast argued, but of the ability
and willingness of policymakers to carry out fscally “responsible” policies and to continue
repaying their debts. This ability and willingness will be high when the material interests
and ideological convictions of domestic elites are structurally and normatively aligned with
those of foreign creditors. The willingness will be low when the material interests and ideo-
logical convictions of fnancial policymakers are not aligned, while the ability to commit
will be low when the political or institutional capacity to carry out fscally “responsible”
policies is lacking. If domestic elites are unable and/or unwilling to carry out the type of
borrow in the frst place, depends on the development of private fnancial markets. More developed
fnancial markets translate into more severe consequences of public defaults, thereby providing govern-
ments with stronger incentives to repay” (Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi 2013:34).
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creditor-friendly policies that allow them to attract further loans at decent terms, their brid-
ging role (and hence their privileged position) will crumble and fall apart.
Finally, on the third point, the ability to fend of popular opposition to painful fscal
adjustment and to retain control over the fnance ministry and central bank depends on the
capacity of domestic elites to contain the legitimation crisis resulting from onerous auste-
rity measures and shield fnancial policymaking from popular pressures. If the population
(Streeck's Staatsvolk) withdraws its loyalty from the state and rebels against the establish-
ment, the option of a unilateral suspension of payments may fnally be put on the agenda –
either as the explicit policy preference of a new pro-default coalition that has just come to
power by ousting the old political establishment from ofce, or as part of an attempt by the
existing political establishment to calm social tensions and restore a semblance of political
stability in the face of a deep crisis of representation. Still, it should be stressed that, while a
successful debtors' revolt or the electoral victory of a pro-default coalition may alter policy
preferences, it cannot by itself overcome the state's dependence on credit or the structural
power of foreign creditors. For policy preferences to be transformed into actual outcomes
requires a degree of autonomy on the part of the debt state. In other words, for the country
to unilaterally default on its external obligations, all three enforcement mechanisms will need
to fail. This means that even if a pro-default or anti-austerity coalition takes power, it may
still encounter the external constraints imposed by highly concentrated fnancial markets
and unforgiving ofcial lenders. In short, even a government that has resolved to end auste-






This research project builds on a qualitative methodology that combines intensive
case studies with cross-country comparison, process tracing and structural power analysis.
Such a qualitative approach has some advantages over the quantitative methods normally
deployed by economists working on sovereign debt and default. First of all, small-N case
study methods tend to be better suited for grasping complex causation in social reality.21
Rather than establishing mere coincidence of hypothesized causes and outcomes, our main
interest is in the exact causal mechanisms – mostly invisible from the bird's eye view of
21 Datz (2009:2) writes: “What is clear is that it has been increasingly difcult to treat debt restructuring
episodes as homogenous developments amendable to parsimonious and generalizable models. Despite
their undeniable importance in creating and analyzing datasets that track correlations among key
variables, large-N analyses and formal models cannot condense in agglomerating exercises all the nuances
that compose diferent restructuring scenarios, which, to a large extent, may determine default costs in
the short and long-terms.” More generally, Hall (2006:26) has observed that, “despite the continuing
popularity of regression analysis, recent theoretical developments in social science tend to specify a world
whose causal structure is too complex to be tested efectively by conventional statistical methods.”
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regression analysis – that connect hypothesized causes to real-world outcomes. Secondly, it
has been argued that the conceptual validity gained from qualitative approaches tends to
feed into more reliable and more innovative results (McKeown 2004; Mahoney 2007). Since
parsimonious modeling generally compels economists to prioritize the operationalization of
variables over the more analytical and qualitative task of conceptualization, their results are
often plagued by a misspecifcation of theoretical micro-foundations (hence the qualitative
typology of default developed in Chapter I). Finally, questions of power are notoriously
difcult to operationalize, especially in large-N studies, leaving most economists to ignore
them altogether. And yet, as Chapter II has argued, the study of sovereign debt will have to
somehow confront such questions, providing an opening for more qualitative approaches
that place the fnancial structure and the power of creditors at the heart of their analysis.
In important respects, this research therefore seeks to move beyond the deductive-
nomological (D-N) approach to social science research, which proposes that qualitative and
quantitative methods share the “same logic of inference” and that scholars working in the
qualitative tradition should model their approaches on the “more advanced” methodologies
of their quantitative colleagues (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). In recent years, social
scientists have increasingly come to reject this D-N logic. As Mahoney (2010:122) writes, “it
seems safe to say that the feld of qualitative methodology has entered a post-KKV era.”
Instead, this thesis therefore deliberately draws on the advantages of a case study approach,
in full awareness that this approach tends to be more apt at hypothesis development than at
rigorous hypothesis testing per se. The frst part of this chapter will frst present an outline
of the three methodological approaches on which this research project is based. The second
part of the chapter deals with research design, the research question, hypotheses and alter-
native hypotheses, variables and case study selection.
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A Comparative Case Study Method
One of the strong points of the comparative case study method is that it is generally
well suited to address “big questions.” As Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003:7) put it, “big
processes and structures were – and still are – most appropriately studied through explicit
comparisons that transcend national or regional boundaries [and] could not – and cannot –
be analyzed without recognizing the importance of temporal sequences and the unfolding
of events over time.” Indeed, scholars in the comparative-historical tradition have managed
to tackle some of the most substantively important questions in the social sciences in recent
decades, including the origins of capitalism, democracy, dictatorship, revolution and labor
unions (e.g., Wallerstein 1974; Arrighi 1994; Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; Collier and Collier
1991). Collier (1993) argued that this “intellectual success … has played an important role in
legitimating a focus on a small N.” Research in the tradition also remains diverse. Mahoney
and Rueschemeyer (2003:22-23) point out that comparative scholars “do not hesitate to seek
guidance from a range of theoretical traditions, including prominently various strands of
'structural' analysis associated with class analytic and confict theory.”
There are good reasons to put the comparative case study method at the heart of this
research project. George and Bennett (2005:21), for instance, have stressed that, “compared
to the shortcomings of regression-analysis and the D-N model, the advantages of such
methods include much higher conceptual validity, the ability to derive new hypotheses
from the observations, the exploration of new causal mechanisms, and the modeling of
complex causal relations.” While early research drawing on case studies methods tended to
select their cases largely on the basis of Mill's method of agreement and diference, in which
the former serves to eliminate necessary causes while the latter eliminates sufcient causes
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(e.g., Mahoney 1999; Skocpol and Somers 1980), recent decades have witnessed a growing
recognition of the overly deterministic nature of Mill's logic of causation, in which “a single
deviation from a hypothesized pattern of necessary or sufcient causation is enough to
eliminate a given explanatory factor” (Mahoney 2007:134). As a result, Mill's logic has been
slowly giving way to a more probabilistic view of causality, a less deterministic approach to
falsifability, and greater emphasis on theory development.
Systematic Process Tracing
Partly as a result of the controversy surrounding Mill's highly deterministic view of
causality, comparative methodologists now recognize the need for a combination of cross-
case and within-case analysis. As George and Bennett (2005:18) put it, there is a “growing
consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a
combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons.” Some even argue that
“within-case comparisons are critical to the viability of small-N analysis” (Collier 1993:17).
One such within-case method is systematic process analysis, or process tracing, as it is more
commonly known (Hall 2006; Collier 2011; Vennesson 2008). Process tracing has been
defned as “the examination of 'diagnostic' pieces of evidence within a case that contribute
to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses” (Bennett 2004:208). In
this method, “the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts,
and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a
case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case”
(George and Bennett 2005:6-7). As such, process tracing is “an indispensable tool for theory
testing and theory development not only because it generates numerous observations
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within a case, but because these observations must be linked in particular ways to consti-
tute an explanation of the case” (George and Bennett 2005:207).
That said, process tracing is not without its own problems. As Checkel (2005:3-4)
writes, “the method of process tracing is deeply rooted in the tradition of methodological
individualism,” making it easy for scholars to “lose the bigger picture.” Falletti (2006:2) has
shown how George and McKeown's (1985) original formulation “attempted to uncover the
microfoundations of individual behavior that connect hypothesized causes and outcomes
and to reduce the difculties associated with unobserved contextual variables,” without
recognizing the relevance of macro-structures (Checkel 2005:1). In his work with Bennett,
George seems to have loosened his defnition somewhat, “allowing for the identifcation of
causal mechanisms that do not have to be rooted at the individual level” (Falletti 2006:2).
Still, Checkel (2005:19) insists that “process tracing forces the researcher to examine, well,
questions of process. In making such a methodological choice, it is all too easy to lose sight
of broader structural context and the normative implications of one’s work.” This is where
structural power analysis comes in, with its emphasis on the wider context and the systems
in which individual actors operate.
Structural Power Analysis
Susan Strange once quipped that comparative scholars often contrast more than they
compare. In the Comparative Political Economy literature, this has been especially true of
the Varieties of Capitalism literature, which has recently been criticized for its emphasis on
the former element of the equation, varieties, at the expense of the latter, capitalism (Bruf
2011; Bruf and Horn 2012). While diverging policy responses to common economic shocks
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such as those studied by Gourevitch (1986) are undoubtedly interesting and important, a
pattern of similar policy responses in diferent contexts should equally fascinate the genuine
comparativist (Armingeon and Baccaro 2012). As some scholars have therefore pointed out,
the objective of comparative analysis should not just be to contrast varying outcomes across
cases, but also to “demonstrate that certain relationships among variables hold true in a
wide variety of cases” (Peters 1998:26; see also Pontusson 1995:129). The remarkably low
incidence of unilateral default is one such outcome that seems to hold true in a wide variety
of contemporary cases. As Walzenbach (2000:374) notes, it is precisely in this area of regular
outcomes across diferent contexts “that the overlap between comparative and international
political economy is most obvious,” and it is precisely here that structural power analysis –
with its focus on the bigger picture – comes in as a useful methodological tool.
Still, like process tracing, this big-picture approach is not without problems of its
own. Structural power analysis has often been criticized for its deterministic overtones and
its failure to account for variation in outcomes. Keohane (2000:x), for instance, writes that
Susan Strange “was interested in structures rather than processes, which she regarded as
derivative,” and points out how as a result she failed to identify the exact channels through
which structural power operates in practice. How, and why, does structural power vary?
Through what mechanisms does it afect policy outcomes? And how can it be successfully
contested? On most of these questions, scholars like Lindblom and Strange remained either
ambiguous or silent. For Strange, this shortcoming was at least partly a result of the fact
that she never really left behind a methodological framework within which her concepts
could be operationalized (Lawton, Rosenau and Verdun 2000). Verdun (2000:78) observes
that, “to test rigorously her theoretical analyses would lead [Strange] to having to adopt a
methodology that she was unwilling to accept.” Instead, she “wanted to provide her insights
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into the global political economy, and left it to future generations of scholars to take her
ideas further.” As a result, Helleiner (2006:84) notes, “even the chief advocate of structural
power analysis failed to grasp its full potential.” Benjamin Cohen (2000:99) concludes that
the task of structural power analysis “would then be twofold: to identify the key conditions
that determine, frst, when power at either level [instrumental or structural] is or is not
likely to be used…; and second, when the use of power is or is not likely to be successful.” 
Cohen's challenge to identify these conditions cannot be ignored. This thesis hopes
to contribute towards the efort of taking structural power analysis forward by emphasizing
the need to identify the precise enforcement mechanisms through which the structural power
of fnance compels borrowers to repay, and by specifying the exact conditions under which
these mechanisms work efectively and the conditions under which they break down, as
well as the countervailing mechanisms that allow the structural power of fnance to be con-
tested from below.
Research Question and Design
This project is driven by the research question outlined in the introduction: why do
countries not default on their external debts more often? Why voluntarily go through great
pains to honor foreign obligations? Or, as Eichengreen (2002) puts it, why are governments
prepared to impose “extraordinary hardships” on their constituents to avoid default, even if
this means giving up part of their national sovereignty and their own chances of re-election
in the process? Why not just suspend payments and wait for recovery to take place before
renegotiating the remaining debts on more favorable terms, as the majority of European
and Latin American countries did in the international debt crisis of the 1930s?
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Hypothesis: The Structural Power of Finance
The main hypothesis developed and tested in this study is that the structural power
of fnance systematically constrains the willingness and ability of governments to default on
their external debts. This structural power is in turn hypothesized to operate through three
enforcement mechanisms, each of which revolves around the capacity of private and ofcial
lenders to withhold much-needed credit; credit upon which the borrowing state depends for
its own reproduction and without which it would run into acute fnancial trouble.
The three hypothesized enforcement mechanisms are the following:
1. The market discipline imposed by an international creditors' cartel, which can 
immediately withhold short-term credit in the event of non-compliance;
2. The policy conditionality imposed by an international lender of last resort, 
which provides emergency loans in return for structural adjustment, and which can 
immediately withhold short-term credit in the event of non-compliance;
3. The privileged position of domestic elites, who are strengthened because of their 
bridging role towards foreign lenders and their capacity to attract short-term credit, 
and who can similarly withhold short-term credit in the event of non-compliance.
A unilateral default by the debtor country would immediately result in the lenders'
refusal to disburse further credit both to the defaulting government and to its private sector,
precipitating debilitating and largely unpredictable spillover costs that would quickly ripple
through the fnancial sector and the domestic economy, undermining the state's capacity to
carry out its core functions of accumulation and legitimization. Since these costs tend to be
short-lived, those negatively afected by austerity may favor a unilateral default; however,
since the spillover costs of default tend to disproportionately harm the interests of domestic
elites, the latter are likely to wield their privileged position in policymaking – derived from
their bridging role towards foreign creditors – to prevent such a default from taking place.
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The operability and efectiveness of the three enforcement mechanisms is therefore
conditional upon a number of factors, each of which relates to the debtor state's capacity to
reproduce itself in the absence of further short-term credit from private and ofcial lenders:
1. Market discipline depends on:
a) The ability of private lenders to hold together a creditors' cartel: the cartel tends to be at its 
strongest when the debt is highly concentrated and creditor interests are structurally interlocked.
b) The debtor's dependence on the creditors' cartel: this dependence tends to be at its greatest 
when the debtor does not have an “outside option” for external fnancing and when its fnancial 
and commercial self-sufciency is low (i.e., when the domestic economy relies on foreign credit).
2. Policy conditionality depends on:
a) The ability of ofcial creditors to present a unifed front: this front tend to be most unifed 
when the risk of contagion is high and the creditors' internal opposition to bailouts is low.
b) The debtor's dependence on the lender of last resort: this dependence tends to be at its 
greatest when the debtor does not have an “outside option” for external fnancing and when its 
fnancial and commercial self-sufciency is low (as above in point 1b).
3. Privileged position depends on:
a) The capacity of domestic elites to attract foreign credit: this capacity tends to be high when 
elites' material interests and ideological convictions are aligned with those of the creditors, and 
when the institutional capacity to carry out fscally “responsible” policies is in place.
b) The ability of elites to retain control over fnancial policymaking: this tends to be high when 
the legitimation crisis can be contained and fnancial policy is shielded from popular pressures.
The conditions under which the enforcement mechanisms break down:
1. Market discipline tends to break down when:
a) Private lenders fail to hold together a creditors' cartel: the cartel will be difcult to maintain 
when the debt is highly dispersed and the lending structure incentivizes free-riding;
Or when:
b) The debtor no longer depends on the creditors' cartel: the debtor has an “outside option” for 
external fnancing or it is very self-sufcient in fnancial and commercial terms.
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2. Policy conditionality breaks down when:
a) Ofcial creditors “pull the plug” on further fnancing: this will only happen when the risk of 
contagion is low and domestic opposition to further bailouts in the creditor countries is high.
Or when:
b) The debtor no longer depends on the lender of last resort: the debtor has an “outside option” 
for external fnancing or it is very self-sufcient in fnancial and commercial terms.
3. Privileged position breaks down when:
a) Domestic elites are no longer capable of attracting foreign credit: this happens when 
creditors lose trust in the debtor country's elites and cut them loose, especially if there is an 
ideological misalignment and/or a failure to satisfy bailout conditions (as a result of point 2a).
Or when:
b) Elites lose control of fnancial policymaking: this happens when the state loses the loyalty of 
its citizens as they rebel against austerity and replace the ruling elite with a pro-default coalition. 
Alternatively, a deep legitimation crisis may force elites to make far-reaching concessions.
The central hypothesis of this research is that a country is only likely to unilaterally
default on its external debts when all three enforcement mechanisms have broken down as a
result of a combination of the conditions and countervailing mechanisms spelled out above.
Alternative Hypotheses: Reputation, Sanctions, and Democratic Advantage
The alternative hypotheses that this project will have to contend with are the tradi-
tional explanations of debt compliance proposed in the economics literature and outlined in
Chapter I: (1) a government's concerns about its reputation as a borrower and its long-term
market access; (2) its fears over legal or trade sanctions; and (3) the credible commitment
generated by democratic (i.e., parliamentary, judiciary) constraints on the executive branch.
The most recent explanation, revolving around (4) spillover costs through the channel of
the debtor's fnancial system, is incorporated into the structural power hypothesis.
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Dependent and Independent Variables
The dependent variable is the policy response of a distressed sovereign borrower to an
international debt crisis. This response can take the form of (1) full and timely repayment;
(2) a negotiated debt rescheduling; (3) a negotiated debt restructuring; (4) a suspension of
payments (moratorium); and (5) a rejection of liability (repudiation). Outcomes 1-3 can all
be considered variations of debtor compliance as none of them involves unilateral action by
the debtor. Outcomes 4-5, by contrast, do constitute unilateral action by the debtor. To ease
the analysis, the outcome will therefore be considered a binary variable that can take the
value of a unilateral default or the absence of a unilateral default. The interest of this study,
broadly speaking, is in the relative absence of default and the prevalence of compliance.
The hypothesized causal factor is the structural power of fnance, defned as the
capacity of private and ofcial creditors to withhold credit upon which indebted states and
their administrators depend for their own reproduction. This structural power is exercised
through three enforcement mechanisms (the market discipline of the creditors' cartel, the
policy conditionality of the lender of last resort, and the privileged position of domestic
elites) that are in turn dependent on the variable conditions and countervailing mechanisms
spelled out in the previous section and discussed in greater detail in Chapters I and II.
Falsifability: Warding Of Confrmation Bias
The scholarly purposes of this research project can be defned as “theory-oriented
explanation” (Hall 2006). The principal goal is to contribute towards theory development
in the study of sovereign debt and the structural power of fnance; two felds of inquiry that
few scholars have so far tried to explicitly connect to one another. Beyond this, the most
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immediate objective of the three case studies under investigation is to test one hypothesis
(the structural power hypothesis, which incorporates and expands upon the spillover costs
hypothesis) and compare its validity against a set of alternative hypotheses (the reputation
hypothesis, the sanctions hypothesis and the democratic advantage hypothesis), with a par-
ticular emphasis on the specifcation of the enforcement mechanisms and the elucidation of
the exact conditions under which these are operative. With these objectives in mind, the
strict requirements of Popperian falsifcation will need to be loosened a little in favor of a
more probabilistic view of causation and research methods oriented towards structured,
focused comparison and theory development rather than hypothesis elimination per se.
Still, hypothesis testing remains an important part of this research project, and there
are a number of ways in which researchers seeking to test hypotheses in a small-N research
design can impose some discipline on themselves in order to avoid the risk of confrmation
bias. First of all, scholars can contribute to future testing of their own fndings by “deriving
predictions that are as 'brittle' as possible, against observations and other theories” (Hall
2006:27). The most central prediction of this thesis is that unilateral default will only take
place when all three enforcement mechanisms have broken down; in other words, when the
creditor cartel has disintegrated and private lenders can no longer enforce market discipline
on the debtor; when the lender of last resort is no longer able to impose conditionality; and
when domestic elites inside the debtor country lose control and can no longer fulfll their
bridging role towards foreign creditors. Given the exact conditions listed in the previous
section, these are all testable propositions.
The other way in which scholars can ward of confrmation bias is by comparing the
outcomes and developments within the case studies to predictions derived from alternative
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explanations. In doing so, special attention should be paid to elucidating the causal mecha-
nisms (or their absence) that connect the hypothesized causal variable to the observed out-
come. As Mahoney (2007:132) puts it, “when clear mechanisms linking a presumed explana-
tory variable and outcome variable are identifed, one's confdence that the relationship
really is causal is increased; if such mechanisms cannot be identifed, one's confdence about
causality is challenged.” This means that the researcher must continuously engage with the
empirical evidence in favor of the proposed hypothesis and the alternative interpretations to
which this evidence might lend itself. This thesis aims to do so by starting each chapter
with a discussion of the three alternative hypotheses, deriving a set of predictions from each
of them and testing whether the observed causal mechanisms in the case are in agreement
with what each explanation would lead us to expect. To ease this process, it will be useful to
briefy visualize the precise “causal chains” that each hypothesis would lead us to observe in
the cases. The following fowcharts provide a rough and very schematic overview of the
causal mechanisms through which the hypothesized variables would produce the expected
outcomes. Each “balloon” constitutes a moment in the causal chain and a “diagnostic” piece
of evidence that we should be able to test against the observed data.
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Figure 3.2a – trade sanctions hypothesis:
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Figure 3.3 – democratic advantage hypothesis:
Figure 3.4 – spillover costs hypothesis:
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Figure 3.5b – structural power hypothesis (continued to outcomes):
In the structural power hypothesis, as mentioned before, default will only become
an option when all three enforcement mechanisms break down. When the mechanisms do
not break down, and the structural power of creditors compels the debtor to repay, we will
– in addition to the borrower's compliance and its diminished room for maneuver – expect
at least two further outcomes: frst, we would expect crisis resolution (through an orderly
debt restructuring) to be delayed until long after the big banks and fnancial institutions of
the core countries have reduced their exposure, and for any debt negotiations to be under-
taken at the initiative of the international lenders with creditor interests frmly in mind;
and second, since the structural power of creditors and wealthy elites allows these privileged
groups to defect the costs of adjustment onto others, we would expect the popular sector –
















































burden, with foreign creditors and domestic elites emerging as winners. In the opposite case
in which the enforcement mechanisms all break down, we would expect – in addition to the
possibility of a unilateral default – a shift in the power relation between the debtor and its
creditors and between citizens (the Staatsvolk) and investors (Marktvolk), with the debtor
country pursuing a more aggressive negotiated restructuring or even a partial debt repudia-
tion, and with the burden of adjustment shared more equitably between the debtor and its
creditors, as well as between social groups in the debtor country.
Case Studies and Case Selection
This study revolves around an investigation of three substantively important and
theoretically relevant case studies: Mexico (1982-'89), Argentina (1999-'05) and Greece
(2009-'15). Before specifying this choice of cases, there is a need to address the metho-
dological issue of selection bias. In the D-N approach, there is a view – derived from the
laws of regression analysis – that one should refrain from selecting along the dependent
variable, as such non-random sampling strategies may result in bias or “systematic error”
(e.g. Héritier 2008; King, Keohane and Verba 1994). However, as some leading qualitative
methodologists have pointed out, “the specifc statistical problem of bias resulting from
selection on the dependent variable has been inappropriately applied to many comparative
historical studies” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:14; Collier and Mahoney 1996; Ragin
2008).  For Mahoney (2007:129), “many concerns about selection bias in qualitative research
are a fundamental misapplication of ideas from regression analysis to qualitative research.”
In fact, for small-N studies it is much wiser to deliberately select on the dependent
variable. Seawright and Gerring (2008:295), for instance, have noted that “serious problems
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are likely to develop if one chooses a very small sample in a completely random fashion.”
Collier and Mahoney (1996:21) have similarly stressed that “in small-N studies, random
sampling may produce more problems than it solves.” Instead, they propose theoretically-
informed non-random sampling as “an alternative approach … that deliberately produces a
sample in which the variance on the dependent variable is similar to its variance in the
larger set of cases” (ibid.; see also Mahoney 2003:351; Braumoeller and Goertz 2000). In the
end, case selection in comparative studies has the same “twin objective” as random sampling
in quantitative analysis, namely that of obtaining a representative sample and a sufcient
degree of variation in the variables of theoretical interest (Seawright and Gerring 2008:296).
The selection of cases on the basis of their outcome – the absence of default in Mexico, the
presence of default in Argentina, and Greece as a case that has been teetering between the
two for the past fve years – is therefore wholly justifed.
The Lost Decade: Mexico (1982-'89)
The frst case – the Mexican debt crisis of the 1980s – was chosen for two reasons.
First, as the frst major sovereign debt crisis of the neoliberal era, the Mexican case occurred
in a transition phase for the global political economy that is likely to be refected in the case
itself. If the three hypothesized enforcement mechanisms of debtor compliance really exist,
the Mexican case should provide us with a unique insight into how they formed, how they
contrasted to previous crises – most importantly that of the 1930s – and how they actually
afected policy outcomes. Second, in terms of its overall outcome, which was marked by the
notable absence of default, the Mexico case represents somewhat of a baseline of compli-
ance against which the two other cases can subsequently be compared. These case compari-
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sons will be particularly interesting as Mexico was considered the “model debtor” of the
1980s for its cooperative attitude vis-à-vis foreign creditors, meaning we should expect to
fnd similar policy responses – albeit in diferent political contexts – in subsequent sovereign
debt crises in Latin America and elsewhere. In terms of its outcome, the Mexican debt crisis
serves as a typical case representing the essential characteristics of neoliberal crisis manage-
ment under conditions of fnancialization (Gerring 2007).
The Great Default? Argentina (1999-'05)
Argentina's well-known sovereign default of 2001 and the broader fnancial crisis
(1999-'05) in which it occurred poses a dramatic contrast to the outcome of the Mexican
debt crisis. Where Mexico in the 1980s was a model of debtor compliance, Argentina post-
2001 is probably the clearest contemporary example of debtor defance. At the height of its
crisis, facing a devastating economic, social and political meltdown, Argentina declared the
single biggest sovereign default (amounting to $100 billion) in world history. Argentina's
default therefore poses an important puzzle: if the structural power of creditors is claimed
to be so important in prevent unilateral default, then how was Argentina able to defy its
foreign creditors in such dramatic fashion? Argentina, in this sense, can be seen as a deviant
case, fundamentally challenging the structural power hypothesis stipulated in this research
(Cooper and Momani 2005:309). And yet, as the case will demonstrate, this conclusion may
be a bit too premature: Argentina before its default was even more compliant than Mexico
in the 1980s, refusing to accept the inevitability of default even as the international fnancial
community actively pushed it to embrace this outcome. Also, as we will see, Argentina's
defant rhetoric post-default may have been targeted at the “vultures” of Wall Street, but the
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bondholders who sufered the biggest hit in the Argentine default were ordinary pensioners
in Italy and other European countries; Wall Street actually made windfall profts from the
default. Argentina is therefore better defned as a specifc subtype of the deviant case – a so-
called infuential case – which at frst glance appears to call into question or even invalidate a
theory's predictions, but which upon closer inspection actually ends up confrming that
theory: “the infuential case is the 'case that proves the rule'” (Gerring 2007:108).
The Specter of Solon: Greece (2010-'15)
Greece, fnally, can be seen as the most substantively important case study under
investigation given contemporary concerns. In terms of its (preliminary) outcome at the
time of writing, in late 2015, Greece is a remarkable case of debtor compliance. For fve
years, the country's policy response was marked by an unwavering commitment to conti-
nued debt servicing and an absolute refusal to take unilateral action – even if the policy
conditions of its bailout loans were not always met, and even if a leftist government briefy
(and unsuccessfully) challenges its creditors in the frst half of 2015. The “socialization” of
Greece's debt between 2010 and 2012 meant that taxpayers in the creditor countries, rather
than Greece's original private lenders, will be forced to pick up the bill of any future default
or restructuring. Greece is interesting for the purposes of this study because it combines a
number of salient elements of the Argentine case (notably its dependence on bond fnance
and the strong popular opposition to debt repayment and austerity from below) without re-
producing the Argentine outcome of a default. As such, it presents an important puzzle:
why did Greece, which at a superfcial level appears to resemble Argentina, not suspend its







The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s was the frst major international debt
crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. While the episode displayed a remarkable
degree of similarity to its predecessor in terms of its underlying economic dynamics, the
policy response could not have been more diferent (Marichal 1989). In the 1930s, virtually
all Latin American debtors – except Argentina – unilaterally suspended payments on their
foreign obligations and, after insisting on a lengthy moratorium, forced highly coercive
debt restructurings onto foreign bondholders. Although the defaults of the 1930s may have
been costly in the short term, the economic recovery was relatively rapid and the burden of
adjustment borne mostly by foreign lenders (Bertola and Ocampo 2012:13). In this respect,
the response to the Great Depression mirrored the established pattern of pre-war crisis
management, in which the imposition of unilateral moratoriums by crisis-ridden peripheral
borrowers was considered “normal and part of the rules of the game” (Ocampo 2013).
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The crisis of the 1980s, by contrast, was marked by a striking absence of unilateral
default.22 Instead, the international fnancial community engaged in a concerted efort to
reschedule the amortization of principal, refnance maturing debts and prevent a unilateral
suspension of interest. The result of this debt strategy was a protracted economic downturn
with extreme social costs. Poverty rates on the continent climbed sharply and hit nearly 50
percent by the end of the decade (Bertola and Ocampo 2012:18). In 1989, Mexico's GNP
was still 11 percent lower than it had been at the start of the crisis, while some 15 million
Mexicans had been born in the intervening period. As millions saw their jobs vanish, the
1980s became known as la década perdida: the lost decade. By the 1990s, a new norm of
crisis management thus seemed to be frmly entrenched: all debts must be repaid, regardless
of the social, political and economic costs for the borrowing country (Oliveri 1992:2). US
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan summarized the rules of the game thus: “I don't think we
should let a country of the hook just because they are having difculty. As debtors, I think
they should be made to pay as much as they can bear without breaking them. You just can't
let your heart rule your head in these situations” (cited in Quirk 1983:10).
This chapter is driven by a simple research question: what explains the remarkable
and unprecedented degree of compliance with this new norm in the 1980s?23 Building on a
case study of Mexico, which remained at the heart of the debt storm and at the forefront of
the fnancial frefghting for most of the decade, it aims to show that the conventional expla-
nations outlined in Chapter I (that the relative absence of default is the result of either long-
22 “The option of unilateral action (leading to default or extended moratoria) has not been ofcially adopted
by any major debtor since 1982” (Grifth-Jones 1988:7-8).
23 “The key questions become: why have the governments of the big Latin American debtors been so
reluctant to build up a debt strategy based on default? And why have the governments of the smaller
nations been so slow to create an efective debtors' cartel that would give them the collective leverage to
default?” (Branford and Kucinski 1988:133).
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term reputational concerns, a fear of legal or trade sanctions, or a democratic commitment
to creditor rights) appears to be rather thin; in many respects the evidence contradicts them
all. Instead, a closer look at the Mexican debt crisis reveals a disconcerting picture about the
growing power of an international creditors' cartel; the steady evolution of the IMF into a
full-fedged fscal disciplinarian and “global capitalist planner”; and the complex ways in
which Mexico's dependence on foreign credit strengthened the hands of a bankers' alliance
whose loyalties clearly lay with domestic elites and foreign creditors. In this sense, the year
1982 marked a watershed in the evolution of the global political economy not only because
it revealed for the frst time how successful the creditors had become in averting default and
avoiding losses, but especially because it helped to cement the enforcement mechanisms of
debtor compliance that continue to undergird the structural power of fnance today.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The frst weighs the evidence in favor of the
conventional explanations of debtor compliance. The second explores the hypothesized
enforcement mechanisms that are at the heart of the theoretical argument of this thesis. The
third aims to connect these enforcement mechanisms to the outcomes of the crisis. The
conclusion briefy considers possible alternative interpretations for the evidence presented.
Reputation Hypothesis
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A central premise of the reputation hypothesis is that reliable debtors with a history
of repayment are able to borrow on better terms than unreliable debtors with a history of
default. In its original formulation by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), the theory assumes that
defaulters are permanently excluded from international capital markets. While this clearly
did not materialize in the case of the Latin American defaulters of the 1930s, a slightly less
restrictive formulation of the hypothesis would still lead us to expect a signifcant diference
in risk premiums between past defaulters and non-defaulters (Tomz 2007). As we already
saw in Chapter II, however, the empirical data and academic consensus are unambiguous on
this point: Argentina, which did not default during the 1930s, borrowed on similar terms in
the 1970s as its defaulting neighbors did (Jorgensen and Sachs 1989). As in the 1920s, Latin
America shared equally in the 1970s lending boom, irrespective of past repayment records
(Eichengreen and Portes 1988a; 1988b; Lindert and Morton 1989). With a vast surplus of
petrodollars fowing through the global fnancial system and international investors hungry
for lucrative investment opportunities, the lenders were eager to forget the continent's pre-
war history. What mattered was the immediate prospect of easy profts.24
This myopic investor attitude was perhaps most clearly expressed in the statement
by Citibank CEO Walter Wriston, just before the crisis broke out, that investors need not
fear default since “countries do not go bankrupt.” Mexico's Director of Public Credit and
24 Even Cuba was able to accumulate a debt of $3.2 billion to non-US banks and Western governments. As
Kaletsky (1985:88) notes, “Cuba's ability to borrow as much per head as Indonesia or Thailand, in a
period of twenty years after a major debt repudiation and foreign asset confscation, provides an eloquent
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current OECD Secretary General Angel Gurría recounts that “the banks were hot to get in
… They showed no foresight. They didn't do any credit analysis. It was wild … We just
issued promissory notes. We were selling them like hotcakes” (cited in Kraft 1984:19/35).25
For foreign creditors, “the prospect of default seemed too extraordinary to consciously
consider” (Oliveri 1992:16). Mexico's wealthy elite were similarly unfazed: “Rather than
alarming the local bourgeoisie,” Branford and Kucinski (1988:48) noted, “the mushrooming
foreign debt reassured them, cementing their alliance with international capital.”
A further observation that the reputation hypothesis would lead us to expect is a
demonstrable concern among policymakers that their country might lose long-term market
access in the event of a default – which would in turn require evidence of policymakers
working with considerable foresight and a visible appreciation of the consequences of their
actions stretching far into the future and even beyond their own political mandates. This
investigation did not uncover any evidence of such long-term considerations or political
foresight. Instead, in the heady days of June and July 1982, when Mexico was closest to
default, short-term concerns about the government's liquidity seemed to predominate over
abstract considerations about long-term market access. With the future heavily discounted
against the urgent need to obtain sufcient foreign exchange to keep servicing obligations
falling due the next day, Mexico's fscal policy efectively became a race against the clock.
As Finance Minister Jesús Silva Herzog recounts, in mid-1982 Mexican government ofcials
were confronted with a “dramatic and recurrent reality” in which crucial decisions on how
to obtain and spend critical resources were made on a day-to-day basis: “Tomorrow we have
to pay $40 million to cover maturities due to banks X and Y; and we have only half of that
25 In 1980, an international banker told Institutional Investor that “maybe no one's making a fortune here
any longer, but you've got to be in Mexico. This is where the action is” (cited in Aggarwal 1996:158).
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amount. We need to borrow $20 million at twenty-four or forty-eight-hour terms from
bank Z to cover our fnancial obligations. We will see, afterwards, how we solve the prob-
lem for the day after tomorrow” (Silva Herzog 1991:55).
This short-termism was not just a product of the lack of foresight among Mexico's
highly sophisticated fnancial policymakers; instead, it appears to have been at least in part
the product of the structure of international lending and the country's debt profle itself.
Following the Volcker shock a few years prior, Mexican banks, businesses and households –
fearing an impending devaluation – had begun to move vast sums of money out of the
country, greatly depressing the central bank's foreign exchange reserves. By the end of July
1982, the Bank of Mexico was losing up to $200-$300 million in foreign currency reserves a
day. Silva Herzog remarks that “what entered the country one day went out the following
day.” Between 1973 and 1982, Mexico's total assets abroad increased by $26 billion, as a
result of which the Bank of Mexico had to borrow ever greater sums to be able to replenish
its foreign exchange reserves (Gurría 1995b:191). In 1981 alone, the public debt soared from
$55 to $80 billion. Investors, increasingly concerned about the sustainability of Mexico's
towering debt load, refused to extend further multi-year credit. As a result, interest rates
shot up and maturities on new debt shortened dramatically. At the start of the year, only 5
percent of Mexico's debt had been due within a year; by the end of 1981 that amount had
risen to 22 percent. As bankers became increasingly wary of lending long-term, almost all
the new money came in the form of six-month loans or less (Kraft 1984:35).
Far from being able to worry about the long-term consequences of their actions,
Mexican policymakers thus found themselves compelled by market forces to keep running
just to stay in the same place, doubling down on their bets simply to pay of their old debts.
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At the same time, both in Mexico and abroad, the crisis was deliberately being construed –
by economists and policymakers alike – as a problem of illiquidity as opposed to a problem
of insolvency (e.g. Cline 1983). This dominant interpretation lent itself very conveniently
to an ofcial policy response emphasizing short-term adjustment, a temporary rescheduling
of maturities, and the disbursement of international emergency loans to bridge the fscal
gap; in other words, precisely the type of short-term solutions favored by proft-maximizing
foreign investors and domestic elites. As Silva Herzog (1991:54) himself later confrmed, “it
was never considered, by any of the participants, that the problem was of a diferent charac-
ter, with structural or more long-term elements.”
Sanctions Hypothesis
Figure 4.2a – trade mechanism:
Reputation concerns therefore do not appear to have ofered a credible regime in the
Mexican case or in the Latin American debt crisis more generally. If policymakers were
instead driven by a fear of creditor sanctions, as Bulow and Rogof (1989) have argued, we
should expect either explicit threats of such direct legal or trade action, or – if we accept
that such threats may be implicit rather than explicit – we should at least be able to see such
sanctions carried out against those debtors that took a more confrontational stance, firting
with default like Argentina and Peru did. Again, this investigation has found no evidence
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for either proposition. There was certainly never any explicit threat of US trade sanctions
against Mexico; in fact, the nature of the relationship between the two remained extremely
cooperative throughout the crisis and it was clear to all actors involved that the US govern-
ment only stood to harm its own economy by imposing import and export restrictions on
one of its most important international trading partners. Mexican policymakers themselves
did not display any demonstrable fears that the US would impose trade sanctions, and the
US never pursued or threatened to pursue trade sanctions against Argentina or Peru.
Figure 4.2b – legal mechanism:
Similarly, legal sanctions by private creditors were unlikely to compel countries to
repay since any creditor victory in court would still be impossible to enforce in practice. As
an infuential Financial Times commentator noted, “bankers' hopes – and borrowers' fears –
that crippling costs could be imposed on recalcitrant debtor countries through court action
appear to be greatly exaggerated” (Kaletsky 1985:21). Of course it is impossible to confrm
what would have transpired in the counterfactual case of a unilateral Mexican default, but it
is clear that the countries that did temporarily pursue unilateral action did not really face
legal reprisals from their creditors afterwards. By 1988, for instance, a leading scholar of the
Latin American debt crisis observed that “the Peruvian experience has shown that after two
years of unilateral action no legal response has come from the creditor banks to confscate
assets or other drastic measures; the only cost of the unilateral action, as regards creditor
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same absence of legal sanctions can be observed in Argentina, in spite of the country's brief
period of non-compliance under its new democratically-elected president in 1984.
Democratic Advantage Hypothesis
Figure 4.3 – institutional mechanism:
If reputation and sanctions did not provide an efective regime of debt repayment, as
North and Weingast (1989) were already arguing by the end of the decade, then what about
the supposed virtues of liberal democracy? The democratic advantage hypothesis would
lead us to expect two things. First, we should observe mechanisms whereby the classical
institutions of liberal democracy – strong parliaments, powerful central banks, independent
courts – systematically constrain the options of the executive and compel it, through voter
preferences and the rule of law, to credibly commit to its fnancial obligations (Schultz and
Weingast 2003). Second, and as a result of the former, we should expect to fnd greater com-
pliance by democratic countries and an increased likelihood of contract abrogation by non-
democratic regimes. Instead, we fnd the opposite to be the case on both counts. As it turns
out, there is a broad consensus that Mexico's authoritarian one-party regime, dominated by
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“the perfect dictatorship,” ofered “the richest example of cooperation from a Latin Ameri-
can borrower” (Oliveri 1992:163/5). The country had a powerful executive and virtually no
democratic checks and balances, yet it was precisely these non-democratic institutions that
endowed it with the capacity to systematically shield fscal policy from popular opposition
to repayment (Bailey and Cohen 1987). Moreover, through a dual strategy of repression and
co-optation, the governments of Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas actively prevented
the emergence of an organized anti-austerity coalition (Middlebrook 1989). As a result, pro-
default voices were efectively excluded from the public debate and from policymaking, and
the PRI remained immune from electoral pressures over the national debt.
Meanwhile Argentina, following its democratic transition in 1982-'83, did exactly
the opposite of what North and Weingast's credible commitment theory would lead us to
expect. After the fall of the military junta, the country briefy took a considerably more
confrontational stance vis-à-vis foreign creditors. Upon assuming ofce in December 1983,
President Alfolsín immediately declared a six-month moratorium on interest payments and
began to openly call for the formation of a Latin American debtors' cartel to pressure
foreign creditors into ofering better terms (Roddick 1988:49). Lamenting that “the debt of
Argentina and of other Latin American nations is the product of perverse mechanisms that
lend us money in order that we do not develop ourselves,” Alfolsín declared that “we are
not going to pay our debt by making our people hungry” (cited in Berg 1984:4). For the
newly elected president, democratic responsibility meant that “the state cannot bow to
international fnancial groups or privileged local groups.” Scholars recognized Argentina as
“the single most resistant debtor in international fnance” (Oliveri 1989:163). In a direct
rebuttal of North and Weingast's democratic advantage hypothesis, Kaufman (1985:474) has
noted that “the newly democratic government of Argentina … was by far the most defant,
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[while] Mexico's party-based authoritarian regime has been most compliant.” For their
part, the creditors did not appear to be very enthusiastic about Latin America's recent wave
of democratization either. After meeting with Argentina's new, democratically accountable
negotiators, one senior US banker complained that “we expected to get facts and fgures, a
detailed picture of the country's medium- to long-term economic plans. All we got were
some platitudes about Argentina's new democracy” (cited in Tussie 1988:293).
Spillover Costs Hypothesis
Figure 4.4 – spillover mechanism:
If the conventional explanations of debtor compliance do not seem to hold much
water, then what about the more recently proposed spillover costs hypothesis? This theory
would lead us to expect demonstrable concerns among policymakers over the consequences
of default on the wider economy. There is some elementary evidence for this. Rather than
fretting about long-term capital market access, direct creditor sanctions or democratic con-
straints on contract abrogation, Mexico's policymakers themselves claimed to be most con-
cerned about the immediate consequences that default would have on access to short-term
credit, private sector confdence and international trade. In his written account of the crisis,
Finance Minister Silva Herzog (1991:58) observed that “a suspension of payments is always
an attractive alternative for debtors; but for Mexico, in those months, the alternative had
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some serious risks.” Citing the fact that Mexico imported 30 percent of its domestic con-
sumption of corn – the country's main food staple – from the US and that his government
feared losing access to trade credit, and citing furthermore the facts that Mexican industry
remained “highly dependent on imports”; that the imposition of a unilateral moratorium
would “run counter” to Mexico's dependence on foreign resources; that such a moratorium
would likely trigger greater private sector uncertainty; and that “a condition of autarky”
produced by a failure to service the country's towering debts “would have gone against the
growing interdependence among nations,” the Finance Minister seemed to frmly underline
the crippling knock-on consequences that a state default would have on overall economic
performance (Silva Herzog 1991:58). Gurría highlighted similar concerns in an interview,
citing as the frst and foremost consideration of the Finance Ministry's crisis management
team “the loss of access to short-term credit,” alongside the danger that a default would cut
of investment fows to the private sector and threaten the steady supply of corn from the
United States. After all, the former Director of Public Credit and current OECD Secretary-
General emphasized, access to credit is the “bread and butter of trade” (Gurría 2013).
These considerations were the product of deliberations made in a small crisis team
convoked by Silva Herzog in June 1982. The crisis team, made up Angel Gurría (Director
of Public Credit), Miguel Mancera (Director of the Bank of Mexico) and Alfredo Phillips
(Deputy Director of the Bank) was instructed by the Finance Minister to weigh the “pros
and cons” of Mexico's diferent policy options. The three men were all deeply concerned
about Mexico's access to short-term credit from foreign banks. As Angel Gurría recalled,
“it was crazy. We held in our hands the fate of Mexico, maybe the fate of the world. But we
couldn't talk to anybody. We couldn't even ask lawyers what to do. If we hired an Ameri-
can lawyer, he'd blab, and the banks would stop all loans” (cited in Kraft 1984:3-4). It later
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emerged that the secret crisis team had discussed three policy options. The frst was to defy
foreign lenders and declare an outright suspension of payments on all or part of the govern-
ment's current obligations. “That was like the atom bomb, the ultimate weapon,” Phillips
recounted (ibid.). For Silva Herzog, this weapon “was not an option.” Instead, the Finance
Minister pledged that “Mexico would behave as a responsible debtor” (Babb 2001:21). Why
so? When pressed on the question, Angel Gurría once again highlighted the fear that the
government and private sector would be cut of from foreign credit and investment: “if we
defaulted everybody would be bankrupt, but it would also stop capital infows to Mexico”
(Gurría 2013). Silva Herzog remembers that “we asked ourselves the question what happens
if we say, 'No dice. We just won't pay,'” and notes that “there were some partisans of that.”
But in the end, defaulting on the debt “didn't make any sense” to Silva Herzog (cited in
Kraft 1984:4). Angel Gurría (2013) summarized the general consensus of the crisis team as
follows: “our logic was simple: there can be no default.”
Mexico was particularly vulnerable to the spillover costs of default because of its
relatively deep fnancial and commercial integration and its dependence on investment and
imports from the United States in particular. As Aggarwal (1996:363) has noted, Mexico's
“economic recovery depended on trade and foreign investment,” and the country's position
“was further weakened by its dependence upon maintaining amicable relations with the
international fnancial community.” A particular weak spot in this sense was the position of
the Mexican banking system, which had played an important role in intermediating inter-
national loans to the Mexican government and which was very vulnerable to the spillover
costs of a sovereign default. As Alvarez (2014:1) has recently shown, “the imbalances which
Mexican banks incurred in running their international operations eventually brought them
to the brink of bankruptcy once the crisis began. Given that the banks that were at risk
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represented a large share of the domestic market, … the whole Mexican banking system was
threatened with collapse.” Alvarez (2014:26) furthermore shares archival evidence showing
“that the fragility of the commercial banks and their overseas branches was a major worry
for the Mexican fnancial authorities.” As a result, during the frenzied days of June and July
1982 – and for the eight years to follow – the principal objective of the fnance ministry and
central bank was to avert the spillover efects that default would have had for the domestic
banking system and on the ability of the public sector and the private sector to trade and to
borrow. The consequences of a credit cut-of would have been profoundly destabilizing for
the Mexican economy, but they would have been particularly painful for the local elite.
“Certainly a moratorium was discussed,” Silva Herzog (1991:59) concluded, “but it was
rejected. We decided to negotiate and avoid confrontation.”
Enforcement Mechanisms
Mexico's growing dependence on foreign sources of credit and its vulnerability to
creditor demands was in turn rooted in a number of structural changes in the global
political economy. Three changes in particular stand out. First, at the level of international
lending, the dispersed bond fnance of the 1930s had by the 1960s and 1970s given way to
highly centralized creditor syndicates whose international lending was overwhelmingly co-
ordinated by big Wall Street banks. This high concentration of Third World debt provided
a solution to the collective action problems that had plagued the dispersed bondholders of
the gold standard era, facilitating the emergence of a coherent international creditors' cartel.
Second, at the level of the global fnancial architecture, the IMF had been brought into
existence and was tasked with international crisis management. In the 1980s, the IMF's role
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changed dramatically as the Fund sought to re-establish its standing and reinvent its purpose
in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime. Over the course of the crisis, the
IMF developed into a de facto international lender of last resort to keep crisis-ridden debtors
in the lending game, while simultaneously serving as a fscal disciplinarian to enforce policy
conditionality and a “global capitalist planner” to corral the commercial banks into their
international creditors' cartel and induce them to act in their collective self-interest. Third,
at the level of the borrowing countries themselves, the growing dependence of governments
on foreign sources of credit and investment had important consequences for their domestic
political economy, empowering social groups that were already relatively integrated into the
world economy at the expense of the less mobile groups that remained more popular and
national in character. Efectively, this meant that wealthy domestic elites with orthodox
policy preferences gained in strength compared to workers, peasants and the unemployed.
The result of these three structural changes was to signifcantly increase the power of
fnancial interests domestically and abroad. As Lipson (1981:606) pointed out early on, the
implicit threat of losing “continued access to credit,” whether from international banks,
fnancial institutions or domestic elites, created a set of “stable expectations that debts are to
be serviced promptly if there is any economic possibility of doing so.” If the theory of
structural power is correct, we should therefore expect two diferent sets of observations in
the Mexican case. First, at the level of processes, we should expect to fnd evidence of the
three enforcement mechanisms resulting from the structural changes outlined above: the
changed structure of lending should ease the formation of an international creditors' cartel
and strengthen market discipline; the emergence of the IMF as lender of last resort should
make it easier to enforce policy conditionality and induce private creditors to act in their
collective self-interest; and the international bridging role fulflled by domestic elites should
125
systematically strengthen an anti-default coalition with close ties to foreign creditors, thus
helping to internalize fscal discipline into the debtor's state apparatus. Second, at the level
of outcomes, we should expect to see little room for unilateral action by Mexico and other
debtors (i.e., high cost of non-compliance); a generalized absence of default or restructuring
until after a signifcant reduction of exposure by the international banks; and a distribution
of adjustment costs that has domestic elites and foreign creditors emerging as clear winners
from the debt game. The following sections will test the evidence for each of these points.
Syndicated Lending and the International Creditors' Cartel
Figure 4.5 – market discipline mechanism:
The frst major diference between the Great Depression and the Latin American
debt crisis lay in the structure of international lending and in the emergence of syndicated
bank loans as the principal source of external fnance for developing country governments.
Whereas the lenders of the 1920s had been scattered groups of individual bondholders, who
were notoriously vulnerable to collective action problems and who often failed to sustain a
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in turn organized into international lending syndicates revolving around a small circle of
systemically important and politically infuential Wall Street banks (Grifth-Jones 1988:6).
This led to an extraordinarily high degree of debt concentration in a small number of US
fnancial institutions, which were in turn dangerously over-exposed to Third World debt. In
1982, Mexico's debt alone stood at $82 billion and amounted to 44 percent of the capital of
the nine largest US banks, with some institutions holding a sum of Mexican debt equivalent
to or in excess of their total capital base (Kraft 1984:9; Sachs and Huizinga 1987:555). The
total exposure of these same banks to the 17 largest developing countries stood at a total
194 percent of their combined capital (Cline 1995:6-7). As late as 1987, the six largest Wall
Street banks still accounted for more than half of the total developing country exposure in
the United States fnancial system (Claessens, Diwan and Fernandez-Arias 1992:132).
The fact that the debt concentration was so high and that creditor interests in full
repayment were now structurally interlocked by the very nature of syndicated lending
greatly eased the ability of the big banks not only to establish common positions amongst
themselves but also to enlist the support and allegiance of smaller banks and non-bank
creditors. As Aggarwal (1987:21) notes, “the oligopolistic nature of the banking community
and the acute overexposure of large banks facilitated cooperation.” Having already begun to
perceive themselves as international banks with “longstanding ties to other major institu-
tions and permanent interests in the stable operation of international capital markets,” the
lenders of the 1980s found it much easier to coordinate collective action than the bond-
holders of the 1930s (Lipson 1985:210). And by managing to hold together a coherent
creditors' cartel, the banks made the threat of cutting of short-term credit that much more
credible, as it would be next to impossible for sovereign borrowers to secure alternative
sources of fnance in the event of default (Oliveri 1992:61/72). This served to strengthen
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market discipline and signifcantly constrain the policy options available to the borrowing
countries (Devlin and Ffrench-Davies 1995:129).
The growing power of creditors was further cemented by their very approach to
crisis management. As one Latin American country after another fell into arrears on their
amortization schedules after July 1982, creditors embarked on a complex set of negotiations
with debtor country governments to reschedule principal payments, refnance outstanding
debts, and ensure the continued servicing of interest. The central tenet in these negotiations
was that each country was individually responsible for its own fscal problems and each
crisis should therefore be dealt with on an individual, case-by-base basis (Teichman 2001:49).
While considered a logical and inconsequential self-evidence by the bankers themselves, it
has rightly been pointed out that the “case-by-case approach wasn't innocent at all” (Tussie
2013). In reality, it served to isolate the borrowing countries and diminish their capacity to
organize collective action, thereby precluding the formation of an opposing debtors' cartel
and frustrating collective eforts to play private the creditors of against one another (Canak
1989:20). The result, as one expert on the international debt crisis of the 1980s has recently
noted, was the informal institutionalization of a fundamentally unequal power relation that
made it “much more difcult to call a moratorium in the 1980s” than in the 1930s (Stallings
2013). In efect, by 1982, “creditor clubs ha[d] successfully replaced unilateral default with
multilateral debt consolidation” (Lipson 1981:622).
This highly unequal power relation between debtors and creditors in turn found an
expression in the growing despair of the Latin American leaders. President José Sarney of
Brazil described his sense of powerlessness in stark terms: “we cannot destroy the system,”
he said. “We can scratch it, but it can destroy us” (cited in Roodman 2006:16-17). In the case
128
of Mexico, this powerlessness was compounded by the country's great dependence on inter-
national credit and the import of corn from the United States (as discussed in the previous
section). President López Portillo lamented that “my hand is on the helm of the ship, but I
cannot direct the storm” (cited in Kraft 1984:39). By the start of 1982, Mexico found itself
under intensifying market pressures, and in April López Portillo was compelled by market
discipline to produce a stringent austerity budget even in the absence of the IMF.
The IMF: Fiscal Disciplinarian and “Global Capitalist Planner”
Figure 4.5 – market discipline mechanism:
But market discipline was not enough. As interest rates soared, maturities shortened
and capital fight spiraled out of control, the bankers' main source of power now threatened
to undermine itself. Mexico and the other Latin American debtors were at risk of being cut
of from short-term credit and thereby rendered incapable of refnancing their outstanding
obligations. This in turn sparked fears in Washington and New York of an impending US
banking crisis. According to one White House ofcial, Chairman Paul Volcker of the US
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both President Reagan and Treasury Secretary Regan to take action (Lissakers 1983:164). In
a later study, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York wrote that “bankers and policymakers
faced a threat of fnancial disorder on a global scale not seen since the Great Depression” in
case Mexico or another major Third World debtor were to default on its obligations (cited
in Helleiner 1994:176). In response, the administration began to pressure Congress to raise
the US contribution to the International Monetary Fund and at the same time insisted that
further loans be made conditional on highly punitive reforms inside the debtor countries to
ensure the uninterrupted fow of interest payments. The continued payment of interest was
crucial because under US regulations the banks were required to write down any 90-day
arrears on interest payments as 'non-performing' loans, which in turn would require them
to make loan-loss provisions, cutting into their overall proft rates. For this reason the US
made the prevention of a Mexican default the pivot around which its Latin American crisis
management strategy was to revolve for the rest of the decade (Bailey and Cohen 1987:24).
As the crisis of the 1980s unfolded, the IMF came to play an increasingly central role
both as a fscal disciplinarian of the debtor countries and as a “global capitalist planner” at
the head of the international creditors' cartel. This marks another clear contrast to the
1930s, when there was no IMF and no hegemonic power willing or able to act as a lender of
last resort and enforcer of bondholder interests (Kindleberger 1973). Yet the importance of
the Fund was not so much a product of the scale of its lending – which remained relatively
small throughout the crisis – but rather hinged on the fact that both creditor governments
and private banks almost always insisted on an IMF Standby Agreement before opening
rescheduling negotiations with the debtors (Wood 1984:705). By making the Fund's stamp
of approval a prerequisite for an agreement with the banks, the creditors' cartel provided
the IMF with a gatekeeper function that allowed it to threaten debtors with immediate
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capital market exclusion in the event of non-compliance (Delamaide 1984:111). This is how
the IMF came to play its new and central role in the crisis despite its relatively modest
fnancial contributions in terms of total bailout funds: “It is the catalysing efect of IMF
agreements which gives the fund its real powers... [T]he loans negotiated after an IMF
agreement are far greater than the IMF loan itself” (Körner, Maass et al. 1986:65).
A major turning point came during the annual IMF meeting on November 16, 1982,
when Managing Director Jacques de Larosière told an assembled group of bankers that the
Fund was no longer capable of shouldering the enormous burden of re-capitalizing Mexico
by itself, and informed them that if they did not raise another $5 billion in new loans to the
country, the Fund would refuse to sign a crucial stabilization agreement with the Mexican
government. Since this would immediately force Mexico into default and thereby possibly
push dozens of banks into bankruptcy, the seemingly casual statement really amounted to
an unprecedented order: lend or die (Lipson 1985:223; Delamaide 1984:112). Although the
bankers were initially shocked and outraged by the IMF's sudden and unexpected shift
towards “concerted lending,” they quickly realized that they had little choice in the matter.
While it was in the narrow self-interest of each bank to withhold further credit and reduce
its exposure, the sum of these seemingly rational investor decisions risked tipping Mexico
into insolvency – an outcome that would end up harming all creditors. As Grifth-Jones
(1988:3) observed, “'involuntary lending' was in the interest of the collective of creditors,
because it avoided default.” The banks in efect needed the IMF to counteract the logic of
the free market – which would have resulted in creditors pulling out of Mexico en masse –
and help keep their creditors' cartel together. “In a capital-scarce world,” Pastor (1989:91)
concluded, “the IMF became a sort of global capitalist planner.”
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Perhaps the most important contribution of the IMF, however, was its function as a
fnancial watchdog capable of imposing and enforcing strict policy conditionality on the
debtors. As Citibank chairman Walter Wriston confrmed, “the fundamental contribution
of the Fund is the discipline imposed on debtor countries, not the amount it lends” (cited in
Bernal 1982:82). Former IMF Managing Director Johannes Witteveen agreed, calling the
Fund a “disciplinary mechanism” for indebted states that have lost their creditworthiness
(cited in Delamaide 1984:221). Despite the inconvenience of concerted lending, the bankers
were therefore quite happy to go along with a greatly empowered IMF. Past experience
played an important role in convincing them of the need for a strong lender of last resort.
As Roddick (1988:38) pointed out, “the banks had already learned from their experience of
negotiating the Polish debt in 1981 the importance of an efective bankers' cartel, and from
their attempts to control Peruvian economic policies in 1978 the importance of having the
IMF as a watchdog with real teeth to monitor Third World economies.” Between 1976 and
'78, a number of Wall Street banks had tried to organize a rescheduling of Peru's debt,
without IMF involvement, conditional upon an austerity program designed and monitored
by the banks themselves. As Delamaide (1984:63) writes, “the experiment failed decisively.”
Peru's economy collapsed, budget targets were faunted, the debt spiraled out of control,
and the banks were accused of “Wall Street imperialism.” Having burnt their fngers once,
the bankers “drew the lesson that commercial banks could not impose conditionality, only
the IMF could” (Lipson 1981:623).26 And so the banks – content to let others do the dirty
26 As Karl Otto Poehl, West-Germany's governor to the IMF, put it around the same time: “the IMF is our
only hope. It is the only institution that can lend money and impose conditions for doing so. No
government can do this, nor any bank” (cited in Branford and Kucinski 1988:18). Similarly, the Vice-
President of the Bank of Canada argued that “there certainly is a need for [the IMF] to be in there, as a
lender and as a disciplinarian and that's the thing all of us like about the IMF. They, perhaps like no one
else, can make conditions on loans, which ensures some tightening of the belt” (cited in Roddick 1988:44).
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work – decided to retreat to the wings, “leaving the IMF center stage to face the barrage of
criticism” (Branford and Kucinski 1988:111).
Given its central role in administering policy conditionality and thereby preventing
default, it is no surprise that private creditors generally hailed what one banker referred to
as “the IMF's triumphant return” in the 1980s (cited in Leslie 1983:24). This constituted a
remarkable reversal in the Fund's fortunes compared to the capital-abundant conditions of
the 1970s: where in the late 1970s global capital markets had been awash with cheap credit,
leaving the IMF increasingly incapable of enforcing policy conditionality on its borrowers
(who could simply ignore the Fund and turn to the markets to refnance their outstanding
obligations), by the 1980s the severe global credit contraction put the IMF in a position of
unprecedented power. The proportion of upper credit tranche IMF lending under conditio-
nality increased from under one-third to 96 percent between 1973 and '83 (Pastor 1989:91).
By 1984, a total of 66 developing countries – over half the IMF's member countries in the
Global South and three out of four Latin American members – had fallen under IMF policy
conditionality (Chahoud 1991:31). As IMF chief de Larosière himself put it, “adjustment is
now virtually universal ... Never before has there been such an extensive yet convergent
adjustment efort” (cited in Wood 1984:706). At the same time, the World Bank stepped up
the conditionality of its aid as well, mostly through the expansion of structural adjustment
lending and the creation of the Special Action Program, providing rapid disbursements of
emergency credit in return for structural reforms. According to some, the World Bank's
conditionality was “arguably more demanding than the Fund's” (Wood 1984:707).
The imposition of policy conditionality and the coordinating role of the Bretton
Woods institutions – backed by the US Treasury and Federal Reserve – thus served as a
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crucial enforcement mechanism of fscal discipline, without which the debt could not have
been repaid. The Mexican case reveals just how important the Fund had become in preven-
ting unilateral default. When Silva Herzog met Jacques de Larosière on August 13, on the
fateful “Mexican weekend” lauding the start of the Latin American debt crisis, the latter
expressed his willingness to help but insisted, in the words of ofcial IMF historian James
Boughton (2001:290), that “Mexico would have to fnd a way to avoid defaulting on its
debts.” In a sign that preventing default had now become the Fund's overarching policy
objective, de Larosière informed Silva Herzog that the IMF could only provide him with
fnancial assistance “if the government stayed current on its interest payments and reached
agreement with its creditors regarding the rescheduling of principal payments”; a condition
that prompted Karin Lissakers – a US Treasury ofcial and later IMF Executive Director –
to accuse the Fund of acting as an “enforcer of the banks' loan contracts” and imposing
austerity on Mexico with the narrow objective of “free[ing] foreign exchange in order to
service debts” (Boughton 2001:290-291; Lissakers 1983:167).
In the same meeting, de Larosière told Silva Herzog to adopt far-reaching austerity
measures “to convince the outside world, particularly the banks, that the Mexican economy
would indeed soon be set on the path of return to order and stability” (Teichman 2001:48).
De Larosière's parting words to the Mexican Finance Minister said it all: “don't do anything
unilaterally” (cited in Kraft 1984:7). “The IMF adjustment program,” the Fund's Managing
Director later refected, “was the anchor of everything else” (cited in Kraft 1984:8).
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The Bridging Role of Mexico's Bankers' Alliance
Figure 4.7 – privileged position mechanism:
It would be all too easy to conclude on the basis of the above discussion that Mexico
was forced by external powers – the international creditors' cartel, the US government and
the international fnancial institutions – to keep servicing its debts. Such an interpretation,
however tempting given the available evidence, would nevertheless be too simplistic. In fact,
Mexico's deepening integration into global fnancial markets and its growing dependence
on foreign credit had major implications for its domestic balance of power, bringing back to
the surface a number of long-standing political conficts in which the political and fnancial
groups that maintained close ties to foreign creditors and shared their interest in austerity,
reform and full debt repayment, gradually found their position strengthened vis-à-vis those
who retained a degree of loyalty towards the popular sector.27 The reason these more ortho-
dox elites were strengthened was because they were seen to be more capable of attracting
cheap credit and providing a bridging role to the international fnancial establishment.
27 “In economies very open in their capital fows, with a very internationalised entrepreneurial class, there
are additional (domestic) constraints imposed on government policy – to those coming from the policy
conditionality attached to the IMF or World Bank lending, and to the broader constraints on growth
posed by the limited availability of foreign exchange and of domestic savings” (Grifth-Jones 1988:356).
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The orthodox elites revolved around the politically infuential circle of Mexico City
bankers and the big industrial exporters of Monterrey who depended on them for credit, as
well as their allies in the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Mexico. This class coalition of
sorts, which Maxfeld (1990) referred to as the “bankers' alliance,” was central to the eforts
of the Mexican government to refnance its internal debt, stem capital fight and revamp pri-
vate investment. As the government moved ahead with IMF-sponsored capital account libe-
ralization, the lucky Mexicans who owned capital could move it to the United States, where
they would hold it in bank accounts, real estate investments or stock exchange portfolios,
safe and immune from infation and seemingly endless devaluations. The option of reloca-
tion and the credible exit threat that these elites thereby obtained gave them considerably
more leverage in economic policymaking. Moreover, it was precisely the integration of this
wealthy elite into the US banking system that made it so unlikely that Mexico's rich would
ever support a unilateral default or even a negotiated multilateral restructuring; after all,
such measures could topple the very banks that now held their savings.
But the bankers' alliance was not the only domestic coalition vying for power. In
1982, Mexico was riven by a ferce political confict on how to respond to the debt crisis.
Silva Herzog (1991:57) has confrmed that “inside the government there were conficting
positions.” On the one hand, the bankers' alliance – backed by its ideological allies in the
Finance Ministry and the Bank of Mexico – argued for an ambitious domestic adjustment
program in combination with a bridging loan from the IMF and a continued commitment
to debt repayment. On the other, the representatives of the national-popular coalition
inside the PRI – the so-called “radicals”, who claimed to represent workers, peasants and
national industries and who dominated not only the Ministries of Labor and National
136
Patrimony but also López Portillo's presidential ofce28 – emphasized the structural causes
of the crisis and insisted that Mexican citizens should not be made to pay for an investor
stampede that had essentially been triggered by the monetarist orthodoxy of the US Federal
Reserve. In Silva Herzog's (1991:57) view, the radicals in the administration believed “that it
was possible to maintain the economic expansion and resist the pressure of the fnancial
constraints.” It was the latter group that had dominated economic policymaking over the
past decades of fnancial repression and import substitution, but with the rapid loss of
investor confdence exposing Mexico's increasing dependence on foreign credit, the crisis of
1982 was to reveal the growing ability of the bankers' alliance to set the economic agenda –
and the dramatic extremes to which López Portillo and the radicals within the PRI were
willing to go in an attempt to counter them (Silva Herzog 1991:58; Maxfeld 1990).
As repaying the debt required harsh austerity measures to free up foreign exchange,
ordinary Mexicans found themselves bearing a heavy burden of adjustment. Between 1981
and 1983, imports and real wages fell by two-thirds, while the country's debt rose by over a
third (Boughton 2001:540). These dynamics angered López Portillo and the radicals inside
his administration. The President was reportedly infuriated by regular reports of banks,
businesses and wealthy Mexicans sending multiple billions of dollars to the US even as his
administration was forced to cut back on public spending and raise taxes on the poor. In
August 1982, López Portillo decided that it was time for action. He summoned his top
radical economists, José Oteyza and Carlos Tello, and set up a secret advisory committee in
Paris to study Mitterand's bank nationalization of 1981 (Delamaide 1984:103). The Mexican
28 Maxfeld (1990) refers to this policy alliance as the “Cárdenas coalition”, after former President Lázaro
Cárdenas (1934-'40), whose national-popular government sided with workers and peasants and who set
out to pursue some of the original goals of the Mexican Revolution, including the nationalization of oil,
the unionization of workers and some of Emiliano Zapata's envisioned land reforms.
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President was under signifcant pressure from his allies in the left-wing of the PRI, whose
intellectual leaders had been critical of the bankers' alliance for years. Some even described
the Mexican Bankers' Association as the “owner of the country” (Concheiro and Fragoza
1979:245, cited in Maxfeld 1990:144). Carlos Tello himself viewed Mexican “fnance capital
as the dominant faction of capital in the 1970s” and blamed the banks for undermining the
state's room for maneuver and its prioritization of social goals (Tello 1984:45, cited in
Cypher 1990:123). Mexico's deepening integration into the global fnancial system only
served to amplify these concerns. One observer noted that, “if, in the past, the president
and the government were increasingly helpless in the face of bankers and businessmen in
general, with the internationalization of banking … the possibilities of action were further
limited” (Blanco, cited in Maxfeld 1990:144). Between 1970 and 1977, the Mexican banking
sector had also become much more concentrated, with 225 banks merging into 87 and with
“powerful domestic fnancial groups … able to boost their market power via the centrali-
zation and concentration of fnance capital” (Marois 2007:7). There was therefore an acute
awareness among radicals of the structural power wielded by domestic banks through their
control over credit. Cypher (1990:123) notes that “the banks were important participants in
the process of granting the Mexican government international loans from the private trans-
national banks … and were crucial to the government in funding and refunding Mexico's
internal debt.” To López Portillo and his advisors, it therefore seemed self-evident that
“nationalizing the banks would break the political and economic power of Mexican bankers
and of the large-scale industrialists with whom they were associated,” and thereby restore a
degree of policy autonomy to the fscally distressed state apparatus (Maxfeld 1990:144).
And so, on Wednesday, September 1, 1982, just a week and a half after reaching a
preliminary agreement with foreign bankers and the IMF on a rescheduling of Mexico's
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debts, President López Portillo – who was due to leave ofce on December 1 – used his last
annual Informe to announce the nationalization of the banking system and the imposition
of capital controls to stem further capital fight. The head of state dramatically declared that
“in the last few years it has been a group of Mexicans, led and advised and supported by the
private banks, who have taken more money out of the country than the empires that
exploited us since the beginning of time” (cited in Kraft 1984:39). Bank of Mexico Director
Miguel Mancera, known for his orthodoxy and staunch opposition to capital controls, was
replaced by the radical economist and presidential loyalist Carlos Tello. Finance Minister
Silva Herzog, who had been kept uninformed about the President's decision until the last
moment, immediately tendered his resignation, but – in a sign of the bridging role he ful-
flled towards foreign creditors – the President refused to accept it. Silva Herzog was needed
for negotiations at an IMF summit two days later. As Maxfeld (1990:146) put it, “Mexico's
economic future depended on successful negotiation of the debt. Silva Herzog's key role in
the negotiations left López Portillo no choice but to keep him in the cabinet.”29
Unsurprisingly, the international fnancial community was terrifed by the dramatic
bank nationalization, which many feared to be the prelude to a unilateral moratorium or
even a wholesale repudiation of Mexico's debt (Bailey and Cohen 1987:20-21). It was clear
to foreign creditors that López Portillo could not be trusted. As a result, for all the radical
rhetoric in which it was ensconced, the president's poorly planned decision backfred disas-
trously, leading to a number of profoundly anti-social consequences. While the imposition
of capital controls had been intended to stem the outfow of capital, the bank nationali-
29 Mexico's President was not the only one who depended on the Finance Minister's bridging role. In a sign
that Mexico's creditors had come to rely on Silva Herzog's pro-creditor leadership as well, US Treasury
Secretary Donald Regan actively pressed his Mexican colleague not to resign. “It was a critical moment for
Mexico and for the international fnancial system,” Boughton (2001:302) recalls, “and Silva Herzog's
resignation would have left a huge vacuum in the [creditors'] circle of power and infuence.”
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zation actually ended up feeding the investor panic and deepening capital fight. Moreover,
by taking over the banks the government also assumed the bankers' debts, forcing them
onto taxpayers. As Maxfeld (1990:160) wrote, “to some extent the nationalization served to
bail out fnancially threatened banks and their industrial partners.” This in turn led some to
remark that, although the language of the Mexican nationalization was very diferent from
the 1983 bank bailouts in neoliberal Chile, “the substance of the intervention was quite
similar” (Diaz-Alejandro 1984:378). In an attempt to fght the bankers, López Portillo had
ended up nationalizing not their wealth and power but their liabilities, as a result of which
the state now held almost the entire foreign debt of the private sector (Bufe 1990:526). For
his part, Director of Public Credit Angel Gurría admitted that, “even though it it could
have been managed diferently and that the decision to nationalize might have been taken
for the wrong reasons, the nationalization was a way of solving the fnancial difculties of
banks that would otherwise have had to declare themselves insolvent” (Alvarez 2014:26).
In the end, the nationalization did little to weaken the bankers' privileged position.
Like a game of Whack-a-Mole, the bankers' alliance instantly popped back up on the stock
exchange. No sooner than their banks had been nationalized, their owners set up a parallel
banking system that allowed them to continue their moneymaking activities in a new form,
most notably through the operation of casas de cambio, the exchange houses that dealt in
the majority of foreign currency transactions. Given the wild exchange rate gyrations of the
1980s – the peso was to lose more than 2,000 percent of its value against the dollar over the
next six years – operating these exchange houses provided the bankers with ample oppor-
tunities for currency speculation. Moreover, with the now nationalized banks heavily over-
exposed to government debt, the government was forced to turn to the stock exchange to
refnance its internal obligations – leading it back into the arms of the same bankers López
140
Portillo had tried to outsmart. The resurgence of the bankers' alliance was therefore a direct
consequence of the deepening debt crisis and the growing structural dependence of the state
on private credit. Whereas the Bank of Mexico had funded over three-quarters of interest
payments on the government's internal debt before 1983, basically moving the debt from
one part of the state to another, after 1983 some 57 percent of the internal debt was being
funded by the private sector, with local elites becoming the state's main source of new
credit (Cypher 1990:175). Since total interest payments on internal debt amounted to more
than double the interest on external debt, the bankers not only gained control over “an
extremely lucrative underwriting business” in internal debt, clawing back most of their
losses from the nationalization, but they also greatly boosted their privileged position in
politics and their leverage over the government (Cypher 1990:163).
As the bankers' alliance grew more powerful in spite of the bank nationalization,
hopes of a national-popular exit from the crisis rapidly waned. In the months following the
announcement of the nationalization, the representatives of the bankers' alliance set out to
limit its impact by undermining its implementation. Maxfeld (1992:76) highlights the fact
that “Mexico's extreme international fnancial vulnerability in 1982 placed [Silva Herzog] in
a very powerful position within the Mexican government.” The Finance Minister's close
ties to foreign creditors, both private and ofcial, empowered him to almost singlehandedly
set the government's spending priorities. Because he enjoyed the trust of the foreign banks,
US Treasury ofcials and the IMF, Silva Herzog was most capable of extracting concessions
and attracting credit on good terms, which in turn endowed him with considerable leverage
over López Portillo, Tello and the radicals in the administration. This, combined with the
systematic isolation of Tello by the close alliance that had already been forged between Silva
Herzog, Volcker and de Larosière, meant that Mexico's debt policy efectively remained
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shielded from López Portillo's resurgent radicalism. As Kraft (1984:44-45) reported, “Tello,
looking back on the [IMF] negotiations a year later, gave the impression of a man battling,
almost alone, for a good cause against the massed forces of evil.” Despite complaining about
the fnancial bureaucracy's alignment with the IMF and the banks, Tello never managed to
outfank Silva Herzog and force foreign creditors to concede better terms. Carlos Salinas,
the Minister of Budget and Planning and future President of Mexico, later confessed that he
“had the feeling that de Larosière came away knowing he could be tough on Tello.” One
Finance Ministry ofcial referred to Tello's meeting with de Larosière as “Tello's last stand”
(cited in Kraft 1984:46). With the radicals now isolated and Mexico's dependence on foreign
credit only growing stronger, the lofty goals of the nationalization never materialized. 
The defnitive turnaround came on December 1 with the inauguration of Miguel de
la Madrid as 52nd President of Mexico. A Harvard-trained economist, De la Madrid was
described as “an extremely cautious technocrat who had great admiration and respect for
the international banking community” (Bailey and Cohen 1987:32). In a sign that the
bankers' victory over the radicals was now complete, the frst thing De la Madrid did upon
assuming power was to partly re-privatize the banks. Although the new President could not
fully reverse the nationalization, he “did whatever possible to ensure that the state adminis-
tered to the needs and caprices of the old fnancial barons” (Cypher 1990:163). De la Madrid
reinstated Miguel Mancera as head of the Bank of Mexico, kept Silva Herzog as his Finance
Minister, and brought with him into government what was at the time considered to be
“the most technocratic and homogeneous team ever to rule Mexico,” with two-thirds of the
cabinet holding graduate degrees in economics and over half having been educated abroad
(Teichman 2001:131). This dramatic turn to orthodoxy raises the question why the radically
inclined López Portillo ever handpicked De la Madrid as his successor in the frst place. Was
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this simply about the triumph of neoliberal ideas? The ideological shift certainly played an
important role. But there was a more practical reason: the state urgently needed resources
to keep itself solvent, which forced the national government to try to attract credit – and
for that it had to establish credibility. According to Babb (2001:20), the decision by López
Portillo's to appoint De la Madrid as his successor “almost surely was a measure designed to
inspire the confdence of bankers and investors.” Earlier, the President had appointed Silva
Herzog to the Finance Ministry for the exact same reason. Just as Silva Herzog was widely
considered to be “more popular with the New York bankers than ... with some of the folks
back home,” De la Madrid enjoyed a reputation among investors as “a technocrat, adept at
modern economics but out of touch with Mexico's revolutionary traditions” (Economist
1984:60; Economist 1981:68). Both Silva Herzog and De la Madrid strongly backed IMF-led
adjustment and “made a priority of keeping good relations with the international fnancial
community by servicing [the] debt” (Bailey and Cohen 1987:21).
The fnal victory of the bankers' alliance cemented the structural power of fnance
over the Mexican government and served to internalize fscal discipline into the Mexican
state apparatus. For the rest of the decade, apart from some heightened tensions following
the disastrous earthquakes of 1985, Mexico remained one of the most compliant debtors on
the continent. What is particularly striking about the Mexican case – in particular when
contrasted to other countries on the continent – is the relative absence of street protest and
political opposition to austerity and debt repayment. Middlebrook (1989:196) notes that
“the economic reverses sufered by the urban working class do not distinguish the Mexican
case from labour's situation in other Latin American countries,” but what does diferentiate
it is the “generally restrained character of Mexican organised labour's response to these chal-
lenges.” Organized labor in Mexico was completely controlled and co-opted by the PRI,
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blocking a main channel for the expression of popular concerns and the defense of labor
interests.30 Walton and Ragin (1989:218), in their study of IMF riots across the continent,
note that “austerity protest in Mexico has been muted by organized labor's preference for
maneuvering within the theater of ofcial institutions, by a defensive Left, and by indus-
trialists' exploitation of the crisis as an occasion to increase productivity.” While IMF riots
contributed to the downfall of governments in Peru in 1980 and '84, Brazil in 1983, Panama
in 1985 and Haiti in 1986, the relative absence of mass mobilization and the thorough co-
optation of organized labor in Mexico gave the bankers' alliance free reign to pursue its
orthodox austerity measures and neoliberal reforms.
In the remaining years of the crisis, strong ties developed between the IMF and the
technocrats in the subsequent governments of De la Madrid and Salinas. As a result, the
austerity measures and structural reforms required to service the debt no longer needed to
be strictly imposed from abroad but were now to be formulated and monitored in a
“collaborative efort” between IMF staf and Mexican authorities. Meanwhile, as Mexico's
debts kept being rolled over by its creditors, international bankers quietly rejoiced at the
endless sequence of austerity measures and debt reschedulings. One banker even publicly
exclaimed that Mexico “is a cash cow for us. We hope they never repay!” (Oliveri 1992:41).
This, in turn, prompted Karen Lissakers (1983:175) of the US Treasury Department to
lament that “the current solution to the international debt problem is disturbingly similar
to the policies and processes that created the crisis in the frst place.”
30 As Middlebrook (1989:196) notes, the Confederation of Mexican Workers and the Mexican Labor
Congress “have not mobilised union members to challenge openly policies that harm workers' interests.
Instead, organised labour has persisted in a well-established tradition of incremental, intra-elite bargaining
with government ofcials on a wide range of economic and political issues – despite irrefutable evidence
that this approach has failed to provide benefts to compensate for workers' sacrifces.”
144
Outcomes of the Crisis
Figure 4.8 – outcomes according to structural power hypothesis:
The fndings presented so far appear to confrm the structural power hypothesis and
the efectiveness of the hypothesized enforcement mechanisms. But if the structural power
hypothesis is to have real explanatory merit, we should be able to connect these observed
mechanisms to a corresponding set of outcomes. First of all, since structural power imposes
a “bias on the freedom of choice” (Strange 1994:31) by limiting the policy options available
to national governments, we should see little or no room for unilateral action by Mexico
and other Latin American debtors. One important sign of this limited room for maneuver
would be a very high cost of non-compliance for the more confrontational debtors, as such
















































were truly structurally powerful and the policy options for debtors constrained, we should
expect the crisis to be resolved at the initiative of the creditors, not the debtors'. Finally, as
a result of the third enforcement mechanism, we should observe a skewed distribution of
adjustment costs that has domestic elites and foreign creditors emerging as clear winners, as
their power would allow them to shift the burden onto others. As we will see next, these
outcomes did indeed materialize in the Mexican debt crisis.
Very Limited Room for Maneuver
How much space did Mexican policymakers have to take more confrontational,
unilateral action? Mexico's bankers' alliance remained extremely cooperative throughout
the crisis and did not break with any of its foreign obligations, making it difcult to test the
counterfactual scenario of a default. Nevertheless, we can identify two points at which the
Mexican government briefy did pursue a more defant response to the crisis. On both occa-
sions it was quickly compelled by its own structural dependence on foreign credit to retreat
and return to orthodoxy. The frst was the botched bank nationalization of 1982, which has
already been discussed above. The following section will focus on the second brief phase of
confrontation, which took place in 1985-'86 when Mexico was struck by two external
shocks: a catastrophic earthquake that left over ten thousand dead and much of Mexico
City in ruins, and a 60 percent fall in the oil price that caused the government to lose 20
percent of its revenue over the course of 1986 (Pastor 1987:13; Gurría 1995a:36). With $1
billion in principal falling due shortly after the earthquake, Angel Gurría – fearing “that he
and his colleagues in government would be lynched if they proposed such a use of scarce
resources in the midst of this calamity” – saw himself forced to negotiate yet another volun-
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tary rescheduling with US banks (Boughton 2001:371). As a result, investor confdence col-
lapsed. Gurría (1988:89-90) recalls that: “the mood in Mexico was ominous. Rumors about
tens of billions being requested were widespread, together with the fear of unilateral default
by the world's second largest debtor. The drop in oil prices generated a wave of demand for
immediately halting payments which included all sectors of society.” He added that “even
within the government, where such decisions were usually left to the Minister of Finance, a
veritable chorus in favor of a moratorium arose.”
In this climate, even the most orthodox technocrats were now openly starting to
doubt if Mexico's compliant approach on the debt still made sense. Gurría (1988:90) wrote
that “this 'dialogue of the deaf' caused increasing frustration within Mexico, and made even
the most reasonable and sophisticated observers advocate a harder line of negotiation.” As a
result, “the Mexican negotiating team ... clearly started drifting towards a stronger response
to the international fnancial community's apparent lack of understanding and support.” It
was clear to Gurría and his colleagues that “the year 1986 marked the climax of Mexico's
worst economic crisis in the post-war period” (Gurría 1995a:36). For the frst time, the real
possibility of a unilateral default was being raised by the Mexican government. President De
la Madrid, the technocrat favored by Wall Street, openly accused the creditors of “choking
Mexico to death” and threatened “an indefnite suspension of all debt service payments to
commercial banks” (Bailey and Cohen 1987:42; Roddick 1988:114). In response, Federal
reserve Chairman Paul Volcker few to Mexico City for a top-secret emergency visit, where
he impressed upon De la Madrid that there would be “an immediate suspension of all bank
credits the moment Mexico took unilateral action” (Roddick 1988:114; Boughton 2001:439).
It was this explicit reminder of the structural power of US fnance that made De la Madrid
climb down, but not before dumping his Finance Minister for having become too close to
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foreign creditors (Teichman 2001:135). According to one Mexican ofcial, Silva Herzog had
become “a defender of the IMF without considering the internal repercussions” (cited in
Pastor 1989:79). In hindsight, Boughton (2001:276) writes, Silva Herzog “wrestled with the
idea of default throughout his term but always rejected it.” Gurría (2013) stresses that “we
never used the threat of default. We stuck to the thesis that the country will lose its access
to credit; it will lose its credit rating … We never confronted the bankers ... There was a
commitment to being responsible, being cooperative.”
Would a more radical administration have acted any diferently? Even if the Mexican
bankers' alliance had been ousted from power or forced by sustained pressure from below
to promote national-popular interests at the expense of foreign creditors, Mexico's room for
maneuver was greatly limited by the state's dependence on foreign credit. It is therefore
unlikely that a radical government would have behaved very diferently – and even if it had,
its attempt at defance would likely have failed, as it did in the case of López Portillo's bank
nationalization. Two observations from other Latin American countries lend credence to
this counterfactual interpretation: Argentina's brief threat, following its transition towards
democracy, to declare a debt moratorium and create a Latin American debtors' cartel, and
Peru's failed attempt at a heterodox repayment strategy from 1985 onwards. Both episodes
of defance were quickly undermined by the structural power of international creditors.
As we saw before, Raúl Alfolsín, Argentina's frst democratic President after the fall
of the junta, had announced a six-month moratorium on interest payments and was trying
to gain support from regional leaders to build a unifed debtors' front. In June 1984, eleven
Latin American countries gathered in Colombia to set up the so-called Cartagena Group.
Among Wall Street bankers, there was widespread concern that the meeting would be the
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frst step in the formation of a debtors' cartel to counter their own creditors' cartel. Such a
debtors' cartel, they feared, would be able to threaten a collective default and thus extract
better terms from the creditors. And so the banks quickly moved to reassert their tested
case-by-case approach, making concessions to Mexico in the hope that this “model debtor”
would help them defuse the potential bombshell of a Latin American debtors' cartel from
within. As one banker put it, “we still think [a cartel is] a danger, and we ought to be ready
to do something. Those countries that comply with the terms of [IMF programs] … should
be rewarded with better terms” (Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1984). One advisor confrmed
that the US government and the banks “are dissuading the Latin nations from collaborating
by promising more rapid treatment if they act alone” (cited in Aggarwal 1996:351).
Following the announcement of Argentina's moratorium, the Mexican government
– in a clear display of “credit-rating self-preservation” (Cline 1983) – immediately moved to
isolate Alfolsín, organizing a $500 million emergency loan by fellow Latin American debtor
countries to cover Argentina's interest payments to its commercial creditors before the
expiration of the 90-day legal limit on which the US banks would have had to write down
their loans as non-performing (Tussie 1988:286-287). According to Roddick (1988:49), “the
message was clear: Argentina would be totally isolated in any attempt to call the banks' or
the US government's bluf.” Tussie (1988:289), moreover, observed that “the dynamics of
'credit-rating self-preservation' are not just a fgment of the debtors' imagination.” Far from
leading to the formation of a debtors' cartel and playing Argentina's creditors of against
one another, Alfolsín's democratic brinkmanship united borrowers and lenders in their
resolve to avoid an Argentine default. The banks insisted that that an IMF agreement was a
prerequisite for any renegotiation of Argentina's debt and then waited “until the economy
went into such a tail-spin that the recalcitrant debtor must come crawling back to the table”
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(interview with a banker in Business Week, August 12, 1985). In a reminder of the spillover
costs of default, the US Treasury Department made the strategic move of sending out a list
of imports that would become unavailable in the event of an Argentine suspension of pay-
ments due to the drying up of trade credit. US Deputy Treasury Secretary MacNamar even
asked Alfolsín: “have you ever contemplated what would happen to the president of a coun-
try if the government couldn't get insulin for its diabetics?” (cited in Roddick 1988:50). The
message was clear: continued defance would cost Argentina dearly.
By early 1985, Alfolsín had been forced into an embarrassing U-turn and found
himself in the humiliating position of having to sign an IMF stabilization program while
pleading to honor the odious debts of the military dictatorship that had gone before him –
in full and on time. “The only solution,” he now told the Argentine people in a televised
statement, “is a policy of austerity that will be very hard and will require great eforts by
everyone; it's called, my dear compatriots, an economy of war” (cited in Solanas 2004).
Schuster (2008:164) writes that the government “became a prisoner of its own inability to
control economic variables and the aforementioned foreign and domestic economic and
fnancial powers.” Mexico, meanwhile, was thrown a bone by the bankers to reward it for
taking such a resolutely pro-creditor stance in its dealings with Argentina. In hindsight, for
all the fear it stoked among creditors at the time, in light of Argentina's defance, most
observers agree that the Cartagena conference is to be remembered chiefy for what it did
not do: none of the attending countries followed Argentina in forming a debtors' cartel,
none ever threatened unilateral action, and none of them defaulted (Branford and Kucinski
1988:116). One Argentine observer even referred to the Cartagena group as a “phantom”
that did “nothing revolutionary at all” (Tussie 2013). Far from laying the foundations of an
international debtors' cartel, article 8 of the Cartagena declaration reafrmed the debtors'
150
willingness to honor their debts and to continue with the adjustment eforts, as well as their
unwavering commitment to the case-by-case approach. As Silva Herzog aptly described it,
Cartagena was “a debtors' cartel to pay, not not to pay” – or, as he put it elsewhere, it was
simply “a payers' club” (cited in Berg 1985:21; Roddick 1988:14).
The ofcial creditor response to García's non-compliance in Peru was similarly swift
and painful. Following García's announcement of a heterodox ceiling on interest payments
equal to 10 percent of exports, the IMF and World Bank immediately withheld their next
credit tranches and, in October 1985, US regulatory agencies declared US commercial loans
to Peru to be “non-performing,” undercutting its credit rating and greatly undermining its
ability to obtain further credit on international capital markets. In August 1986, the IMF
disqualifed Peru from future loans altogether, further harming the country's credit rating
and casting it – alongside Sudan, Liberia and Cambodia – into the world's credit rating
dungeons of utterly ineligible countries (Roddick 1988:175). As with Argentina in 1984,
creditors adopted a “wait and see” approach, forcing Peru – simply by withholding further
credit – to slowly “stew in its own juice,” as one banker put it (cited in Roddick 1988:174).
Throughout this period, García had actually been very cautious not to alienate his private
creditors. In a speech to Congress, he stated that his heterodox policies did “not mean that
we will ignore our responsibilities to our foreign creditors.” García promised to “resume
payments in full when external circumstances permit. We want to pay because we are
honest, and though we are mindful of the injustices of that debt, we assume our respon-
sibility as a people that stands by recognizing its own mistakes” (cited in Roddick 1988:169-
170). As Roddick (1988:170) writes, “a total moratorium was also deliberately ruled out, not
least because Peru hoped to continue borrowing from some of its creditors.”
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The curtailment of short-term credit greatly limited Peru's room for maneuver and
efectively forced the García government to monetize the governments' budget shortfall,
causing hyperinfation and sending the economy into a tailspin. By July 1990, accumulated
infation reached 2.2 million percent, as GDP fell 7 percent and real per capita income
dropped back to 1960 levels. Extreme poverty rate skyrocketed up 41 percent to a total of
54 percent, with social expenditures cut from $46 per person in 1986 to $12 in 1990 (Pastor
and Wise 1991). With accumulation grinding to a halt, the state had become incapable of
fulflling its legitimization function. In 1990, widespread discontent over his policies led to
García's electoral defeat, giving rise to the authoritarian rule of Alberto Fujimori, who
immediately pushed through a package of far-reaching neoliberal reforms and privatizations
that came to be known as the Fujishock, which rapidly restored Peru's standing among inter-
national investors and the IMF, but which also contributed to further social dislocation
(Gouge 2003:364). Experts later pointed out the irony of the fact that García had actually
ended up sending more money abroad in interest payments than the creditor-friendly
conservative government before him (Ugarteche 2013). As these two counterfactual cases
indicate, should a pro-default coalition ever have assumed power in Mexico, its room for
maneuver would have been very marginal, and it is likely that even a defant government
would either have been quickly forced back into compliance, like Alfolsín in Argentina, or
would eventually have been undermined by creditor powers, like García in Peru.
Crisis Resolution at the Initiative of the Creditors
A second outcome we should expect if the structural power hypothesis were correct
and the room for maneuver of Mexico and the other Latin American debtors was really sig-
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nifcantly constrained, would be a pattern of crisis management in which the creditors took
the initiative and the debtors followed. More specifcally, since the lenders were mostly big
and over-exposed international banks, we would expect the latter to fercely oppose any
debt restructuring at least until after they had managed to reduce their exposure to Mexican
and Latin American debt. We have already seen that there was no real unilateral action to
speak of, but what is remarkable is that for seven to eight years there was no real attempt to
multilaterally resolve Latin America's debt problems either. It was not until the Brady deal
of 1989-'90 that the external debts of developing countries – starting with Mexico – were
restructured, one by one, slowly helping them to regain access to private credit. Up to that
point, the international fnancial community had muddled through with one rescheduling
after another, consistently refusing to force losses onto private creditors or to fnd a more
lasting resolution to the crisis. By 1987, it was clear that this approach had failed to restore
the creditworthiness of the borrowers. On November 30, 1987, the New York Times neatly
captured the contradiction at the heart of the prevailing international policy response to the
debt crisis: “There is a consensus of two things. One is that the debt has to be paid, and the
other is that the debt cannot be paid.”
An important turning point was reached in May 1987, when Citicorp bank took the
initiative to raise its loan-loss reserves by 150 percent with an additional $3 billion, boosting
its capital reserves to a quarter of its Third World debt. In the second quarter of 1987, the
US banks added a total of $21 billion to their loan-loss reserves, as a result of which “the
banks no longer had to live in terror of a Mexican default” (Aggarwal 1996:40/361). At least
equally important was the proposal made by J.P. Morgan in December 1987 to exchange its
discounted Mexican loans for securitized government bonds, which the bank could in turn
sell on secondary markets, thus providing Mexico with a modest degree of debt relief while
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providing J.P. Morgan with an opportunity to reduce its exposures (Aggarwal 1996:334).
The Mexico-Morgan deal, which was concluded in 1989, was hailed as “a watershed for the
debt strategy” and has been credited with “infuenc[ing] later multilateral eforts to further
alleviate Mexico's debt crisis [and leading] the way for the more sophisticated menu-driven
deals of the Brady plan” (Boughton 2001:491; see also Gurría 1995a:36; Claessens, Diwan
and Fernandez-Arias 1992:20). The build-up of loan-loss provisions and the reduction of the
banks' exposure greatly reduced their vulnerability to an eventual debt restructuring. US
bank exposure to the 17 largest debtors, which had stood at 130 percent of capital reserves
in 1982, fell to 27 percent by the end of the decade. The result, Cline (1995:71/76) notes,
“was to disarm the threat of the debt bomb to the international fnancial system.”
At the same time, some members of Congress were becoming increasingly vocal in
their criticism of the US approach to crisis management “for defending the interests of the
banks to the detriment of US manufacturing frms and their workers” (Cline 1995:216). In
January 1989, three bank regulators testifed to Congress that the US banks could now
withstand a large default, indicating that the Latin American debt crisis no longer posed an
existential threat to the banks (New York Times, January 6, 1989; Aggarwal 1996:364). As a
result, the bankers began to change their attitude towards debt restructuring. As one broker
told the New York Times, the banks “have diminished vulnerability to Mexico ... The talk in
1982 was that the Mexican debt crisis meant the collapse of the fnancial system. [But] we
have come a long way from that point” (cited in Oliveri 1992:73). While still vehemently
opposed to forced losses, some degree of debt cancellation was increasingly starting to look
attractive to the bankers as a way to keep Mexico and the rest of Latin America in the
lending game. Finally, after the bloody repression of a major IMF riot in Venezuela – the
infamous Caracazo of 1989, which by some counts left more than 3,000 people dead – US
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ofcials, weary of stoking the fames of radicalism in the region, began to openly discuss the
possibility of a multilateral debt restructuring. The result was Mexico's Brady deal of 1989,
which paved the way for voluntary debt renegotiation across the developing world.
The full extent of debt relief obtained under the Brady plan has been a source of
considerable debate among economists. In a letter to the IMF, Mexico's Finance Minister
Pedro Aspe claimed that the Brady deal would save the country $4 billion a year until 1994,
while the chairmen of Lloyds Bank and Midland Bank estimated that the plan would “save
the country less than $1 billion in interest payments each year” (Aggarwal 1990:26). Sweder
van Wijnbergen (1991:17), the World Bank's chief negotiator in the Brady restructuring, has
argued that the deal managed to avoid a bailout of the creditors, but other observers have
vehemently contested this assertion. Dooley, for instance, noted that “the amount of debt
reduction was quite limited, especially when new ofcial debt was added to the calculation
of net debt reduction,” while net reduction for Latin America as a whole only amounted to
15 percent of the total debt (Dooley 1995:279; Dooley, Arias and Kletzer 1994:7). One
infuential study found that the banks made signifcant fnancial gains in the restructuring
while the debtors took big losses (Claessens, Diwan and Fernandez-Arias 1992:37). Others
also found that “the amount of debt relief granted to Mexico was rather low, particularly
when one compares it to historical standards” (Armendariz and Armendariz 1995:138). In
the 1930s debt crisis, Latin American debtors had managed to secure “substantial” debt
relief, with Jorgensen and Sachs (1989:79) fnding that “the terms of the fnal agreements
settling the defaults of the 1930s were highly favorable to debtors.” In the 1980s, by
contrast, the creditors clearly had the upper-hand in the negotiations.31
31 Cline (1995:220): “various accounts suggest ... that despite the high public profle of the IMF in calling for
deep forgiveness, in the actual negotiations the institution did not press the banks.” Cline ascribes the
Fund's defense of creditor interests to the Treasury's single-minded insistence that the IMF should not
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World Bank economists have recognized many of the aforementioned observations.
Claessens, Oks and Van Wijnbergen (1993:1) show that Mexico received a total cash fow
relief of around $4 billion per year, $2 billion of which would have occurred anyway as
amortization would have been rolled over in the absence of debt restructuring. Noting that
“in a $200 billion economy, 2 or even 4 billion seems like a small tail to wag a large dog,”
the authors argue that “the main beneft of debt relief was not to lower expected payments
but to reduce uncertainty.” The Brady deal, as it turns out, was more efective at restoring
investor confdence by reducing bank exposures and marking the remaining debt to market
– thereby allowing the banks to more realistically estimate the true value of their assets –
than it was in reducing the debt burden. By restoring confdence, however, the Brady deal
instantly caused interest rates to drop over 20 percentage points, enabling Mexico to return
to capital markets and start borrowing from private lenders again (Crowley 1993:26). The
Brady deal, in short, was more important for its psychological role in reducing uncertainty
than it was for the fnancial aim of reducing Mexico's overall debt load (Cline 1995:43).
“The Rich Got the Loans and the Poor Got the Debts”
The fnal outcome we would expect given the above is a highly unequal distribution
of the costs of adjustment in favor of foreign creditors and domestic elites. As it turns out,
Mexico's poor did indeed overwhelmingly bear the costs of adjustment while the creditors
– having successfully prevented both a unilateral Mexican default and an early multilateral
debt restructuring – emerged from the 1980s largely unscathed, even making major profts
(Aggarwal 1996:351). There is a broad scholarly consensus that, rather than serving the
take a side against the Wall Street banks in their negotiations with Mexico.
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interests of ordinary people in Latin America, the international response to the debt crisis
primarily served creditor interests – and the interests of big US banks in particular (Dooley
1995:275; Grifth-Jones 1988:9; Sachs 1986:406; Bertola and Ocampo 2012:16). At the same
time, the structural power hypothesis should also lead us to observe a highly uneven distri-
bution of adjustment costs within the debtor countries, as privileged domestic elites success-
fully shift the burden of adjustment onto weaker and less privileged social groups. Again,
the evidence appears to confrm this expectation (e.g. Roodman 2006:17; Frieden 1991:218).
In Mexico, workers, peasants and the urban poor paid a particularly heavy price under suc-
cessive adjustment programs even as the elite managed to escape taxation. 32 With infation
averaging 93.1 percent a year between 1983 and 1987 and reaching 177 percent in 1988, the
government enforced strict wage controls and dramatic cuts in spending that saw living
standards drop drastically over the course of the decade. Overall, per capita income fell at
an average rate of 5 percent annually in 1983-'88, while real wages fell between 40 and 50
percent (Lomnitz-Adler 2004:47, cited in Harvey 2005:100). As a result, the labor share of
income fell from 35.9 percent in 1982 to 26.6 percent in 1987 (Middlebrook 1989:198-9).
This erosion of worker livelihoods fts a broader pattern of class bias in IMF and World
Bank structural adjustment programs. Pastor (1987:249) has found statistical evidence for a
“strong and consistent pattern of reduction in labor share of income,” both in absolute and
relative terms, over the course of IMF Standby Agreements and Extended Fund Facilities;
fndings that have been confrmed by subsequent studies (Garuda 2000; Vreeland 2001). In
Mexico, where over half of the population already lived in poverty before the start of the
crisis, the purchasing power of the minimum wage fell 66 percent (Robinson 2004:144).
32 “The wealthy have been able to avoid taxation through institutionalized loopholes and weak enforcement,
but average wage earners cannot easily escape income tax and have therefore borne the brunt of income
tax payments” (Marois 2011:18-19).
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While by the mid-1980s it took 4.8 minimum wages for a family of four to meet essential
needs, 80 percent of households now had to get by on an income of 2.5 minimum wages or
less. As a result, a wave of malnutrition spread among the poor (ibid.). World Bank chief
economist Stanley Fischer (1989:363) recognized that “most of the burden has been borne
by wage earners in the debtor countries.” An internal study assessing the World Bank's
stated objective of poverty reduction concluded that “poverty issues have seldom featured
signifcantly in such dialogues, and the analysis of structural adjustment programs rarely
considered who will carry the heaviest burdens of adjustment” (World Bank 1983). 
At the same time, the crisis – as costly as it was for Mexico's poor – turned out to be
a boon for the rich. The failed bank nationalization of 1982 had efectively socialized the
bankers' liabilities, while the top 10 percent of income earners managed to move between
$64 and $80 billion (or more) out of the country by 1988, much of it returning a proft in
foreign investments (stocks, bonds, interest and so on). This allowed wealthy Mexican elites
to “utilize income from these assets to advantage by transferring funds back into pesos
whenever frequent devaluations allowed the elite to maximize its buying power” (Cypher
1990:155). According to one estimate, the interest on capital fight returned to wealthy local
elites amounted to roughly 40 percent of total debt payments  – private profts that could
not be taxed by the Mexican government (Pastor 1989:98). Far from helping to stem capital
fight, the IMF actually made matters worse by insisting on capital account liberalization as
a precondition for its loans. With wages down, private profts were up across the board,
while control over the foreign exchange houses and the anomalous mid-crisis stock market
boom provided the rich with ample opportunity for rent-seeking. In the end, the head of
UNICEF (1989:11) concluded that “it is hardly too brutal an oversimplifcation to say that
the rich got the loans but the poor got the debts.”
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Conclusion and Possible Alternative Interpretations
This chapter has presented the evidence in favor of the structural power hypothesis
and fnds it to be more convincing than the evidence in favor of the traditional explanations
revolving around reputation, sanctions or democratic advantage. But what about possible
alternative interpretations? The political economy literature ofers at least two additional
explanations to the ones explored here. An instrumentalist view of business power would
suggest that foreign creditors and domestic elites managed to get their way through more
traditional political channels like corporate lobbying, revolving doors between business and
government and the efective “colonization” of key administrative positions by fnancial
elites. This chapter does not deny that such direct pressure may have played a role; indeed,
it has shown how a group of technocrats aligned with foreign creditors and domestic elites
managed to occupy important government positions during the crisis. One of the central
points of the analysis, however, has been to show that there is more at play than a mere
“colonization” of the state apparatus. The bankers' alliance grew in strength precisely
because of the state's structural dependence on capital and the elites' own position in the
Mexican political economy, marked by their close relations with international creditors.
In a word, the victory of Mexico's bankers' alliance was both cause and consequence
of the growing power of the international creditors' cartel. It was a consequence in the sense
that Mexico's technocrats and elites, by providing a bridge to foreign creditors, were much
more capable than the radicals of attracting foreign credit at afordable terms and thereby
seeing to the state's structural dependence on capital. This in turn strengthened their hand
in internal power struggles within the ruling party PRI. It should therefore be stressed that
the bankers' alliance was not powerful because it took over the state; rather it was able to
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take over the state because it was powerful. At the same time, the rise of the technocrats was
a cause in the sense that the bankers' ultimate victory under Presidents De la Madrid and
Salinas helped to further cement creditor interests and internalize fscal discipline into the
Mexican state apparatus. Again, the point is that there were certain structural forces at play
that systematically strengthened the hand of one social group against another. The growing
power of the Mexican bankers' alliance cannot simply be reduced to its superior resources
or strategies; it rested on the state's structural dependence on credit and the structural
constraints imposed by the nature of international lending.
A further interpretation could be derived from the constructivist emphasis on the
centrality of norms, narratives, ideas and interpretations. Again, the point of this chapter
has not been to deny the importance of such factors. Indeed, the evidence presented above
shows very clearly how the norm of debt repayment in the 1980s contrasted sharply to the
norm of the 1930s, when the imposition of a unilateral moratorium was still considered
“normal and part of the rules of the game” (Ocampo 2013). The chapter has also shown
how a particular interpretation of the crisis as a problem of short-term liquidity, combined
with a creditor-friendly narrative that placed the blame for the debt crisis squarely on the
fscal profigacy and economic mismanagement of the borrowing governments, was closely
connected to the prevailing policy response of short-term fscal adjustment and case-by-case
treatment. The chapter even shows how the orthodox economic ideas of Mexican fnancial
ofcials became increasingly infuential as the crisis deepened, culminating in the rise of an
army of US-trained technocrats under President De la Madrid. At one level, this evidence is
therefore not incongruent with more constructivist explanations, like the one presented by
Teichman (2001), who has convincingly shown that the debt crisis of the 1980s marked a
period of dramatic neoliberal transformation across the continent.
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The main objective of the chapter, however, has not so much been to explain the rise
or role of these norms and ideas, on which we already have a number of very insightful
studies, but rather how they were enforced. The conclusion is that the neoliberal norm of
debt repayment – along with dominant interpretations about the causes of the crisis, hege-
monic narratives identifying the blame, and orthodox ideas about the appropriate policy
response – were backed by three highly efective disciplinary mechanisms that had the
capacity to infict considerable material costs on the governments that proposed alternative
interpretations, pursued diferent ideas, or transgressed the norm of debt repayment. This
shows that, while ideas certainly played a very important role (especially in relation to the
internalization of debtor discipline through the third enforcement mechanism), they cannot
be divorced from the underlying material interests, social conficts and power dynamics.
This observation appears to be confrmed by the handful of cases where leaders with more
heterodox ideas did question established norms and neoliberal policy proscriptions. The
governments of López Portillo in Mexico, Alfolsín in Argentina and García in Peru were all
punished for their non-compliance with dominant norms and ideas. Short-term credit lines
were cut of and investors withdrew their capital. The resulting spillovers forced all three of
these governments to recant and fall back in line. Ideas were therefore powerful insofar as
they stood in relation to specifc material interests and structural forces that systematically
favored one set of norms and ideas over all others. Those pursuing heterodox alternatives
found it more difcult to obtain foreign credit, diminishing the power of their ideas in the
process. Pastor (1989:103-104) was right, then, to point out that “none of the more radical
proposals – full or partial repudiation, debt service limits, or mobilizing the foreign wealth
of local elites – will be adopted without a redistribution of political power.” It is for that








On December 23, 2001, Argentina declared a unilateral suspension of payments on
over $80 billion in public debt, triggering the largest sovereign default in history. The scale
of the default was staggering: as Latin America's biggest debtor, Argentina's bonds made up
a quarter of all emerging market debt traded globally (Mortimore and Stanley 2006:16). The
outcome constitutes a remarkable contrast to the widespread compliance of the 1980s and
poses an interesting puzzle. By the turn of the century, as globalization continued apace,
many argued that the power of multinational corporations – and of global fnance in parti-
cular – was rapidly on the rise (e.g., Friedman 1995; Pauly 1997; Strange 1998; Klein 1999;
Hardt and Negri 2000; Stiglitz 2002). Argentina's unilateral default, followed by its coercive
restructuring and President Kirchner's rhetorical interventions against foreign creditors and
the IMF, seemed to challenge these presumptions. Suddenly the “bond vigilantes” did not
appear to be so omnipotent after all: apparently, even a crisis-ridden peripheral country like
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Argentina was capable of challenging its foreign creditors and reneging on its debts. For this
reason, some scholars have posited the Argentine case as a challenge to the structural power
hypothesis. Cooper and Momani (2005:306), for instance, have argued that “the notion of
structural discipline sets the 'reach of coercion' at a level that, at least in the Argentine case,
failed to match realities … The power of international creditors' discipline appears to be far
more elusive in practice than might be expected.”
Such interpretations, however, largely pass over a crucial observation: Argentina's
puzzling over-compliance in the months and years leading up to the default. Up until late
2001, Argentina was considered a model debtor and largely resembled Mexico in terms of
its commitment to repay. In the late 1990s, in particular, the country was widely considered
to be an IMF “poster child” and a darling of global capital markets. Presidents Menem
(1989-'99) and De la Rúa (1999-'01) stubbornly insisted on full repayment throughout their
terms – even when the country entered into stormy waters following contagion from the
Mexican peso crisis of 1995, the East-Asian crisis of 1997-'98, the Russian default of 1998
and the Brazilian devaluation of 1999. Between 1999 and 2001 Argentina went into a deep
recession that saw unemployment rates climb sharply from 14 percent to over 25 percent.
During this time, President De la Rúa steadfastly refused to pursue a default strategy even as
his approval rates fell to historic lows and Wall Street, the IMF and the US government
actively pressed him to face up to the inevitable and simply restructure the debt. Finally, in
December 2001 there was a rupture. After De la Rúa was forced out of ofce, his interim
successor immediately declared a unilateral suspension of all payments.33 What explains this
33 This moratorium was upheld by President Duhalde in early 2002 and overcome through a successful debt
restructuring by President Kirchner in 2005, which saw 76 percent of bondholders accepting a 75 percent
haircut on the value of their old claims. The remaining 24 percent of “holdouts” saw their claims repudi-
ated. When Argentina temporarily re-opened the deal in 2010, participation went up to 91 percent. Some
of the remaining holdouts have continued to pursue legal action for full repayment – unsuccessfully so far.
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sudden switch from compliance to defance? Clearly, a full account of Argentina's crisis
should be able to explain not only the default itself but also the earlier refusal to default; in
other words, both the country's over-compliance in the frst three years of the crisis and the
breakdown of compliance in the fnal days of 2001. This chapter shows that posing the
question this way leads to a very diferent answer than that reached by critics of the structu-
ral power hypothesis. Indeed, rather than challenging this hypothesis, the absence of default
in the frst three years of the crisis and the process through which it eventually came about
actually appear to confrm it. Argentina is the exception that proves the rule.
This chapter is structured like the previous one. The frst part weighs the evidence
in favor of the conventional hypotheses – reputation, sanctions and democratic advantage –
and fnds the case for them to be unconvincing. The evidence for the spillover costs hypo-
thesis is again more convincing, but it cannot account for the crucial switch from compli-
ance to default. The second part investigates the enforcement mechanisms of the structural
power hypothesis and shows how they eventually broke down, leading to default. The third
part connects these mechanisms to the outcomes of the crisis, while the conclusion briefy
discusses the possible alternative interpretations for the evidence presented.
Reputation Hypothesis
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In its original formulation, the reputation hypothesis would lead us to expect no
default at all. Because Eaton and Gersovitz presented a static model of reputation, there is
no way to properly account for Argentina's switch from compliance to default. But even if
we were to relax these theoretical assumptions somewhat and allow for a change in a debtor
country's policy preferences, we should still expect investors to recall Argentina's long-
standing reputation as a recalcitrant borrower and a “debt intolerant” serial defaulter, which
should reduce their willingness to lend (Reinhart, Rogof and Savastano 2003). The reality
was diferent. As in the 1980s, investors turned out to be remarkably myopic, driven more
by “irrational exuberance” and the prospect of short-term profts than by any historically-
informed assessment of reputation and risk. By 1997, for instance, in a telling sign of the
times, investment banks J.P. Morgan and Merrill Lynch managed to sell some $2 billion in
20-year Argentine bonds in a single month. “Every time we fnished a meeting [with inves-
tors], the orders would come,” Argentine undersecretary of fnance Miguel Kiguel recalled.
“People were desperate to buy Argentina” (cited in Blustein 2005:30-31). Argentina had been
the most recalcitrant debtor in the 1980s, yet it managed to quickly re-establish itself as an
investor favorite in the 1990s, attracting more credit than any other emerging market. As in
previous lending cycles, far from being determined by reputational factors, Argentina's debt
dynamics were driven by the eternal ebb and fow of the global credit supply.
Argentine policymakers displayed a similar lack of foresight as their creditors. As in
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primarily by concerns over their country's long-term access to capital markets. Rather, the
Argentine debt strategy hinged exclusively on a desperate attempt to ignore long-term debt
dynamics and double down on short-term bets in order to avert the immediate costs of
default. Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo, in particular, made a number of decisions
that seemed very irrational from the point of view of long-term debt sustainability; but he
made them because he feared the immediate consequences of default. As Setser and Gelpern
(2006:31) have pointed out, “continued support for the status quo refected a key economic
reality: all other policy options carried higher short-term costs than trying to muddle
through.” Domingo Cavallo himself expressed his concerns that “seeking meaningful debt
relief meant losing access to domestic and external credit and immediately moving into fscal
and external balance” (Setser and Gelpern 2006:475, emphasis added).
A more important piece of evidence, however, would be the actual consequences of
Argentina's default. The reputation hypothesis would lead us to expect complete exclusion
from foreign credit after December 2001. We do fnd that after the default the government
briefy lost access to foreign sources of credit. But no sooner than the restructuring deal had
been completed in 2005, foreign money started fowing in again (Gelpern 2005:1). Critics of
Argentina's default often point out that the country remains locked out of the international
capital markets, which – while true – ignores the fact that the country has still been able to
raise signifcant sums of foreign credit through domestic bond auctions. Given the benefts
of the commodity boom of the 2000s, the country's phenomenal post-default growth rates,
and the vast amount of liquidity fowing through the global fnancial system, investors were
more than happy to take the additional risk of buying locally issued bonds. In the BONAR
V and VI auctions, 70 and 80 percent of bonds, respectively, were sold to international
investors. Despite the default, demand for Argentine bonds was so strong that in 2005 the
167
riesgo país – the risk spread compared to US Treasury bills – converged with Brazil's, which
did not default on its debts (Datz 2009:470). In fact, as soon as the debt restructuring was
completed, the riesgo país that had plagued Argentina throughout its crisis returned to the
same level it had been at at the peak of the fnancial euphoria in 1997. Investors were clearly
much more myopic than the reputation hypothesis would lead us to expect.34
Sanctions Hypothesis
Figure 5.2a – trade mechanism:
The sanctions hypothesis also does not hold up against the empirical evidence. First,
the lenient, even supportive position taken by the Bush administration both in anticipation
of and in reaction to the Argentine default shows that there was never any risk of the US
imposing trade sanctions in retaliation for Argentina's non-compliance. Insofar as the US
government took a stance at all, it actually pushed for default and later pro-actively sided
with Kirchner in his wrestling matches with the private creditors and the IMF during the
restructuring; a stance that was made possible by the fact that the big US investors had by
this point already shed most of their exposure anyway. Helleiner (2005b) has identifed a
number of reasons – including ideological opposition to the IMF among US ofcials and
34 “[T]he amount of credit declined dramatically in 2001 and reached a low point in 2005 ... Credit began to
fow in again in 2005 and by 2006 reaching the levels of 1994-5. Thus these type of sanctions were of short
duration and one can conclude that the evidence shows a myopic view of the default” (Baer et al. 2010:13).
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arch-conservatives in Congress, as well as geopolitical distractions in the wake of 9/11 and
concerns over the emergence of a radical axis from Venezuela to Argentina – that motivated
the Bush administration to be supportive of an aggressive Argentine debt restructuring. In
sum, Argentina never sufered trade sanctions and this investigation has not uncovered any
evidence that De la Rúa's or Kirchner's governments feared such trade sanctions either.
Figure 5.2b – legal mechanism:
Legal sanctions are a diferent story altogether. Unlike trade sanctions, legal action
has certainly been pursued in response to Argentina's default. But even though hundreds of
lawsuits have been brought forth and are still dragging on at the time of writing, creditors
have failed to enforce these rulings, while the Kirchners have been content to either ignore
or scof the “vultures” who continue to demand full repayment. A New York judge put it
succinctly: “not only have the [lawsuits] not yielded a hundred cents on the dollar, they
have not even yielded one cent on the dollar” (cited in Gelpern 2005:4). In the past years
there have been a number of high-profle US rulings, including one allowing a subsidiary of
Paul Singer's Elliott Management, NML Capital, to briefy attach Argentina's fagship navy
vessel La Libertad of the coast of Ghana, but the ship was quickly released after the UN
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea unanimously upheld its sovereign immunity. More recently,
a landmark ruling by Judge Griesa of the US District Court of Southern New York barred
Argentina from transferring funds to its exchange bondholders (the ones who did accept the
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ones who did not). Nevertheless, the ruling – which has been strongly opposed by Wall
Street and the Obama administration – has failed to extract any concessions from President
Fernández de Kirchner (outgoing at the time of writing). In July 2014, Argentina tried to
make a payment to its exchange bondholders, but its US trustee, the Bank of New York
Mellon, was unable to process the transfer as it would have been held in contempt of court.
Faced with the false choice to either repay the holdouts in full or defy Judge Griesa and
default a second time, Argentina chose the latter. This episode clearly shows that, in the
Argentine case at least, legal sanctions have not been an efective enforcement mechanism.
While Judge Griesa's ruling has rocked the jurisprudence of sovereign debt – with poten-
tially far-reaching consequences for future debt restructuring deals – it has not been able to
reverse Argentina's original default. In fact, it actually triggered another.
Democratic Advantage Hypothesis
Figure 5.3 – institutional mechanism:
What about the role of domestic institutions in securing credible commitment? As
we saw in the previous chapter, Schultz and Weingast's democratic advantage hypothesis
would lead us to expect a mechanism whereby the institutions of liberal democracy limit
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balances, most importantly a powerful legislative and independent courts. Moreover, we
should be able to observe a breakdown of these mechanisms in the switch from compliance
to default, with a move towards more authoritarian and less responsive political institutions
providing the executive with greater leeway to renounce its contractual obligations. This
investigation once again fnds the exact opposite to be the case. Argentina complied at a
time when democratic checks and balances were rapidly eroding as a result of international
fnancial pressures and precarious economic circumstances; it fnally defaulted in response
to intense democratic contestation from below. Insofar as political institutions can be said
to have played a role in shaping the outcome of the crisis, it was precisely their relatively
undemocratic nature that shielded the executive from popular pressures and that ensured
repayment – just as had been the case in the non-democratic Mexico of the 1980s. Unlike in
Mexico, however, this lack of responsiveness eventually became politically untenable as the
crisis deepened and half the population fell into poverty, giving rise to a deep legitimation
crisis and provoking a citizens' revolt that shook the political system to its very core.
The origins of this erosion of democratic responsiveness in Argentina can be traced
back to the resolution of the crisis of the 1980s, which had ended with the resignation of
President Alfolsín following a bout of hyperinfation and intense riots. When Menem won
the elections in 1989, he “soon realised that emergency management of the economy would
demand concentration of power in the executive. So he tried and enlarged his authority by
means of congressional delegation and by the use of NUDs [necessity and urgency decrees]”
(Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 2000:2). At this point, Menem's Justicialist Party controlled
both Houses of Congress, most provincial administrations and the Supreme Court. This
control over the executive, legislative and judicial branches allowed Menem to decisively
abandon the left-Peronist platform on which he had run (which included debt repudiation),
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eradicate the national-popular sensibilities of Alfolsín and the Radicals, and carry out an
ambitious program of neoliberal reform and privatizations that eventually gained Argentina
its status as an IMF poster child. In 1994, coinciding with his embrace of the Washington
Consensus, Menem successfully pushed through a constitutional reform that enshrined the
NUDs upon which he had increasingly come to rely into law,  expanding the discretionary
powers of the presidency in the process (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1995:89). Before 1994,
lawmaking authority had been reserved to Congress, but after the institutionalization of
the decretazo the executive was able to bypass Congress and create laws by decree, giving the
president great “agenda-setting power” and giving rise to a “hyper-presidentialist” regime in
which the head of state, according to some scholars, efectively assumed the role of an
“elected dictator” (Rose-Ackerman, Desierto and Volosin 2010; Stinga 2009).35
Despite the moderate style of his successor, the dynamics of hyper-presidentialism
established under Menem further intensifed with the onset of the economic crisis after
1999. When De la Rúa re-appointed Menem's old Economy Minister in a desperate bid to
restore investor confdence in 2001, “the technocratic Cavallo demanded vast discretionary
powers over economic policy, just as he had done under Menem. This only … reinforced a
policymaking process already heavily dependent on executive degrees, marginalized
Congress, and devalued the overall process of representation” (Schamis 2002a:87). Rose-
Ackerman, Desierto and Volosin (2010:1) stress how “emergency powers, arising from poor
economic conditions … have enhanced presidential power. Presidents seek to enhance their
power by taking unilateral actions, especially in times of crisis, and then assert that the
constitutional separation of powers is a shield that protects them from scrutiny and that
35 Stinga (2009) shows that the use of law-making NUDs (as compared to simple presidential decrees)
increased sharply after 1994 to 30% of total decrees issued (up from 13% before 1994). He moreover notes
how this “confrm[s] the important role of institutional veto powers exclusively in favor of the President.”
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undermines others' claims to exercise checks and balances.” The authors conclude that in
Argentina “presidential power is difcult to control through formal institutional checks.”
Interestingly, this growing power of the executive and the erosion of democratic checks and
balances over the course of the country's neoliberalization seemed to strengthen Argentina's
credible commitment by insulating economic policy from popular pressures.
As we will see later in this chapter, Argentina only defaulted after a citizens' revolt
forced the political establishment to become less subservient to wealthy domestic elites and
foreign fnancial interests and more responsive to the concerns of the general population at
home. For this reason, Tomz (2002) categorizes Argentina's moratorium as a “democratic
default,” emphasizing the widespread public support and voter preference for a unilateral
suspension of payments. Noting that “voters may favor noncompliance as the best way to
promote the national interest or their personal welfare,” Tomz argues that, insofar as those
people who stand to beneft from default are represented politically, democratic institutions
may actually increase the likelihood of non-compliance. Only by shielding economic policy
from such popular pressures could investors be convinced of Argentina's commitment to
repay. The democratic advantage hypothesis has the world standing on its head.
Spillover Costs Hypothesis
Figure 5.4 – spillover mechanism:
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The fourth hypothesis proposed in the literature – spillover costs – once again seems
to be the most credible in light of the available evidence. This explanation would lead us to
expect three things: frst, demonstrable fears among policymakers of the impact of a default
on the wider economy and the fnancial sector in particular; second, early signs of such
spillovers when the government approached default, as creditors and investors took fright
and anticipated the consequences; third, and most important, the actual materialization of
debilitating spillover costs following the default of December 2001. As in the Mexican case,
there is elementary evidence for each of these propositions. For one, Cavallo (2002:1-2) was
deeply concerned about the averse consequences that even a voluntary debt restructuring
would have on the wider economy. The Economy Minister declared that, when he was re-
appointed by De la Rúa, “I made it clear that I would by no means join the government to
devalue the peso and to declare default on the debt because I considered that such measures
would create chaos.” Specifying the kind of chaos he expected, Cavallo never mentioned his
concerns over Argentina's long-term reputation, the threat of legal or trade sanctions, or
the limits imposed upon him by democratic institutions. Rather, he explicitly identifed the
immediate consequences that default would have on economic performance, emphasizing in
particular the transmission belt of the country's fragile and over-leveraged fnancial system:
“defaulting on loan repayments would temporarily ease the burden of public debt interests
on budgets; however, it would automatically bring about the collapse of the fnancial
system, cause the destruction of pension funds, and adversely afect savers and workers,
because over 50 per cent of the bonds issued by the national state and the provincial govern-
ments represented the assets of those institutions” (Cavallo 2002:2).
The health of the fnancial sector thus became the primary concern of government.
In his authoritative investigative account of the crisis, Blustein (2005:168) confrms this:
174
“more worrisome than litigation … was the concern about the banking system.” Cavallo's
chief economic advisor, Guillermo Mondino, pointed out that “the population was very
much aware of the exposure the banks had to government securities,” and hence even the
slightest hint of a default would risk triggering a potentially catastrophic bank run (ibid.).
In November 2001, with the government failing to allay the fears of ordinary Argentinians
and the country inching ever closer to default, signs of anticipatory spillover efects openly
manifested themselves as a slow-motion bank run that had been brewing for several months
escalated into a full-blown fnancial panic. Worried that an impending default would lead to
a collapse of the banking system and that a breakdown of the convertibility regime and a
subsequent currency devaluation would eat up their peso-denominated savings, depositors
began to withdraw over $1 billion per day, rapidly eroding the banks' deposits (Rambarran
2004:6-7). This came on top of the $10 billion that had already fed the country in the wake
of an earlier debt rescheduling in June that year.
When Argentina fnally defaulted, the traumatic consequences largely confrmed the
fears of policymakers and the general public – but they nevertheless turned out to be short-
lived. The default almost immediately led to a breakdown of the convertibility regime and a
subsequent devaluation of 30 percent, followed by a government-declared “pesifcation” of
domestic deposits. After the abandonment of its fxed exchange rate with the dollar, the
peso began to slide and was to lose 300 percent of its value (Levitsky and Murillo 2003:155).
Foreign investors and international fnancial institutions immediately withheld all further
credit and refused to lend to Argentina unless it agreed to “negotiate in good faith” with its
private creditors for an orderly restructuring of the defaulted debt – something that was
politically unpalatable in the social environment that had given rise to the default. And so,
with both private investors and the IMF refusing to lend more money,  the government was
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efectively cut of from foreign credit (Lewis 2009:147). The domestic banking system froze
up and the economy fell into a deep depression.
As the interbank payment system ground to a halt, frms could no longer access the
fnancing they needed to sustain their everyday activities. Sales dropped by 40 percent and
over 100.000 companies went bankrupt, leading to at least 280.000 layofs (Lewis 2009:146).
In the frst quarter of 2002, Argentina's GDP contracted by 16 percent and manufacturing
output by 20 percent, while a classic investor strike undermined any hopes of an immediate
recovery. The rate of investment to GDP, which had stood at an already relatively low 19.1
percent in 1999, fell to 11.3 percent (Baer, Margot and Montes-Rojas 2010:8). Meanwhile,
frms struggled to obtain export credits – a troubling development about which Foreign
Minister Carlos Ruckauf and Enrique Mantilla, head of Argentina's Chamber of Exports,
as well as the World Bank explicitly expressed their concern (Weisbrot and Cibils 2002:4;
Cibils, Weisbrot and Kar 2002:20). The ongoing bank run also intensifed after a much-
maligned limit on deposit withdrawals – the corralito, which had been one of the immediate
triggers for the December uprising – was lifted. Total bank deposits collapsed from $70
billion at the start of 2002 to a mere $2.9 billion by October. With their capital base rapidly
depleting, the banks closed 210 branches and fred 9,500 workers (Lewis 2009:145-6).
The social consequences were devastating. Unemployment hit 25 percent, the share
of the population living in poverty reached 57.5 percent and extreme poverty doubled to 27
percent (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007:10). Klein (2004:4) wrote that, when he took power in
early 2002, “the Argentine economy threatened to disintegrate before Duhalde's eyes.” The
dramatic collapse in output was the worst to hit any capitalist economy since World War II
(Llach 2004). In a country that less than a century ago had ranked among the ten richest in
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the world, one in four citizens now “could no longer aford sufcient food” (Rock 2002:56).
Still, the economic trauma quickly subsided once Argentina returned to very high levels of
growth in 2003; an observation that is in line with the spillover costs hypothesis, which
stresses the short-term consequences of default on the fnancial system and its dramatic
knock-on efects on overall economic performance.
Still, the spillover costs hypothesis fails to explain why Argentina suddenly switched
from repayment to default. If it was really the prospect of economic collapse that forced De
la Rúa's government to comply, why did the same prospect not also bind its successors? To
understand Argentina's dramatic shift in policy preference, we need to take into account a
number of changes in the power dynamics and political conficts at the heart of the crisis.
By focusing on the way in which the enforcement mechanisms that compelled De la Rúa to
repay gradually “broke down” over the course of 2001, the structural power hypothesis is
capable of providing a more dynamic account of Argentina's policy preferences and a more
faithful interpretation of the actual outcome of the crisis – which, as we will see, once again
saw global fnance turn an economic catastrophe decisively in its favor.
Enforcement Mechanisms
As has been stressed before, a proper explanation of Argentina's default should be
able to account both for the government's remarkable compliance in the frst years of the
crisis and for its equally remarkable defance in the wake of the events of December 2001.
In this respect, we can observe a number of important contrasts with the crisis of the 1980s.
Again, three stand out in particular. First, at the level of international lending, the return of
bond fnance in the 1990s made it possible for the big institutional investors to sell their
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bonds on secondary markets and thus reduce their overall exposure. In practice, the efect
was to disperse the holdings of Argentine bonds among a large group of small investors –
mostly pensioners in Europe and Japan – who failed to hold together a creditors' cartel in
the way that the US investment banks and institutional investors had. Second, at the level
of the international lender of last resort, the IMF had overextended itself in the crises of the
1990s, unleashing a wave of criticism from across the political spectrum. Heavily over-
exposed to developing country debt and with the Republicans in US Congress refusing to
replenish its reserves, the IMF found itself less capable of enforcing policy conditionality
and eventually withdrew its fnancial support altogether. Third, unlike in Mexico in the
1980s, the decreasing responsiveness of political institutions to popular concerns led to a
proliferation of contestation in the streets. While Argentina's bankers' alliance – referred to
as the patria fnanciera – was strengthened from above as a result of the state's growing
dependence on foreign credit, it was simultaneously weakened from below as popular oppo-
sition to austerity and repayment manifested itself in the form of a deep crisis of represen-
tation. This crisis gave rise to mass protests that eventually culminated into a popular
uprising, ousting the patria fnanciera from ofce and forcing the Peronist establishment to
make sweeping concessions to the population at large, the frst of which was a unilateral
suspension of payments. In sum, the evidence suggests that the hypothesized enforcement
mechanisms – while initially fully operative – eventually broke down, opening a window of
opportunity that, with a decisive push from below, fnally tipped Argentina into default.
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The Return to Bond Finance and the Collective Action Problem
Figure 5.5 – market discipline mechanism:
The conclusion of the Brady deal in the early 1990s led to a crucial change in the
structure of international lending, marking the end of the syndicated bank loans of the
1970s and 1980s and giving rise to the return of bond fnance. This in turn had important
consequences for the ability of creditors to organize collective action amongst themselves.
While syndicated bank lending had interlocked creditor interests and eased the internal
coordination of a unifed international creditors' cartel, bond fnance rests heavily on
secondary markets, which tend to disperse holdings among a wider and more diverse range
of small investors. As we already saw with respect to the crisis of the 1930s, the incapacity
of geographically scattered bondholders to act monolithically in threatening to withhold
short-term credit tends to lead to a breakdown of market discipline. Anne Krueger, IMF
Deputy Managing Director during the Argentine crisis, observed a clear contrast between
the “generally orderly” crisis management of the 1980s and the chaotic and unpredictable
crises of the 1990s and 2000s, in which investors “were increasingly numerous, anonymous,
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The return to bond fnance, however, does raise an important puzzle. If creditors are
really more difcult to coordinate in a lending structure based on bond fnance than in a
structure based on syndicated lending, then why did the deep crises of the 1990s not lead to
more widespread default? During the peso crisis of 1995 and the East-Asian fnancial crisis
of 1997-'98, debtor countries and international fnancial institutions gained notoriety for
their orthodox policy responses, and we have already seen that Argentina itself was very
subservient in its frst crisis years. What explains this compliance under bond fnance? The
answer, this investigation suggests, lies in the ownership structure of the debt, and specifcally
the high concentration of Argentina's bonds in the frst phase of the crisis. When holdings
are highly concentrated in a number of systemically important fnancial institutions in the
dominant creditor country, in this case the US, these institutional bondholders – assisted by
the international lender of last resort and fnancial authorities in their host country – will
tend to take the lead in forming an international creditors' cartel to prevent default, thereby
helping to overcome the collective action problem that would otherwise have plagued small
and decentralized bondholders. Highly concentrated bond fnance in this respect resembles
syndicated bank lending; the major diference being that bonds can be sold on secondary
markets, providing institutional investors with an exit option and the ability to reduce their
exposure in anticipation of default. This is exactly what appears to have happened in the
Argentine case. As long as Argentina's debt remained highly concentrated and institutional
investors and Wall Street investment banks stood to gain from repeated debt rescheduling
arrangements, the bondholders did not encounter any difculties in maintaining a coherent
international creditors' cartel. The very moment this creditors' cartel began to shed its hol-
dings in order to reduce its exposure, dumping the bonds on hundreds of thousands of scat-
tered small retail investors in Europe, market discipline quickly broke down.
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The decisive turning point, in this respect, was an obscure rescheduling arrangement
agreed to by Cavallo in mid-2001. In May that year, Crédit Suisse-First Boston and seven
other international banks had joined together in a consortium and had taken the initiative
to sell the Economy Minister a notorious scheme that became known as the mega-canje, or
“mega-swap.” The deal would exchange old maturing bonds with new ones carrying much
higher interest rates, so as to efectively wipe out $15 billion in payments falling due in 2001
and push the moment of reckoning back until after the next presidential elections. While
the deal bought Cavallo much-needed time, it provided US institutional investors with a
unique opportunity to shed their exposure to risky Argentine bonds. The result was a dra-
matic change in creditor composition (debt ownership structure), the importance of which
is difcult to overstate. As Economy Minister under Menem in the 1990s, Cavallo had dealt
with a small group of Wall Street investment banks – brokerage frms like Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley and Crédit Suisse-First Boston – which had acted as intermediaries between
Argentina and the buyers of its bonds, mostly large pension funds and mutual funds in the
United States. As the Menem era drew to a close, however, and as the frst signs of crisis
became apparent, US institutional investors became increasingly wary of holding Argentine
debt, so the big Wall Street investment banks “turned to Europe, where regulations protec-
ting small investors were less strict” (Lewis 2009:133). In countries like Italy and Germany,
small investors bought stocks and bonds through their local banks or pension funds. Since
European pension funds could not aford the kind of large and well-trained research units
that steered the investment decisions of the wealthy US funds, they were easily tricked into
purchasing risky Argentine bonds and selling them on to unsuspecting small savers and
pensioners. In the process, the risk of default was “atomized” and dispersed overseas.
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As a result of this process, hundreds of thousands of small savers, including some
400,000 Italians, ended up holding over $24 billion in claims on an all but bankrupt foreign
government. According to an emerging market bond manager, “that's what kept Argentina
going. Those poor suckers didn't have a clue as to what they were buying” (cited in Lewis
2009:133). The mega-swap allowed the Wall Street investment banks to dump Argentina's
worthless bonds onto a dispersed panoply of unsuspecting European retail investors, while
setting Argentina up with an ever growing long-term debt load. Blustein (2005:125) argues
that the swap “ranks among the most infamous deals that Wall Street has ever peddled to a
government – and with good reason: for [Crédit Suisse-First Boston] and a half dozen other
Wall Street frms, the megaswap would be a bonanza … For Argentina, it would be a bust,
rendering the country's solvency even more questionable than it was already.” At the same
time, by dispersing Argentina's creditors, the swap had very negative consequences for the
ability of the new bondholders to maintain a unifed creditors' cartel as the banks had.
The breakdown of the international creditors' cartel – or rather, the existing cartel's
success in passing on the risks and losses of a future default to a less organized third party –
in turn helped to disarm the enforcement mechanism of market discipline that had been so
efective in the 1980s and 1990s and that had, up to that point, served to enforce the com-
pliance of the De la Rúa government. After the mega-swap, however, Argentina was for all
practical purposes excluded from international capital markets. The institutional investors
refused to extend further credit unless there was a debt restructuring to make Argentina's
debts sustainable again. The big US investment banks – knowing that a default was coming
– started hedging their bets. By September 2001, it was clear that the government had “all
but lost access to credit markets,” bringing the country “to the brink of default” (Rambar-
ran 2004:6). With its exposure greatly reduced and the risk of contagion efectively defused,
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Wall Street saw the dark clouds gathering on the horizon and dramatically changed tack,
suddenly embracing the inevitability of an Argentine default.
In October 2001, a meeting took place between IMF Managing Director Horst
Köhler and the senior executives from some of the biggest US-based investment banks and
institutional investors, including J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Crédit Suisse-
First Boston and AIG. According to Lewis (2009:157), the bankers assembled at the meeting
concluded that “Argentina was going to collapse and that nothing could be done to save it.
A default was inevitable, and the best that the creditors could do would be to approve a
restructuring under which they would voluntarily accept less than the face value of their
claims.” As Blustein (2005:162) emphasizes, “this was a remarkable moment. The major
creditors of a country were efectively saying that the government should pay them less
than they were owed, on involuntary terms.” But while the bankers' position may seem
puzzling at frst sight, their dogged insistence on the necessity of a default had little to do
with altruism. Rather, they were hoping to restore Argentina's creditworthiness, keep the
country in the lending game, and thus allow its government to come crawling back to the
banks for further high interest loans. The losses from a haircut, even a large and involun-
tary one, would be bearable as most of the costs had already been passed on anyway.
The Weakening of the IMF and Policy Conditionality
A second major observation in the Argentine case relates to the role of the IMF,
which had been so crucial in cementing the creditors' cartel and preventing default in the
1980s. Together with the US Treasury, the Fund played an even more important role in the
crises of the late 1990s. Echoing the main lessons from the last Latin American debt crisis,
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Cibils, Weisbrot and Kar (2002:6) noted that “the role of the IMF is important, not so much
because of its own resources or expertise, but because of its power – together with the US
Treasury Department – as head of a creditors' cartel that can deny Argentina access to sour-
ces of credit.” Why, then, did the Fund not manage to prevent Argentina's default in 2001?
Was it unable to prevent it? Or did it not want to? The answer is probably a combination
of both.
Figure 5.6 – policy conditionality mechanism:
First, at the turn of the century the IMF was severely weakened, having dramatically
overextended itself in the East-Asian crisis of 1997-'98 and facing scathing criticism – and
growing opposition – from across the political spectrum in response (Bhagwati 1998; Wade
and Veneroso 1998; Stiglitz 2002; Eichengreen 2005; Johnson and Kwak 2010). Second, after
the (non-)election of George W. Bush, the US government grew increasingly hostile to the
type of international bailouts pursued by the Clinton administration, especially in light of
the reduction of US bank exposure to Argentine bonds discussed in the previous section.
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compel De la Rúa to stick to his fscal targets. The second led to a growing unwillingness
among the IMF's main sponsors in Congress and the White House to keep Argentina afoat
in the face of a default that was now widely considered to be inevitable anyway. The two
conspired in November 2001 to lead to the withholding of a critical IMF credit tranche on
grounds that Argentina had failed to live up to the conditions of its Standby Agreement.
The severing of the Fund's ofcial credit line set in motion a sequence of events that three
weeks later fnally led to default.
The IMF's approach to Argentina thus underwent a change at least as dramatic as –
and very much in line with – the change in debt concentration and creditor composition
addressed in the previous section. We can identify three distinct phases in this respect. The
frst, which covered Menem's presidency from 1989 until 1999, was marked by very close
and cooperative relations between Argentina and the Fund. Throughout the 1990s, the
international fnancial community enthusiastically sponsored the neoliberal agenda pursued
by Menem and Cavallo, which “matched perfectly with the reigning economic ideology” of
the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury (Lewis 2009:56). As late as 1998, Menem was invited
to address the IMF annual meeting in Washington, D.C. to share his views on responsible
fnancial management. At this point, the representatives of Argentina's patria fnanciera
resembled the technocratic allies of Mexico's bankers' alliance of the 1980s, working closely
with US and IMF ofcials to establish “a high degree of agreement on the economic policies
to be implemented” (Cibils and LoVuolo 2012:755). In the late 1990s, the IMF's Managing
Director Michel Camdessus exclaimed that “in many respects the experience of Argentina
in recent years has been exemplary ... clearly, Argentina has a story to tell the world: a
story which is about the importance of fscal discipline, of structural change, and of mone-
tary policy rigorously maintained” (cited in Blustein 2005:58).
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The second phase, which covered the frst part of De la Rúa's presidency and the
lame duck phase of the Clinton administration, was marked by continued attempts to stave
of an Argentine default but at the same time also by the waning infuence of the IMF and
its growing inability to enforce policy conditionality on the Argentine government. In the
US, conservative opposition to international bailouts gathered steam in the wake of the
unprecedented US-led rescue operations in Mexico, East Asia, Russia and Brazil. From 1998
onwards, infuential voices were going up for the abolition of the Fund and the Clinton
administration struggled to convince Congress to replenish its reserves. As a result, the IMF
became severely over-exposed to emerging market debt, with Turkey, Brazil and Argentina
accounting for 73 percent of its outstanding liabilities at the end of the decade (Cooper and
Momani 2005:313). By 2001, the Fund's reserves of $8.7 billion paled in comparison to the
$16 billion in exposure it had to Argentina alone (Helleiner 2005b:963). All of this gave the
IMF signifcantly less leverage over the Argentine government than it had had with respect
to the Latin American debtors of the 1980s and the East Asian governments in the 1990s.
In this phase, the IMF nevertheless remained determined to avoid default. Setser and
Gelpern (2006:474) write that “Cavallo's core accomplishment [as Economy Minister] was
to draw on his considerable reputation to secure a series of additional injections of IMF
liquidity to fnance what turned out to be a classic gamble for resurrection.” The IMF dis-
bursed several of the largest augmentations in IMF history, but even this failed to stem the
investor stampede for the exits. Meanwhile, IMF managers, who had not been informed
about the mega-swap, grew increasingly frustrated with President De la Rúa. Cooper and
Momani (2005:308) write that relations between Argentina and the IMF “soured during this
time as the Fund watched Argentina continue to announce policies that the IMF deemed
'misguided', although these initiatives were overtly approved out of fear of a systemic col-
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lapse.” As late as September, the IMF came to the rescue again by adding another $8 billion
lifeline to its Standby Agreement from the previous year; the third such augmentation in
less than a year, bringing the total of extra credit to $22 billion. There is a broad consensus,
including among the IMF's economists, that these loan extensions constituted “the most
contentious decisions regarding the IMF's involvement in the Argentine crisis” (e.g. Mussa
2002). Not only did the augmentations triple the Fund's exposure to Argentina and turn
the IMF into the country's single biggest creditor, but they were also held responsible by
IMF economists for “delaying the inevitable, postponing the default and amplifying the dis-
location caused by the crisis” (Cassou, Erce-Domínguez and Vázquez-Zamora 2008:16).
This period of muddling through fnally gave way to the third phase, which covered
the frst years of the Bush administration and the fnal months of De la Rúa's presidency.
At this point, Washington's pent-up frustrations with Argentina turned to outright, full-
blown hostility. First, as the economic performance of its former poster child grew from
bad to worse, the IMF notably shifted its narrative. Whereas it had previously praised the
fscal discipline of the profigate Menem, it now began to blame the relatively compliant
technocrat De la Rúa for his fscal ineptitude. This in turn refected a change at the helm of
the IMF and the US Treasury. When the Mexican, East-Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises
struck during the Clinton administration in the 1990s, the Treasury and the IMF had prio-
ritized emergency lending over all other priorities. However, from Clinton's last Treasury
Secretary Larry Summers on, the United States' fnancial leadership position was gradually
undermined from within by conservative forces. In 1998, Republicans lawmakers had put
up stif resistance to a proposed $18 billion increase in IMF reserves to protest against
Clinton's Asian bailouts. The increase eventually passed under the condition that Congress
establish a commission to review the IMF's role in international crisis management. This
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gave rise to the Meltzer commission, chaired by free-market economist Allan Meltzer, an
infuential advocate for the abolition of the Fund (Helleiner 2005b:362). In its fnal report,
the commission urged a radical downsizing of IMF activities. Faced with this increasingly
isolationist climate, it is no surprise that Bush's response to the Argentine crisis amounted
to little more than “a placeholder with relatively modest upfront fnancial commitments
that deferred hard decisions” (Setser and Gelpern 2006:474). 
After the Bush administration took ofce in January 2001 and a new management
took over at the Treasury and IMF, the international stance hardened. The new Treasury
Secretary, Paul O'Neill, expressed his opposition to further international bailouts while his
undersecretary for international afairs John Taylor even advocated abolishing the IMF alto-
gether (Blustein 2005:117). Bush's chief economic advisor, Lawrence Lindsey, was also on
record for his staunch free-market convictions; views that weighed heavily on the admini-
stration's response to the Argentine crisis, which on the one hand became ever more laissez-
faire in its approach to emergency lending and on the other much tougher in terms of the
conditionality it imposed on the debtor (Cibils, Weisbrot and Kar 2002; Helleiner 2005b).
Corrales (2002:35) writes that “the frst sign of hard-line posturing came when Secretary of
the Treasury O'Neill, shortly after taking ofce in 2001, chided Argentina publicly for
getting in trouble because it never did its homework, essentially ignoring Argentina's
reform record of the past decade and the role of external crises.”
Moreover, by mid-2001 – following the mega-swap discussed above – the Fund had
decided that “the fre in Argentina would not spread, mostly because bondholders had pro-
tected themselves (more specifcally, most major U.S. bondholders had already sold much of
their Argentine debt)” (Corrales 2002:35-36). Carmen Reinhart, the Fund's deputy chief
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economist, tried to ease the contagion fears of her colleagues by reassuring them that an
Argentine default would probably have only limited repercussions. As she co-wrote in a
staf memo of the IMF research department on August 15, “a 'credit event' in Argentina is
widely anticipated and has been (partly) discounted by the markets for some time. The
possibility that a default by Argentina triggers a sharp reversal of capital fows to other
countries in South America is therefore relatively small” (cited in Blustein 2005:142).
Another internal IMF report showed that, while a few Spanish banks might take a hit, the
risk of contagion and the overall threat posed to the international fnancial system were low
(Blustein 2005:175). At the same time, drawing on its experience with devaluations in East
Asia, the IMF had become convinced that Argentina's infexible exchange rate had to go,
which would in turn require a restructuring of the debt. None of this meant that Argentina
would be granted any leeway though: as the American stance hardened, loan conditionality
was further ramped up (Corrales 2002:36).
By now, infuential economic commentators and leading fgures in the US fnancial
establishment had already been openly expressing the need of a default for quite some time.
Back in March 2001, Columbia economist Charles Calomiris and a group of Wall Street
bankers had proposed that “Argentina declare itself bankrupt, request debt forgiveness, and
start over with new policies intended to reward creditors only if its economy improved”
(Wucker 2003:50). Calomiris was by no means a left-wing populist or Jubilee campaigner.
Well-known in conservative circles as a long-time champion of fnancial deregulation who
kept the interests of Wall Street close at heart, he was convinced that there was only one
way to keep Argentina in the lending game: by writing of a signifcant chunk of the debt.
It has been noted that “devaluation and default were openly discussed (particularly in fnan-
cial and academic settings in the United States) and there was a widespread opinion that the
189
debt and the convertibility regime were not sustainable” (Damill, Frenkel and Rapetti 2005:
74). With the IMF itself heavily over-exposed, Horst Köhler, the Fund's new chief, began to
investigate the possibility of private sector involvement in the burden sharing. Blustein
(2005:98) notes that Köhler “raised the possibility that the IMF and the Argentine autho-
rities should consider something like Calomiris's 'haircut' proposal for forcing creditors to
accept reduced payment of their claims.” And so the IMF actively began to prepare default
scenarios, a so-called 'Plan Gamma', as a possible resolution to the crisis.
In April 2001, Calomiris went public with his default proposal in a Wall Street
Journal article entitled 'Argentina Can't Pay What It Owes'. In the piece, he specifcally
argued that most US institutional investors had already sold of their Argentine bonds and
therefore US policymakers did not need to fear a default. Calomiris highlighted the fact that
“U.S. institutions are already 'underweight' on Argentine debt,” and pointed out that while
Argentina accounted for some 25 percent of emerging market bonds in circulation world-
wide, it only made up 10-15 percent of the portfolios of the large US-based mutual funds
and pension funds (note that this was before the mega-swap; these ratios were even further
reduced as institutional investors ofoaded their Argentine bonds in the swap). The opinion
piece elicited a strong rebuke from Cavallo, who shot back that “I have thought a lot as to
why honest people may dare to write a recommendation as to how Argentina may default.
Who could conceive such a destructive idea for a country, and be bold enough to propose
it? … There is a complete misunderstanding (almost omission) of the costs that a compul-
sory restructuring of our debt would have” (cited in Blustein 2005:122).
By October 2001, Schamis (2002a:87) writes, “it was obvious to most analysts that
Argentina would have to default on its debt, but Cavallo – some said with an eye on his ties
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to Wall Street – stubbornly refused to admit it.” The perceived inevitability of default,
however, was already turning into a self-fulflling prophecy. On December 5, the IMF dryly
announced that it would be withholding its next $1.24 billion loan installment out of
frustration with the government's failure to keep its budget under control. With the lender
of last resort simply pulling the plug on its fnancial life-support, there was very little the
Argentine government could do to prevent the downward spiral that, three weeks later,
would force the country to declare the largest unilateral default in world history.
In a fnal act of desperation, Cavallo seized the country's pension funds and trans-
ferred the contents to the Treasury, allowing the government to keep paying its bills and to
once more extend the moment of reckoning. In a meeting with IMF ofcials on December
7, when it was clear to everyone involved that Argentina had no other option but to declare
a default and exit the convertibility regime, Cavallo refused to even discuss the option with
Fund ofcials (Setser and Gelpern 2006:475). And so the US simply kept pushing Argentina
further towards the clif. “As if the message was not clear enough,” Cavallo later fumed in
indignation, “Allan Meltzer visited Buenos Aires to tell [opposition leader] Eduardo
Duhalde and most of the senators that the debt restructuring process which the Argen-
tinian government was engaged in would not generate enough of a haircut and Argentina
should simply default on all its debt” (Cavallo 2004:147). Cavallo and De la Rúa would have
none of it. In one of the most remarkable cases of over-compliance in recent fnancial
history, the two men continued to defy their foreign creditors precisely by not defaulting.
If the entire international fnancial community was now pushing for Argentina to
suspend its payments, why did the country's leaders not just get it over with and default?
What drove De la Rúa and Cavallo to repay, and what were the fnal factors that eventually
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brought about the inevitable default? So far, we have explored the gradual breakdown of the
international enforcement mechanisms; to answer the above questions we will now need to
look at the important political and social changes that took place inside Argentina itself.
The Rise and Fall of the Patria Financiera
Figure 5.7 – privileged position mechanism:
As in Mexico, the Argentine political economy underwent a major transformation
in the last three decades of the twentieth century. In the 1970s, the most important political
cleavage had been the split between the left-wing and right-wing of the Peronist movement.
The former advocated a patria socialista, a socialist homeland, while the latter advocated a
nationalist and corporatist patria Peronista. The military coup of 1976 dramatically changed
this situation. Like in Chile, the left was brutally persecuted as the junta began to liberalize
the economy. The result was increasing state dependence on private credit and investment
and the growing indebtedness of government, frms and individual households to private
banks. Schamis (2002b:129) writes that “Argentines came up with the term patria fnanciera
to refer to the main benefciary of the liberalization process.” While this patria fnanciera
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was by no means as deeply rooted as Mexico's bankers' alliance (it lacked the organizational
and structural ties to domestic industrialists), it nevertheless grew increasingly infuential in
the debt crisis of the 1980s and fnally reached its apogee under Menem and Cavallo in the
1990s. When the crisis of 1999 struck and the state's dependence on foreign credit grew ever
more acute, the political allies of the patria fnanciera – who shared creditors' interest and
belief in stabilization, privatization, liberalization, deep integration and the “sound money”
guaranteed by peso-dollar convertibility – efectively monopolized economic policymaking,
especially in the wake of the reappointment of Domingo Cavallo. In this sense, Argentina
resembled Mexico in the frst years of its crisis.
Unlike in Mexico, however, the rise of the patria fnanciera and Cavallo's policy
response to the crisis did not go uncontested. While the labor unions had been largely co-
opted by the Peronist establishment and did not put up a very strong resistance, there was
signifcant popular pressure from below to reverse painful austerity measures and fght sky-
rocketing poverty and unemployment. As we will see in this section, the rise of the patria
fnanciera thus corresponded closely to the growing dependence of the state on credit, while
its fall was a direct result of both the cutting of of foreign fnancial support (discussed
above) and the deepening crisis of representation that grabbed a hold of Argentine society
in 2001, as the state's failure to see to its accumulation function increasingly undermined its
legitimization function. As a result, the crisis led to a complete loss of public trust in the
political establishment and the post-junta order, culminating into an uprising in December
2001 that forced out De la Rúa and Menem, fnally leading to Argentina's historic default.
Just as in Mexico, the crisis started out with two conficting positions on the debt
question. Unlike in Mexico, these conficting positions could be openly expressed in free
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democratic elections, with the Peronist candidate Eduardo Duhalde of the Justicialist Party
openly calling for default in his 1999 campaign and Fernando De la Rúa, who ran on the
ticket of the 'Alliance' between his centrist Radical Party and the center-left Frepaso,
pledging “to pay the debt under all circumstances” (cited in Schamis 2002a:82). However, as
international fnancial pressures grew stronger in the wake of the elections, the victorious
De la Rúa found himself stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the
markets and IMF demanded far-reaching austerity, while on the other popular opposition
to such measures was growing stronger. As Argentina entered into a vicious cycle of rising
risk premiums, deeper budget cuts, a worsening economic downturn and widening social
unrest, there seemed to be little the President could do to rectify the situation: pleasing
investors deeply angered voters, and pleasing voters scared away investors. Still, investors
clearly had the upper hand, eroding De la Rúa's standing at home. By 2000, even fellow
party members began to openly air their opposition to the president's policies; De la Rúa's
predecessor and party leader Raúl Alfolsín, for instance, lambasted the president for his
orthodoxy and called for a debt moratorium.
Increasingly incapable of sticking to the IMF's fscal targets and desperate to streng-
then his weakening grip on power in the wake of a corruption scandal that had left him
politically isolated, De la Rúa decided to replace his Economy Minister with Ricardo López
Murphy, a fscal hawk and former IMF economist who he hoped could help restore private
sector confdence. But when the $4.45 billion austerity package he announced upon taking
ofce triggered violent student protests, 'The Bulldog', as López Murphy was known to the
media, was forced to retreat with his tail between his legs. As a result, research staf at the
IMF rapidly lost faith in Argentina's ability to pay its debt (Cooper and Momani 2005:308).
Chief economist Michael Mussa believed López Murphy was the only one who could have
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credibly reigned in government spending – and he had just been mowed down by popular
protest (Mussa 2002). Meanwhile, as wealthy citizens started withdrawing or expatriating
their savings and a slow-motion bank run quietly gained pace, it began to dawn on more
and more people that “default was only a matter of time” (Lewis 2009:130). But De la Rúa,
determined to avoid that outcome, continued to gamble for resurrection and pledged once
more that he would honor Argentina's obligations in full. To add force to that pledge, the
president did something remarkable: he turned to his political opponent Domingo Cavallo,
against whom he had squared of in the presidential elections of 1999, and reappointed the
former Economy Minister back to the position he had held under President Menem.
The economic motivations behind Cavallo's appointment were clear. With his close
ties to domestic and international investors as well as the US government and the IMF, “the
Wizard”, as Cavallo was known, was the man deemed most capable of providing a bridging
role towards foreign creditors. In fact, Cavallo was so loved by investors that, when Menem
had announced on January 29, 1991 that he would be appointing him as Economy Minister
the frst time around, the Buenos Aires stock exchange instantly shot up 30 percent in a
single day (Blustein 2005:13; Rock 2002). As Schamis (2002a:87) noted, the main reason De
la Rúa now reinstated his one-time rival was because “he was hoping thereby to gather poli-
tical support from economic and fnancial elites, as well as to put in place a man whom he
could trust to attack the defcit aggressively, foster growth, and service the debt.” As had
been the case with Silva Herzog in Mexico before, the combination of Cavallo's reputation
as a savior and his bridging role to foreign creditors provided the Economy Minister with
vast political leverage. Setser and Gelpern (2006:472) point out that “the institutional power
of the economy ministry in particular hinged in no small part on its ability to deliver exter-
nal fnancing.” As the earlier discussion about the discretionary powers of the executive
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showed, Cavallo – in a desperate bid to steer the economy around – wielded this leverage to
near-autocratic efect, with remarkable frankness about the purpose of his second coming:
“it was perfectly clear that President De la Rúa intended to appoint me as his Economy
Minister in order to avert a default on the debt and to pre-serve the convertibility regime.”
Why, then, were De la Rúa and Cavallo so adamant on preventing default? Setser
and Gelpern (2006:475-6) have pointed out that, since half of the country's $90 billion debt
was in the hands of domestic constituents and fnancial institutions, a default “would [have]
reduce[d] the fnancial wealth of those Argentines who had invested in the debt – banks and
pension funds as well as wealthy Argentines with ofshore accounts.” It would also have led
to the collapse of the country's fnancial system and would have forced the government to
come to the rescue of private banks and the large pension and insurance funds. The vast
capital injections this would have required were impossible to undertake in the fscal and
monetary straitjacket of the convertibility regime. A default would therefore automatically
force the government to abandon convertibility. This in turn risked reviving the specter of
infation that so haunted not only the lower and middle classes – who always bore the
brunt of price increases – but especially the investor class (since infation cancels out real
interest). Moreover, the convertibility regime cemented Argentina's integration into the US
fnancial system, enabling wealthy Argentines to invest and safely deposit their savings
abroad. A default was therefore clearly not in the interest of Argentina's political and fnan-
cial elite – and De la Rúa and Cavallo, as representatives of the embattled patria fnanciera,
were determined to avoid harming this key constituency at all costs.
The problem was that three years of crisis and over a decade of relentless austerity
and neoliberal restructuring had left an indelible mark on the already-fraught relationship
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between the government and its voters, and between the political establishment and citizens
more generally. De la Rúa's failure to do anything about the economic collapse, combined
with his embarrassing corruption scandals and his seeming indiference to the sufering of
ordinary people, caused presidential approval ratings to drop to unprecedented lows. While
his popularity stood at 70 percent when he took ofce in 1999, by October 2000 it had
dropped to 32 percent and by June 2001 it had was down to 15 percent, easily making De la
Rúa the country's most unpopular and most despised democratically-elected President ever
(Epstein and Pion-Berlin 2006:7). In fact, a Gallup poll in November 2000 found that only
11 percent of voters believed the government was doing a good job economically, while
nearly half saw no diference between the policies of De la Rúa and those of the thoroughly
corrupt crony-capitalist caudillo Carlos Menem, from whom the President had so despera-
tely tried to distance himself all these years (Epstein and Pion-Berlin 2006:8).
But the anger ran deeper than that: citizens had begun to question the legitimacy of
the post-junta order as a whole. As one observer put it, “there was a widespread feeling, if
an ill-defned one, that the people had been let down by the entire political class” (Klein
2004:3). As the government grew ever more committed to its obligations towards foreign
bondholders and ever less responsive to its own citizenry, a deep crisis of representation
took hold that saw public trust in the political establishment and in democratic institutions
collapse. Several Graciela Römer polls during Menem's presidency had already indicated a
slide in public confdence in political parties: while only 24 percent of those questioned
expressed some or much confdence in 1993, this fell to a mere 10 percent in 1999, while
confdence in Congress as a political institution fell from 31 percent to 13 percent (Epstein
and Pion-Berlin 2006:9). These dynamics were further aggravated by the fnancial crisis, and
in particular by Cavallo's erratic and autocratic approach to crisis management. 
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The majority of people simply lost their faith in democratic institutions. Protests,
strikes and occupations were on the rise, and incensed citizens took to physically attacking
ofcials spotted in public. Social tensions reached a point where most politicians were too
afraid to even go out for dinner or cross the street on foot. Senator Eduardo Menem, the
former President's brother, was assaulted on an airplane; others were yelled and spat at in
restaurants. According to a Graciela Römer poll taken around the congressional elections of
October 2001, 70 percent of respondents were dissatisfed with political institutions.36 The
midterm elections themselves were widely seen as a referendum on the government's eco-
nomic policies. As Tomz (2002:14-15) recounts, “all major parties addressed the default in
their manifestoes, with some clinging to the status quo policy of payment and others
seeking an immediate suspension of payments.” Duhalde, representing the national-popular
center-left of the Justicialist Party, restated the same default pledge he had made in the 1999
elections, and members of De la Rúa's Radical Party – including ex-President Alfolsín and
De la Rúa's former cabinet chief Rodolfo Terragno – publicly distanced themselves from De
la Rúa by pledging a default on the external debt. Terragno even claimed to have made
default “the leitmotif of my campaign” (ibid.).
The outcome of the mid-term elections was the clearest manifestation of the crisis of
representation to date. Despite the fact that voting was obligatory, more than 26 percent of
the electorate did not show up at the polls. Of those who did vote, an unprecedented 22
percent cast blank or spoilt ballots (the so-called voto bronca) in protest against the political
class (Lewis 2009:134). “Public frustration,” Levitsky and Murillo (2003:154) wrote, had
“reached a boiling point.” One observer noted that “the cumulative social disillusionment
with the [Radical Party] of Alfolsín, the [Justicialist Party] of Menem and the Alliance of
36 'El 70% está insatisfecho con las instituciones políticas', La Nación, October 28, 2001 
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De la Rúa gave rise to the idea that there was no place within the structure of the Argentine
political system for the representation of broad and diverse social demands” (Schuster
2008:165). The leading newspaper La Nación simply headlined that “the people do not feel
represented.” In addition to the widespread abstention and the large voto bronca, Tomz
(2002:15) shows that those who did cast a positive vote “overwhelmingly favored candidates
who did not want to repay the foreign debt.” Thus the pro-default Peronists, the Justicialist
Party, became the biggest group in the Lower House while retaining its control over the
Senate. Federico Storani, a leading fgure in the ruling Radical Party, admitted defeat and
called it a “plebiscite against the government's economic policy” (ibid.).
Meanwhile, polls revealed that public opinion had largely turned in favor of default.
According to one poll in the city and greater metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, only 28
percent of Argentines wanted their government to stay current on its debt obligations,
while 63 preferred to impose a unilateral moratorium (Tomz 2002:15). Another found that
only 5 percent considered repayment to be a priority, while support for a total repudiation
of the debt more than doubled from 11 to 27 percent compared to the last elections of 1999
(ibid.). But De la Rúa refused to give in. In fact, he decided to swim right against the current
of public opinion by insisting on even more austerity to prevent what he considered to be a
“catastrophic” default. The president declared that “I am going to give over my life to this
struggle. We discard the idea of a devaluation or default.” Despite losing his Congressional
majority and witnessing his party disintegrate before his eyes, President De la Rúa stood
frm in his insistence on the full and timely repayment of the national debt. In a televised
address he euphemistically stated that “I know that many are not content with the govern-
ment or with the form of my management and style, [but] it is time to face reality... Argen-
tina will not fall into a cessation of payments” (cited in Tomz 2002:15).
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The obstinance of the president and the complete disqualifcation of the political
class as a whole left many Argentines hungry for change. Strikes and protests became not
only more frequent but also more militant. In the period between July and December 2001,
the amount of strikes per month tripled compared to the same months of the previous year.
Tomz (2002:13-14) remarks that “the jump, sparked by a major new round of budget cuts
and a 'zero defcit' plan ... confrms that workers were becoming less tolerant of the
austerity needed to continue servicing the debt.” Meanwhile, protesters blocked highways
and major intersections, attacked government buildings and on a number of occasions tem-
porarily took ofcials “hostage” to demand social jobs or unemployment benefts. As the
government continued to lay of civil servants and cut salaries, pensions and social security
benefts, new forms of popular protest began to bubble up from below. Hausman and
Velasco (2003:11) recount that “the new poor realised that their social collapse was unstop-
pable. They were going to carry on falling. It was at that point that new political actors
appeared.” Notably, these were “not the historical leaders of the working class because,
when the labor market collapsed, the unions, as the political representatives of the working
class, went with it.” Schuster (2008:167) writes that the “new forms of political construction
[were] built from within society rather than the political system, [and] emerged on the
Argentine scene with unusual force.”37
At the end of November 2001, these dramatic changes from below coincided with
equally dramatic changes from above: the riesgo país shot up to 5,000 basis points, leaving
37 Emphasizing democratic principles and stressing their autonomy from parties, unions and the state, these
“new social protagonists” began to craft alternative forms of self-organization that touched upon the lives
of millions. Given their widespread popular appeal and innovative grassroots practices – which included
the blocking of roads and the mass occupation of closed factories and other workplaces – the traditional
political actors largely failed to connect to these burgeoning social movements, let alone come up with a
convincing political response (Colectivo Situaciones 2002; Zibechi 2003; Sitrin 2012).
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Argentina with no external sources of fnancing. On November 30, amid growing fears of a
breakdown of the convertibility regime and a consequent devaluation of the peso, a bank
run took of, leading Cavallo to shut down the country's banks and declare the corralito on
December 1, freezing bank deposits, outlawing deposit transfers abroad and imposing a
withdrawal limit of 1,000 pesos per week. As one banker put it, “the corralito trapped the
perejiles,” the little guys. “The big players already knew what was going to happen and got
out ahead of time” (cited in Ariso and Jacobo 2002:159). The corralito backfred, prompting
dramatic social unrest and setting in motion a vicious cycle that would eventually culminate
in Cavallo's own political demise. A few days later, on December 5, against the backdrop of
intensifying opposition in the streets, the IMF announced its decision to withhold the next
installment of its bailout program in response to the government's inability to stick to the
conditions of its loans. Now the government found itself under immense pressure from all
sides to simply get it over with and default.
The popular outrage that had been building all throughout the year came to a head
on December 19 when the streets exploded in furious anger. As Rambarran (2004:6-7) puts
it, “the social fabric unraveled.” Food riots and violent looting frst broke out in Rosario
and within hours spread through the country to Santa Fe, Córdoba, La Plata and Mendoza,
and from there via the suburbs of Buenos Aires to the heart of the capital (Lewis 2009:135-
6). Violent clashes broke out between protesters and police. Groups of rioters and looters
stormed banks and supermarkets. In a poorly calculated attempt to quell the uprising, De la
Rúa went on national television to announce a suspension of constitutional rights and to
declare a 30-day state of exception, deploying the federal police, border guard and naval pre-
fecture to restore order. Given the severity of the social unrest and the speed at which the
riots spread across the country, the president briefy entertained the idea of shutting down
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all private radio and TV stations and mobilizing the army to put down the rebellion, but
both options were rejected by his cabinet. With the experience of the junta still fresh in the
country's mind, even the army leadership turned out to be unwilling to leave the barracks
without express approval from Congress and so long as there remained a chance, however
slim, that conventional political solutions might save the day.
Like Cavallo's corralito, the president's televised address backfred in the worst way
imaginable. According to Malamud (2006:13), “De la Rúa looked distant and insensitive to
what was taking place. Some of his aides even qualifed his speech as 'autistic'.” Citizens felt
that their legitimate expressions of indignation were not being taken seriously and so they
defed the curfew and descended from their homes in the hundreds of thousands. As protes-
ters marched on the Plaza de Mayo and amassed in front of the presidential palace, clashes
broke out and police violently cracked down on the protests, killing 17 people nationwide,
fve of them right in front of the presidential palace (Malamud 2006:13-14). That night, De
la Rúa – looking for a scapegoat – forced a publicly humiliated Cavallo to resign.
The rage, however, could no longer be contained so easily. In the morning of the
next day, December 20, renewed protests broke out as thousands returned to the Plaza de
Mayo to defy the curfew again. When it had become clear that violent repression would not
diminish the people's resolve, De la Rúa again went on national television in the afternoon
to invite the Peronists to join him in a “government of national salvation” and help restore
“peace and order” to the country. The Peronist leadership refused. Even De la Rúa's own
cabinet members later declared that, watching the President's performance on TV, they
could not escape the feeling that De la Rúa was on another planet, far removed from what
was truly going on “out there” (Malamud 2006:14). As his Ministers and Senators began to
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abandon him and as the protesters only seemed to grow stronger in numbers and resolve,
the politically isolated De la Rúa fnally tendered his resignation. Security forces considered
it too dangerous to evacuate him from the presidential palace by car, and so – in an image
that would come to defne Argentina's deepest political crisis since the fall of the junta – De
la Rúa was forced to escape the palace by helicopter. As he was airlifted from the roof of the
building, the crowds below roared: “All of them must go!” As Tomz (2002:15-16) put it,  the
protesters “had just removed from power the most signifcant obstacle to default.” 
Since the vacant position of vice-president had never been flled, the role of interim-
president fell to Ramon Puerta, the Peronist leader of the Senate, until Congress elected
Adolfo Rodríguez Saá as the new head of state. The frst thing Rodríquez Saá did upon
taking ofce was to declare a unilateral moratorium on Argentina's entire outstanding debt
to private creditors. In his inaugural address on December 24, he declared that “I believe in
an Argentina without unemployment, without misery. I will govern for the most humble
and for those who sufer. I call for the suspension of payments on the foreign debt until all
Argentines have jobs” (cited in Tomz 2002:15-16). Rodríquez Saá lamented that “the gravest
thing that has happened here is that priority has been given to foreign debt while the state
has an internal obligation with its own people.”
But while Argentina entered into default on over $80 billion in debt (half of which
owed to foreign private creditors and half to domestic creditors), the new President almost
immediately fell foul of his other pledges. As fresh protests took of, the most important
Peronist governors came together and decided that Rodríguez Saá had to go. On December
30, Congress voted to replace him with Ramón Puerta, who resigned immediately. From
there, the hot potato of the presidency passed to Eduardo Oscar Camaño, chairman of the
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Chamber of Deputies, who was a known supporter of Eduardo Duhalde, the former vice-
president under Menem and De la Rúa's main opponent in the 1999 elections. On January
1, 2002, the power vacuum was fnally flled when Camaño arranged for Duhalde to take
over and complete the remainder of De la Rúa's term, with new elections set for December
2003. Duhalde acceded to power as the country's ffth president in just ten days' time.
In analyzing this incredible sequence of events, unprecedented and still unequaled in
Argentina's post-war history, the conventional explanations of debtor compliance appear to
hold little explanatory power. Between Argentina's exceptional over-compliance of October
2001 and its record-shattering default of December 2001, nothing truly changed in terms of
its reputation, the credible threat of sanctions, or the nature of its political institutions. If
these variables remained constant, they cannot account for the change in outcome. After
the institutional investors had dumped their bonds in the mega-swap and the IMF had cut
of its credit line, the only thing that truly changed in the intervening period was that the
patria fnanciera – represented by De la Rúa and Cavallo – was ousted from ofce, and
sustained mass pressure from below forced the Peronist establishment that inherited the
presidency to make serious concessions to the population at large. These concessions took
the form of a unilateral moratorium, which had been advocated by the national-popular
wing of the Peronist opposition from 1999 onwards, which was strongly supported by a
majority of voters, and which was already widely expected, desired and actively pursued by
the US, IMF and Wall Street. Since the other two enforcement mechanisms of market disci-
pline and policy conditionality had earlier been been deactivated from above by the mega-
swap and the IMF's refusal to release the next credit tranche, the ouster of De la Rúa fnally
made the inevitable unstoppable.
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Outcomes of the Crisis
Figure 5.8 – outcomes according to structural power hypothesis:
The above discussion shows how the three enforcement mechanisms – as in Mexico
– were initially fully operative in the Argentine case, compelling the government to comply
and repay its debts. But at the same time it also shows how these mechanisms – unlike in
Mexico – ended up breaking down, ultimately leading to default. If the structural power
hypothesis is correct, then, we should observe a number of contradictory outcomes in the
Argentine crisis that on the one hand reveal an unexpected similarity to the Mexican case
while on the other presenting a sharp contrast. First, given the fact that its private creditors
were scattered, the Bush administration disinterested and the IMF incapacitated, we should
















































the uniqueness of the Argentine case we would expect this room for maneuver to remain a
quite limited phenomenon that did not necessarily apply to its neighbors. Second, given the
greater room for maneuver Argentina experienced, we should expect it to take the lead in
pursuing a debt resolution process in its own national interests. At the same time, however,
we would expect global fnance – whose structural power remains undiminished, according
to this thesis – to have escaped from the crisis relatively unscathed, even with profts (after
all, as we have seen, US institutional investors had already shed their Argentine exposure by
the time of the default). Third, given the relative strength of Argentina's social movements
and the country's rupture with global fnance following the default, we should expect the
privileged position of the patria fnanciera to be eroded – since its bridging function broke
down the moment Argentina lost access to capital markets – and a new coalition to emerge
in which national-popular interests would play a more central role, with important conse-
quences for the distribution of adjustment costs. At the same time, however, given the state
dependence on national capitalists for an economic recovery, we would expect the redistri-
butive post-default measures to be conciliatory rather than emancipatory and the defance
of investors to be rhetorical rather than truly transformative. Once again, we fnd evidence
for each of these propositions, lending further support to the structural power hypothesis.
Argentina's Exceptional Room for Maneuver
Perhaps the most remarkable outcome of Argentina's crisis is the exceptional room
for maneuver the country enjoyed following its default. While Eduardo Duhalde struggled
in 2002 to balance the contradictory needs to restart private accumulation on the one hand
and restore popular legitimacy on the other, Néstor Kirchner upon assuming ofce in 2003
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found himself presented with a political and economic opportunity structure for much
more confrontational action, opening space for an aggressive debt restructuring where no
such space had existed before. In early 2005, after a long and arduous negotiation process,
Argentina reached a deal with its creditors that saw 76 percent of bondholders accept new
bonds worth 25 percent of the original defaulted ones. The remaining 24 percent, a Baptist-
Bootlegger coalition of European pensioners and American vulture funds, saw their claims
repudiated (Baer, Margot and Montes-Rojas 2010:12). When Argentina briefy reopened the
restructuring deal in 2010, more bondholders subscribed, reducing the “holdouts” to a mere
9 percent. This is a remarkably high degree of participation given the size of the haircut and
the aggressive posturing of the government. How was Kirchner able to get his way?
There were a number of factors that played to Argentina's advantage. First, as has
been discussed already, Argentina's bondholders were greatly atomized after the creditor-led
mega-swap of mid-2001, and mostly made up of so-called “fnancially illiterate” small savers
and pensioners. This had important consequences for creditors' bargaining power vis-à-vis
the Argentine government in the debt negotiations. As Lewis (2009:158) puts it, “most of
the bondholders were 'small fry' and scattered geographically, making it difcult for them
to coordinate any strategy.” The collective action problem of 1930s bond fnance returned
with a vengeance. “True to atomistic stereotype,” Gelpern (2005:3) observes, “bondholders
could not hold a coalition. Each acted in its own self-interest.” Furthermore, Gelpern (ibid.)
has importantly noted that “these [small] investors generally were not repeat players and
knew little about emerging-market debt.” Mortimore and Stanley (2006:20) also afrm that
“the lack of cohesion among the diferent organizations representing the creditors worked
to the advantage of the government.” Kirchner made strategic use of these factors to play
his creditors apart. For one, when bondholders set up the Global Committee of Argentina
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Bondholders in an attempt to present a united front at the debt negotiations, he simply
refused to talk to the group or even to recognize its existence (Gelpern 2005:3). He was able
to do this because he did not depend on these dispersed bondholders for future credit –
even if he restructured the debt on extraordinarily good term for the creditors, most bond-
holders had made a one-of investment and were unlikely to ever lend to Argentina again.
Argentina's unilateral suspension of payments also contributed to reversing the
debtor-creditor power dynamic – just as it had done in the wake of the defaults of the 1930s
(Ocampo 2013). Before Argentina's moratorium, bondholders had been receiving 100 cents
on the dollar and any reduction in the face value of their claims would have undoubtedly
been considered an unacceptable loss. Now, some two years after the default, creditors were
receiving 0 cents on the dollar, and – barring moral concerns over the violation of creditor
rights – any form of restructuring, even an unusually harsh one, would at least allow them
to mark their holdings to market and continue to proft from restructured bonds and new
deals in the future. The moratorium, in other words, restored the initiative to the debtor
and allowed it to wield the prospect of a restructuring as a carrot instead of a stick, creating
an incentive structure for creditors to sign up to an aggressive debt restructuring that they
would otherwise never have agreed to. As Datz (2013:474) succinctly put it, “investors were
not looking at losses taken in 2001, but at a scenario of gains in 2005.” Economy Minister
Roberto Lavagna seemed to be under a similar impression when just a month before the
conclusion of the deal he rhetorically asked why – despite the destruction of numerous debt
contracts in 2001 – investors were still so eager to buy Argentine bonds. His simple answer:
“because today clearly they can get a very good rate of return” (cited in Datz 2013:465).
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The benefts of Argentina's restructuring accrued especially to the fnancially literate
repeat players: the international banks and institutional investors, who had a direct interest
in keeping Argentina in the lending game. But they were not immediately clear to the small
European retail investors, who were unlikely to lend to Argentina again and who would
have preferred a higher payout. Kirchner was acutely aware of these conficting interests in
the creditor base and exploited the fssure to full efect. By negotiating individually with the
big international banks while at the same time denying the very existence of the dispersed
bondholders, his government successfully drove a wedge in the (non-existent) international
creditors' cartel – to the detriment of pensioners and other small investors in Europe.
The second factor playing to Argentina's advantage was that its dispersed creditors
received little or no support from their own governments, the IMF or the United States
(Lewis 2009:158). In its negotiations with private bondholders, Helleiner (2005b:956) notes,
“the USA was … quite sympathetic to the position taken by the Argentine government.”
When Bush met Kirchner at the Summit of the Americas on January 13, 2004, Bush “quite
signifcantly did not echo Koehler's request that he consider paying more than just 25
percent to holders of bonds.” As Quarles of the US Treasury put it: “it's not the IMF's role
to impose any particular terms of the deal. ... How much can Argentina repay? ... I think
that's something that the IMF and the US, as a shareholder in the IMF, should not have a
view on.” Treasury Secretary Taylor echoed the same sentiment: “the idea here is to allow
negotiations but not to be in the middle, or choose sides. That's for the creditors and
Argentina to work out” (all cited in Helleiner 2005b). Mortimore and Stanley (2006:20)
conclude that “the non-intervention of the IMF together with the lack of cohesion within
the G7 ultimately benefted the debtor.” It also greatly frustrated the small bondholders. As
an Italian lawyer representing a group of pensioners who lost their life's savings in the
209
default put it: “Argentina doesn't want to pay its debt, and Washington doesn't want to
force it to pay. So the easiest thing is to send the bill to the bondholders in Europe, little
people no one will ever see” (cited in Mofett 2004). Another Italian lawyer pointed out to
the Wall Street Journal that “with what's happening in Iraq and Afghanistan, you can be
sure that Mr. Bush didn't want to start a battle with Argentina, just to defend some retirees
in Europe” (ibid. 2004).
But the role of the US government was not just characterized by disinterest. In fact,
the Bush administration took an active stance in favor of Argentina's aggressive approach to
the private creditors and the IMF. When Kirchner missed a $2.9 billion payment to the IMF
on September 9, 2003, President Bush personally supported the move, further reducing the
IMF's ability to defend bondholder interests in the debt negotiations (Lewis 2009:157). A
group of Argentine economists has noted that, “because there was a real risk of Argentina
defaulting on its large obligations to international fnancial institutions, the Fund's leverage
to infuence the outcome of the private debt restructuring was much weakened all through
the post-default phase of the crisis” (Cassou, Erce-Domínguez and Vázquez 2008:15). When
Kirchner fnally reached an agreement with the IMF that was uncharacteristically benefcial
to Argentina, Bush personally called up his Argentine counterpart to congratulate him and
express his satisfaction with the deal, while Treasury Secretary John Snow was reportedly
very pleased with the agreement as well. Randal Quarles, Assistant Treasury Secretary for
International Afairs, claimed that the administration had “deliberately pushed for the
budget surplus targets [in the IMF Standby Agreement] to be left undefned in the second
and third years – over IMF objections – because it wanted the IMF not to take a stance in
the debt negotiations with private creditors,” stating that “it's not the IMF's role to take a
stance to impose any particular terms of a deal” (cited in Helleiner 2005b:954).
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This active support from the Bush administration in turn allowed Argentina to
segment not just its small bondholders and large institutional investors, but also its ofcial
and private creditors. By negotiating on two diferent tables at once, Kirchner efectively
removed IMF conditionality from the equation when it came to his government's arm-
twisting with private creditors. And indeed, when Kirchner made his fnal “take it or leave
it” ofer to foreign private bondholders, the US government “raised no objections to the
Argentine ofer” (Helleiner 2005b:955). In fact, the day after the fnal ofer was made, Bush
briefy met Kirchner at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly where the US President
“seemed to endorse” the deal. According to Kirchner's spokesperson, Bush told him the
following words: “congratulations again for the agreement with the IMF; now you must
keep negotiating frmly with private creditors.” When Kirchner approached him later that
day, Bush even had the wit to crack a joke about the deal to a group of assembled world
leaders: “here comes the conqueror of the IMF!” (all cited in Helleiner 2005b:955). 
The third factor playing to Argentina's advantage were the “extraordinarily good
international conditions” it found itself faced with post-default, most importantly a boom
in commodity prices generated by rapid Chinese growth and the wave of liquidity sloshing
through international fnancial markets thanks to the Fed's historically low interest rates in
the wake of 9/11 and the collapse of the dotcom bubble (Baer, Margot and Montes-Rojas
2010:12; Mortimore and Stanley 2006). These benefcial external conditions combined with
Argentina's own relative insulation from the world economy. Cibils et al. write that “one of
the great advantages that Argentina has over other countries confronting the creditors'
cartel ... in terms of recovering on its own is that the country is running large surpluses on
both its trade and current accounts” (Cibils, Weisbrot and Kar 2002:21). Between 1999 and
2002, the government actually managed to run a sizable primary budget surplus, leaving it
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much less dependent on external fnancing than most other peripheral countries facing
balance-of-payments crises (Weisbrot and Cibils 2002:3). Unlike Mexico, Argentina was also
self-sufcient in food production and a net exporter of commodities, while its large current
account surplus greatly reduced its dependence on hard currency for the import of basic
necessities. As a result, Argentina's currency reserves never fell below four months' worth
of imports, compared to two weeks' in Mexico in 1982 (World Bank 2015). Meanwhile, the
government could count on the support of an important regional ally: during and after the
negotiations, the Socialist government of Hugo Chávez came to the rescue by reinvesting
parts of Venezuela's oil revenue surplus in special Argentine bonds. In 2005, the Venezuelan
government lent a total of $3.1 billion and the two countries set up a special investment
fund, the Fund for the South, whose mission “was to free South America from dependence
on the United States and the IMF” (Lewis 2009:162; Datz 2013:472). Chávez purchased $3.6
billion in bonds in 2006 and a further $1 billion in 2007. Venezuela's assistance contributed
to Argentina's insulation from market discipline and IMF conditionality (Scott 2006:6).
With the commodity boom boosting exports and alternative sources of fnancing
reducing dependence on global fnance, Argentina experienced high growth rates averaging
7.5 percent in the post-default years. The recovery began under the presidency of Duhalde
in mid-2002 and continued right up until the global fnancial crisis of 2008. These factors
combined to boost Kirchner's standing at home and his self-confdence abroad, feeding his
fery anti-creditor rhetoric. As Mortimore and Stanley have observed, “the short-term cost
[of Kirchner's defant stance] to the country was minimal, since Argentina clearly had no
possibility of obtaining external fnancing in the international fnancial markets anyway”
(Mortimore and Stanley 2006:20). With the prospect of high growth and the possibility of
raising cheap credit through domestic bond auctions, confrontation with powerless small
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bondholders and unpopular international fnancial institutions seemed like a sensible path
to pursue. All of this goes to show that Argentina had considerably more room for maneu-
ver in the wake of its default than it had had under Alfonsín in the 1980s.
Still, it would be overly hasty to conclude on the basis of these observations that all
sovereign borrowers therefore enjoy similar opportunities and that the structural power of
fnance somehow does not hold up in reality. Argentina's opportunity structure was highly
idiosyncratic, as were the circumstances in which it found itself; a fact that is confrmed by
the observation that the country's unilateral moratorium and aggressive debt restructuring
remain isolated and exceptional phenomena in the global political economy. As Roubini
(2005) has emphasized, “the lesson of Argentina is that crisis and default are very costly and
painful, not that they are costless. Otherwise, if default is so costless, how come we do not
see dozens of highly indebted countries following Argentina and defaulting?”
The Brazilian experience presents a particularly interesting contrast in this respect.
In 2002, as Brazil prepared for presidential elections, it found itself facing similar pressures
as Argentina had since 1999; pressures that were exacerbated by the prospect of a victory
for Lula's Workers' Party. As a devout left-wing activist and outspoken labor leader, Lula
gained a negative reputation among investors in the 1980s debt crisis for his vocal advocacy
of a debt moratorium and an outright repudiation of the international obligations incurred
by the military dictatorship. In its December 2001 electoral program, the Workers' Party
still “spoke of denouncing the existing agreement with the IMF and auditing and re-
negotiating the external debt,” and mentioned “a complete revision of the policy of giving
priority to the payment of the debt service” (Williamson 2002:12). So when Lula began to
advance in the polls, investors took fright. Every time a new poll indicated a Lula lead, the
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“Brazil risk” shot up (ibid. 2002:11). Unlike Argentina, foreign banks still carried signifcant
exposure to Brazil in 2002. As they withheld their lending fearing a default, Brazil's spreads
shot up, widening from 7 percent in March 2002 to 20 percent in September, as Lula rose
from 30 to 40 percent in the polls (Miller, Thampanishvong and Zhang 2004:3-4).
In response to this market pressure, Lula decided to tone down his rhetoric over the
course of the campaign. By January 2003, The Economist reported that, “since the fnal
weeks of the election campaign, Lula has worked hard to turn investor panic into mere
wariness. He has stressed that Brazil means to pay its debt and has chosen ministers who
seem ready to carry that promise through” (Economist 2003). After Lula's victory, econo-
mist Arminio Fraga, a former investment banker who had served as Central Bank Director
under the previous conservative government, noted that “the biggest event when Lula came
to ofce in 2003 is that nothing happened” (cited in Miller, Thampanishvong and Zhang
2004:24). Roubini (2005) writes that, “Lula, as soon as he was elected, looked across the
border and saw what default – even an unavoidable one like Argentina's – causes as its by-
product, i.e., massive crisis and pain. And he rightly decided to do even more fscal adjust-
ment and try to avoid default.” Argentina's default thus remained the exception.
US Hedge Funds as Big Winners of the Debt Restructuring
Given the unilateral nature of Argentina's default and the aggressive restructuring it
pursued, perhaps the most surprising outcome of the entire episode was the fact that certain
elements of global fnance still managed to somehow turn the crisis to their advantage. In
this sense, Argentina's policy choices may have been diametrically opposed to those of
Mexico in the 1980s, but for Wall Street the outcome was more or less the same – if not
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better. As we have seen, by the time of the default in 2001 the big US-based institutional
investors had already dumped most of their bonds on a scattered group of European retail
investors, meaning they largely emerged unscathed from the initial default. But by the time
of the 2005 restructuring, some of these retail investors – including many pensioners who
were terrifed at the prospect of losing their life savings – despaired at Argentina's refusal to
recognize their representatives in the debt negotiations and sold back the same bonds, for
mere cents on the dollar, to an eager army of traders at the big Wall Street hedge funds. The
opposition to the eventual deal came mostly from Italian pensioners; the US hedge funds
hardly put up a fght and signed up by an overwhelming 90 percent (Roubini 2005).
Why would the hedge funds be so eager to jump on Kirchner's ofer if they thought
they were receiving such a bad deal? The answer is that they were, in fact, not receiving a
bad deal at all. As Datz (2013:474) shows, “some hedge funds bought these bonds at 17 cents
in 2002 and were happy to swap them for nearly double that amount in 2005.” This, in
turn, greatly eased the restructuring process for the government, “because instead of dealing
with private international creditors who bought the bonds at 90 cents on the dollar, the
government was dealing with those who paid around 20 cents” (ibid.). In short, when the
debt restructuring fnally came around, Wall Street had basically already won the battle by
dumping most of its worthless bonds on powerless European pensioners and then buying
them back up at greatly discounted prices to restructure them at a proft. European retail
investors ended up as the losers, while Wall Street hedge funds emerged as the big winners.
While the opaque nature of bond fnance means that exact numbers are impossible
to verify, the Wall Street Journal reported that by the time of the 2005 restructuring small
European and Japanese investors (including 450,000 Italians, 35,000 Japanese and 15,000
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Germans and Central Europeans) held around 44 percent of Argentina's defaulted bonds,
with local Argentines holding another 38 percent (Mofett 2004). Given these numbers, it is
not surprising that the main opposition to the restructuring came from the European retail
investors. But as Roubini (2005) has angrily pointed out, even the opposition of these retail
investors was designed to serve narrow Wall Street interests. In what probably amounts to
the greatest scandal of all, the retail investors who had already been defrauded by the Wall
Street investment banks in the mega-swap were now lured back by these same investment
banks who ofered to represent them in negotiations with the Argentine government. In
Roubini's view, the banks feared being sued by these retail investors and refused to sign a
deal with the Argentine government simply to avoid such litigation (Roubini 2005).
Moreover, the eventual debt reduction for Argentina is nowhere near as large as the
75 percent nominal haircut would lead one to expect. The reason is that the government
added an obscure and rare “sweetener bonus” to the deal – a so-called GDP warrant – which
paid bondholders an annual dividend in case Argentina's economic growth rates were to
exceed a certain threshold. Since its GDP had contracted by almost 20 percent between
1998-'02, and since the country encountered such a favorable external environment after its
default, it was to be expected that Argentina would grow rapidly and that investors stood to
gain lavishly from these clauses. Since Argentina's average annual growth rates shot up to
7.5 percent after the default, the government actually found itself confronted with higher
rather than lower debt servicing costs as it emerged from the crisis. At the same time, the
banks made big profts from the intermediation fees they could charge for the restructuring
itself. Santiso (2003:193) reports that “almost all the investment arms of leading Wall Street
frms made lucrative deals” with the Argentine government (cited in Datz 2013:474). In the
end, it is clear that Kirchner's scathing rhetoric outshone the actual losses he managed to
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impose on powerful international fnanciers. As the Economist (2005) dryly noted after the
conclusion of the restructuring deal: “even in a default, there is money to be made.”
A Rearrangement of Domestic Power Relations
The third important outcome of the Argentine crisis – and a point on which the
contrast to the Mexican case could not be sharper – is the rearrangement of domestic power
relations following the default and the consequences this had for the relative redistribution
of the costs of adjustment. Up until the default, the burden of adjustment had largely been
borne by the seemingly powerless popular sector; the imposition of the corralito was the
clearest manifestation of this. Argentine fnancial authorities deliberately left a loophole in
the corralito that allowed their main constituency – wealthy elites – to pull their money out
of the banks anyway. Through a mechanism very similar the one used by Mexicans elites in
the wake of López Portillo's bank nationalization, rich Argentines were able to move their
savings and investments to the stock exchange. Dominguez and Tesar (2004:15-16) explain
that “restrictions in the corralito … allowed investors to use their frozen bank deposits to
purchase Argentine stocks, and, in so doing, provided a legal mechanism for transferring
funds abroad.” As a result, the lucky Argentines who still had real savings in the bank could
simply buy stocks that were cross-listed in the US to legally convert their Argentine shares
(purchased with pesos) into American Depository Receipts (ADR), which could then be
sold for dollars and deposited in a US bank account (Dominguez and Tesar 2004:15). Only
this loophole can explain the idiosyncratic 50 percent increase in Argentine stock exchange
valuations in December 2001, at a time when the national economy was efectively in a
state of collapse: the rich were pouring their money into shares to get it out of the country.
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The strength of the popular resistance to such privileges for the  wealthy eventually
forced the political and fnancial establishment to make a number of concessions to the
domestic population, leading not only to the unilateral moratorium but also to new set of
redistributive policies and anti-poverty measures. This is why Schuster (2008:168) argues
that “the power of protest has been perhaps one of the most important lessons derived from
the events of December 2001.” As Argentine historian Ezequiel Adamovsky put it, “it was
the constant threat of looting, targeting of politicians, of rebellion, of occupations, of road-
blocks, and assemblies that disciplined both management and local and international fnan-
cial sectors, opening an unimagined space for politics” (cited in Fiorentini 2012).
In the immediate wake of the December uprising, President Duhalde struggled to
restore a semblance of legitimacy to the state apparatus and was constantly forced onto the
defensive by a restive population. Upon taking ofce, Duhalde's approval rating stood at a
mere 10 percent (Rock 2002:56), and Levitsky and Murillo (2003:155) write that the initial
wave of protests had “grown into a massive civic rebellion against the entire political elite.”
A Gallup poll showed that 84 percent of respondents did not feel represented, while 87 per-
cent rejected all parties outright (Turner and Carballo 2005:175-6). Duhalde was therefore
acutely aware of the need for some kind of shift in policy and rhetoric to outmaneuver the
country's burgeoning social movements and restore political legitimacy. He embarked upon
a populist campaign to shore up national support for the political system by pursuing a
diferent distribution of adjustment costs. Publicly railing against “the destructive alliance
of 'political power and fnancial might' that had sold the nation out to foreign creditors and
international fnancial institutions at the expense of internal production and consumption,”
the President tried to portray himself as a real man of the people (Epstein and Pion-Berlin
2006:12). He restored the yearly extra months' pay for public sector workers and earmarked
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$350 million for soup kitchens. In an address to Congress in March 2002, he for the frst
time publicly recognized the “formidable crisis of representation” that had undermined the
public's trust in the institutions. Despite the acute fscal crisis of the state, he announced
the implementation of the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados, a $1 billion household
support program targeted at the unemployed, in a move that was widely interpreted as an
attempt “to combat militant opposition by the piquetero movement” (Féliz 2012:5).
But even these moves failed to subdue the people's vexation with the authorities.
The government remained trapped between the social unrest at home and the total loss of
credit from abroad. Duhalde, in a word, struggled to bridge the contradiction between the
state's dependence on capital on the one hand, and its need to restore popular legitimacy on
the other. One observer identifed the president's approach as profoundly “schizophrenic”:
while he embraced the radical rhetoric of the movements, Duhalde “began (gradually and
almost secretly) to do as the IMF advised, not only devaluing the currency, but also secu-
ring an agreement with the provinces to cut spending, unifying the exchange rate, and
changing a bankruptcy law to match international standards” (Corrales 2002:38-9). While at
home he complained endlessly about the crimes and national betrayal of Argentina's patria
fnanciera, he simultaneously sought to placate his other audience – international investors –
by exuding a market-friendly pragmatism abroad. As he failed to reconcile the state's two
most basic functions, street protests resumed and Duhalde was forced by intensifying social
unrest to call early elections for April 2003.
These were the conditions that Néstor Kirchner inherited when he assumed the pre-
sidency in May 2003, elected with just 22 percent of the vote after his contender withdrew
from the race. To boost his standing, Kirchner, known as a moderate and pragmatic center-
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left Peronist, immediately announced an economic program that prioritized growth and job
creation and refused to resume payment of the debt at the expense of social and economic
recovery. In a return to the classical national-popular blend of left-Peronism, Kirchner
praised the virtues of “national capitalism” as an alternative to the Washington Consensus
that had led to the country's collapse. “It's not that we want not to comply, not to pay,” he
declared, echoing the words of Alfolsín and García in the 1980s, “but neither can we pay at
the expense of seeing more and more Argentines postponing their access to proper housing,
a safe job, education for the children, and health services” (cited in Helleiner 2005b:954).
In an attempt to restore the legitimacy of the political system and the dominant
position of the traditional Peronist establishment, Kirchner set out to build a corporatist
coalition constituted by an alliance between national capitalists and leaders of the labor and
unemployed workers' movements. In a meeting with a group of Buenos Aires bankers on
September 29, 2003, Kirchner declared that “it is crucial that national capital partakes in the
process of the reconstruction of society. It is impossible to build a national project if we do
not consolidate a national bourgeoisie.” This followed an earlier statement by Alberto
Alvarez Gaiani, President of the Industrial Union, who had argued that – with Argentina
now cut of from foreign credit – the only way to see to the state's structural dependence on
capital would be to resume domestic investment by strengthening the government's ties to
Argentine business. “There is a need for a national bourgeoisie,” he declared. “A country is
stronger when you have the owners of the most important companies in the country sitting
around the decision-making table. Nobody is going to invest a single penny in this country
for a long time” (both cited in Zibechi 2003). At the same time as opening up government
to national capital, Kirchner pursued a classical Peronist strategy of co-optation with regard
to labor and the popular sector. Now that the trade unions had practically imploded, the
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main opposition came from the various factions of the piquetero movement. By incorpora-
ting the leaders of some of its more traditional and hierarchically organized groups into his
government, Kirchner hoped to isolate the more radical autonomous wing of the piqueteros,
demobilize opposition to the political system, and at the same time obtain a powerful ally
in his political maneuvers against opponents (Schuster 2008:176). Luis D'Elia,  leader of the
Federación Tierra y Vivienda, one of the more visible piquetero groups, was appointed under-
secretary for Land and Housing. D'Elia's followers, called piqueteros-K, became a crucial
support base for Kirchner and a powerful weapon in the government's public confronta-
tions with foreign companies (Lewis 2009:156). 
This rearrangement of the dominant class coalition – away from Menem's neoliberal
alliance between national capital and the patria fnanciera and towards a typical Peronist
alliance between national capital and elements of the popular sector – went hand-in-hand
with the embrace of an alternative economic model that has often been referred to as “neo-
developmentalist” or “neo-extractivist.” The embrace of this model was made possible by
the advantageous external conditions mentioned before – ample liquidity and a commodity
boom – and saw a massive transformation of Argentina's economy and agricultural sector,
with a soy boom changing the face of the countryside. This shows that the events of 2001
and 2002 marked more than a change in government; they marked a profound rupture in
the development of the Argentine political economy and a transformation (however partial)
in the state-capital relation. The reduced dependence on foreign credit weakened the patria
fnanciera and allowed for the emergence of a new class coalition that subordinated fnancial
interests to the interests of extractive and exporting industries on the one hand, and of co-
opted elements of the popular sector on the other.
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Recent years have clearly revealed the vulnerability of the national-popular coalition
and its accompanying state-led neo-extractivist model to changing external conditions. The
end of the commodity boom in the wake of a Chinese slowdown and the end of cheap
credit after the Federal Reserve's decision to raise interest rates for the frst time in nearly a
decade increased the external constraints on commodity exporters like Argentina, especially
on those with left-leaning governments. Faced with infationary pressures and skyrocketing
borrowing costs, the left-Peronist coalition lost popular support and eventually faltered in
the 2015 presidential elections, as Fernández de Kirchner's appointed successor lost out to
the right-wing candidate Mauricio Macri, the former mayor of Buenos Aires and a scion of
one of the country's wealthiest families, who at the time of writing was widely expected to
begin a renegotiation of the defaulted debt with Argentina's holdout creditors, bringing the
country's protracted and acrimonious standof with its foreign creditors to a long-awaited
end. In the capital-scarce environment that now lies ahead, the patria fnanciera – with its
superior capacity to attract credit and investment – is likely to stage a vindictive comeback.
Conclusion and Possible Alternative Interpretations
The above discussion has shown that the three classical explanations of debtor com-
pliance – reputation, sanctions and democratic advantage – are all unconvincing in the case
of Argentina. None of these variables changed in the expected direction in the lead-up to
default, so none of them can truly explain the switch from compliance to non-compliance.
And while there is elementary evidence of debilitating spillover costs following the default,
an explanation based purely on spillover costs cannot explain why Argentina changed its
policy preferences from repayment to default. The structural power hypothesis, with its
222
emphasis on the three enforcement mechanisms of market discipline, policy conditionality
and the privileged position of domestic elites does appear to be supported by the prevailing
evidence and is able to provide a more dynamic account of the shift in policy outcome. The
chapter showed how the three mechanisms gradually broke down over the course of 2001,
eventually making the inevitable default unstoppable. As in the Mexican case, however, we
could imagine at least two possible alternative interpretations for the main observations
made in this chapter: the instrumentalist explanation and the constructivist explanation.
The instrumentalist view would emphasize interpersonal relations, elite control of
government and direct forms of political pressure. Again, the fndings in this chapter show
that all of these factors may have played a role in swaying the government in specifc direc-
tions. Cavallo, for instance, was known to be close to Wall Street and the patria fnanciera,
and it was essentially the backdoor deal between the Economy Minister and a number of
powerful international investment banks that sealed the envelope on the mega-swap, which
set Argentina up with even greater debts while allowing institutional bondholders to divest
of their Argentine exposure. In this sense, the instrumental power of creditors continued to
play a role behind the scenes. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that these more direct
forms of power occurred against the backdrop of Cavallo's growing desperation about the
government's acute fscal crisis and the vulnerabilities of the fnancial system. With Argen-
tina acutely dependent on foreign credit, Cavallo was willing to go to any extremes to keep
liquidity circulating through the domestic economy. To paraphrase Lindblom, the bankers
could not simply be left knocking on the doors of the Economy Ministry – they had to be
invited in. The same goes for Cavallo's re-appointment: as this chapter clearly showed, both
De la Rúa and Cavallo were very clear about the reasons he was asked to take over the
Economy Ministry: to restore fscal order, attract foreign credit and prevent a default on the
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national debt. The patria fnanciera did not simply “colonize” key government positions, as
an instrumentalist reading of the crisis might have it. Finance was powerful not because it
controlled government; it controlled government because it was powerful. The state acutely
depended on Argentine bankers and the elite to refnance the domestic debt and to provide
a bridging role towards foreign lenders. There is no doubt that more direct forms of power
continued to be exercised throughout the crisis, but they always occurred against the
backdrop of the state's structural dependence on credit and hence the structural power of
creditors and the privileged position of those with close ties to these creditors.
The policy preference eventually shifted from compliance to default not because a
pro-default coalition suddenly managed to exert greater direct pressure or mobilize superior
resources to defeat the anti-default coalition, but because the three enforcement mechanism
of the creditors' structural power broke down: market discipline was dysfunctional in the
absence of a coherent creditors' cartel and in the face of Argentina's relatively high self-
sufciency in food, fuel and fnancing; policy conditionality did not work with a hostile US
Congress opposing further international bailouts and with the IMF eventually pulling the
plug on Argentina's Standby Program; and the privileged position of domestic elites was
thoroughly hollowed out by the deep legitimation crisis that took hold over the course of
the crisis and that eventually exploded in the rebellion of December 2001. Insofar as any
real pressure was exercised it was therefore the structural pressure of a withdrawal of foreign
fnancing and the popular pressure of a withdrawal of loyalty from the government and the
state. Both were manifestations of the collective agency of diferent social forces, more than
the instrumental power of specifc interest groups.
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A similar response could be made to the constructivist view, which would empha-
size the importance of norms, narratives and ideas about the crisis, its causes and possible
solutions. Again, the chapter has not sought to dispel the importance of such factors; it has
actually shown how, as in Mexico, there were diferent ideas on how to resolve the crisis
from the very start. From the elections of 1999 onwards, Duhalde's narrative, for instance,
always revolved around the idea that ordinary citizens were not to blame for the govern-
ment's fscal problems and should not be made to pay for the irresponsible lending of US
investors. Advocating the idea of a unilateral cessation of payments, Duhalde clearly broke
with the prevailing international norm of debtor compliance – and he paid for it dearly, as
voters were swayed by De la Rúa's and Cavallo's argument that such a default would have
catastrophic consequences for the Argentine economy. Still, the battle of ideas continued to
rage throughout the crisis, with social movements stepping up their struggle against ortho-
doxy and proposing their own heterodox or radical alternatives. In the background, there
was always a belief among large sections of society and parts of the political establishment
that a more heterodox and national-popular exit from the crisis, in the form of a unilateral
moratorium on debt payments, would be a preferable option.
Yet, as the chapter has also tried to show, these ideas did not hover in a vacuum. In
the early years of the crisis, orthodox ideas about fscal policy and market reform gained the
upper-hand because these were the same ideas that foreign investors had. These investors, in
turn, did not just have an abstract intellectual attachment to these ideas; they believed in
them because they had a vested material interest in them: “responsible” fscal policies freed
up resources for debt payment while convertibility, liberalization and privatization allowed
for much greater foreign penetration into domestic markets. Given the growing dependence
on foreign credit and investment, it was precisely those who shared the investors' material
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interests and ideological predilections for austerity, reform and debt repayment who found
themselves strengthened in the immediate lead-up to the eventual default; once again, the
appointment of Cavallo is a clear case in point. It was not until the rupture of December
2001 that more heterodox ideas made their way into the mainstream – the reason being that
these less conventional ideas were much better suited at pacifying an increasingly restless
population and providing material concessions and rhetorical distractions to restore a sense
of political stability in the midst of a deep legitimation crisis. Again, as in the Mexican case,
ideas played an important role, but not in isolation from the underlying power relations
and the social and political struggles over who was to bear the costs of adjustment.
Argentina's default proved to be the explosive conclusion to the second major inter-
national lending cycle of the postwar period. It was followed almost immediately by a third
lending cycle, spurred on by historically low US interest rates in the wake of 9/11 and the
dotcom bust, and a commodity boom emanating from China. As with the preceding cycles
of the 1970s and 1990s, this third credit expansion quickly turned to bust, provoking a bout
of major market turmoil. Unlike in previous crises, however, the fnancial crisis of 2008-'09
was centered on the advanced capitalist core – initially the US subprime mortgage market –
and spread from there to Europe, where by 2010 it unleashed the most severe international
debt and currency crisis since the Great Depression – except this time without the wave of








The European debt crisis of 2010-'15 has rekindled long-standing debates about the
power of creditors and the quality of national democracy under conditions of fnancializa-
tion and European integration. Centered on a small country representing just 2 percent of
the EU's total economic output, the crisis nevertheless roiled global fnancial markets over
fears that a Greek default could undermine the stability of the European banking system
and call into question the country's place within the single currency, thereby threatening to
unravel the very fabric of the monetary union. As the debt crisis deepened, the EU creditor
states – together with the ECB and the IMF – organized the largest international emergency
loans in history, including three successive bailouts for Greece (in 2010, 2012 and 2015), in
order to ensure continued repayment. Yet in spite of these bailouts, or precisely because of
the onerous conditions attached to them, the Greek economy went into free-fall and the
country entered a deep depression from which it has yet to recover. Losing a third of its
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economic output and with a quarter of its population out of work, Greece has experienced
one of the most severe contractions of any advanced capitalist economy during peacetime –
with all the attendant social and political consequences.
Yet despite these high costs of austerity and debt repayment, successive governments
of diferent political orientations have consistently rejected unilateral action on the debt and
have pursued orthodox structural adjustments instead. Even the election of the leftist Syriza
party, the formation of an anti-austerity government and the resounding rejection of the
creditors' terms in a 2015 referendum did nothing to change policy outcomes. What, then,
explains this remarkable degree of debtor compliance? Much of the debate has centered on
the question of Greece's euro membership, which certainly appears to be a crucial factor.
Still, as this chapter aims to show, a narrow focus on the euro risks obscuring some of the
more fundamental power dynamics at the heart of the debtor-creditor relation; something
past debt crises in the Global South have done much to elucidate. The following case study
builds on the insights derived from the previous two case studies and demonstrates how
Greece has been confronted with remarkably similar enforcement mechanisms as Mexico
and Argentina. Eurozone membership, far from setting the Greek crisis apart from past
international debt crises, has served to both entrench and amplify existing structural power
relations by removing monetary policy autonomy and rendering Greece acutely dependent
on a “foreign” central bank for liquidity provision to its domestic banking system.
A unilateral default was therefore systematically disincentivized not just because it
would immediately bring about an exit from the Eurozone, but because it was likely to
result in Greece's ofcial lenders pulling the plug on further credit and liquidity provision,
thereby unleashing debilitating short-term spillover costs that would ripple throughout the
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fnancial system and wider economy. Since these spillover costs would disproportionately
afect wealthy elites – and since they scared whatever remained of the middle class – there
was a concerted efort on the part of the Greek establishment, whose interests and ideology
were closely aligned with those of foreign creditors, to prevent a default from taking place.
Despite the uniqueness of its Eurozone membership, then, the Greek case displays a remar-
kable degree of similarity to other post-1982 debt crises. The main puzzle this chapter seeks
to address is what sets Greece apart from Argentina: why did the latter default while the
former did not? Both countries experienced deep legitimation crises and large anti-austerity
protests, and both eventually witnessed the ouster of pro-austerity establishment politicians
and the rise of an anti-austerity coalition. So why did Greece not default?
This chapter is structured like the previous ones. The frst part weighs the evidence
for the conventional hypotheses of debtor discipline; the second looks at the hypothesized
enforcement mechanisms; and the third considers the actual outcomes of the crisis, conclu-
ding with a short word on possible alternative interpretations of the evidence.
Reputation Hypothesis
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As in the Mexican and the Argentine cases, the original reputation hypothesis would
lead us to expect two things. First, given Greece's history of default, we should observe a
signifcantly higher risk premium in Greece than in other European countries without such
a history of default.38 Second, we should observe concerns among policymakers of the long-
term consequences of default for the country's access to foreign credit, which would in turn
require Greek ofcials to govern with considerable foresight. On both counts, the evidence
suggests the opposite to be the case. First, despite having spent about half of its existence as
an independent country in a state of default, Greece notably borrowed on almost the exact
same terms as Germany as late as 2008, its spread only rising above 1 percent following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the Wall Street meltdown. It was not until the reschedu-
ling of Dubai World's debts in November 2009, and after incoming Prime Minister George
Papandreou announced that the previous government had cooked the books – with the
help of Goldman Sachs – and that Greece's defcit and debt load were in fact much higher
than previously thought, that the German-Greek risk spread began to widen dramatically
(Gibson, Hall and Tavlas 2011:9-10). This appears to indicate that lenders did not take into
account Greece's reputation as a “debt intolerant” serial defaulter that has spent a total of 90
years in default; rather, they based their investment decisions on short-term risk assessment.
In fact, for years investors appeared to reason that all debt in the Eurozone carried more or
less the same default risk. As a result, Greece, with its perceived high growth potential,
developed into an investor favorite, just like Mexico and Argentina had before it, and began
to attract large amounts of cheap credit in spite of its poor repayment record – which is the
exact opposite of what the reputation hypothesis would lead us to expect.
38 After contracting its frst loan during its war of independence, Greece instantly defaulted. It contracted a
new set of loans in the 1880s, but defaulted again after the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, leading to fnancial
control by the Great Powers. It defaulted again during the Great Depression (see Borchard 1951).
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Second, it was not just the lenders who were myopic and exuberant with respect to
the risks involved; Greek ofcials were just as shortsighted when it came to the long-term
sustainability of the debts they were taking on. As the crisis deepened, IMF staf began to
quietly sound the alarm bells about Greece's ability to repay its debts, but the government
did not heed their warnings. Former Deputy Director of the IMF's European Department
Susan Schadler (2013:11) recounts that “Greek ofcials perceived the [IMF's] doubts [about
debt sustainability], but their attention was focused almost solely on whether the near-term
amortization schedule would be met, not on whether the debt trajectory would be compa-
tible with renewed market access a few years out.” This observation similarly contradicts
the reputation hypothesis and fts with the theme of investor and policymaker myopia that
emerged from the previous case studies. The creditors, narrowly concerned with short-term
bond yields, lent without taking into account Greece's past repayment record, while Greek
ofcials repaid not because of long-term considerations about their country's future credit-
worthiness but due to fears over the immediate consequences of default.
Sanctions Hypothesis
Figure 6.2a – trade mechanism:
The sanctions hypothesis would lead us to expect explicit or implicit threats of trade
or legal sanctions, as well as a demonstrable concern among policymakers of such sanctions
231
CREDITORS
Host state holds credible
threat to impose import
or export restrictions
Host state is willing to




dependent on trade w/
host state of lenders
State administrators
display demonstrable





being imposed. Yet trade sanctions are unlawful under EU treaties on the free movement of
goods within the single market, and this investigation did not uncover evidence that the
Greek government feared their imposition by the other European creditor countries. When
Greece briefy went into arrears on the IMF, no such sanctions materialized, and it is highly
unlikely they would have materialized even in the event of a full default.
Figure 6.2b – legal mechanism:
In terms of legal sanctions, the evidence also points in the opposite direction. As
Buchheit and Gulati (2010:2) pointed out early on in the crisis, “from the legal standpoint,
the salient feature of Greece's bond debt is that approximately 90% of the total is governed
by Greek law.” This means that, if Greece had wanted to default, legal sanctions would not
have been able to stop it from doing so: it could have simply changed the laws governing
the majority of its bonds, leaving bondholders unable to sue the government in any court –
Greek or foreign. For this reason, an Allen & Overy (2012:11) report points out that, from
a legal point of view, Greece held “quite a good card” when the debt crisis frst broke out.
Faced with unafordable interest rates, it could “ultimately impose a unilateral rescheduling
on its creditors simply by passing a statute. This statute would, subject to various qualifca-
tions, be recognised in the courts of most developed countries since creditors who contract
under local law take that system of law as it is from time to time.” If legal sanctions had
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lity of the Greek government to disarm this mechanism simply by changing its laws would
lead us to expect a Greek default, which did not materialize.
Another type of sanctions that is never brought up in the sovereign debt literature
but that nonetheless could be argued to have played an important role in the Greek debt
crisis is monetary sanctions – or more specifcally, the credible threat by ofcial European
creditors to expel Greece from the Eurozone (see Kirshner 2005). It should be emphasized
that there are no formal provisions allowing Eurozone leaders to remove another member
state, but there are ways in which a disorderly Greek exit (or “Grexit”) from the Eurozone
could have been forced by the European Central Bank simply by withholding much-needed
liquidity from the banking system. This would have led to a collapse of Greece's four syste-
mic banks and the need to recapitalize them, followed by an injection of fresh liquidity into
the domestic economy – a set of measures that the Greek government would not have been
able to undertake without reasserting control over its central bank and introducing its own
parallel currency (initially in the form of scrip or IOUs, later in proper coin and notes) that
would eventually come to replace the euro as de facto means of payment. A convincing case
could therefore be made that Greek policymakers feared the implicit threat of  monetary
sanctions throughout the crisis, even before the game of brinkmanship between Syriza and
the Eurogroup made such threats explicit in 2015. Given the lack of legal provisions for
expulsion, however, the execution of this threat – whether implicit or explicit – would by
necessity have to operate through informal processes of liquidity asphyxiation; a mechanism
that lies frmly within the domain of the structural power hypothesis. After all, the only
way for the European lenders to pursue their ultimate monetary sanction of a forced Grexit
would have been through the strategic use of their systemic privilege,39 namely their capacity
39 For a theoretical clarifcation on the strategic use of structural power, see Culpepper and Reinke (2014).
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to deny further credit to the Greek government and withhold liquidity from Greek banks,
thereby indirectly forcing an outcome they could not pursue in a more overt manner. The
reason Greece would fear such an “ejection by stealth” has little to do with the instrumental
power of monetary sanctions per se and everything with the structural power of the ECB,
whose capacity to withhold emergency liquidity assistance from Greek banks and cut the
Bank of Greece of from the TARGET2 interbank payment system would instantly leave
Greece incapable of attracting foreign fnancing, thus triggering debilitating spillover costs.
Democratic Advantage Hypothesis
Figure 6.3 – institutional mechanism:
As in the previous two cases, the democratic advantage hypothesis would lead us to
expect Greece's compliance to be the result of signifcant legislative and judicial checks on
the executive, limiting the latter's ability to act unilaterally and compelling it to credibly
commit to “creditor rights.” As in Argentina, however, the evidence suggests the opposite,
with the credibility of Greece's commitments strengthened not by limits on the executive
but by “an extension of autocratic executive power” (Watkins 2014:14). Indeed, as the crisis
deepened, subsequent Greek governments increasingly resorted to emergency decrees and
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reform. Prior to the 2015 elections, Dalakoglou (2014) remarked that “for the last two years
Greece has been governed almost exclusively with decrees that were designed to be emer-
gency provisions for use in extreme cases such as war or natural disasters. Since June 2012,
twenty-fve [such decrees] have been issued. Hardly any of the major structural adjustment
measures were approved by the normal parliamentary process.” This tendency intensifed
with the deepening of the social and economic crisis, which led to an increasingly unilateral
approach by the executive. In 2013, the New York Times reported that Prime Minister Sama-
ras “stepped up his use of emergency decrees and edicts to impose changes that other poli-
tical parties and Greece's unions have a long history of trying to thwart,” including edicts
to prevent and end strike actions by schoolteachers, seamen and metro workers, as well as
executive decrees “imposing stricter supervision on ministries and state bodies.”
At the same time, many long-standing constitutional provisions – especially those
guaranteeing labor and pension rights, the minimum wage and collective bargaining – were
aggressively dismantled at the orders of the Troika and the behest of private creditors, who
at times openly expressed their opposition to the legal protections aforded by the post-
dictatorship settlement. In one report, J.P. Morgan (2013) complained that the constitutions
of the Southern European countries display too much of a “socialist infuence,” with “weak
executives; weak central states relative to regions; constitutional protection of labor rights;
consensus building systems that foster clientelism; and the right to protest if unwelcome
changes are made to the political status quo.” Many of these provisions were important
checks and balances introduced to reduce the power of the executive after the dictatorship;
rather than asking for these limits on the executive to be strengthened in order to improve
Greece's ability to credibly commit to its obligations, the creditors wanted such provisions
weakened. As a result, the legislative increasingly became sidelined as the crisis deepened.
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Douzinas (2013) has noted that “the loan and memorandum agreements imposed taxation
increases and savage pension and salary cuts before they reached Parliament, which was
reduced to the role of rubber-stamping a fait accompli.” To give some concrete examples: an
emergency act passed along with the frst memorandum of understanding in 2010 (s.1.4 law
3845/2010) provides government ministers with a “carte blanche” to “issue executive decrees
which can cover all aspects of economic and social policy, repeal pre-existing laws and sign
further binding agreements giving away parts of national sovereignty without Parliamen-
tary approval.” Another act (s.1.9 law 3847/2010) states that memorandums and agreements
with foreign creditors become binding upon their signing and “are introduced in Parliament
later just for 'debate and information'” (both cited in Douzinas 2013).
A further challenge to Greece's democratic institutions arose in the wake of two
fateful announcements – the frst by Prime Minister Papandreou on October 31, 2011, the
second by Prime Minister Tsipras on June 27, 2015 – that they would be holding referenda
on the terms of the second and third bailout agreements, respectively. Both were met with
ferce opposition from the European creditors, who frst tried to prevent the plebiscite from
taking place, then tried to impose the question, and fnally – in the 2015 referendum – tried
to infuence the vote by threatening Grexit in the event voters chose the “wrong” outcome.
After the announcement of the frst referendum in 2011, European Commission President
Manuel Barroso reportedly told Greek Finance Minister Venizelos that “we have to kill this
referendum,” to which the latter “agreed almost immediately.” The response to the second
referendum in 2015 was to instantly limit the amount of emergency liquidity assistance (or
ELA) available to Greek banks, forcing the government to close the banks and impose far-
reaching capital controls in the face of an incipient bank run. In both cases, yields on Greek
bond spiked dramatically following the announcement of the plebiscite – on the Monday
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after Tsipras' announcement in June 2015, two-year bond yields shot up 14 percentage
points to 34 percent (Jolly and Bradsher 2015). Investors clearly feared that voters might
object to the terms of the memorandum of understanding with the Troika, thereby under-
mining the executive's capacity to credibly commit to its international obligations. Better,
in other words, to keep the executive shielded from democratic pressures, especially since
the loan conditions determined in the memoranda were deeply unpopular with voters.
In 2012, the creditors' direct interventions in domestic politics were cemented with
a set of institutional changes at the European level. As Watkins (2014:14) writes, “with debt
restructuring of the table, the burden fell on 'control'.” The European Fiscal Compact, in
particular, was unambiguously intended to impose budgetary discipline on the defcit states
of the periphery and to limit the national sovereignty of individual Eurozone members in
determining budgetary priorities. Bugaric (2013:25) has observed that the treaty “basically
entrenches a certain economic theory at the level of constitutional law” and notes that,
“while it elevates the austerity paradigm … to the status of 'unbreakable law', it basically
outlaws Keynesianism and its counter-cyclical economic policies.” Loïc Azoulai, who holds
the Chair of Law at the European University Institute, has referred to the pact as a “legal
monster” for its far-reaching encroachment on national sovereignty and fundamental consti-
tutional provisions (cited in Kocharov 2012). An editorial in the European Constitutional
Law Review, the leading journal in the feld, declared that the fscal compact “strikes at the
heart of the institutions of parliamentary democracy by dislocating as a matter of consti-
tutional principle the budgetary autonomy of the member states” (ECLR 2012:5-6). Debtor
states like Greece would have to abide by the rules laid down by the creditor states. As the
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble candidly put it, the Greek people “can vote
however they want, but whatever election result we have will change nothing about the
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actual situation in the country” (cited in Donadio and Erlanger 2012). With democracy sus-
pended, political leaders could carry on with the more urgent task of repaying their debts.
The evidence is therefore clear on this point: Greece's creditors – both private and
ofcial – had remarkably little faith in the ability of democratic processes and institutions
to ensure credible commitment. Insofar as Greece's political system, its political culture and
its post-dictatorship constitution were to be reformed to ensure continued repayment, the
creditors' priority was not to limit executive power but to elevate it; not to strengthen the
role of parliament but to sideline it; not to defend hard-fought labor rights but to upend
them; not to increase national ownership over the reform efort but to eliminate it; not to
force Greek leaders to respect the popular will but to insulate them from it. And just as in
Argentina, the lenders' generalized disregard for democratic processes and institutions gave
rise to a deep crisis of representation inside the country, with public trust in the political
system all but collapsing, a massive wave of protests, strikes and riots rocking the country,
and anti-establishment parties rising rapidly in the polls. By early 2012, public trust in the
government had fallen to around 7 percent and trust in parliament to around 12 percent;
down from roughly 57 and 43 percent, respectively, in 2005-'06 (Exadactylos and Zahariadis
2013). Democratic legitimacy was sacrifced at the altar of the European bond market.
Spillover Costs Hypothesis
Figure 6.4 – spillover mechanism:
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If the three conventional hypotheses once again fail to explain the compliance of a
major debtor country in distress, then what about the spillover costs hypothesis? As in the
previous two cases, the fourth explanation appears to be backed most convincingly by the
available evidence. If the spillover costs hypothesis is correct, we should fnd demonstrable
policymaker concerns over the debilitating consequences of unilateral default on the wider
economy. We should also witness the materialization of anticipatory spillover efects when-
ever the perceived default risk rose. Given the difculty of gaining access to policymakers'
considerations, the frst point is impossible to verify with certainty – yet there seems to be
evidence that Greek ofcials genuinely feared the spillover costs of default. Greece's high
degree of commercial, fnancial and monetary integration into the wider Eurozone made it
particularly vulnerable in this respect. Like Mexico in the 1980s, Greece remains heavily
dependent on imports of important goods like oil and pharmaceuticals: “It was pointed out
that the hospitals would have no medicines and the lights of Athens might go out” in the
event of default, as the loss of access to trade credit and the lack of foreign currency reserves
would leave the country unable to pay for fuel and drugs (Allen & Overy 2012:8). At the
same time, as in Argentina, Greek government ofcials were particularly concerned about
preserving the fnancial system and the currency regime. After all, prior to the 2012 debt
restructuring, Greek banks were exposed to government bonds to the tune of €30 billion
euros and “would immediately go bankrupt” if the state defaulted (Aglietta 2012:27). The
country's elite and upper-middle class were also strongly tied to euro membership, making
them strongly opposed to default as this would likely result in Grexit.
We can identify at least three specifc episodes during which a chaotic Greek default
was widely feared by Greek ofcials and foreign creditors alike, allowing us to test whether
anticipatory spill-over efects did in fact materialize in the face of high default risk, as the
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spillover costs hypothesis would lead us to expect. In the frst episode, following Papan-
dreou's announcement on October 31, 2011 that he would be holding a referendum on the
latest bailout agreement, it was reported that “world leaders fear that if Greece failed to sign
on to a bailout plan that was worked out late last month, it would trigger a bank run and
market panic” (Birnbaum 2011). In September and October 2011, a “bank jog” had gotten
underway, with Greeks withdrawing up to €14 billion in savings and time deposits. This
slow-motion bank run intensifed after Papandreou's referendum announcement. George
Provopoulos, Governor of the Bank of Greece, informed the Parliament's economic afairs
committee that “in the frst 10 days of November the decline [in deposits] continued on a
large scale,” bringing total savings to €170 billion by the end of 2011, down 30 percent from
€237.7 at the start of 2010. When the referendum was cancelled, under intense fnancial and
political pressure, Finance Minister Venizelos defended the U-turn by explaining it would
have led to total panic: “Imagine the reaction of the markets. In three days we would have
collapsed. We would never have got to the referendum because there would have been a run
on the banks” (cited in Smith 2014). Deposit fight stabilized after the appointment of the
technocrat Papademos, as the perceived default risk subsided (Weeks and Ziotis 2012).
A similar pattern developed in the second episode, following the inconclusive elec-
tions of May 6, 2012. New Democracy and Syriza fnished the frst round neck-and-neck,
and when both failed to form a governing coalition, new elections were called for June 17.
With Syriza polling frst until mere days before the vote and the leftists openly calling for a
moratorium, fear of an impending default and Grexit motivated depositors to pull out their
money en masse. “We are talking about June 2011,” one Troika ofcial said, “when Greeks
were taking about one to two billion euros a day from the banking system. And the Greeks
had to send military planes to Italy to get banknotes. It got to that point” (cited in Islam
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2013:4). As deposits fell to €159 billion, demand for paper money tripled, causing total cash
in circulation to reach €48 billion, or 24.8 percent of GDP – an extraordinary fgure given
the 4-7 percent average for developed economies (ibid.). George Provopoulos later said that
“in a matter of a few days [after a possible Syriza victory], a full-blown banking crisis could
have erupted” (Spiegel 2014a). A Troika ofcial predicted “there would have been complete
and immediate panic” (cited in Islam 2013:4). In another interview, Provopoulos said that “I
was much more afraid because I knew everything; I had the data in front of me. If this phe-
nomenon had gone on, there would have been no reason but to go into a full bank run.
That would have resulted in the exit of the country from the euro area” (cited in Reguly
2013). Prime Minister Papademos was so concerned about the possibility of a Syriza victory
“that he remained in his ofce on the Sunday night of the elections to prepare for the mar-
ket shock,” fearing “that the constellation of election results would not allow the formation
of a government supportive of the new economic programme” (Spiegel 2014a).
In the end, New Democracy won the elections and formed an uneasy coalition with
PASOK, causing the risk of default to recede and depositor fears to subside. More recently,
however, Greece has been going through an intensifed replay of these dramatic events, this
time under radically diferent political conditions. In anticipation of Syriza's eventual elec-
toral victory in January 2015, deposit fight and capital fight returned with a vengeance.
The economist Theodore Pelagidis relayed that “the rich and afuent have been telling their
private bankers to transfer funds, and that refects the mounting concern over how Syriza
will behave after the election” (cited in Smith 2015a). In the lead-up to the snap elections,
€14 billion was withdrawn from the banks, with deposits falling to their lowest level in 10
years at €155.4 billion (Chrysoloras, Ziotis and Bensasson 2015; Chrysoloras and Bensasson
2015). Capital fight continued apace as well. The Guardian reported that “Greek investors,
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led by shipowners and other industrialists, have stepped up transfers of funds. One insider
said bankers were being instructed to make multimillion-euro transfers daily” (Smith 2015).
The four systemic Greek banks were forced to re-apply for the ECB's emergency liquidity
assistance, with a senior banker in Athens explaining that ELA “is seen as a bufer against a
growing liquidity squeeze on the banks, caused by political uncertainty over the election
outcome” (cited in Hope and Wagsty 2015). In the week of the elections, the biggest four
banks – Alpha, Piraeus, Eurobank and National Bank – each lost over 20 percent in market
capitalization. As another Athens banker put it, “This is a massacre. Markets are panicking
… They're trying to preempt a crisis on banks' liquidity. They know the crisis will be cen-
tered around the banks” (cited in Thompson 2015).
And it was. The moment Syriza was elected, the bank jog intensifed while the stock
market lost a further 41.5 percent in the frst quarter (Chrysoloras and Bensasson 2015). By
April, total deposits had fallen to €133.7 billion, €100 billion below their 2009 peak (ibid.).
The fnancial panic fnally came to a head in June, when the Syriza-led government stepped
up its brinkmanship ahead of a crucial cut-of date on June 30 when the previous bailout
program was set to expire and an important IMF payment was due. When the bailout talks
broke down on June 26 and Tsipras announced the referendum in the early hours of June
27, the slow-motion bank jog turned into a full-blown ATM run overnight. Just two days
later, the ECB announced that it would not be increasing its ELA ceiling – having disbursed
€89 billion in emergency loans up to that point – and the Greek government was forced to
shut down the stock exchange and banks and impose far-reaching capital controls, including
an ATM withdrawal limit of €60 per day and an outright ban on bank transfers abroad. On
June 30, the second bailout program expired and Greece missed a €1.5 billion payment to
the IMF, becoming the frst developed country to ever go into arrears on the Fund.
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As a result, and just as the spillover cost hypothesis would lead us to expect, Syriza's
game of brinkmanship – and the lenders' aggressive decision to withhold further credit and
liquidity – led to a situation in which the economy efectively ground to a halt. On July 11,
the head of the Hellenic Chamber of Commerce said that “there is no system in place for
Greek companies to transfer money abroad. Our life-blood has been shut of. People are
depleting their stocks. We are going to start seeing shortages of meat by the end of the week
… The ferry operators are demanding cash up front to bring in fuel and supplies” (cited in
Evans-Pritchard 2015a). With frms unable to pay their foreign suppliers, imports dropped
and domestic production collapsed. The Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI), a key indicator
of the health of the manufacturing sector, fell from 46.9 to 30.2 in July (its lowest point on
record) while new orders fell from 43.2 to 17.9.40 An economist at Markit, the private frm
compiling PMI data, explained that “factories faced a record drop in new orders and were
often unable to acquire the inputs they needed, particularly from abroad, as bank closures
and capital restrictions badly hampered normal business activity” (cited in Hannon 2015).
While the Greek economy had been projected to emerge from its depression in 2015, the
European Commission estimated that it would now contract up to 4 percent as a result of
the capital controls and the collapse in business confdence (European Commission 2015a;
Strupczewski 2015). Still, it should be emphasized that these spillover efects were not just
the result of an “apolitical” market reaction to Syriza's “irresponsible” policies; they were
the ultimate political weapon in the arsenal of Greece's lenders, who – as we will see in the
remainder of this chapter – wielded its power to full efect.
40 Any value over 50.00 marks an expansion of output and anything below 50.00 marks a contraction.
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Enforcement Mechanisms
The spillover costs hypothesis is well-positioned to explain policymakers' hesitance
to default. Pronunciations by Alexis Tsipras that a default and Grexit would have unleashed
“catastrophe” and constituted “suicide” may have been improvident and exaggerated in view
of the likely consequences of endless austerity, but they do hint at the fact that Greek of-
cials encountered an impermeable material barrier to unilateral action: the barrier of severe
short-term spillover costs. The ability of the left-led government and of society as a whole
to breach this barrier by withstanding the economic, social and political consequences of
liquidity asphyxiation depend entirely on their internal resilience and their capacity for self-
reproduction under conditions of temporary autarky; a capacity that could be considered
very low in Greece's case, given its dependence on key imports, foreign credit and external
liquidity assistance for its banks, as well as the absence of foreign currency reserves. While
certain elements in Greek society, within Syriza and even in the governing coalition itself
may nevertheless have been willing to pursue a rupture with creditors, the balance of forces
within Syriza, within the government and between Greece and its lenders did not appear to
be in favor of these pro-default and pro-Grexit voices. It can therefore be surmised that the
spillover costs hypothesis falls short by ignoring the political nature of crisis management as
an asymmetric power struggle over the distribution of the costs of adjustment. The next
section aims to bring this power struggle into closer focus.
First, at the level of international lending, we will see how Greece's debt at the start
of the crisis was highly concentrated in a number of systemic and over-exposed French and
German banks, whose unifed creditors' cartel helped to enforce strict market discipline.
Second, at the level of the international lender(s) of last resort, fears of a European banking
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crisis, peripheral contagion and a catastrophic collapse of the Eurozone led EU leaders and
the ECB to undertake an aggressive bailout under strict policy conditionality, with the IMF
partaking as a “junior partner” to assist in monitoring and surveillance eforts and the ECB
performing a crucial role as fscal disciplinarian. Finally, we will see how Greece was extra
vulnerable to the consequences of default because of the exposure of its own banks and its
Eurozone membership. Combined with its reliance on EU credit, especially its dependence
on ECB liquidity, this vulnerability strengthened the hand of domestic elites whose anti-
Grexit interests and pro-EU ideology were aligned with those of the creditors. The combi-
nation of these factors served to enforce compliance in relatively smooth fashion up until
early 2015, when a deep legitimation crisis led to the rise of Syriza's anti-austerity coalition,
producing a brief breakdown of the third enforcement mechanism and forcing ofcial len-
ders to strategically resort to their structural power, eventually compelling Tsipras to capi-
tulate by refusing to disburse further credit and withholding liquidity from Greek banks.
The Financial Markets as “Global Supra-Government”?
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In the dark hours of the European debt crisis in late 2011, it became somewhat of a
fashion among commentators from across the political spectrum to highlight the growing
power of fnancial markets. When leaders in Greece and Italy were toppled and replaced by
unelected technocrats, the New York Times wrote that “the power of fnancial markets has
upended traditional democratic processes.” A later piece in the same newspaper observed
that “the bond market has emerged as a mighty protagonist in Europe's economic crisis,
representing a seminal shift in power from politicians to investors and a relatively obscure
cohort of bankers.” Martin Wolf (2012) of the Financial Times noted that “in a big crisis,
creditors rule,” while investment banker Roger Altman (2011) dramatically declared in the
same pages that “fnancial markets [are] acting like a global supra-government”:
They oust entrenched regimes where normal political processes could not do so. They
force austerity, banking bail-outs and other major policy changes. Their infuence dwarfs
multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. Indeed, leaving aside
unusable nuclear weapons, they have become the most powerful force on earth.
But who are these abstract “markets”? And how did they become so powerful? This
section argues that, just as in the debt crisis of the 1980s, the rule of the creditors in Europe
was a product of the highly concentrated ownership structure of peripheral debt. Research by
Barclays Capital (2011) revealed that Altman's “omnipotent fnancial markets” were in fact
made up of a small number of very powerful actors, with the ten biggest holders of Greek
bonds accounting for more than half the country's debt in mid-2011, and the top-30 bond-
holders accounting for over over two-thirds. The immense strength of market discipline in
the European debt crisis thus appears to be a result not of efcient, self-regulating market
dynamics but of the oligopolistic nature of sovereign lending. As in Mexico and Argentina,
the high concentration of the debt in a number of systemically important institutions eased
the formation and coherence of a creditors' cartel that could credibly threaten “a sudden
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stop,” or an immediate withholding of credit, thereby unleashing debilitating spillover costs
with potentially dramatic consequences for the wider economy and society as a whole.41
So who held the debt? As in Mexico in the 1980s, at the start of the crisis in 2010-'11
Greece's debt was heavily concentrated among a handful of international banks in the main
creditor countries, especially France and Germany. Greek banks and pension funds held a
large share as well, while a variety of foreign institutional investors (including mutual funds,
pension funds and hedge funds) also had some exposure. Crucially, unlike Argentina after
its mega-swap and prior to its default, and unlike the debt crisis of the 1930s, the extent of
retail (non-institutional) ownership of Greek debt was and remains small (Buchheit and
Gulati 2010; Fontevecchia 2011; Moore and Hope 2014). Yet this observation still leaves us
with an important puzzle: if international lending in the build-up to the European debt
crisis took the form of bond fnance, as it had in the 1990s and in the case of Argentina,
then why did the ownership structure of the Greek debt end up resembling the highly
concentrated bank loans of the 1980s more than the dispersed holdings of the 1990s? There
are two possible explanations. First, the discrepancy appears to be the result of the peculiar
structure of the continental European fnancial system, which like the Euromarkets of the
1970-'80s remains heavily bank-centered (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012). Second, there is the
perverse incentive structure of the regulatory regime inside the Eurozone, which “does not
require banks to have equity capital funding for sovereign debt – there is no capital require-
ment, in banking jargon – so banks accumulated these debts over many years under the
assumption no additional capital would be needed” (Boone and Johnson 2012:4).
41 For the concept of “sudden stops” in the context of the Eurozone, see Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).
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There were a number of other factors that structurally interlocked creditor interests
and thereby eased the formation of a coherent international creditors' cartel. The frst and
most important factor concerns the exceptionally deep integration of EU capital markets,
which opened up an additional line of systemic vulnerability: banks of the core were not
only heavily exposed to peripheral governments but also to peripheral banks and businesses.
As Ardagna and Caselli (2014:25) write, “due to the close links among the fnancial markets
of advanced economies, distress of one sovereign can spill over to other sovereigns and
banks. Key channels – in addition to banks' direct holdings of foreign sovereign debt – are
banks' cross-border interbank exposures and banks' claims on non-fnancial entities in
countries afected by sovereign tensions.” Since the latter actors would have been the frst to
fold in the event of a sovereign default, European bankers and ofcials had every interest in
the stability not just of the governments but also of the banking sectors in the periphery.
The interests of European creditors were therefore intertwined across the board, making it
much less likely that individual creditors would decide to free-ride against the others.
Another important factor that eased creditor coordination and strengthened market
discipline was the rise of credit rating agencies and their central role as monitors of debtors'
policies and creditors' assets. In recent decades, rating agencies have assumed a number of
functions that had previously been frmly within the domain of the IMF. Throughout the
1980s, the Fund had fulflled the task of a surveillance agency and a gatekeeper of private
market access; only with an IMF stamp of approval – in the form of a Standby Agreement –
could debtors expect to tap capital markets, and a debtor could only expect to obtain such a
stamp of approval if it carried out “responsible” policies geared towards the freeing up of
foreign exchange with which to service its debts. This not only gave the IMF considerable
leverage over the debtors' policies; it also helped the Fund coordinate creditor action by
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providing important “extra-market” signals beyond mere risk-based pricing. With the rise of
the rating oligopoly from the 1990s onwards, these key functions have since been privatized
by the “Big Three” agencies, whose entire business model is based on monitoring debtors
and assessing their risk of default. The credit reports released by these rating agencies now
serve as a private stamp of approval for continued market access. As before, a debtor will
have to be seen pursuing “responsible” (creditor-friendly) policies to tap capital markets.42
Two developments cemented the agencies' disciplinary power: frst, the fact that the
ratings of the Big Three began to be actively used by central banks – including the ECB – in
defning the eligibility of collateral; and second, the fact that “credit ratings were 'hard-
wired' into the wider fnancial system through their use in fnancial market regulations and
supervision” under Basel II and III rules (Dyson 2014:391). It is again worth noting that the
process of determining market access (the force of market discipline) is not reached through
“free” self-adjusting market dynamics. Unlike adherents of the Efcient Markets Hypothesis
have long liked to believe, the means of determining creditworthiness is not a product of
abstract price mechanisms but rather of a highly centralized and state-supported system of
risk assessment that depends to a large extent on the subjective and often fawed judgments
of a handful of supposedly neutral experts, in combination with the continued willingness
of regulators to keep accepting these judgments as objective and meaningful.
Like the market for government bonds more generally, the credit rating industry is a
highly concentrated business, with S&P's, Moody's and Fitch together accounting for 95
percent of total world market share between them. This extremely high concentration gives
42 As Dyson (2014:391) argues, “the disciplinary power of the credit rating agencies derives from the way in
which the ratings that they choose to assign to states provide the signals that prompt bond and foreign
exchange markets to discriminate fscal saints from sinners.”
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these companies considerable pricing power and vast leverage over the governments whose
various debt instruments they rate. While an agency like Standard & Poor's cannot prevent
default in a direct sense, its ratings do serve to shape the incentive structure for the buying
and selling of government bonds, thus providing trusted non-price signals to coordinate
creditor action and prevent free-riding in the event of default, as the average investor would
not want to be seen holding junk bonds. Since both investors and regulators rely on private
ratings to assess default risk and determine whether a government's bonds are investment
grade and can be used as collateral, a downgrade by a single agency can have far-reaching
consequences for an investor's ability to hold on to these bonds and for a government's
ability to access international capital markets. This dynamic of centralized monitoring and
gatekeeping therefore creates a powerful additional constraint on debtors, compelling them
to continuously impress “the markets” on the credibility of their commitments.
Various structural factors thus contributed to the formation of a coherent creditors'
cartel that could enforce market discipline onto the peripheral debtors and compel them to
pursue strict austerity measures and repay their debts. Later on in the crisis, this creditor
coherence in turn found its organizational expression in the important innovation of the
bondholders' steering committee that was formed ahead of the 2012 PSI debt restructuring,
along with the renewed centrality of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), which had
been formed in the crisis of the 1980s to defend the interests of the commercial banks and
to coordinate creditor action. Together, the IIF and the steering committee helped bond-
holders present a unifed creditor front in negotiations with the Troika and Greek ofcials.
A report by law frm Allen & Overy (2012:9) notes that this “was a remarkable innovation
since it is believed that there has been no major steering committee for bondholders since
perhaps the 19th century, although there have been steering committees for bank lenders.”
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Interestingly, the steering committee explicitly “took [its] cue from the last great steering
committees of international banks established in the 1980s to deal with the bankruptcy of
Mexico in 1982 and many other emerging countries” (ibid). A direct connection can there-
fore be established between concentrated lending and coordinated creditor action in Mexico
and in Greece. In both cases, the banks managed to prevent a unilateral default, buy crucial
time to reduce exposure and build up capital, and fnally coordinate an “orderly” (creditor-
led) restructuring that helped them divest of devalued debt without having to accept signi-
fcant losses. Needless to say, the outcomes in both countries contrast sharply to the highly
dispersed holdings and the poorly coordinated creditor action in Argentina after mid-2001,
which ended in unilateral default and a forceful debtor-led restructuring.43
As in Mexico and Argentina, the enforcement mechanism of market discipline was
most clearly on display at the start of the crisis, when Greece still had a degree of access to
the bond market and greatly depended on it to make up for its widening budget shortfall.
In assessing the diferent options that Greece had at the beginning of the crisis, Ardagna and
Caselli (2014:6) point out that an early default would have necessitated even more extreme
austerity than that demanded by ofcial lenders, as the Greek government was running a
defcit of over 10 percent of GDP in 2009 and of 4 percent in 2010. This meant that, in the
absence of access to fresh credit, the government would have been compelled to move into
primary balance immediately following a default, which made a suspension of payments a
remarkably unattractive option in the frst phase of the crisis. Still, a series of downgrades
between 2009 and 2011 caused investors to panic, leading to rising yield spreads and forcing
43 “In the 1980s, it was possible to organise bank creditors because typically the number of really major
banks involved was not more than a couple of dozen. With the re-opening of the bond market for
emerging countries in the 1990s, there was no mechanism whereby bondholders were sufciently
organised to form a representative group. There were too many bondholders and some were not subject
to ofcial pressures.” (Allen & Overy 2012:9).
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the PASOK government to further cut spending in the vain hope of reassuring the markets.
Similar patterns unfolded in Portugal and Ireland and to a lesser extent in Spain and Italy,
irrespective of the partisan afliations of those in power or the institutional specifcities of
the country in question. De Grauwe and Ji (2013:3) have observed that this growing market
panic resulted in the imposition of “excessive austerity” on the peripheral countries, and
they provide important evidence showing that “the higher the spreads in 2011, the more
intense were the austerity measures.” In fact, they fnd that “the intensity of the austerity
can be explained almost uniquely by the size of the spreads” (emphasis original). This fnding
highlights the disciplinary force of highly concentrated fnance not just in Greece but across
Europe, and confrms the lessons learned from Mexico and Argentina. Just as in these
previous crises, however, market discipline eventually risked undermining itself and would
have led to default if it were not counterbalanced in time with ofcial intervention. Again,
high concentration was a necessary but not a sufcient condition to prevent default.
Troika to the Rescue? Austerity and Financial Control
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By early 2010, it had become clear that investor panic was producing a self-fulflling
prophecy, as collapsing credit ratings and skyrocketing borrowing costs efectively excluded
Greece from international capital markets. With interest rates on two-year bonds breaching
12 percent in late April, Greece found it impossible to attract sufciently afordable credit
to refnance its outstanding obligations. If it did not immediately secure alternative sources
of fnancing, the largest sovereign debt default in history loomed as early as May 19. This in
turn sparked fears across European capitals of a banking crisis in the core, contagion across
the periphery, and a disorderly Greek exit from the monetary union; all this in the wake of
massive bank bailouts following the Lehman Brothers debacle in the United States, with the
international fnancial system still fragile and investors constantly on edge in anticipation of
the next systemic shock. Since Greece's debt stood at €300 billion, “virtually all of it in the
hands of private sector creditors,” there were fears that a Greek default might turn out to be
that next shock (Buchheit and Gulati 2012:2). And since the principal lenders turned out to
be a handful of systemic French and German banks, each “dangerously overexposed to peri-
pheral countries,” this shock would have instantly led to the collapse of some of Europe's
biggest and most powerful fnancial institutions (Buchheit 2011:4). European leaders were
therefore convinced that there could be no Greek default: the creditor governments and the
ECB would rather bail out the banks indirectly, by “rescuing” Greece, than allow Greece to
fail and be forced to bail out the banks directly for a second time in two years. The bankers
themselves clearly shared this policy preference as it helped them avoid both the costs and
the blame of another meltdown while shielding shareholders from a dilution of their equity
stake that would likely accompany further capital injections by their governments.
The international efort that was eventually set up to prevent a Greek default shows
some striking similarities to past crisis management in the Global South, but also a number
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of important diferences. The Greek “rescue” operation was similar in that it hinged on the
tranche-by-tranche disbursement of large ofcial-sector emergency loans under strict policy
conditionality, combined with a staunch insistence on full and timely debt repayment and a
wholesale rejection of early debt relief. It was diferent in that the emergency loans and the
conditionality were unprecedented in their scope and severity, and in that the US Treasury
Department and the US Federal Reserve played only a marginal role in their disbursement
and implementation. Instead, the initiative was taken by the French and German govern-
ments, the European Commission and the ECB, while the IMF – instead of assuming the
leadership function it was used to – ended up participating as a “junior partner” focused on
designing the program and monitoring compliance with loan conditionality.
The biggest diference, however, relates to Greece's Eurozone membership. While
Argentina had experienced a similar lack of monetary policy autonomy as a result of its
convertibility regime, it always retained its own central bank and its own currency. Greece,
by contrast, sufered an additional layer of dependence as its banking system relied directly
on ECB liquidity provision for its survival. As we will see in subsequent sections, Greece's
dependence provided the ECB with an exceptionally strong form of structural power that it
wielded strategically in order to enforce compliance with the Troika's loan conditionality.
The following section will consider how these similarities and diferences played out
in practice. For the purposes of our analysis here, the international response can be divided
into three phases. The frst covers the preparations for and implementation of the frst €110
billion bailout program of May 2010; the second, roughly from from early 2011 on, covers
the preparations and implementation of the second €130 billion bailout program, including
the PSI debt restructuring of February 2012; the third phase began, after a two-year inter-
254
lude following the debt restructuring, with the snap elections of January 25, 2015, the rise
of an anti-austerity coalition and the six-month stand-of between Greece and its creditors
over the terms of further fnancing and the necessity of debt relief, eventually leading to a
third bailout. This section will consider the frst and part of the second phase; the 2012 debt
restructuring and the 2015 bailout will be considered in the fnal sections of this chapter.
Phase I: The First Bailout
The frst phase began around February 2010, when – after an initial period of denial
and insistence on the “no-bailout” clause of the Maastricht Treaty – European leaders began
to openly recognize the need for emergency fnancing to prevent a disorderly Greek default.
On February 17, a research note by Société Générale, which carried signifcant exposure to
Greece, explained that “what seems to have galvanized minds is the realization that much of
European banking is heavily exposed to Southern Europe and Greece in particular” (cited
in Fuhrmans and Mofett 2010). While the opaque nature of bond fnance once again makes
it difcult to confrm exact numbers for individual banks, it has been estimated that over
two-thirds of Greece's €300 billion debt mountain was held abroad. One analyst at Crédit
Suisse said that “Greek banks own around €40bn of the total … implying most Greek debt
is sitting on the balance sheets of non-domestic banks” (cited in Treanor 2010). Moreover,
as we saw in the previous section, European banks also held very large indirect exposures to
Greece through their loans to and ownership shares in Greek banks and businesses. It has
been estimated that French banks held some €60 billion in consolidated claims on Greece,
while German banks held around €35 billion (Bastain 2012). Fears of contagion across the
Eurozone periphery added a further element of systemic vulnerability, as major lenders like
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Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Société Générale, BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole carried
large exposures to Southern Europe as a whole. Buchheit and Gulati (2010:6) point out the
remarkable similarities with the 1980s, in this respect, as well as the notable diferences with
the 1990s: the “sovereign debt crises of the last 10 years or so have afected mostly non-bank
creditors – hedge funds, pension funds, other institutional holders of emerging market
sovereign debt, sometimes even individuals. Those crises did not threaten the stability of
the banking sectors in creditor countries. A restructuring of Greek debt will, [by contrast],
rekindle fretful memories of the global debt crisis of the 1980s.”
Unlike the 1980s, however, there was to be no rescheduling of debts and no “bail-in”
of private creditors. By May 2010, European leaders summarily swept aside the no-bailout
clause in the Maastricht Treaty and agreed upon a €110 loan to the Greek government – the
largest international bailout in history. The funding, provided by European governments,
the ECB and the IMF was intended to cover Greece's external obligations and domestic
expenditures for a period of three years, after which the country was expected to be able to
return to the markets on its own. Like previous Standby Programs in the Global South, the
loan was disbursed in tranches and under strict loan conditionality44 compelling the Greek
government to enact one of the most severe fscal contractions of any developed country on
record, to pursue deeply unpopular market reforms, reduce labor costs, slash pensions and
unemployment benefts, lay of civil servants, and dismantle basic workers' rights like job
protections and collective bargaining. As in previous programs, the policy conditions were
enforced through the tranche-by-tranche disbursement of the bailout loan, always leaving
44 As Trichet put it: “Loans are not transfers, and loans come at a cost. They come not only at a fnancial
cost; they also come with strict conditionality. This conditionality needs to give assurance to lenders, not
only that they will be repaid but also that the borrower will be able to stand on its own feet over a multi-
year horizon. In the case of Greece, this will require courageous, recognisable and specifc actions by the
Greek government that will lastingly and credibly consolidate the public budget” (ECB 2010a).
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the threat of a refusal of the next loan installment hanging like a Damocles' sword over the
government's head. Ardagna and Caselli (2014:13) point out that “this option of 'pulling
the plug,' common to all conditionality programmes, would limit the exposure of ofcial
lenders” and left the government with little choice but to adhere to the program.
Seen in light of past adjustment programs, the rapid fscal consolidation demanded
of the Greeks was unusually tough.45 The harsh austerity measures went hand-in-hand with
a staunch refusal to consider an early debt restructuring. When Greece's Finance Minister
George Papaconstantinou few to Washington, D.C. on April 24, 2010 for an emergency
meeting with IMF chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn, ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet and
EU Economic and Monetary Afairs Commissioner Olli Rehn at the sidelines of the annual
IMF-World Bank spring meeting, he was told the exact same thing that Jesús Silva Herzog
had been told when he made the exact same trip in the fateful Mexican Weekend of 1982.
As Blustein (2015:1) writes, “one message was emphatically conveyed in the meeting: there
would be no restructuring of Greece's debt.” Papaconstantinou himself recounts that it was
said “in the most clear terms, aimed at me: 'George, do not open this issue' … I was not a
fool. I would never have opened this issue unilaterally, and then be told, in the media, that
it was not an option, and have all the investors running for cover in 24 hours. It was a very
delicate situation” (cited in Blustein 2015:1). As in 1982, in other words, intervention was
made conditional on Greece rejecting unilateral action and maintaining its debt servicing.
From the very beginning, however, it was clear that the IMF's role in the Troika was
going to be diferent from its role in past debt crises. While in the 1980s and 1990s the Fund
45 “There is only one precedent of a country succeeding in implementing an average annual primary defcit
reduction larger than the one Greece was to undertake, and none that has achieved a comparable cumul-
ative reduction over a similar number of years. Recall that the comparison programmes are the most
aggressive on record in the OECD in the last 40 years” (Ardagna and Caselli 2014:16-17)
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had – with the backing of the US Treasury and Federal Reserve – taken an active leadership
role in international crisis management, the Europeans were very uneasy about such direct
intervention inside their monetary union. ECB President Trichet was particularly strongly
opposed to IMF involvement in the bailout, especially since some IMF ofcials continued
to insist on the need for debt relief, which was unacceptable to the ECB. While Merkel
shared Trichet's rejection of debt relief, she eventually managed to convince the ECB chief
of the need for IMF participation in the bailout. Merkel insisted on IMF participation
because of the Fund's unrivaled expertise in enforcing policy conditionality and monitoring
compliance; the Europeans simply lacked the technical knowledge and institutional capacity
to administer conditionality.46 As Finland's Finance Minister Stubb explained after the third
bailout in 2015, “we would prefer to have the IMF on board. It's not just because of its
approximate €15bn-€20bn input into the [third] programme, but the credibility and tough
conditionality the IMF approves in all of this” (cited in Robinson et al 2015). In 2010, the
compromise that eventually emerged was for the IMF to participate as a “junior partner,”
provide part of the loan, help design loan conditionality, monitor performance and enforce
compliance, but without taking complete control of the Greek economy (Blustein 2015).
This awkward arrangement was to have serious consequences for Greece. The most
important was that the early calls for debt restructuring made by a number of high-ranking
IMF ofcials were overruled in the face of staunch European opposition. Certain depart-
ments within the Fund had been convinced from the very start that without meaningful
debt relief the program had little chance of success, which technically disqualifed the IMF
from participating. The Strategy, Policy & Review Department, in particular, was adamant
46 Blustein (2015:6) writes that “the German public … would never accept an emergency loan unless it came
with severe conditions, enforced by arbiters with recognized neutrality and competence – and the IMF
was the only institution that came close to that description.”
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that “an IMF loan to Greece must not go simply for payments to bondholders, as it had in
Argentina's case [since] giving Athens a big international rescue loan, with no haircut,
would shift the burden to taxpayers” (Blustein 2015:6). But despite the misgivings of many
of its economists, and despite the fact that the IMF's share of the loan far exceeded Greece's
allotted quota, the Fund's management decided to press ahead with the program anyway –
to vehement protests of many of its executive directors.47 In efect, former executive director
Miranda Xafa (2014:14) writes, “the debt sustainability criterion was waived based on the
systematic concerns arising from spillover risks if the program was not approved.”
And so the program went ahead, and – although it lagged behind on its reforms –
Greece dutifully carried out the budget cuts and tax hikes demanded by the Troika. In 2010,
the Greek government reduced total public spending by 5 percent of GDP. As the OECD
(2011) acknowledged, “no other OECD country has achieved such a fscal improvement in
a single year over the past three decades.” But the efect of this austerity was an unmitigated
social and economic disaster. By 2011, it was clear that the Greek economy was contracting
much faster than ofcial IMF prognoses had foreseen (Cline 2013:2). Olivier Blanchard, the
IMF's chief economist, later acknowledged that the Fund's unrealistic prognoses had hinged
on a set of questionable assumptions about Greece's fscal multipliers that underestimated
the contractionary efects of the harsh austerity the IMF had helped to enforce (Blanchard
47 Brazil's executive director complained that “debt restructuring should have been on the table” and argued
that the bailout “may be seen not as a rescue of Greece, which will have to undergo a wrenching adjust-
ment, but as a bailout of Greece's private debt holders, mainly European fnancial institutions.” Rene
Weber of Switzerland expressed “considerable doubts about the feasibility of the program,” asking: “Why
has debt restructuring and the involvement of the private sector not been considered so far?” Executive
directors from China, Argentina and several other developing countries expressed similar concerns. The
IMF's minutes of the 2010 board meeting mention that “the exceptionally high risks of the program were
recognized by staf itself, in particular in its assessment of debt sustainability.” The minutes were leaked
and published by the Wall Street Journal (2013).
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and Leigh 2013). These incorrect multipliers were not just a product of innocent presup-
positions, however; according to Susan Schadler (2013:12), former deputy director of the
IMF's European Department, the multipliers were an outcome of “fundamental political
pressures” that compelled IMF staf to paint a much rosier image of Greece's public fnances
and growth prospects than reality merited in order to be able to keep participating in the
bailout program. In its review of the 2010 Standby Agreement, the IMF acknowledged that
“in retrospect, the [bailout] program served as a holding operation” allowing private bond-
holders to reduce exposure and boost their capital ratios, “leaving the ofcial sector on the
hook” to bear the brunt of a future default or restructuring (IMF 2013). Between the frst
quarters of 2010 and 2011, German lenders cut their exposure to Greek government debt
by $9 billion and their overall lending by $19.8 billion, while the French reduced theirs by
$13.6 billion and $14.16 billion, respectively (Badkar 2011).
Phase II: The Second Bailout
Nevertheless, bank exposures were still signifcant by early 2011 and the collapse of
the Greek economy raised the specter of a disorderly default anew. This marked the start of
the second phase of crisis management, in which Greece's ofcial lenders were to double
down on their efort to enforce compliance. Despite the failure of the frst bailout program
to produce a swift return to the markets, the European creditors had a number of reasons
to stay the course. Schadler (2013:12) writes how “several interviewees suggested that apart
from domestic political considerations, one reason the Europeans did not want to commit
openly to absorbing the costs of the crisis and establishing an endgame [i.e., debt relief] was
that they felt it necessary to perpetuate uncertainty as a method of holding the feet of the
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Greek government to the fre.” While many criticized EU leaders for “muddling through”
and “kicking the can down the road,” in hindsight Europe's indecision appears to have been
part of a deliberate strategy to buy time and allow private creditors to escape (Streeck 2014).
As Ardagna and Caselli (2014:10) note, “default delayed could conceivably turn into default
avoided…, and perhaps more importantly, delaying default … would give core-country
banking sectors time to reduce their own exposure to Greece.”
The events of late 2011 made it clear that EU leaders were actually perfectly capable
of organizing decisive action when confronted with an episode of non-compliance. When
George Papandreou called a referendum on October 31, the lenders immediately responded
by fexing their structural power: the disbursement of the sixth loan installment was halted
until after the referendum and European ofcials made it clear “that the entire loan package
would become obsolete if the plebiscite were to yield a negative result” (Roth 2013:21).
Papandreou was summoned to the G20 summit in Cannes on November 1, where – after
being publicly humiliated by his fellow EU leaders – he was told in no uncertain terms that
he risked cutting his country of from all foreign credit and thereby being pushed out of the
Eurozone. Finance Minister Venizelos recounts Merkel's message as follows: “either you
cancel the referendum or you hold one, immediately, that asks: 'yes or no to the euro'. And
after that we'll see if we'll go ahead with the [next] installment, the [bailout] program, the
hair-cut” (cited in Smith 2014). Faced with this explicit threat of a cut-of of fnancing and
an indirect expulsion from the euro, Papandreou cancelled his referendum just days later.
Beside the increasingly aggressive moves by EU leaders to force Greece back into the
fold, the second phase of crisis management was also marked by an increasingly central role
for the ECB. While the ECB – as we saw earlier – had already played an important role in
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opposing an early IMF-led debt restructuring, its participation in the frst bailout mostly
took place behind the scenes. But the technocratic veneer rapidly faded as Trichet took of
his gloves and the central bank became much more actively involved in managing the crisis.
Dyson (2014:384) notes that the years 2011-'12 marked “a tipping point for the ECB. It
embraced unlimited, three-year liquidity provisions to euro area banks [and] committed to
unlimited, if conditional, intervention in sovereign bond secondary markets, despite the
opposition of the German Bundesbank.” In the process, “the euro area sovereign debt crises
catapulted the ECB into a broader role in crisis management” (ibid). The frst clear signs of
active ECB interventionism came in the form of a handful of letters from ECB President
Jean-Claude Trichet to the fnance ministers or heads of state of the peripheral countries in
which he explicitly threatened to withdraw various forms of ECB support.48 During the
negotiations on the second Greek bailout in 2011, Trichet sent one such letter to George
Papandreou – dated April 7, 2011 – in which he threatened to revoke a suspension of rating
requirements for privately-held securities issued or guaranteed by the Greek government.
Since this would have disqualifed the country's four systemic lenders from using these
securities as collateral for ECB loans, Trichet's letter essentially amounted to a threat to
destroy the country's banking system, which depended on ECB support to stay afoat. As
such, the letter provides an exceptionally incontrovertible piece of evidence highlighting the
central bank's willingness to strategically wield its structural power over the Greek banking
sector – and hence over the Greek state that depended on it to refnance its internal debt
and keep credit circulating through the domestic economy – in order to enforce compliance
with the terms of the Troika loan conditions.49 As Xafa (2014:15) notes, “essentially, Trichet
48 The Irish, Italian and Spanish press have since released Trichet's letters addressed to their respective
governments over the course of 2011.
49 Parts of Trichet's letter to Papandreou have since been published in the Greek press (see Palaiologos 2014).
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informed the Greek government that even a maturity extension would lead the ECB to pull
the plug on Greek banks, since they would lack appropriate collateral as well as the capital
adequacy needed to access the ECB discount window. The consequence of such a move
would be to force Greece to leave the euro area and print its own money.”
In addition to its emergency lending to governments and its emergency liquidity
assistance to banks, the ECB also organized what practically amounts to an indirect  bailout
of private institutional bondholders through the mechanism of its bond-buying scheme. In
May 2010, the ECB governing council agreed upon the Securities Market Program (SMP),
which revolved around the ECB purchasing the distressed bonds of peripheral governments
on secondary markets. Since its statutes ofcially forbid monetary fnancing of member
states, the ECB could not buy these bonds directly from distressed governments; what it
could do, however, was to indirectly depress the interest rates on this debt by entering into
secondary markets and ofering to buy up the securities held by private bondholders who
could not otherwise get rid of them at good prices. The ECB intensifed its bond-buying
scheme in August 2011, when market pressure on Spanish and Italian debt rose signifcantly
with the escalation of the Greek crisis. Between May 2010 and September 2012, when the
SMP was replaced by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) scheme, the ECB pur-
chased €210 billion in peripheral bonds, including half of Greece's outstanding obligations
(Truth Committee on Public Debt 2015:24; Dyson 2014:387). The result of the SMP was to
concentrate a growing share of Greek bonds on the ECB balance sheet and to turn the ECB
into Greece's single biggest creditor in the short-term.50 More importantly, SMP provided a
source of demand, and hence an exit option, for private bondholders who could not other-
50 The European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and IMF hold a greater share of Greece's total debt load
today, but the maturities of these obligations extend much further into the future.
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wise reduce their exposure to Greece without taking major losses. By driving up the prices
of these securities, the ECB essentially ended up subsidizing private bondholders.
Like the other ECB programs, the SMP came under strict conditionality for the
borrowing governments.51 The implication of this was that ECB bond purchases could also
be withheld, which is precisely what happened on a number of occasions during 2011, most
importantly in November when the Papandreou government in Greece and the Berlusconi
government in Italy were both brought to their knees after the ECB temporarily suspen-
ded its bond-buying scheme to signal its displeasure over the inability of both governments
to implement the demanded fscal adjustments. As ECB governing council member Yves
Mersch stated: “if we observe that our interventions are undermined by a lack of eforts by
national governments then we have to pose ourselves the problem of the incentive efect.”
When he was asked if this would involve withdrawing SMP, Mersch said: “If the ECB board
reaches the conclusion that the conditions that led it to take a decision no longer exist, it is
free to change that decision at any moment. We discuss this all the time” (see Jones 2011).
Combined, the ECB's three threats – to withhold its emergency loans, to withdraw
its support for domestic banking systems, and to halt its secondary market bond purchases
– constituted the main sticks of the central bank's structural power over peripheral debtor
states. At the same time, the ECB also held an important carrot, which it tellingly reserved
for its dealings with private banks. When negotiations on a Greek debt restructuring with
private sector involvement (PSI) got underway in 2011, the ECB decided “to compensate
the damage … by introducing new measures in favour of the banking sector” (Panico and
51 In Trichet's words: “It is crucial that governments implement rigorously the measures needed to ensure
fscal sustainability. It is in in the context of these commitments only that we have embarked on an inter-
vention programme in the securities markets” (ECB 2010b).
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Purifcato 2013:5). These took the form of two exceptional Long-Term Refnancing Opera-
tions (LTROs), allowing private banks to borrow an unlimited sum from the ECB at a fxed
interest rate of 1 percent and with an unusually long three-year maturity. Both operations
were heavily subscribed and allowed Eurozone banks to borrow over €1 trillion at negative
real interest rates. LTRO constituted a clear indication of the ECB's pro-creditor bias: while
it lent to national governments under strict policy conditionality, threatening to cut of all
credit in the event of non-compliance, it simultaneously provided banks with unlimited and
unconditional liquidity at interest rates so low as to efectively constitute a free handout to
private investors, enabling them to engage in a lucrative carry trade between low-interest
ECB loans and high-yielding peripheral debt instruments. Moreover, this cheap credit enab-
led domestic banks in the periphery to increase their exposure to their own governments
(Dyson 2014:386). This in turn led to a repatriation of peripheral debt: as banks in the core
reduced their exposure to the periphery, the ECB's interventions were loading these toxic
bonds onto the balance sheets of the debtor countries' own private banks. This meant that,
in the upcoming PSI debt restructuring, Greece's private banks and pension funds were to
be left holding the hot potato, while EU banks had already divested of their bond holdings
– a point to which we will return in the next section on the outcomes of the crisis.
The ECB's role in crisis management culminated in Draghi's famous statement on
July 26, 2012 that the central bank would do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” This
statement was followed on September 6 by a governing council decision to terminate the
SMP and replace it with Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), which never needed to
be activated; the sheer force of Draghi's statement and the frewall of the European Stability
Mechanism and possible resort to OMT were enough to pacify bond markets and restore at
least a semblance of normalcy to the Eurozone – even as the Greek economy continued its
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steady decline under the austerity regime. Finally, in January 2015, the ECB announced its
expanded assets purchase, or quantitative easing, program. The QE program, which would
see the ECB purchase up to €60 billion in assets a month, turned out to be another mecha-
nism for exerting pressure on national governments. Following the election of Syriza in
January 2015, Draghi made it very clear that Greece's eligibility for QE would depend on
its compliance, stating that “there are obviously some conditions before we can buy Greek
bonds” (cited in Bensasson and Chrysoloras 2015). As before, the implicit threat was a with-
drawal of ECB support in the event of non-compliance.
Given its important role in enforcing conditionality and providing free money to
banks but not to sovereigns, it is perhaps no surprise that the ECB has been widely critici-
zed for narrowly defending the interests of the creditors at the expense of the debtors (e.g.,
Lapavitsas 2012:3; Mallaby 2012). The question that arises, then, is why the ECB – as a
nominally independent and apolitical institution – would display such a strong institutional
bias in favor of private-sector creditors.52 Here, we should insist on the fact that the ECB –
regardless of whoever administrates it – is by its nature a highly politicized institution with
a strong pro-creditor bias. This bias is due to the fact that its mandate blends the functions
of an independent central bank, supposed to guarantee fnancial stability and keep infation
in check (but never to answer to social concerns about unemployment or defation), and
simultaneously that of a creditor – or a European lender of last resort – charged with enfor-
cing fscal discipline on its borrowers. This dual mandate directly inserts the monetary
policymakers of the ECB into the fscal policymaking of democratically accountable natio-
nal governments. While these national governments are never allowed to interfere with the
52 The ECB, of course, would deny that it has such an institutional bias. As Mario Draghi himself put it, the
ECB is a “rules-based institution, not a political one” (Draghi 2015).
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independence of the ECB, the ECB's role of a lender of last resort does frequently compel
it to interfere with the independence of these governments. In other words, while the ECB
enjoys signifcant autonomy from “political meddling” by its individual member states, the
weaker member states – those that depend on the ECB for emergency fnancing – do not
enjoy similar autonomy from “political meddling” by the ECB (see Varoufakis' discussion
on this subject in a teleconference with British investors, OMFIF 2015). This asymmetry in
the Eurozone's power structure is profoundly political by defnition, regardless of how of-
cials or policymakers seek to administer, justify or obscure the resultant imbalances.
Moreover, as the Eurozone debt crisis escalated and the survival of systemically
important banks in the core countries and the existence of the single currency were called
into question, the ECB found itself under intense systemic pressure to intervene and rescue
the pillars of the Eurozone's highly concentrated fnancial sector, namely the “too big to
fail” banks of the core countries, from the systemic risk of a Greek default. Its creditor-
friendly actions and pro-creditor bias in crisis management thus followed logically from its
institutional mandate to safeguard stability in a heavily concentrated and imbalanced fnan-
cial and monetary system. A European Parliament inquiry on the Troika's role in the debt
crisis recognized this pro-creditor bias in the subsequent bailout programs when it noted
that “the protection of bondholders was seen as an EU necessity in the interests of fnancial
stability.” The Budget Committee of the European Parliament reached a similar conclusion,
adding that “we have in fact transferred the wild card from private banks to governments.”53
53 See: European Parliament (2014) and Libération (2015), respectively. Both are cited in the preliminary
report of June 2015 by the Truth Committee on Public Debt of the Hellenic Parliament.
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The “Establishment Triangle”: From Compliance to Defance and Back
Figure 6.7 – privileged position mechanism:
As in the previous two cases, a narrow reading of the frst two enforcement mecha-nisms
could give the impression that Greece's compliance was purely imposed from abroad. But
while private bondholders and the Troika clearly played a crucial role, they could never
have been as successful without the help of their allies in the Greek political and fnancial
establishment. In fact, just as in Mexico and Argentina, the crisis resulted in a growing state
dependence on credit, boosting the privileged position of those capable of attracting that
credit on the best possible terms. And just as in Argentina, the Greek state experienced a
deep legitimation crisis as the economic depression deepened and Troika-enforced austerity
measures and structural reforms intensifed. This legitimation crisis initially expressed itself
in the form of ferce popular opposition in the streets, which the Greek political establish-
ment – unlike President De la Rúa in Argentina – was initially able to withstand, although
protests did produce the fall of the Papandreou government in 2011. By 2015, after fve long
years of austerity, support for the two dominant parties – New Democracy and PASOK –
had been so thoroughly eroded that the anti-establishment Coalition of the Radical Left, or
Syriza, arose to form the frst radical left-led government in EU history. Syriza's defance of
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its lenders proved to be rather short-lived, however; after barely six months in power, the
Eurozone had brought the leftists to their knees, forcing Prime Minister Tsipras to execute
a dramatic U-turn on austerity and sign up to a third bailout.
The main puzzle this chapter seeks to address is why Greece, despite experiencing
ferce popular contestation from below, culminating in the ouster of the political establish-
ment and the rise of an anti-austerity coalition, did not go down Argentina's path of a uni-
lateral default. This section identifes three domestic reasons for Greece's remarkable debt
compliance over the past fve years. First, the existence – well before the crisis – of a power-
ful elite constituency that has long enjoyed unrivaled privileges and that has traditionally
pursued the type of orthodox policies favored by Greece's foreign creditors, albeit with an
unusually high degree of corruption, cronyism and clientelism. A second reason is the fact
that Greek banks were heavily exposed to their government's debt at the start of the crisis
and grew even more so as a large share of Greek bonds was repatriated when the crisis
deepened after 2010. The third reason relates to Greece's growing dependence on foreign
credit; a development that visibly strengthened the hand of banker-friendly Greek politi-
cians and technocrats with orthodox views and close ties to the European political, fnancial
and bureaucratic establishment who could more “credibly commit” to servicing the debt.
Crucially, unlike Argentina, the Greek establishment was never cut loose by its creditors:
while the IMF may have contemplated pulling the plug on the Greek bailout program at
various points during the crisis, the Eurogroup and the ECB simply stood to lose too much
taxpayer money in a Greek default and so continued to support the Greek establishment in
a bid to maintain at least a semblance of (creditor-friendly) political stability.
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The Establishment Triangle:
Starting with the frst point, it cannot be emphasized enough that austerity and debt
repayment were never purely imposed from abroad: European creditors had a powerful ally
in the two establishment parties – PASOK and New Democracy – that had dominated the
Greek political scene ever since the metapolitefsi period, or the transition to democracy in
1974. These two establishment parties were in turn structurally bound to a powerful elite
constituency centered on a number of oligarchic clans with roots in shipping, construction
and banking that has long enjoyed privileged access to fnancial policymaking and that, ever
since the start of the crisis, has been a mighty force clamoring for full repayment; champio-
ning austerity, market liberalization and the privatization of public property as a means of
defecting the burden of adjustment onto the rest of society. Just as Maxfeld (1990) high-
lighted the power of a distinct bankers' alliance inside Mexico, and just as commentators in
Argentina have spoken of a patria fnanciera, a similar phenomenon has been identifed in
Greece: Varoufakis (2013) has referred to it as an “establishment triangle” revolving around
the political class, private bankers and the technocrats at the Bank of Greece. Pagoulatos
(2003), who has studied the evolution of state-fnance relations in Greece, observes that the
country's banks have always been “run by prominent members of the political-economic
elite.” He also points out that the bankers are powerful not just because of their close perso-
nal ties to the political establishment; they are powerful because they fulfll “a crucial insti-
tutional role as intermediaries and distributors of developmental fnance in the economy”
(Pagoulatos 2003:74). The source of their power, in other words, is structural.
Just as Mexico and Argentina opened up to foreign capital under the Washington
Consensus in the 1990s, so Greece underwent a neoliberal turn of its own under the nomi-
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nally Socialist Prime Minister Simitis. In these years of globalization, fnancialization and
European integration, the privileged position of the Greek banking establishment was fur-
ther entrenched. As Fouskas and Dimoulas (2013:157) write, Simitis set out to create “a new
type of social alliance, the 'social alliance of modernization', gathered around the 'party of
the stock exchange' and unifed via a complex paralegal corruption network forming a new
bipartisan consensus across the trembling [fault-lines] of post-1974 Greek politics.” As a
result, even if the two establishment parties alternated in ofce and competed fercely on
the electoral stage, the country's political reality after 1996 was completely conditioned by
the fact that both were structurally dependent on private credit to maintain their systems of
patronage and their networks of clientelism. Laskos and Tsakalotos (2013:30) have noted
how “fnance was central to both PASOK's and New Democracy's economic strategy.” In
other words, behind Simitis' alliance of modernization and the dominant two-party regime,
“there was a growing symbiosis of fnancial and political power” (ibid). At the same time, as
the Greek banks expanded their operations into Turkey and the Balkans and entrenched
their ties with European fnance after entry into the Eurozone, the banking sector became
deeply integrated into the continent's monetary and fnancial circuits and thus structurally
bound up – through foreign ownership, shared investments and other linkages like holding
companies and subsidiaries – with some of the country's biggest foreign creditors, investors
and trading partners. These deep ties ensured that the fate of Greece's banking oligarchy
and domestic elite would from now on be closely intertwined with the fate of European
fnance in general, providing a powerful “internal” incentive to honor foreign obligations,
maintain fnancial stability and ensure Greece's continued membership of the Eurozone.
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Domestic Exposure and Debt Concentration:
One of the most important structural ties binding Greek creditors to foreign ones
was the high domestic exposure to government debt and its strong concentration in a small
number of systemically important institutions: the biggest banks and pension funds. While
it remains difcult in the case of bond fnance to confrm exactly who holds the debt at any
given point in time, at the start of the crisis it was generally believed that “a signifcant per-
centage (perhaps more than 30 percent) of the bonds [were] owned by Greek institutional
owners” (Buchheit and Gulati 2010:6). Others put the total share lower, at €30-40 billion,
but given the size of the Greek economy and fnancial sector even these amounts could be
considered astronomical (Roth 2013:5-6). Research undertaken by Manolopoulos (2011) for
Marfn Investment Bank found that, in the spring of 2010, the holdings of the National
Bank of Greece amounted to 88.6 of its investment portfolio; for Piraeus this share was 83
percent, for Eurobank 97.1 percent, for Postbank 98.5 percent, for Alpha Bank 87 percent,
for the state-owned AteBank 75.6 percent, and for Emporiki Bank, then still owned by
Crédit Agricole of France, 83.2 percent (Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013:153-4). Moreover, in
late 2012, the top fve commercial banks in Greece accounted for 70 percent of the domestic
liquidity market, which meant that the collapse of any of these institutions would have had
dramatic spillover efects on the provision of credit to businesses and households (ibid.).
On top of this, something very signifcant happened as the crisis deepened in 2011:
while banks in the core countries divested themselves of peripheral bonds, holdings steadily
migrated towards the balance sheets of banks and institutions in the periphery, increasing
domestic debt concentration, heightening overall fnancial vulnerability in these countries,
and entrenching the privileged position of domestic bankers. Brutti and Sauré (2014) show
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that Greece's debt was repatriated during the crisis: as infows from abroad declined, Greek
banks reduced their foreign investment and started buying more of their own government's
bonds.54 This development appears to ft a broader pattern across the Eurozone: data show
that “holdings of government debt by non-residents have diminished in proportion for all
the countries in trouble (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and to a lesser extent Italy), while
more or less stable for France and the Netherlands, and increasing for Germany” (Merler
and Pisani-Ferry 2012:4). This refects, on the one hand, risk aversion on the part of foreign
investors, and on the other a growing dependence of the government on its own fnancial
elite. A recent paper co-authored by some of the world's leading experts on sovereign debt
explains that this process helped prevent a unilateral default and, for a while at least, even
forestalled an orderly renegotiation, as “any signifcant restructuring of the government's
debt [would have led to] a domestic banking crisis” (Buchheit, Panizza et al 2013:25-26). The
authors note that “domestic banks are relatively immune from restructurings because they
expect to be recapitalized, for fnancial stability reasons, if their losses from domestic sove-
reign bond holdings are sufciently high. Indeed, if the holdings of the banking system as a
whole are high enough, the restructuring will likely not happen at all” (ibid). The same
could be said of a unilateral default: if the holdings of the banking system are high enough,
a unilateral suspension of payments is unlikely to happen in the frst place.
The result was a dynamic not unlike the one previously observed in Mexico, where
the domestic bankers' alliance grew stronger as the crisis deepened at least in part because
the government increasingly depended on domestic investors to refnance the internal debt.
As in Mexico, where the foreign holding companies of Mexican banks acted as interme-
54 Brutti and Sauré (2014:6-7) explicitly position their “secondary markets” hypothesis – based on previous
work by Broner, Martin and Ventura (2010) – as an answer to the traditional “enforcement problem” of
sovereign debt, highlighting the importance of high domestic debt concentration in preventing default.
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diaries for foreign bank syndicates, making it impossible to default on one without default-
ing on the other, the Greek government was similarly constrained in its ability to default
on German and French banks because the anonymous nature of secondary bond markets
made it impossible to discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors. This provided
the government with a strong incentive to simply accept the bailout deal it was ofered by
European lenders, even if this required painful adjustment and risked undermining popular
and electoral support in the long run. The alternative – to default on all outstanding debts –
would have led to a collapse of the country's systemic banks, the implosion of the domestic
fnancial system and a forced exit from the euro, all with dramatic consequences for overall
economic performance – at least in the short-term. As we saw earlier, this logic appears to
confrm the spillover costs hypothesis and disprove the theory that the state's long-term
market access was the most important factor in enforcing compliance. After all, Greece was
efectively excluded from international capital markets anyway and by 2014 had established
a primary surplus of 2.7 percent of GDP, removing its dependence on foreign creditors for
the fnancing of current government expenditures. The reason Greece did not default – and
even refused to do so under a nominally radical left anti-austerity government – shows that
there are greater forces at play than the government's access to capital markets alone; the
most important of which appears to be the vulnerability of the country's banking system
and its membership of the single currency, combined with strong material and ideological
opposition to default among the country's fnancial elite. Indeed, it is now evident that the
domestic banks remained Greece's Achilles' heel throughout the crisis.
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Rise of the Technocrats:
Apart from the two factors discussed so far – the long-standing privileged position
of an “establishment triangle” and the dependence of the Greek state on its domestic banks
– there was a third internal reason for the government not to default: the growing infuence
of political leaders and technocrats who maintained close ties to EU ofcials and the inter-
national fnancial establishment, who held strong orthodox views on economic policy, and
who were adamant to avoid Grexit at all costs. Papandreou, himself the scion of a political
dynasty, fell well within this clique, but as the protests against austerity intensifed, a schism
emerged between Papandreou and his Finance Minister, Evangelos Venizelos, who made no
secret of his ambitions to obtain the party leadership. After two years of sustained protests,
it was clear that public trust in Papandreou and the democratic legitimacy of the country's
political institutions more generally were rapidly evaporating. By mid-2011 Greece began to
eerily resemble the equally ungovernable Argentina of a decade before (Hawley and Allen
2011; Walker and Kakaounaki 2012; Douzinas 2013:102; Mason 2013:99; Lynn 2011:7).
The Papandreou government initially managed to face down a bout of mass protests
in May and June, but it was immediately confronted with another wave of demonstrations
in October. During a national holiday celebrating Greece's rejection of Mussolini's ultima-
tum on October 28, 1940, protesters disturbed a military parade by marching through the
procession of soldiers towards the stand of dignitaries, forcing the President of the Republic
to make a hasty and humiliating retreat. The media widely reported the incident as the
ultimate degradation of the national honor and a sign that the legitimacy of the state had
sunk to previously unimaginable lows. Kouvelakis (2011:18-19) notes that “a symbolic
threshold had been crossed … It was in response to this situation that a shaken Papandreou
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suggested his high-risk referendum initiative” (see also Roth 2013:21). As a government aide
confded, “George has decided to go over everyone's head and take it to the people. To do
otherwise would have meant death to the political system and economy by a thousand
slices. No country could go on with strikes and protests on such a scale” (cited in Smith
2011). Papandreou himself explains that “everybody was saying that the government [were]
traitors. I realised the situation was getting out of control” (cited in Spiegel 2014a).
In hindsight, the Prime Minister's risky call for a plebiscite can be seen, in a way, as
analogous to the bombshell announcement by President López Portillo of Mexico in late
1982 that he would be nationalizing the country's banks: both were desperate gambles for
resurrection by center-left leaders who were rapidly losing control over their countries and
who felt compelled by greater forces to make a dramatic last stand to save their political
legacy. And just like López Portillo's bank nationalization, Papandreou's referendum call
ended up backfring disastrously. Four days later the idea had been shelved – and within a
week Papandreou had ceased being the country's Prime Minister. Remarkably, however,
Papandreou's resignation did not give way to chaos and default, as De la Rúa's resignation
had in Argentina. An important question we should answer, then, is why the mass protests
in Greece between May and October 2011 did not produce an “Argentina-style” outcome –
the defeat of the bankers' alliance and the rise of a pro-default coalition – but rather had the
opposite efect of Mexico's failed bank nationalization: the defeat of the center-left and the
ultimate victory of the bankers' alliance.
The short answer proposed here is that, unlike in Argentina – where De la Rúa and
Cavallo were completely cut of by a weakened IMF and a disinterested, inward-looking and
laissez-faire-oriented US government – the Greek establishment triangle was still actively
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supported by the Troika and its European partners, who continued to exert strong pressure
on Greek ofcials while maintaining the prospect of future fnancing. Unlike Argentina's
popular explosion of December 19 and 20, which occurred after the vast majority of US
institutional investors had already shed most of their exposure and the IMF had already
withheld its last credit tranche following its decision that an Argentine default would be
inevitable and relatively harmless, the Greek anti-austerity revolt occurred at a time when
Europe's big banks were still heavily over-exposed to Greek debt and would have very
possibly required another bailout (the second after 2008-'09) in the event of a Greek default.
Since this was politically unpalatable to the European creditor governments, the Eurozone's
preference was to continue with the Troika bailouts, which required reliable pro-creditor
partners inside the Greek government, capable of credibly committing to the country's
fnancial obligations. Given the structural dependence of the Greek state on foreign credit
and the lack of political representation of the anti-austerity coalition that had now taken
control of the streets, European creditors did not encounter great difculties in locating and
imposing such partners from abroad. Put simply, the reason Greece did not go the way of
Argentina in 2001 is that – even if Papandreou himself lost their backing – the Greek estab-
lishment triangle retained the support of international creditors and Greece was never cut
loose from its emergency credit lines as Argentina had been.
Far from helping to build national unity around the reform and stabilization efort,
Papandreou's democratic brinkmanship ended up isolating the Prime Minister within his
own party. Kouvelakis (2011:25) has noted how “domestically, Papandreou's gesture – fol-
lowed swiftly by direct pressure from European lenders – indirectly strengthened the hand
of the 'Internal Troika' faction of PASOK [whose leaders included Anna Diamantopoulou,
Andreas Loverdos and Giannis Ragousis], who immediately rejected the idea of a referen-
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dum and instead called for a government of 'national unity'.” The more orthodox Finance
Minister Venizelos, who gained the lenders' preference over Papandreou, found his position
strengthened as well. When the two PASOK leaders were summoned to the G20 meeting in
Cannes, those present noted that the Prime Minister “visibly defated as the fght [with EU
leaders] continued. As [Papandreou] fatigued, Mr Venizelos took up the battle, a sign many
saw as the sudden realisation by the Greek prime minister that he had become a spent
political force – and Mr Venizelos, who had long coveted the premiership, was moving to
exploit the change in circumstances” (Spiegel 2014a). The European Commission President
Barroso approached Venizelos at the gathering and agreed with the Finance Minister that
the referendum had to be “killed.” As soon as this alliance between Venizelos and European
lenders was forged, Papandreou lost control over his own governing party. In discussions
with aides, it was later revealed, Barroso personally handpicked former ECB Vice-President
Lucas Papademos to head a technocratic government of national salvation with the backing
of Samaras' New Democracy and Venizelos himself as Finance Minister and PASOK's new
leader (ibid). As Kouvelakis (2011:26) writes, “thus the way was paved for the formation of
a government headed by the banker Papademos – the natural incarnation of a ruling bloc
that is entirely dominated by the interests of European fnance.”
The rise of Papademos himself closely mirrored that of the pro-creditor technocrats
in Latin America in previous decades. Like Cavallo and Silva Herzog, Papademos was seen
as capable of enhancing the credibility of Greece's commitment to its fnancial obligations
and hence seeing to the state's deep dependence on foreign credit. As Laskos and Tsakalotos
(2013:92) write, “Papademos was chosen for his technocratic prowess and his afnity with
fnancial markets” and he was “a favourite of both the Troika and important business and
media interests within Greece itself.” In a telling sign of his loyalties, one of the frst public
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statements by the new unelected prime minister was an opinion piece published in the
Financial Times in which Papademos (2011) explicitly opposed the idea of a 50 percent hair-
cut of Greece's privately held debt; a much more extreme position than that of the German
government, whose proposal for a 50 percent write-down eventually prevailed in the debt
restructuring of February 2012, when German banks had already reduced the bulk of their
exposure. Tellingly, Papademos' article stressed the spillover costs of a potential default on
Greek banks, investor confdence and the wider economy: “the adverse consequences for
Greece of 'hard', involuntary debt restructuring and a sovereign default are not limited to
the costs of recapitalising domestic banks and supporting pension funds. The efects on
confdence, the liquidity of the Greek banking system and the real economy are likely to be
substantial, though difcult to predict and quantify.”
Apart from strengthening the “internal Troika” and giving rise to a technocratic
government, Greece's continued dependence on foreign creditors also greatly strengthened
the position of the Governor of the Bank of Greece, George Provopoulos, who was himself
a former CEO of Emporiki Bank and later Piraeus Bank. A New York Times report noted
that “few hold as much power within their own country as [George Provopoulos], who has
played a crucial role in keeping Greece out of bankruptcy and in the euro zone” (Thomas
2013a). The waxing infuence of the central bank within the establishment triangle was a
direct outcome of its control over the fow of credit through the economy and its central
role in keeping Greece's private banks – the state's principal creditor after 2011 – afoat. As
Thomas (2013a) writes, “for decades, political infuence in this country has been a direct
function of a politician's ability to borrow and spend, with local banks, as the main buyers
of Greek government bonds, acting as the primary facilitators. Under an austerity regime,
such an approach is no longer possible. And as governments have come and gone …, the
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power of the Bank of Greece's governor has only solidifed.” Thus, in the frst years of the
crisis, the establishment triangle further strengthened its hold on fnancial policymaking.
Counterarguments:
These observations difer in several important respects from the conclusion reached
by Pagoulatos (2014), who argues that Greek bankers had structural power and enjoyed a
privileged position in policymaking during the credit-fueled consumption and construction
boom of 2001-'08, but lost their power and privileges with the deepening of the crisis after
2009. Pagoulatos' (2014:452) main argument is that the “fscal failure of the sovereign and
the current account imbalances of the euro area” created a set of structural limitations
under which “the banks cannot escape the confnes of their sovereign,” thus circumscribing
the bankers' power. While this is true, the conclusions he draws from this is problematic.
First, it is based too narrowly on the capital mobility hypothesis of the globalization
literature, which holds that high mobility provides bankers with an exit option – the main
source of structural power – whereas low mobility erodes this power. But while capital mo-
bility, as we already saw in Chapter II, is undoubtedly a key source of the structural power
of fnance, it is not the only one. For as long as nation states have depended on “the private
management of public debt,” creditors – whether mobile or immobile – have enjoyed a pri-
vileged position in fnancial policymaking (Dyson 2014). The deep source of the structural
power of fnance cannot be reduced to capital mobility alone; it must be traced back to the
structural dependence of the state on private credit; a dependence that in the case of Greece
greatly increased as the crisis deepened and the state relied more and more on its domestic
banks to refnance the internal debt, even as these banks lost their exit threat.
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The second problem concerns the fact that Pagoulatos never spells out the relative
nature of the banks' reduced power. It is one thing to note that the banks became vulne-
rable and structurally constrained over the course of the crisis; it is quite another to argue
that therefore the banks lost their privileged political position, or the state was able to exert
greater control over the banking sector. The broader issue here is that power is a relational
concept, so when arguing that a given actor is less powerful one should always follow up by
asking relative to whom. In the Greek case, Pagoulatos appears to describe the structural
constraints operating on private banks through their insertion into the Eurozone and their
dependence on creditor states for bank recapitalization funds and on the ECB for liquidity.
The Greek state itself was incapable of providing either as it lacked its own central bank
and the required currency reserves. So, while it is certainly true that the Greek banks were
weakened by their fnancial vulnerability, this was a weakness vis-à-vis European creditors.
It does not automatically follow from this that the Greek state thereby gained power over
the banks; in fact, the dependence of the Greek state and banks was mutual, their fate struc-
turally intertwined – a phenomenon analysts refer to as the “doom loop” between sovereign
and banking risk. While the banks' power was certainly circumscribed, so was the power of
the Greek state, which – despite the banks' weakness – continued to depend on them.
A third problem with Pagoulatos' conclusion, fowing naturally from the previous
two, is that it does not appear to be borne out by the available evidence. If the banks really
lost their privileged position or their relative power vis-à-vis the state, we would expect the
Greek government to assert control over them in one way or another. Pagoulatos presents
one piece of evidence to this efect: the PSI debt restructuring deal of 2012, in which Greek
banks took a €37.7 billion hit on their government bond holdings (Pagoulatos 2014:475). At
the same time, however, the Greek state assumed up to €50 billion in new debts from its
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European creditors in order to be able to recapitalize the banks, efectively passing the debt
from one hand to another: while PSI reduced the state's obligations to domestic banks, the
recapitalization increased its debts to the Troika just to make the banks whole again. Most
crucially, despite the fact that the Greek state thus covered 90 percent of the total capital in-
jection into the banking system, it never actively asserted ownership rights over the banks.
While the bank owners themselves only put up 10 percent of the injected funds, they were
left untouched and remained in full control of their banks. Perhaps Pagoulatos, who served
as an advisor to Papademos – who presided over PSI – has his own perspective on PSI, but
the terms of the restructuring clearly favored private bankers. A critical report in the New
York Times noted that “the banks' top executives are poised to potentially strike it rich. The
plan developed by the Greek government and its international creditors to recapitalize the
country's banks involves an unusual twist as stock oferings go: the new shares in the banks
will give investors free and potentially lucrative warrants that will entitle them to buy many
more shares in the future at a predetermined price.”55 Given the rising stock valuation of
the banks post-PSI, this warrant – which came in the form of a put-option – constituted yet
another state handout to private bankers.
Legitimation Crisis:
Eventually, as the social and humanitarian crisis deepened and the pro-banker bias in
the prevailing policy response became all but undeniable, the political establishment rapidly
55 “Because many of the investors who are expected to participate in the stock program are the same execu-
tives who were running the banks at the time of their near collapse, critics see it as a case of bankers being
rewarded despite their management missteps. And they say the Greek government is forgoing billions of
euros in potential revenue with the way the stock ofering is being handled. To date, of the 206 billion
euros … that the troika has dispensed to bail out Greece, an estimated 58 billion euros — all of which
comes from European taxpayers — has been spent propping up the country’s banks” (Thomas 2013b).
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lost the trust of the Greek people. The protests that rocked the country in 2010-'12 were a
case in point, and while the mobilizations subsided after February 2012, the incidence of
protest remained impressive. Ofcial data from the Ministry of Public Order show that the
number of protest actions and demonstrations that took place in Greece between 2010 and
2014 was 20,210, with 6,266 of those taking place in the metropolitan region of Attica. As a
report in the Greek establishment newspaper Kathimerini points out, “this translates into
5,100 protests per year, or approximately 14 marches and rallies on a daily basis, including
Sundays” (Stangos 2014). The protests were a visible expression of the deep legitimation
crisis of the Greek state and of the capacity of Greece's social movements to mobilize large
segments of society against austerity and structural reform. While the demonstrations initi-
ally went unheard, over time the widespread social discontent translated into the collapse of
the two establishment parties, which fell from a combined 77 percent of the vote in 2009 to
32 percent in the frst election round of 2012. This crisis of representation and the bur-
geoning social movements in turn fed into the rise of the anti-austerity party Syriza.
After narrowly losing the 2012 elections to New Democracy, Syriza – which had up
to that point persistently called for a unilateral suspension of debt payments – toned down
its rhetoric and moderated its policy proposals, much as Lula had in Brazil, in an attempt to
win over middle-class voters who remained fearful of the spillover costs of default and of
the consequences of Grexit in particular; showing how the structural power of fnance (in
this case of ofcial creditors) exerts its infuence even over left-wing opposition parties. With
its vague and inconsistent new pledge to “renegotiate” the debt, avoid unilateral action and
at the same time end austerity while remaining inside the Eurozone, Syriza fnally won the
snap elections of January 25, 2015 and formed a coalition government with the xenophobic
far-right Independent Greeks after falling just one seat short of an absolute majority. Setting
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out with a series of symbolic anti-austerity moves – rolling back past privatizations and lay-
ofs, refusing to meet Troika negotiators on Greek territory, and demanding a negotiated
debt restructuring from European creditors – the left-led government initially appeared to
resemble the Kirchners of Argentina in their ferce rhetorical defance of foreign creditors.
Unlike Argentina, however, Greece explicitly rejected unilateral action. Its non-compliance
with the bailout conditions was also quickly neutralized by the aggressive response of the
Troika. In the next section on the outcomes of the crisis we will take a closer look at these
events, which reveal just how limited the room for maneuver in the Eurozone has become,
especially for the heavily indebted states of the periphery.
Outcomes of the Crisis
















































The previous section has shown how the three hypothesized enforcement mecha-
nisms were fully operative in the Greek case. When the initial mechanism of market disci-
pline broke down in early 2010, after Greece was excluded from international capital mar-
kets, the second mechanism of the lender of last resort kicked in with force, starting with
the frst bailout. The third mechanism of privileged domestic elites served to entrench fscal
discipline within the Greek state apparatus. Unlike in Mexico, however, and reminiscent in
some ways of Argentina, this third mechanism briefy broke down with the election of the
Syriza government in January 2015. But unlike Argentina, where the Bush administration
and the IMF pulled the plug on the program, this breakdown of the third mechanism in
Greece did not coincide with a breakdown in the second mechanism, as ofcial creditors –
despite substantial internal disagreements – managed to maintain a united front and kept
providing the prospect of further fnancing, as long as Greece proved itself willing to accept
the Troika's strict policy conditions. In the following section, we will consider if and how
the three enforcement mechanisms produced the outcomes of the crisis. Like the previous
chapters, this fnal section will start with an assessment of Greece's room for maneuver
before turning to the “resolution” of the crisis and the distribution of adjustment costs.
The frst part will show how, in terms of Greece's room for maneuver, the outcome
has been reminiscent of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, with very limited space
for unilateral action by the debtor countries as a result of a set of structural constraints on
sovereignty that have compelled even left-leaning anti-austerity governments to abide by the
terms of the creditor-imposed bailout programs. Second, in terms of the supposed “reso-
lution” of the crisis through the PSI debt restructuring of 2012, a closer inspection reveals
that – as was the case with previous debt restructurings in Latin America – Eurozone banks
had already reduced most of their exposure, boosted their capital ratios and written down
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their remaining bonds by the time they signed up for the deal. Like the 2001 mega-swap in
Argentina, the 2012 PSI was in fact an opportunity for institutional bondholders to divest
themselves of their remaining Greek debt. But unlike the mega-swap, in which the holdings
of Argentine bonds were dispersed, following PSI holdings of Greek bonds were socialized.
Debt concentration thus remains inexorably high, although the vast majority of Greek debt
has now been transferred from the private to the public sector, leaving European taxpayers
on the hook to bear the burden of a future Greek debt restructuring, even as the big banks
escape unscathed and hedge funds continue to land windfall profts. Finally, when it comes
to the distribution of adjustment costs within Greece, the same familiar pattern emerges –
with the popular sector taking the hit even as the elite retains its wealth and privileges. The
“left parenthesis” of 2015 proved to be too impotent to genuinely challenge these dynamics,
highlighting once again just how deeply entrenched the structural power of creditors has
become and how little national autonomy heavily indebted peripheral states truly have.
The Eurozone Straitjacket: Limited Room for Maneuver
The frst and most obvious outcome of the European debt crisis has been the very
constrained space for monetary and fscal policymaking in the heavily indebted states of the
periphery. While social opposition to austerity has been ferce at times, it has not led to any
change in policy outcome (Glencross 2013:14-15). The prevailing approach to crisis manage-
ment across the Eurozone periphery has presented a challenge to some of the established
theories in Comparative Political Economy. For one, the Varieties of Capitalism literature
has been ill-equipped to account for the similarity in policy responses across institutional
contexts (Bruf and Horn 2012; Streeck 2014). Similarly, the Gourevitch (1986) approach of
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examining diverging domestic policy responses to common economic shocks appears to be
less fruitful in a situation where everyone is compelled by external forces to pursue the
same measures. Armingeon and Baccaro (2012:182) observe how “governments of diferent
political orientations, of diferent political strength, with diferent capacities for concerta-
tion with the social partners found themselves implementing essentially the same structural
adjustment program centered on public sector cuts, pension reform, easing of employment
protection legislation, weakening of unemployment insurance, and fexibilization of collec-
tive bargaining rules. The only type of choice left to governments was in the modalities
used to mobilize popular consensus for, or at least blunt hostility against, austerity.”
This broad and largely uncontested similarity in policy outcomes strongly hints at
the existence of structural factors that overruled party politics and institutional contexts by
disciplining national governments, circumscribing the policy options available to them,
punishing divergent actions and ideas, and compelling policymakers to play by the rules of
the game or face the wrath of bond markets and European institutions. As Armingeon and
Baccaro (2011:31) put it, the European debt crisis is a clear “case in which domestic politics,
either party- or interest group-based, does not matter: there is only one option – internal
devaluation – and it is imposed from the outside.” They conclude that “for peripheral coun-
tries, the policy space and the amount of discretion have shrunk dramatically.” This limited
room for maneuver is, in a way, reminiscent of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s,
in which even left-leaning governments were compelled by their creditors to comply with
the basic tenets of the Washington Consensus. If anything, the constraints on policy auto-
nomy in the Eurozone appear to be even greater, as national governments lack control over
monetary policy, thus forcing them to shift the full burden of adjustment onto fscal policy;
with the option of an external devaluation foreclosed, the only remaining choice is between
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internal devaluation or default. The fact that the latter has been successfully banished and
internal devaluation remains as the only policy option within the Eurozone is in fully in
line with what the structural power hypothesis would lead us to expect – after all, it is the
preferred outcome of creditors, as it defects the burden of adjustment onto the debtors.
The brief period of defance under the Syriza government in the frst half of 2015
constitutes an ideal test for this structural power hypothesis, precisely because the radicals
inside the cabinet actively tried to push out the “boundaries of the possible” during their
frst six months in ofce – only to fnd these boundaries rapidly closing in on them as the
Troika, fearful of the leftists setting a successful precedent of debtor resistance that might
embolden similar anti-austerity forces elsewhere (notably Podemos in Spain) mobilized all
its might in a concerted attempt to crush Syriza's democratic experiment. The mechanism
through which Eurozone creditors forced Alexis Tsipras to his knees was twofold: frst, by
the Eurogroup withholding the last €7 billion credit tranche of the 2012 bailout and the
ECB withholding €2 billion in retained profts on Greek bonds acquired through SMP; and
second through what has been called the “liquidity asphyxiation” of Greek banks, limiting
the amount of emergency fnancing available to domestic lenders and surgically raising this
limit by only just enough to keep the banks going from week to week. This constantly left
the Greek fnancial system teetering on the brink of collapse, which in turn enabled the
ECB to keep the Syriza government on a tight leash: a refusal by the ECB to increase the
ELA ceiling next time around would instantly lead to a collapse of Greece's private banking
system and force the country out of the euro.
It should be emphasized that the creditors' methods were applied in a context of
extremely high dependence – both of the Greek government and of its banking system – on
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the Eurozone creditor states and the ECB. The Greek government's payment schedule for
2015 was exceptionally onerous, with a total sum of €17 billion56 falling due over the course
of the year and a series of large payments due to the ECB in July and August – obligations
that the government would never have been able to service without the disbursement of the
€7 billion credit tranche from the last bailout and, at the very least, an additional bridging
loan. For the Greek banks, meanwhile, liquidity was a major concern since the “bank jog”
and widespread capital fight were eroding their capital base and cash reserves, leaving them
acutely dependent on ECB liquidity assistance to be able to stay afoat and keep dispensing
cash. In January alone, both in the lead-up to and in the wake of the elections of January
25, a total of €12 billion was withdrawn from Greek banks, pushing deposits down to €155
billion – the lowest level in 10 years, lower even than the previous nadir of the crisis during
the 2012 elections. All of this rendered the Greek government vulnerable to a withdrawal
of creditor support; a fact that the Syriza government appeared to be strangely oblivious to,
but the Europeans were clearly well aware of. In a sign that it was willing to aggressively use
the dependence of the Greek state and banks on European credit as a political weapon, the
ECB frst disqualifed Greek government bonds as collateral for regular funding operations,
forcing Greek banks – which had up to that point depended on the central bank accepting
these bonds in return for access to its discount window – to turn to the higher-interest rate
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) instead. The ECB then systematically refused to raise
the ELA ceiling to the levels it had allowed Greek banks to access under the technocratic
Papademos government in 2012: while it had provided almost €110 billion in emergency
liquidity assistance in 2012, by June 28, 2015 it was only providing up to €89 billion. As a
senior international banker put it, “they [ECB] are squeezing them [Syriza] on everything,
56 This excludes treasury bills that are regularly rolled over by the domestic banks that hold them. If these
bills are included the total amount due in 2015 rises to €37.5 billion.
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it's part of a system to sufocate them, to make them realise the end is coming, to realise it
is time to get on their knees” (cited in Barker and Hope 2015).
Despite a number of defant moves in its frst days in ofce, by February 20 the ECB
and Eurogroup fnance ministers had efectively forced the Syriza government into its frst
capitulation, signing up to a preliminary agreement that would extend the second bailout
program to June 30 – but without disbursing the remaining loan tranche or raising the ELA
ceiling. The agreement stated that “the Greek authorities commit to refrain from any roll-
back of measures and unilateral changes to the policies and structural reforms that would
negatively impact fscal targets, economic recovery or fnancial stability, as assessed by the
institutions.” Dijsselbloem noted that “the biggest driver” behind the deal – which did not
ofer any concessions on debt relief, privatizations or fscal surpluses, as Tsipras had hoped
– were “fears that Greece might experience a full-blown bank run” (Giugliano 2015; Spiegel
2015). Michala Marcussen, head of economics at Société Générale bank, noted that “Greece
is being kept on an incredibly tight leash” and stated that the Eurozone's refusal to disburse
further credit or to provide additional liquidity was “clearly intended to keep Greece under
pressure and keep things moving forward in the negotiations” (Chrysoloras and Bensasson
2015). This pressure was kept up over the next months, as Eurozone fnance ministers syste-
matically refused to give in to Greek demands for leniency. Faced with the infexibility of
its counterparts, the Greek government eventually opted for a cataclysmic last stand in June
2015. The crisis fnally came to head when the increasingly unproductive talks approached a
critical June 30 deadline, when the second bailout was set to expire and a big IMF payment
was due, which Greece was unable to make without the disbursement of the fnal tranche.
By then, Tsipras was in the thralls of a ferce power struggle inside his cabinet in which he
“oscillated between rival groups of ministers and aides” (Stamouli and Walker 2015).
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On one hand, the infuential internal opposition around the Left Platform (made up
mostly of former Communists and led by the far-left Energy Minister Panagiotis Lafazanis)
and the so-called “Group of 53” (made up of prominent Syriza ofcials inside Tsipras' presi-
dential faction of the party who were increasingly critical of the government's negotiating
strategy) strongly opposed the idea of further concessions to the creditors. Exasperated by
the intransigence of his fellow Eurozone fnance ministers, Varoufakis was also pushing for
a more confrontational line, as was Zoë Konstantopoulou, the Speaker of Parliament who
presided over the Truth Committee on Public Debt (2015), which in a preliminary report
declared parts of Greece's debt to be “illegal, illegitimate, odious and/or unsustainable” and
called on the government to pursue a unilateral suspension of payments followed by an
aggressive restructuring and a repudiation of all odious debts. This hotchpotch of radicals
inside the party and the cabinet squared of against a highly infuential group of close prime
ministerial aides (including Tsipras' closest confdant, Nikos Pappas) and high-ranking cabi-
net members (most importantly Deputy Prime Minister Yannis Dragasakis) who had long
been pushing for a more moderate and conciliatory line in a bid to unlock the remaining
money of the previous bailout and to avoid a forced exit from the Eurozone.
In the weekend of June 20 and 21, Tsipras backed Dragasakis and other moderates
inside the government, who had already taken control of the Brussels negotiating team after
Tsipras had partly sidelined Varoufakis following an ill-fated previous summit in Riga on
April 24, in drafting up a proposal that practically amounted to a declaration of surrender,
including a commitment to much harsher fscal targets than anything the government had
previously agreed to and rolling back virtually all of the prime minister's election promises.
But when, on Tuesday, June 23, the Greek proposal came back marked in “red ink,” with
Eurozone ofcials striking through most of the Greek concessions as insufcient, replacing
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them with their own words and leaking the document to the press, the combination of the
creditors' intransigence and their insistence on his public humiliation convinced Tsipras of
the merit of Varoufakis' repeated calls for a more confrontational line: if the creditors even
refused to accept his capitulation, what options remained but to make a dramatic last stand?
After this rejection, the sequence of events unfolded in rapid succession. First, at an
EU leaders summit on June 26, billed as the “last chance” to avoid Greece from going into
arrears on the Fund and crashing out of the euro, Eurozone leaders made Greece an ofer it
could not refuse, in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it deal demanding much tougher measures
in return for a bridging loan. Reportedly startled and infuriated by what he perceived to be
the creditors' ultimatum, Tsipras stormed out of the Brussels negotiating room and few
back to Athens to inform his cabinet that he would be activating a referendum plan that he
had long been contemplating in a bid to strengthen his negotiating position. In reality, the
call for a referendum was more like a last-ditch attempt by the prime minister to keep his
failing party together. Cornered by his creditors and in full awareness that accepting their
demands would lead to an internal rebellion and possibly a secession by the Left Platform,
Tsipras took the decision to the people, urging them to vote against the creditors' demands
with the promise that this would allow him to extract greater concessions from creditors in
further negotiations. Even at this point, he explicitly rejected unilateral action.
As we saw before, the creditors' response to this move was very aggressive. Despite
Tsipras' repeated claims to the contrary, European leaders instantly declared that the refe-
rendum would constitute a vote on Greek euro membership. Jeroen Dijsselbloem reiterated
his long-standing calls for further austerity and declared that “if [the Greek] people say they
don't want that, there is not only no basis for a new programme, there is also no basis for
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Greece in the euro zone” (cited Sterling 2015). European leaders immediately cut of nego-
tiations on further fnancing and refused to agree to a fve-day bridging period requested by
the Greek government to be able to carry out the referendum in peace. As a result, the ECB
felt that it was no longer justifed to keep increasing ELA and decided in a governing board
meeting the next day that it would maintain the present level – which, in the face of the in-
cipient bank run that had started following Tsipras' referendum announcement, amounted
to a decision to cut the Greek banking system loose from further central bank support. The
dramatic consequences – ATMs running out of cash, a closure of the banks, and the impo-
sition of far-reaching capital controls and withdrawal limits – were already discussed in the
section on spillover costs. Here it is just worth citing a policy advisor at the Greek fnance
ministry who reported that in a matter of days after the ECB's decision large parts of the
economy and state were already starting to “die of” or malfunction (cited in Salmon 2015):
Companies [that] do not pay their employees through bank accounts cannot pay cash to
employees – and there are many … So we have a situation which is escalating into a
chain reaction … like having a heart attack … if you view cash liquidity as the blood of
the economy. On the weekend when the ECB stopped, we had the heart attack. Now [the
week before the referendum] we are having its after-efects. Diferent organs are getting
numb. Some stop working, others are trying but they don't have enough blood.
The creditors' dramatic response – and the debilitating spillover costs it triggered –
subsequently caused Tsipras to veer back towards his more moderate advisors and ministers,
who in a heated cabinet meeting on June 30 called for a cancellation of the referendum and
a resumption of negotiations with the creditors. Refusing to go down in history as another
Papandreou, Tsipras upheld his referendum decision but decidedly shifted his tone, insisting
once again that he would not take unilateral action and that Greece's position within the
Eurozone was not in question. To give substance to this pledge and to please the moderates
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inside the government, Tsipras authorized his negotiating team to draft a contradictory new
proposal – remarkably similar to the one he was calling on voters to reject – and sent it to
the Eurogroup. Unsurprisingly, it was rejected out of hand by the Europeans, who insisted
that there would be no further negotiations until after the July 5 referendum. In the next
days, mass rallies took place in favor of the “yes” and “no” vote, with the latter drawing
hundreds of thousands into Syntagma Square on July 3. Two days later, an overwhelming
61.8 percent of Greeks, far more than the government had anticipated, voted to reject the
creditors' terms, defying threats made by the European creditors and the Greek opposition,
business elite and corporate media that a “no” vote would spell disaster and constitute an
exit from the euro. A geographical analysis of the outcome showed that the poorer areas in
Athens had overwhelmingly voted against while the wealthier areas had overwhelmingly
voted in favor, highlighting a deep social divide over the issues of austerity, debt repayment
and euro membership (Galatsidas and Arnett 2015).
That same night, Varoufakis presented a dramatic plan to an inner-cabinet meeting,
proposing to capitalize on the spectacular energy generated by the popular mobilizations
around the referendum and the resounding “no” vote through a three-pronged approach: to
issue euro-denominated IOUs, declare a unilateral haircut on ECB-held Greek bonds, and
take back control over the Bank of Greece (Lambert 2015). The plan was rejected outright
by the majority of the six-member inner cabinet, with only Varoufakis and one other cabi-
net member voting in favor, having failed to convince Tsipras himself.
That very night, Varoufakis resigned. Within less than a week, Tsipras found himself
back at the table in Brussels signing up to a new bailout with conditions even worse than
the ones he had just convinced his own people to reject. It is difcult to think of a clearer
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manifestation of the strategic exercise of structural power than the process through which
Greece's creditors forced the leader of Europe's frst radical left government and the fgure-
head of a continent-wide anti-austerity movement into this kolotoumba, or somersault. As a
senior Syriza ofcial put it, “It is a total capitulation. We never had a 'Plan B' for what to
do if the [ECB] cuts of liquidity and the creditors simply destroyed our country, which is
what they are doing” (cited in Evans-Pritchard 2015a). An EU ofcial confded that Tsipras
had been “crucifed” by his Eurozone counterparts during the post-referendum negotia-
tions, while a diplomat from German-allied country described the terms of the agreement
as “akin to turning Greece into an economic protectorate” (cited in Spiegel and Wagstyl
2015). The third memorandum stipulated that “No unilateral fscal or other policy actions
will be taken by the authorities, which would undermine the liquidity, solvency or future
viability of the banks. All measures, legislative or otherwise, taken during the programme
period, which may have an impact on banks' operations, solvency, liquidity, asset quality,
etc., should be taken in close consultation with the EC/ECB/IMF and where relevant the
ESM.” The Financial Times concluded that Greece had “pledged to accept a level of external
oversight of its economy unprecedented of an EU member … This can be seen as a hard-
nosed programme in which the principal authors sit not in Mr Tsipras's cabinet but in the
ofces of the IMF, the EU and the creditors, led by Germany” (Wagstyl 2015).
In the parliamentary debate on the third memorandum of understanding with the
resuscitated Troika of foreign lenders – which had never really gone away – Labor Minister
Panos Skourletis declared that “the current balance of power makes capitulation inevitable.”
As Tsipras himself lamented as he passed the third bailout agreement through Parliament: “I
had a choice between a deal I did not agree with, or a disorderly default.” In line with the
generalized trend away from the latter, he opted for the deal. As a Greek fnance ministry
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ofcial explained afterwards, when asked about the reasons for Syriza's dramatic capitula-
tion: “we underestimated their power” (cited in Salmon 2015).
Restructuring and Socialization of the Debt
Long before Syriza's rise to power, the restructuring of February 2012 was supposed
to have brought an end to the crisis. European leaders announced the 53.5 percent haircut
on private holdings of Greek bonds as a major sacrifce by creditors to help Greece back
onto its feet and allow it to grow again. But as in the Brady plan of the 1980s and the mega-
swap in Argentina, it is questionable how much debt relief Greece actually obtained and
how heavily creditors were really hit by private sector involvement. In fact, three crucial
points stand out. First, over the course of 2011 the European banks had already divested
themselves of the majority of their bondholdings, boosted capital ratios and marked the
remaining bonds to market (Allen & Overy 2012:13; Angeloni and Wolf 2012:9). Second,
the restructuring was rigged so as to not harm existing bondholders and beneft hedge funds
and other speculators, while doing very little to resolve Greece's underlying debt problems
(Buchheit and Gulati 2012; Cline 2013). Third, the debt restructuring mostly hit the Greek
banks, pension funds and small investors, which by that point held the majority of Greek
government bonds. And while Greek banks were made whole through the recapitalization
that came with the second bailout – a sum that would consequently be added to the public
debt, forcing the costs of PSI onto Greek taxpayers – the pension funds  and 15,000 small
investors were never compensated for the haircut.57 This outcome, favoring international
57 “Among the losers of PSI were public entities which sufered losses of €16.2 billion. Most of these losses
accrued to pension schemes, with losses of €14.5 billion. … Another group, which registered signifcant
losses, were the small bond-holders. It is estimated that more than 15.000 families lost their life savings”
(Truth Committee on Public Debt 2015:17/20).
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fnance at the expense of Greek citizens and European taxpayers, is once again in line with
what the structural power hypothesis would lead us to expect: the power of the former
allowed lenders to proft during the boom while defecting the costs of the bust onto others.
On the frst point, it was clear that European banks were much better prepared for
an orderly debt write-down in early 2012 than they had been around the same time a year
before. Over the course of 2011, most private bondholders had gotten rid of their exposure
to Greek debt by selling their Greek junk bonds to the ECB or to vulture funds (Buchheit,
Panizza et al 2013:25-26). As one analyst noted, “when Europe's leaders claim the continent
is now better placed to withstand a crisis they mean only that this accumulation [of Greek
bonds] has been largely transferred from the private to the public sector, mainly the Euro-
pean Central Bank” (Kay 2012). Through SMP, discussed at length in the previous section,
the ECB bought peripheral junk bonds from banks at above-market prices, thus enabling
private bondholders to dump their exposure on taxpayers for much better money than they
could possibly have obtained on the market. As Ruparel and Persson (2011:13) noted early
on in the ECB's bond-buying scheme, “by buying government bonds that otherwise would
have been close to unsellable, the ECB is monetising otherwise illiquid debt – which is one
of the reasons why the practice is (in theory) explicitly prohibited by the ECB's own rules.”
The debt that could not be dumped was written down (Roth 2013:19). Bloomberg
data revealed that some of the biggest lenders had already written down their Greek bonds
by over 70 percent in early 2012. PSI, which would bring about an estimated 74 percent loss
on the net present value of these bonds, thus forced them to only subtract a little bit more,
leaving “Europe's largest lenders and insurers ... likely to accede to the Greek debt swap
because they've already written down their sovereign holdings and want to avert the risk of
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a default” (Benedetti-Valentini and Kirchfeld 2012). Notably, these write-downs did not
constitute real capital destruction but simply a downward adjustment of prospective profts
(Roth 2013). An analyst at Kepler Capital Markets remarked that “European banks have
had a long time to prepare and many already have the losses behind them. In the end, this
deal was negotiated by the biggest banks and insurers, so a large participation rate is assu-
red” (Benedetti-Valentini et al 2012). French banks, which had been most heavily exposed at
the start of the crisis, had already written down their holdings of Greek government bonds
to 25 percent of nominal value, making the haircut involved in PSI meaningless in terms of
the banks' overall profts. For BNP Paribas, for instance, the amount was estimated to be in
the range of €300 million – a negligible amount for a bank that raked in €6.5 billion in
profts in 2012, up from €6 billion in 2010, making it Europe's most proftable fnancial
institution. For other big lenders like Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank exposures were
similarly negligible. For the banks, a debt restructuring started to look like an increasingly
attractive option to reduce the risk of default and further divest of their Greek bonds.
As a result, Eurozone ofcials – who had been so terrifed of a Greek default in 2011
– suddenly reversed course and embraced the need for a PSI debt restructuring. “Europe is
prepared,” Finland's Finance Minister Alexander Stubb said. “A hell of a lot better prepared
than it was on May 9, 2010 – and a hell of a lot better prepared than it was last year” (cited
in Chafn 2012). And so the PSI deal went ahead, providing a misleading impression that
Greece's foreign private bondholders had now shared in the burden of adjustment for the
crisis. The reality was diferent. After the deal was concluded, one senior Eurozone ofcial
observed that “they [private bondholders] got a good deal. They get nearly 50 percent [of
the debt's face value] back. Given the alternative, that's good” (cited in Baker and Sassard
2012). In fact, the deal turned out to be a boon for creditors. For one, lenders were ofered
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an “exceptionally large cash sweetener, in the form of highly rated EFSF notes… Regardless
of what happened in Greece, participating investors would have this 'bird in hand'” (Zettel-
meyer, Trebesch and Gulati 2013:26). In the process, creditors managed to divest themselves
of their last-remaining toxic Greek bonds at decent prices, with signifcant upfront benefts
and with their restructured bonds now denominated under English as opposed to Greek
law, making it impossible for Greek ofcials to retroft diferent conditions onto them or to
legally denounce the debts by passing a repudiation bill through parliament.
The result of the above, unfolding over the two years between the onset of the crisis
in early 2010 and the conclusion of PSI in February/March 2012, was a complete transfor-
mation of Greece's debt profle. The shift in the ownership structure was so dramatic that
some of the world's leading sovereign debt scholars felt compelled to point out that “we are
not aware of any other similarly drastic case of 'credit migration' from private into ofcial
hands in the history of sovereign debt” (Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati 2013:34). Where
Greece's privately-held debt had once constituted nearly 80 percent of the total, by late
2012 this was only 20 percent, with the remaining 80 percent now held in ofcial hands –
marking a perfect inversion of the country's debt profle in the space of just one year. As in
Argentina's mega-swap, private bondholders once again managed to get rid of their expo-
sure. This time, however, the debt was not dispersed among hundreds of thousands of small
investors, but socialized by ofcial creditors.58 The process through which this socialization
occurred was twofold, going back to the second enforcement mechanism of ofcial-sector
58 “[S]tarting in May 2010, Greece began drawing down on its ofcial sector loans, partly to cover its budget
defcits, but mostly to repay its bondholders at par. The liabilities thus inexorably began to migrate out of
the hands of the folks who had lent the money and taken the commercial risk (the bondholders) and into
the hands of Greece’s ofcial (taxpayer funded) sponsors. It was a policy that lasted … until the summer of
2011. It seems belatedly to have dawned on the ofcial sector players that they were gradually displacing
their private sector counterparts as the principal lenders to Greece” (Buchheit and Gulati 2012:4).
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intervention: frst, the lion's share of the two emergency loans to the Greek government –
amounting to €240 billion in total – went straight to debt servicing, leading to a gradual re-
placement of privately-held debt with ofcially-held debt. It has been calculated that, for
every single euro Greece received in Troika fnancing, it spent 89 cents on debt repayment
and recapitalizing its banks (Mouzakis 2015). This, combined with the fact that the Greek
government did not regain market access by the date foreseen in the program, meant that
Greece literally assumed debts to the ofcial sector in order to be able to repay its debts to
the private sector – amounting to a de facto bailout of the latter in all but name. The second
process through which the debt was socialized was the ECB's securities markets program,
which allowed bondholders to dump Greek junk bonds on the central bank.
The outcome was possibly even more scandalous than Argentina's mega-swap: not
only did private bondholders manage to shift the burden of adjustment onto the people of
Greece and their liabilities onto European taxpayers, thereby avoiding essentially inevitable
losses; they also found a way to completely obscure that fact (Roubini 2012; Buchheit and
Gulati 2012:4; Eifel Group and Glienicker Group 2015; Modi 2015). As the IMF (2013:17)
concluded in its critical review of the 2010 bailout program:
Private creditors were able to signifcantly reduce their exposure … There was a large-
scale substitution from privately-held to publicly-held debt. Part of this was by design –
program fnancing was to be used to repay maturing bonds in 2010 and 2011 – but the
shift was intensifed by market access not being regained in 2012, as well as by SMP.
Purchases of Greek government bonds under SMP created rigidities when debt was
restructured as a result of the decision to exclude SMP … bond holdings from the PSI.
By the time Syriza came to power in January 2015 and began to demand debt relief
from Eurozone creditors, the big European banks had only negligible exposures to Greece.
According to Reuters (2015) fgures, German banks held €23.5 billion in Greek bonds, but
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the biggest two banks – Deutsche and Commerzbank – “hold only a tiny fraction of that,”
with the state-owned development bank KfW responsible for the majority of holdings at
€15 billion. As the head of the German banking association BdB put it, “the credit exposure
of German banks in Greece is low. That's why, should it come to insolvency for Greece,
the direct efects on German banks could be overcome.” Consolidated exposure to Greek
banks and companies was also down sharply compared to 2011. An emailed report by J.P
Morgan showed that the cutting of links to Greek units and the systematic dumping of
Greek bonds on the ECB left Europe's biggest banks with “limited risk to Greece.” The
total amount owed to the major European banks like BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société
Générale, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank and ING – which had been among Greece's main
creditors before 2012 – were said to range between 0.1 and 0.9 percent of these banks' total
outstanding loans: “very limited” and “immaterial” for the banks' profts (Bloomberg 2015).
All of this signifcantly changed the nature of the game: by the time Syriza took power, the
struggle over the burden of adjustment was no longer a question of how much European
bankers would be made to pay for the irresponsible lending that helped cause the crisis, but
how much European taxpayers should be made to pay to alleviate the burden of their Greek
counterparts. By August 2015, the US and the IMF were insisting that the Eurozone should
distribute the adjustment more equally – but Germany and its allies would have none of it,
and fercely resisted any type of debt relief or restructuring.
In the end, just like in Mexico and in Argentina, the debt reduction Greece obtained
from the 2012 restructuring was negligible. As Cline (2013:4) points out, “the overall efect
of the large PSI of April 2012 was … to reduce total Greek debt by slightly less than one-
fourth. It is perhaps not surprising that once the country had plunged into the insolvency
mode, a debt reduction by only one-fourth would not have been sufcient to reestablish sol-
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vency decisively.” Others conclude that “the PSI component of the deal was little more than
symbolic, and provided no meaningful debt relief” (Ardagna and Caselli 2014:17). What is
worse, the next time the debts are restructured, the burden will not fall on the bankers who
had taken the risks of lending to Greece in the frst place, but on the taxpayers of the core
countries who – mostly without being aware of it – have already bailed them out.
Unequal Distribution of Adjustment Costs
As a result of the above, the distribution of adjustment costs between Greece and its
creditors ended up heavily skewed, with Greece shouldering virtually the entire burden. We
have already seen how private creditors escaped unscathed and how a number of hedge
funds made windfall profts. To this we can now add the highly asymmetric distribution of
adjustment costs between Greece and its ofcial European creditors. The ECB, for one,
made signifcant profts of the Greek bonds it acquired in the SMP – profts it had pledged
to return to Greece in late 2012, but has failed to after 2013.59 The ECB itself estimates that
it will make €5.6 billion in profts on Greek debt between 2014 and 2016, setting it on
course for total profts of €10.4 billion by the 2020s. However, according to calculations by
the Jubilee Debt Campaign (2015), the actual numbers may be signifcantly higher, as the
interest rates the ECB receives and the discount at which it bought the bonds could push
yields up to €22 billion. And the ECB – which systematically refused to partake in any debt
restructuring – is not the only actor that profted: the German government has turned out
handsome gains as well, not necessarily from interest paid by the Greek government but in
59 In fact, the ECB made the return of the profts it made on Greek bonds in 2014 conditional on the Greek
government sticking with the letter of the second bailout agreement, using the return of these profts as
another lever for enforcing discipline and exerting control over Greek policy.
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particular from the lower interest rates it paid on its own bonds as a result of the “investor
fight to safety.” Recent research by the Halle Institute for Economic Research has found
that “Germany benefted substantially from the Greek crisis,” saving over €100 billion – or
3 percent of GDP – on lower interest payments between 2010 and 2015, with most of this
reduction attributable “Greece fight” alone. The authors specify that “these benefts should
not be overlooked, as they tend to be larger than the expenses, even in a scenario where
Greece does not repay any of its debts” (Dany, Gropp, Littke and von Schweinitz 2015).
Beyond this asymmetric international distribution of adjustment costs, the burden
of adjustment within Greece was also heavily skewed towards working people, pensioners,
the youth, the middle class, the unemployed and the poor, as opposed to the wealthy (Roth
2013:63-64).60 Unsurprisingly, as in past crises in the Global South, the adjustment process
depended almost exclusively on cuts in pensions and welfare spending, regressive tax hikes,
public sector layofs, wage reductions and privatizations, all of which disproportionately
harmed low and middle income households that depend on income from wages or welfare
spending for their livelihoods. To provide just a particularly egregious example: low income
households witnessed a 333.7 percent increase in their tax burden between 2009 and 2013;
contrasting sharply to the 9 percent increase for the upper decile (Giannitsis and Zografakis
2015:17). Meanwhile, under the weight of austerity, unemployment rose over 25 percent (60
percent for the young) and average wages were cut by over a quarter. While the labor share
of income (wage-related income relative to GDP) had increased from 34 percent to 35.7 per-
cent between 2008 and 2010, it “fell signifcantly to 32.3% in 2013” while “the absolute
amount of total wages decreased to €59.3 billion (2013) from €82.4 billion in 2008 (-28.0%)”
60 “The measures taken so far place the burden of adjustment almost exclusively on the crisis countries,
despite that they are not solely responsible for the crisis. Even worse, within these countries, the burden is
borne disproportionately by the weakest and least-responsible for the crisis” (Antzoulatos 2012:531).
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(ibid:36). As a result, the average income of the poor fell 45.2 percent in 2008-'12 (ibid:63).
This relative depravation has been unprecedented; it is difcult to think of any other case in
which living standards in an advanced capitalist economy have collapsed so rapidly and so
dramatically in peacetime conditions.
To make matters worse, as the public hospital budget was slashed in half and some 3
million uninsured Greeks lost access to the healthcare system, an unmitigated medical crisis
took hold (see Stuckler and Basu 2013). HIV infections, child mortality and depression rates
have all shot up dramatically, cancer patients are going untreated as hospitals – in arrears on
their international pharmaceutical suppliers – can no longer obtain crucial drugs, and even
tuberculosis and malaria have been staging a comeback. Charities report that in some of the
poorest districts of Athens up to 90 percent of inhabitants rely on soup kitchens and food
banks to avoid hunger. Apartment buildings are unheated during winter as landlords and
tenants can no longer aford heating oil; brand new EU-funded highways remain eerily
quiet as drivers can no longer aford the toll or the petrol. With a third of Greeks estimated
to live below the poverty line and more than 680,000 children at risk of poverty or social
exclusion, it is fair to say that austerity has unleashed a veritable humanitarian catastrophe;
an acute and ongoing social crisis on a scale unseen in Greece since the Great Famine under
the German occupation. More than 200,000 Greeks have already fed their homeland since
2010 – a mass migration that has been described as “the biggest brain drain in an advanced
western economy in modern times” (Smith 2015b). In 2015, this even prompted the Obama
administration to issue a number of sharp rebukes of Europe's crisis management. Caroline
Atkinson, US deputy national security advisor, declared that “they have asymmetric rules.
They need to make it socially fairer. It is important for creditors to take into account that
Greece has had a very sharp drop in incomes, real wages, and output as well as a big rise in
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unemployment. Greece has moved into primary surplus. How much more fscal consolida-
tion is necessary?” (cited in Evans-Pritchard 2015b).
The sacrifces of ordinary Greeks contrast sharply to the preferential treatment and
fnancial privileges of the country's elite – most of whom have been able to evacuate their
wealth from Greek banks by depositing it in Swiss bank accounts or routing their incomes
via various tax havens like Cyprus, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, avoiding both taxes
and a possible post-Grexit devaluation in the process. The aforementioned case of Greek
bankers being ofered a special “call option” after the post-PSI bank recapitalization – allow-
ing them to buy back shares in their own banks at very low fxed prices – is possibly the
most glaring indication of the special position of the country's fnancial establishment,
whose privileges have largely been left intact despite the fnancial vulnerability and moral
bankruptcy of their institutions (Varoufakis 2014). The perverse incentives created by this
call option in turn allowed speculators like John Paulson, the US hedge fund billionaire, to
pick up Greek bank shares at defated prices with a view to collecting easy profts a few
years out; a development that triggered an anomalous stock exchange bubble between mid-
2012 and late 2014, while the economy was mired in depression. The outcome was clear:
“The bigger winners ... were hedge funds, which pocketed higher profts than many had
expected, in yet another Greek bailout fnanced by European taxpayers” (Thomas 2012).
In the end, perhaps the most telling conclusions about the Greek debt crisis were
those reached by the IMF (2013) itself in its review of the initial 2010 bailout program. The
report noted that “the actual decline in GDP was so much greater than anticipated [because]
the fscal multipliers were too low” (p. 21); “the burden of adjustment was not shared
evenly across society” (p. 24); “ownership of the program was limited” (p. 24); “the prog-
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ram was based on a number of ambitious assumptions” (p. 26); “the risks were explicitly
fagged” (p.27); and “ex-ante debt restructuring was not attempted” (p. 27). The most remar-
kable admission in the IMF report is that there was an alternative at the start of the crisis –
a negotiated debt restructuring – but that this was not taken because of political pressure
exerted by European governments whose banks carried great exposure to Greece. IMF
ofcials recognized that “many commentators considered debt restructuring to be inevi-
table,” but it was not an option to the Fund's European partners (Xafa 2014:14). And so,
“with debt restructuring of the table, Greece faced two alternatives: default immediately, or
move ahead as if debt restructuring could be avoided. The latter strategy was adopted, but
in the event, this only served to delay debt restructuring and allowed many private creditors
to escape” (IMF 2013:27). The Standby Agreement, by the IMF's own admission, thus
“served as a holding operation” for the banks to reduce their exposure (IMF 2013:28). “An
upfront debt restructuring would have been better for Greece,” the Fund notes, “although
this was not acceptable to the euro partners. A delayed debt restructuring ... provided a
window for private creditors to reduce exposures and shift debt into ofcial hands. As seen
earlier, this shift occurred on a signifcant scale and limited the bail-in of creditors when PSI
eventually took place, leaving taxpayers and the ofcial sector on the hook” (ibid). The
worst part, then, is that much of the sufering turned out to be unnecessary: “Earlier debt
restructuring could have eased the burden of adjustment on Greece and contributed to a
less dramatic contraction in output” (IMF 2013:33). A counterfactual analysis by the Hans
Böckler Stiftung's Macroeconomic Policy Institute found that “austerity explains almost
the entire collapse of Greek GDP,” and suggests that “in the absence of austerity, the Greek
economy would have entered a prolonged period of stagnation, rather than a depression,”
as 80 percent of the contraction would have been avoided (Gechert & Rannenberg 2015:1).
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Conclusion and Possible Alternative Interpretations
The fndings presented in this chapter appear to confrm those uncovered in the
previous two chapters. The three standard explanations of debtor compliance – reputation,
sanctions and institutions – are unconvincing in the face of the available evidence. Instead,
we fnd the same enforcement mechanisms at work as in the Mexican and Argentine cases,
with high debt concentration and structurally interlocked creditor interests producing strict
market discipline; with the high risk of contagion and the vulnerability of the European
banking sector producing an aggressive ofcial-sector intervention in the form of the three
largest international bailout loans in world history, each provided under strict policy condi-
tionality; and with the Greek political and fnancial elite strengthened in the frst phases of
the crisis as a result of the state's deepening dependence on private credit. As in Argentina,
a deep legitimation crisis eventually led to a temporary and partial breakdown of the latter
mechanism, with an anti-austerity coalition rising to power; unlike in Argentina, however,
this did not produce a unilateral default since the second enforcement mechanism – the loan
conditionality imposed by the Troika of foreign lenders – remained fully operative. Until
the moment of writing, at least, ofcial sector creditors have still not completely cut Greece
of from further credit, although there have been tentative moves in this direction, most
importantly in the wake of Tsipras' referendum announcement in the summer of 2015.
Driven in part by ideological motivations and in part by growing public opposition
to further bailouts inside the creditor countries, the hardline position taken by German
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and his conservative allies in small creditor countries
like Finland, Austria, Latvia and the Netherlands, ofers the possibility that an Argentina-
style outcome – whereby ofcial sector creditors accept the inevitability of default and cut
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of their fnancial lifeline – may yet become a reality further down the road. With the third
bailout program likely to fail in its stated attempts to restore debt sustainability, much will
depend on the capacity of the second Tsipras government to stick to the letter of the memo-
randum, on the willingness of the ofcial lenders to keep propping up the insolvent and im-
ploding Greek state apparatus, and on the Troika's capacity to maintain a degree of internal
coherence despite deepening tensions between the IMF and the Europeans. At the time of
writing, it appears that – in contrast to the frst half of 2015 – the immediate threat of a uni-
lateral default has momentarily subsided, thanks to Tsipras' neutralization by the creditor
powers and Syriza's metamorphosis into a pro-memorandum force. Still it remains unclear
how much longer the Greek government and its ofcial creditors can keep buying time to
stave of the inevitable moment of reckoning at which a signifcant part of Greece's unsus-
tainable debt will simply have to be written down, either voluntarily or forcefully.
Can we imagine alternative explanations for the evidence presented in this chapter?
As in the previous two cases, the instrumentalist interpretation would emphasize the resort
to direct forms of political pressure, interpersonal relations, lobbying, campaign fnance and
the like in preventing a Greek default. To varying degrees, some of these factors have indeed
been observed: Eurozone ofcials exerted direct pressure on the Greek government when
they threatened Grexit; close ties between Greek technocrats and the European fnancial
establishment helped to cement fscal discipline into the Greek state apparatus; lobbying by
the Institute of International Finance likely played some role behind the scenes; and Greek
banks poured hundreds of millions into the Greek political system over the years. Again,
the point of this chapter has not been to disconfrm the existence of this instrumental type
of power. However, as the chapter has tried to make clear, a truly exhaustive account of the
Greek crisis should consider the unique form of power that private and ofcial creditors
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derived from the structural dependence of the Greek state on credit. Without the threat of
withholding further credit and/or liquidity, the exercise of other forms of power would
never have been as efective. The Eurozone could exert such enormous pressure on Greece
precisely because of the credibility of its threat to withhold further credit and the extreme
economic dislocation this would bring about; the Greek technocrats with close ties to the
European fnancial establishment did not just “colonize” the state apparatus in isolation,
but found their hand strengthened as the Greek crisis deepened and the state's dependence
on foreign credit became more acute; the capacity of the IIF to exert direct pressure was a
product of the highly concentrated ownership structure of the Greek debt and the struc-
tural interlinking of creditor interests, which eased the formation of a coherent creditors'
cartel; and the Greek banks did not just exert infuence by fnancing the election campaigns
of the two establishment parties but by fnancing the very reproduction of the Greek state
apparatus as such. In this sense, we should follow Culpepper and Reinke (2014) in emphasi-
zing that the key feature that makes structural power structural is not the way in which it is
exercised (through indirect and automatic rather than direct and intentional means) but the
source of the power as such (in this case the capacity of private and ofcial lenders to with-
hold credit from a heavily indebted peripheral state that acutely depended on it). Structural
power, in this sense, can be exercised with deliberate and strategic intent on the part of its
bearer; it need not be limited to the more impersonal, indirect and automatic channels that
past work on structural power tended to emphasize.
Another possible explanation would be the constructivist one, which would empha-
size the role of norms, ideas, narratives and the like. Again, the objective of this chapter has
not been to disprove the importance of such factors. Quite the contrary: it can be argued
that a “creditor morality” fercely opposed to burden sharing ruled supreme throughout the
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crisis, while the role of ideas has been emphasized as an important intersubjective adhesive
maintaining the internal coherence of the international alliance between Greek elites and
European creditors. If these factors did not receive a more extensive treatment it is simply
because the aim of the chapter (and of the thesis more generally) has not been to investigate
how creditors understand or formulate their interests but how they enforce their prevalent
ideas of crisis management and their dominant norms of debt repayment. Here it is argued
that the economic consequences of a “sudden stop” in credit provision create a hard barrier
to default that even the most well-formulated heterodox ideas would fnd impossible to
penetrate. Again, as in the previous two cases, ideas need to be taken seriously – but always
in relation to underlying conficts and power dynamics.
In this sense, the experience of the frst Syriza-led government has once again been
instructive. In the summer of 2015, Tsipras' belief that his fellow Eurozone leaders could
simply be won over by force of argument sufered a bruising defeat at the hands of an un-
forgiving power balance that systematically favored and institutionally entrenched creditor-
friendly norms and ideas. Indeed, the dominance of neoliberal ideas at the highest echelons
of the Eurozone and the extreme asymmetry in the power balance between Greece and its
creditors was such that the alternative norms and ideas proposed by the Syriza government
could simply be laughed of, scorned and ignored – letting the refusal of credit do the hard
work of forcing the Greeks back into line while resorting to the depoliticized language of
“rules” and “necessity” to paper over the creditors' own lack of ideas when it came to long-
term crisis resolution. In Europe as much as elsewhere, the present balance of forces simply







This thesis has sought to address a simple question with far-reaching implications:
why do heavily indebted peripheral states not default on their external debts more often?
The short answer is that the balance of power between these countries and their creditors
tends to be heavily skewed in favor of the latter. Through the threat of withholding much-
needed credit in the short term, thereby unleashing debilitating spillover costs in the debtor
country's economy, international lenders – private and ofcial – can compel a dependent
borrower to pursue creditor-friendly policies even if the government in question is strongly
opposed to such policies. Large international bailouts ensure that the debtor is kept solvent,
while the attendant policy conditionality enforces fscal discipline in order to free up public
revenue for debt servicing. As the crisis deepens and the state's dependence on credit grows,
domestic elites with creditor-friendly views and close ties to the fnancial establishment fnd
their hand strengthened at the expense of those who retain heterodox ideas and a degree of
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loyalty towards domestic citizens and the interests of working people. If the latter do come
to power, the state's dependence on credit greatly diminishes their room for maneuver and
ultimately compels them to repay. As Lipson (1981:629) noted early on, “this political struc-
ture for collective action ensures that no state will default unless it is insolvent or is willing
to accept a radical rupture with the capitalist world economy.”61
All of this tells us important things about the nature of contemporary capitalism
and the quality of democracy under conditions of fnancialization. Compared to both the
pre-war era and the immediate post-war decades, the policy autonomy of heavily indebted
peripheral states has been signifcantly circumscribed by the resurrection of global fnance.
Seen in this light, the international debt crisis of the 1980s was the signal event highlighting
the start of a new era in international lending; a phase that was marked by a generalized
trend away from unilateral default and a propensity towards negotiated settlements favoring
creditor interests. This evolution – which has only further intensifed in subsequent decades
– is in turn indicative of a shift not just in the international debtor-creditor relation, but in
the state-fnance relation more generally, with fnancial and political interests increasingly
closely intertwined as state administrators become ever more concerned with the systemic
prerogatives of fnance-led growth. In this sense, the process through which the state-fnance
nexus and the international fnancial institutions have managed to banish the specter of uni-
lateral default speaks to a much broader development in the global political economy and in
the nature of the capitalist state. After drawing a set of conclusions from the fndings pre-
sented in the case studies, the fnal section of the thesis will briefy discuss the implications
of these fndings for the study of political economy and of political science more generally.
61 “The debts are politically secure because they are backed by a network of multilateral banks, private
lenders, and ... advanced capitalist states. They are jointly capable of consolidating debt in emergencies
and severely punishing those who default lightly” (Lipson 1981:629).
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Conclusions from the Findings
The fndings presented in the case studies allow us to draw at least three conclusions
about the structural power of fnance in contemporary capitalism. First, at the heart of this
structural power lies the vast increase in market concentration and the oligopolistic tenden-
cies in international lending, which have produced a situation in which public debt instru-
ments are increasingly held by a handful of systemically important fnancial institutions, as
a result of which governments come to depend ever more on the willingness of these insti-
tutions to keep providing credit. This conclusion stands in contrast to arguments made by
proponents of the Efcient Markets Hypothesis and other scholars who hold that market
discipline resides in the “the democracy of the marketplace”; in other words, in the imper-
sonal, decentralized and “apolitical” process of thousands of individually rational investors
collectively pursuing their own self-interest and thereby inadvertently arriving at the opti-
mal outcome for all involved. If the investigation into the frst enforcement mechanism has
revealed anything, it is that market discipline is far from a neutral economic phenomenon.
What is generally referred to as “the markets” is in fact constituted by a small number of
very powerful fnancial institutions whose lending decisions have far-reaching redistributive
implications and whose preferences carry enormous weight in political decision-making.
These observations are corroborated by the fndings of at least two groundbreaking
studies that came out while this thesis was being written. First, Voth and Drelichman (2014)
have found that the Genoese bankers' syndicates that lent to King Philip II of Spain in the
sixteenth century benefted from a highly concentrated and interlocked lending structure to
form a closely-knit “lenders' coalition” that, by acting as one, was capable of compelling
even the world's most powerful sovereign to settle his debts every time he defaulted. These
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fndings indicate that the variable nature of market structure and debt concentration is not
just a decisive factor in the contemporary global political economy, but holds signifcant
explanatory power in the historical development of fnancial power more generally. Second,
Hager (2016) has recently mapped the emergence of a “new aristocracy of fnance” over the
past three decades, demonstrating statistically how growing concentration in the ownership
of the US public debt has gone hand-in-hand with an expansion of corporate power, which
has “reinforced patterns of social inequality and proceeded in tandem with a shift in govern-
ment policy, one that prioritizes the interests of government bondholders over the general
citizenry” (Hager 2015:1). Hager's fndings seem to confrm that the role of debt concentra-
tion in shaping the power of fnance is not just limited to the periphery but applies even in
the case of the most powerful capitalist state in the world today.
The second conclusion is that the power, proftability and privileges of fnance have
been crucially underwritten by creditor states, central banks and the international fnancial
institutions. Since market discipline, as we have seen, is a necessary but insufcient barrier
to default, there is an acute need – from the creditors' point of view – for an international
lender of last resort capable of keeping distressed debtors solvent and enforcing strict fscal
discipline to free up resources for debt servicing. The record emergency loans provided by
ofcial-sector creditors and the policy conditionality they impose in return for such lending
have been foundational to the ability of fnance to reproduce itself in the face of its propen-
sity to generate severe crises through speculative excess. Where in the past even the most
powerful fnancial institutions risked going bankrupt in a major debt crisis, today the very
survival and success of systemic (“too big to fail”) institutions is guaranteed by the public
sector. In sharp contrast to the 1930s, which famously lacked an international lender of last
resort, today this function has been enshrined deep within the global fnancial architecture.
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The third conclusion is that the dual processes of globalization and fnancialization
have greatly strengthened the hand of wealthy elites – or Streeck's Marktvolk – in fnancial
policymaking. The structural dependence of the debt state on credit creates an institutional
bias in favor of fscally orthodox policymakers and business-friendly technocrats with close
ties to the international fnancial establishment. Political leaders who retain less orthodox
views and a degree of loyalty towards domestic citizens, by contrast, are confronted with
higher borrowing costs, creating an incentive structure that systematically favors fscally
conservative candidates. Over time, this bias tends to be internalized into the state through
various means, including the pre-selection of orthodox economists in the fnancial bureau-
cracy, the introduction of constitutional checks on government spending, and the sidelining
of the legislative at the expense of the executive power. This dynamic in turn contributes to
a gradual breakdown of traditional processes of political representation, as fscal policy –
and hence highly contentious decisions over public spending and taxation – is increasingly
insulated from popular pressures and removed from the orbit of democratic accountability.
As a result, citizens fnd it more and more difcult to infuence their governments' spending
priorities through traditional democratic channels like elections and pressure politics.
Implications for Political Economy
The conclusions of this thesis have a number of important implications for both the
study of sovereign debt and the study of structural power. To begin with, the former will
have to become much more attentive to the tendency of mainstream economics scholarship
to depoliticize its subject matter. A political economy approach to sovereign debt would take
into account the redistributive consequences of default and repayment; the centrality of
315
conficts of interest and power struggles over the distribution of the burden of adjustment;
the asymmetric balance of forces and structural constraints on state autonomy that lie at
the heart of the global political economy; and the diferent forms that default can take in
practice: unilateral or negotiated. The latter, meanwhile (i.e., the study of structural power),
will have to devise innovative new ways to account for variation in outcomes between cases
and across issue areas. This thesis has focused specifcally on the enforcement mechanisms
through which the power of fnance is exercised in the management of sovereign debt crises
in the global periphery, identifying the precise conditions under which these mechanisms
are efective and the conditions and countervailing mechanisms under which they will tend
to break down. Moreover, by taking social struggles seriously, allowing for structural power
to be contested from below, it has aimed to restore collective agency to its appropriate place
in the study of political economy; even if this collective agency is increasingly being over-
shadowed by structural power in the important redistributive conficts of our times.
While the exact mechanisms and conditions shaping the structural power of business
will difer across sectors and issue areas62, we can nevertheless distill a number of important
themes from the key factors identifed in this research project; themes that may hold rele-
vance for scholarship in political economy and political science more generally. From the
discussion above we can extrapolate at least three such themes, which could be summarized
under the rubrics of (1) the growing concentration of wealth and power; (2) ongoing trans-
formations in the state-fnance relation; and (3) growing tensions between capitalism and
democracy. These fnal pages of the conclusion will briefy consider each of these areas.
62 The structural power of the oil or pharmaceutical industry does not operate through the withholding of
credit, for instance, while the structural power of fnance will operate through diferent mechanisms and
be afected by diferent conditions in the efort to fend of criminal litigation instead of a sovereign default.
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On the frst point, the fndings presented in this thesis could be considered part of
an emerging research agenda that places a strong emphasis on the concentration of wealth
and power. In the wake of the global fnancial crisis and the Occupy Wall Street movement,
talk of the “1 percent” has not just become a mainstay of contemporary political discourse,
but is now also considered a subject area worthy of scholarly inquiry. After Stiglitz (2011),
Graeber (2011) and the Occupy movement popularized the concept, the focus on the 1 per-
cent has evolved from a political catchphrase into an important analytical tool in scholar-
ship on wealth inequality (Piketty 2014; Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2013; Dor-
ling 2014), public policy (Gilens and Page 2014) and business power (Hager 2016; Di Muzio
2015; De Donder and Roemer 2013). If the fndings of these studies and this thesis are any-
thing to go by, there thus appears to be extensive fertile ground for further research into the
political, economic and social consequences of the growing concentration of capital. Taking
this metric as an important co-determinant of structural power could help future political
economy scholarship produce a better understanding of how this power varies in practice.
The second theme on the transformation of the state-fnance relation also has impor-
tant implications for political economy. While the globalization literature of the 1990s and
early 2000s tended to conceive of the relationship between state and market as one in which
the former was passively retreating at the expense of the latter, future research is likely to
pay much more attention to the ways in which the state is actually being actively restructu-
red in line with fnancial prerogatives. Far from standing in opposition to fnancial markets,
the state has been foundational to their spectacular expansion over the past four decades, as
well as their survival in the wake of the fnancial meltdown of 2008. This is in turn forcing
a rethinking of the concepts of “the political” and “the economic”, especially in terms of the
relationship between states and markets – or state and capital – as a complex set of mutually
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constituted interdependencies rather than a simple dichotomy (Mügge 2010). In the process,
long-standing work on the centrality of the state in making and governing markets (Polanyi
1944; Wade 1990; Bruszt 2002) is likely to gain renewed interest from political economists,
while a host of new opportunities will open up for innovative scholarship probing into the
intricacies of the state-fnance relationship in particular. In this light, the role of multilateral
lenders like the IMF and World Bank in underwriting global fnancial interests has already
been treated extensively in the development studies literature, but one area of inquiry that
will probably prove to be of growing interest to scholars in the next years is the increasing-
ly important role of central banks in propping up fnancial systems in the post-2008 period.
The Greek case in this thesis, for instance, has demonstrated how the ECB played a leading
role not just in enforcing debtor compliance and fscal discipline, but also in subsidizing
heavily over-leveraged banks and nurturing these private lenders back to life through its par-
ticipation in numerous international bailouts, negative real interest rates, quantitative easing
and a de facto socialization of their liabilities. Much more work is needed in this domain to
help scholars better understand the ways in which fnancial markets are afected by central
bank intervention and the ways in which central banks are afected by market pressures.
The third thematic concerns the deepening tensions between capitalism and demo-
cracy and the disintegration of traditional processes of political representation as a result of
the state's need to consolidate its enormous debt load. Greece may be an extreme example
of this development, but the tendency is more generalized and appears to afect countries in
the core and periphery alike. Here Streeck's analysis of the rise of the Marktvolk as a second
constituency alongside the Staatsvolk remains pertinent; even more important, however, is
his observation that in the wake of the global fnancial crisis, the Marktvolk has increasingly
become the only constituency that really counts, as the state – eager to consolidate its debt
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burden through the internalization of fscal discipline – has begun to actively shield policy-
making from popular pressures to please its creditors. For Streeck (2014), this dynamic is
now giving rise to a “consolidation state,” marked by “the immunization of policy against
pressure from below, so as to win back the confdence of 'the markets' in the system.” In
the course of this transition, “capitalism is emptied of democracy” (Streeck 2014:94; see also
Streeck 2015). The fndings presented in this thesis seem to corroborate this observation.
As the administration of the emerging consolidation state takes on an increasingly
depoliticized form, with technocratic governments and grand coalitions replacing electoral
party politics as the paradigmatic mode of governance in capitalist society, citizens lose the
capacity to afect policy outcomes and social realities through elections or petitions, causing
them to increasingly “tune out” from institutional politics altogether (Crouch 2004; Mair
2013). This development is gradually giving rise to a situation in which representatives who
do remain responsive to popular concerns are systematically punished by “the markets” for
their democratic inclinations and derided by technocratic experts and fnancial institutions
for unnecessarily politicizing economic decisions that are supposed to be left frmly outside
of the realm of politics. In this light, we could even hypothesize the existence of a distinct
democratic disadvantage at the heart of fnancial capitalism, confronting those who retain a
degree of responsiveness towards their voters with higher borrowing costs than those who
answer solely to their creditors (cf. Schultz and Weingast 2003). As Streeck (2014:87) notes,
“the mere possibility that a less market-friendly opposition might come to power may cost
the state dearly in confdence and therefore in money.” Over time, the repeated punishment
meted out to less “responsible” politicians will tend to disincentivize popular responsiveness
and institutionalize fscal discipline at the level of the state, with negative consequences for
the quality of democracy and the distribution of wealth and income.
319
Of course the notion of a distinct democratic disadvantage, or an inherent tension
between capitalism and democracy that is intensifed under conditions of fnancialization,
will have to be further tested and refned through careful empirical investigation. But if the
fndings of this thesis and the emerging literature on the political consequences of the global
fnancial crisis are anything to go by, it is a concept that future scholarship will likely have
to reckon with over the next years. Certainly the case for polyarchy will become a lot more
difcult to sustain as the oligarchic and anti-democratic tendencies in capitalism continue to
come to the fore. The substantively important question, then, is not just how scholars will
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